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A MESSAGE FROM THE
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
H. E. Kofi Annan
Once again, Kevin Cahill has brought together a remarkable
group of people to consider a topic that is of great importance
to us all.
Traditions are what distinguish each human society from all
the others. They are what each society brings to the great banquet of human diversity. Indeed, they are the essence of that diversity itself, which is what makes the human species such a rich
and splendid one to belong to.
The tragedy of human history is that so often people have allowed diversity to drive them apart instead of bringing them together, have interpreted their traditions exclusively, and taken
refuge within them. Too often, in the name of tradition, anathemas have been pronounced and wars have been fought.
Values are what enable us to overcome those divisions—to approach one another with confidence and curiosity rather than
fear and suspicion, to learn from each other, to respect each other’s traditions, to cherish our diversity.
In short, if traditions can and should be kept distinct, values
need to be shared. And first among our shared human values
must be the humanitarian instinct, the instinct that drives us to
help our fellow human beings in their hour of need, no matter
how different from us they may be.
Kevin Cahill has devoted his life to humanitarian action, and
to bringing people together so that they can learn from each
other. It is entirely typical of him to have conceived and brought
together this symposium and book.

INTRODUCTION
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.
Our most profound thoughts evolve, often very slowly, and coalesce, sometimes, into workable concepts only after prolonged
gestation. Someone asked me at the conference that led to this
book, ‘‘How long did it take you to plan and organize this symposium?’’ I thought for a moment and answered, ‘‘About forty
years.’’
In the early 1960s, I worked for many months as a physician
in the Southern Sudan. It was a time of great social unrest and
revolution in an area long isolated from the impact of modernity.
The missionaries, who provided the only health and educational
services available, were ejected shortly after my arrival. I found
myself the only doctor within hundreds of miles of roadless,
swampy land, the Nilotic Sudd, home of the Dinka, Nuer, and
Shilluk tribes.
Offering basic emergency medical services exposed me to customs and practices of which, to that time, I was utterly ignorant.
They were not based on our Western traditions and values and,
initially, seemed to me the relics of a primitive culture. Over
months, however, I came to respect the strength and beauty of
their ways and beliefs. I gradually learned to see long-horned cattle not merely as a symbol of wealth but as a measure of a man’s
pride; I saw polygamy and family love in a new light.
I worked with an indigenous ‘‘healer’’ as my therapeutic partner. Together we saved some lives and helped alleviate much suffering, but part of the ‘‘therapy’’ offered was chicken bones and
burnt cow dung. I quickly and humbly came to understand that
the local population, my patients, believed more in those modalities than in the incomprehensible antibiotic pills I provided.
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Shortly thereafter I began a series of studies in Somalia and
spent part of every year for the next thirty-three years traveling
with nomads across the Horn of Africa. The Somalis had no written language at that time and I spent many nights, around campfires under brilliant stars and the Southern Cross, listening to
their songs and gabays, the poetry of a proud people, in which
they recorded, for future generations, how they survived epidemics and famines. They told, in rhyme, of drought and warfare,
and also, despite the incredibly harsh landscape, of love and
flowers, of the joy of rain and of camels giving birth. This immersion in Somali culture utterly changed my perceptions of human
dignity and strength. I learned how traditions and values allowed
clans to handle severe deprivations without complaint. The Somalis faced death with courage, with loyalty, and with protection
and care for their most vulnerable. Even in the midst of conflict,
or in the face of starvation, I was always safe, for I was their guest.
I was in Somalia when the nation was born, and I was there
when it collapsed in the early 1990s. The soul of the people had
been destroyed by corruption, oppression, the introduction of
alien, selfish ways, and the gradual abandonment of their own
ancient ethos. Sadly, but inexorably, traditional customs that had
bound the people together were shattered. There was no longer
respect for the aged, for women, for religious leaders. The gun
ruled the countryside. The fault lines got ever wider and Somali
society, and the new nation, came crashing down.
Even earlier, in the late 1950s, I had worked in Calcutta and
there I learned that cows could be sacred and insects so precious
that one wore face masks to prevent accidentally inhaling them.
I spent my mornings at the School of Tropical Medicine; and for
the rest of the hot, sweaty day, I worked with Mother Theresa and
her dying brood. She did not question the beliefs of those she
cared for—they were human beings and that was enough. That
was my introductory lesson in how the traditions and values of a
people can influence the very process of death. Vast numbers of
poor people were dying and palliative care, any care, seemed to
be a much appreciated gift from God. Providing medical care
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became a far more complex undertaking when one tried to serve
a living population and a vibrant community in foreign lands.
Here one learned to tread softly, to offer change with great
care. One quickly found that existing customs and practices in
any community, even in the chaos of a refugee camp, must not
be altered without consultation and deliberation. The ways of a
people, sometimes quite incomprehensible to one trained in a
Western scientific system, are ultimately that group’s own precious heritage and protection. Attempts to introduce new methods and replace time worn approaches can be devastating to a
society, especially in times of crises, when the community is very
vulnerable and dependent on strangers for the essentials for life.
These personal tales are the genesis of this book. For decades
I have been privileged to work in remote areas among people far
removed from the effects—good and bad—of modernity. The
more I traveled, and read, and participated in the daily lives of
isolated tribes, the more convinced I was that the richness of humanity lay in its incredible diversity. I do not share the belief that
there is only one right way—whether that is how to rule, or how
to worship, or court a mate, or establish a family, or express love,
or even how to die. Any diminution in that diversity diminishes
all of us. Attempts to homogenize the world, to impose uniform
standards of behavior, to stifle differences of opinion and style,
to impose restrictions on customs and practices because they are
different from our own are regressive, usually destructive, acts.
The biologic world thrives in its complexity, and artistic creativity
flourishes best when there are multiple varying stimuli.
It was in this search for, and growing admiration of, other cultures that I saw that, everywhere, people prefer to help more
than harm their fellow man. What are the universal bases of these
different traditions and value systems, and how do they affect
humanitarian action? What are the foundations on which we
build caring societies? What are the acts we do—as individuals or
as states—that can crack those foundations? And can anything be
then done to put our humpty-dumpty world together again? This
book reflects that triad of questions.
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At the beginning of the book are chapters from representatives
of some of the great religions of the world. I asked these contributors to reflect on those fundamental texts in their teachings that
promote humanitarian action. I chose Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam as examples of the great faiths, fully recognizing that space
did not allow detailed consideration of Hinduism, Buddhism,
and other religions. In international medicine, one quickly
learns that there is no single approach to therapy, that peoples’
backgrounds, their cultural heritage as well as their aspirations,
may be very different. Where one culture sees an action that demands an immediate response, another might see alternatives as
mere illusions that too will pass away. One group may find in
their religion the basis for action while another finds that spiritual detachment is the best way to survive. Dialogue and a search
for the universal common bases of humanity between people will,
therefore, demand an understanding and acceptance of these
differences. I also include a chapter on animist beliefs and practices of the Dinka of the Southern Sudan, and place that among
the religious chapters since it demonstrates how similar are the
world’s different values systems.
In the second part, I have asked distinguished colleagues from
four different disciplines to reflect on the unique codes of conduct, the often elaborate but unwritten rules and regulations that
guide their professional lives. One could have selected many
other occupations but I trust that the military, medicine, media,
and academia offer adequate examples of some of the essential
influences on our approach to humanitarian action.
Finally, in the Foundations section, I include a chapter emphasizing the positive aspects of migration. Throughout the centuries, mass movements of people have enriched societies, and the
very diversity of cultures, the cross-fertilization of traditions and
values, became the pride of modern nations. The United States
of America, at one time, had an open door policy, ‘‘give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.’’ That unbridled welcome, for reasons to be discussed later, no longer exists. Around
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the world, but especially in Europe, the open approach is being
questioned, and the benefits of immigration, the essential ferment for growth, is now threatened by ignorance and fear.
Life is never secure, and the strongest foundations, so carefully
constructed, can crack under the pressure of fear or folly or evil.
Fault lines in quake-prone areas cover moving earth plates that
can collide and cause great damage. Individual—or governmental—acts that are in opposition to the foundations of a society
can also cause devastation and destruction. This process can
begin subtly. For example, it is almost easy to justify harsh interrogation methods of a suspected terrorist but such an approach
can lead, inexorably, to accepting dehumanizing torture as a legitimate tool of government. The world is now engaged in a ‘‘war
on terrorism,’’ a war without borders and, possibly, without end.
Here the fault lines are potentially catastrophic. In this part are
two chapters on terrorism, one from a university-based center
and one from terror-filled conflict zones of the world. Accepting
gender exploitation, and trafficking in vulnerable women and
children, may seem an obvious evil but it is, shamefully, accepted
today as a way of life in too many parts of the world.
There are other fault lines that presage disaster to our global
community. Especially in times of crises one can be tempted to
abandon, for short-term advantage, those precious civil liberties
for—and on—which a nation was founded. Sometimes even easier, one can forsake international conventions that bind civilized
states together, even in times of war.
The overwhelming power of the Western media can be, as discussed in the Foundations section of this book, a positive force if
it remains a free press. But there is another aspect to be considered in our complex world of so many different cultures. Can
reporters, even fair and unbiased reporters, adequately understand the nuances of alien cultures and, if not, do their news
articles and analyses merely reinforce existing prejudices? Migration, as noted in the Foundations section, has been an essential
element in the growth of nations, but the sheer scope of human
movement across sovereign borders as the twentieth century
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came to an end has pushed immigration policy in many lands to
the boiling point.
There are other fault lines that are considered, even implicitly,
in many of the chapters of this book on traditions, values, and
humanitarian action. For example, even humanitarian assistance
itself can be a tragic contribution to the destruction of a society.
Good intentions and apparently generous deeds are simply not
enough to avoid causing serious problems, ones that can perpetuate evil. Following the Rwanda genocide, humanitarian assistance helped killers survive in secure refugee camps where they
re-established their murderous regimes. There are many dangers
in the chaos that follows armed conflicts and one must be very
aware of the almost predictable pitfalls that accompany external
aid.
Supplying food to refugees may, to the innocent, seem like an
unmitigated good action. But such donations can alter traditional farming practices, increase dependency, and radically
change the fundamental relationship between children and their
parents, because the children can now obtain sustenance from a
stranger and need no longer rely on, or respect, their parents. If
donated food becomes the vehicle for perpetuating deeply
flawed systems of order, even inflaming rather than reducing tensions, then aid itself will become a fault line breaking the foundations of long-established societies. The more one is involved with
international humanitarian assistance, the more one is aware
how easily aid can be manipulated in ways that donors never considered. Being aware, however, must not become an excuse for
inaction. Rather, the professional in humanitarian assistance
must humbly but decisively plan, and constantly modify, programs to avoid fault lines and, hopefully, reinforce foundations.
Trying to correct the fault lines that we consider in this text—
and the many others that challenge our civilization—is the job of
governments, international bodies such as the United Nations,
nongovernmental organizations, and even individuals. National
borders are no longer sacrosanct, and sovereignty is now considered an inadequate protection in the face of widespread abuse
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of human rights and life. A decade ago, the former Yugoslavia
disintegrated into civil war, the Soviet Union collapsed, Somalia
imploded, and the world became aware of genocide in Rwanda.
Out of all this, new concepts in statecraft emerged. Humanitarian need was used as a justification for armed interventions in
many parts of the world.
Fundamental questions began to be asked regarding the primacy of inalienable individuals’ rights over the rights of a state
when the state failed to offer basic protections to their own citizenry. Is there a basic human right to humanitarian assistance in
times of need? Some such rights for civilians have been codified
into law in settings of armed conflict, whether internationally declared wars or in internal civil strife, but they unfortunately cover
only essential provisions at this time.
International law defines both the rights of civilians in armed
conflicts and the corresponding duty of combatants to alleviate
suffering. But in today’s complex emergencies, situations and
combatants are rarely clear or easily amenable to the power of
law. Nevertheless there is a growing movement to consider serious breaches or obstacles to providing humanitarian assistance
to afflicted civilians as war crimes. In reality, most UN resolutions
urging humanitarian assistance in conflicts are mere rhetoric,
but the Security Council can employ a Chapter VII resolution
that is binding on all members of the United Nations. Chapter
VII resolutions can lead to the imposition of sanctions or even be
the basis for ‘‘humanitarian interventions.’’
As these changes in law and diplomacy developed in the early
1990s, a group of diplomats and physicians established the Center for International Health and Cooperation. The Center was
founded to explore basic problems in humanitarian action and
to propose practical solutions. It has done so in education by developing a standard training program acceptable to academia
while meeting the needs of field workers; it has devised and demonstrated practical prosthetic programs for land mine victims; it
has imaginatively and effectively linked the disciplines of public
health and diplomacy.
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Now, through its sister Institute of International Humanitarian
Affairs at Fordham University, we probe deeper, attempting to
elucidate those basic forces that both help and destroy mankind’s noblest urges. This book will, hopefully, stimulate the
reader to appreciate the diverse strands that bind us together as
a human family; to recognize those brutal acts that diminish the
dignity of all mankind and endanger world stability and civilized
intercourse; and, finally, in helping in the search for ways out of
the current morass, it might encourage the reader to join the
many thoughtful and good men and women, such as those who
contributed to this volume, in the endless quest for peace, justice, and health around the world.

FOUNDATIONS

Part 1
The Foundations section begins, appropriately, with a consideration of the teachings of God on humanitarian action. These supernatural directions came, according to different faiths, by revelation
or divine inspiration and were delivered through various holy men
and prophets. The teachings have been refined, over the centuries,
by careful theological study and interpretation of the Bible, the
Koran, the Talmud, as well as other sacred scriptures in other formal
religions. In societies without written texts there often are equally
rich verbal references to the teachings of an almighty power encouraging peace and compassion for mankind.
In this part, four renowned scholars explain the origins of our most
important moral and ethical bases. Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., is a Jesuit theologian whose profound influence has been recognized within
his church by Papal elevation from priest to Cardinal reminiscent of the
similar respect, and influence, of John Cardinal Newman in the nineteenth century. Dr. Harlan Wechsler is a highly respected Professor of
Jewish Philosophy who also brings to his deliberations the insights of a
practicing rabbi responsible for the pastoral care of a large synagogue
community. Throughout his writings, Rabbi Wechsler finds textual
support for his argument that mankind is not meant to be alone but,
rather, to share in relationships with all their promises as well as their
risks. His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal is the senior member
of the Hashemite family and, therefore, a direct descendant of the
Prophet Mohamed. He has, for many years, tried to foster dialogue between opposing and even hostile neighbors in the Middle East,
grounding his struggles for peace in relevant sura of the Koran that
promote respect and understanding. Finally, I include in this part a
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chapter on an animist culture by Ambassador Frances Deng, a remarkable diplomat-scholar who moved from a childhood herding cattle in
the almost unmapped Nilotic swamps to become Foreign Minister of
the Sudan, a senior member of the UN staff, and a revered teacher.

1

Christianity and Humanitarian
Action
Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J.

The Problem
We could easily be tempted to imagine that Christianity would
deter its followers from commitment to humanitarian action.
Christian revelation teaches that life in this world is but a preparation for the life to come, which is immeasurably more important. Riches and comforts in this life are dangers, if not obstacles,
to achieving the state of soul that brings eternal life. Poverty and
suffering, patiently accepted, can be means of salvation. Anyone
who believes all this would be content, one might think, to leave
the destitute in their wretchedness rather than seek to relieve
them.
But the fact is that the Christian Church since its beginnings
has been a dynamo of humanitarian activity. Countless saints
have given their possessions, their time, their talents, and their
very selves to serve the poor and the needy. Historians tell us that
the loving care that the Christian communities extended to the
outcast was a major factor in the conversion of the Roman Empire. According to the distinguished sociologist Rodney Stark:
Christianity served as a revitalization movement that arose in response to the misery, chaos, fear, and brutality of life in the urban
Greco-Roman world. . . . To cities filled with the homeless and
impoverished, Christianity offered an immediate basis for attachments. To cities filled with orphans and widows, Christianity provided a new and expanded sense of family. To cities torn by violent
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ethnic strife, Christianity offered a new basis for social solidarity
. . . And to cities faced with epidemics, fires, and earthquakes,
Christianity offered effective nursing services.1

Throughout the centuries, Christian movements and religious
orders have dedicated themselves to caring for the sick, feeding
the poor, ransoming captives, comforting prisoners, freeing
slaves, and educating the unlettered. The church is always on
hand in situations of disaster.

Christian Anthropology
How, then, do we explain the paradox that a faith that directs
its members to happiness in another world should be so heavily
engaged in ministering to the needy in this world? The question
can, I think, be answered on several levels.
Fundamental to any answer is the Christian vision of the
human person in society. Christians are convinced that human
beings stand at the very summit of God’s creative work. On the
sixth day, Genesis tells us, after creating the inanimate world, the
plants, and the animals, God said, ‘‘Let us make man in our own
image, after our likeness’’ (Gen. 1:26). The Psalmist asks: ‘‘What
is man that thou are mindful of him, or the son of man that thou
dost care for him? Yet thou hast made him little less than God,
and dost crown him with glory and honor; thou hast given him
dominion over all the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things
under his feet’’ (Ps. 8:5–6). The whole visible world is related to
man as its center and crown.
The dignity that belongs to human persons by virtue of creation is further enhanced by the work of redemption. The Son
of God, Christians believe, became man and gave his life on the
Cross in order to cancel out the debt of human sin and reconcile
the human race with God. We have been purchased at a great
price and called to a destiny far beyond all that we could merit.
The Second Vatican Council, in its Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World, teaches that human beings are
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the only creatures on earth that God has willed for themselves.2
Minerals, plants, and animals exist for the sake of man. The
human person, by contrast, has intrinsic worth and inviolable
dignity. Pope John Paul II, like many other contemporary Christians, agrees with Immanuel Kant that it is never permissible for
us to treat other human persons as mere means to be exploited
for our own pleasure or for their utility to serve our own ends.3
Although persons can and should help one another, they have to
be respected for what they are.
From the dignity of each person follows the concept of human
rights. Because we have a duty to respect the dignity of others,
they have a corresponding right to be treated with respect and
reverence. Philosophers have tried to specify different levels of
human rights. Christians would agree with the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America when it speaks of
the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as basic
and inalienable. Some less fundamental rights, such as gainful
employment, education, health care, leisure, and retirement
benefits, cannot always be implemented but they are, in any case,
desirable social goals.
During the Second World War, Pope Pius XII, looking forward
to a new world order, called for recognition of the rights that
flow from the dignity of the person. In his Christmas address of
1942, he proposed a list of personal rights, including those to
life, to religious freedom, to family life, to work, to choose a vocation, and to own private property while making use of it in a
socially responsible way.
Christians of various denominational affiliations enthusiastically cooperated in the writing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1948. In his encyclical Pacem in Terris of 1962, Pope
John XXIII spoke appreciatively of the Universal Declaration and
submitted his own list of human rights, in some ways more extensive than the charter’s. Pope John Paul II has been a tireless advocate of human rights, which he grounds in the very nature of the
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human person and in the sacred relationship of human beings
with God.
Our concept of the human person would be deficient unless
we were aware that persons are by their very nature oriented to
live in society. They cannot fulfill themselves except in giving
themselves to one another. As stated by Vatican II, the human
person ‘‘cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift
of himself.’’4 To be locked up in one’s private self-interest is to
condemn oneself to a stunted existence. Since the friend is, as
Aristotle said, another self, we enlarge ourselves through friendship with others.
Any well-ordered society aspires to be a network of human beings all working in concert for the authentic self-realization of
each through interaction with others. From this mutuality there
results what political philosophers call the common good—a
condition of society in which all the members benefit because of
their collaboration. If the common good were fully achieved on
a universal scale, a state of general peace and prosperity would
emerge, in which the good of the whole society redounded to
the advantage of the individual members and private associations. Recognizing that this result cannot be achieved without
mutual good will, Pope Paul VI called for the building of a civilization of love. In such a society, particular efforts will have to be
made to assure that the benefits are distributed to all the members. Individuals and groups that are marginalized or excluded
must receive special attention, as must those experiencing distress and deprivation due to calamities such as earthquakes and
wars.

Biblical Basis: Teaching of Jesus
The social vision that I have been proposing has its roots not only
in Greek philosophy but also, to an even larger extent, in biblical
revelation. Many centuries before Christ, the priests and prophets of Israel were insisting on the two great commandments of

AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J.

9

love of God and love of neighbor. Love, they insisted, must be
manifested in practical service. They pronounced woes on the
rich who oppressed the poor, on moneylenders who charged usurious interest rates, on merchants who falsified the scales, and on
judges who discriminated against orphans and widows. Reminding the Israelites that they were once strangers in the land of
Egypt, the Law required them to love strangers and foreigners
dwelling in their land as they loved one another (Lev. 19:34;
Deut. 10:19).
The humanitarian dimension of the mission of Jesus is expressed in his inaugural sermon at Nazareth, in which he referred to himself as fulfilling the words of Isaiah: ‘‘The Spirit of
the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to proclaim
release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, to set
at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable
year of the Lord’’ (Luke 4:18–19). While reaffirming the social
morality of the Old Testament, Jesus extended it in directions
that had already been intimated in the Mosaic Law and the
prophets. For our purposes, three themes may be singled out for
emphasis: universalism, mercy, and love of enemies.
Jesus gives unlimited extension to the command to love one’s
neighbor as oneself. In answer to the scribe’s question ‘‘Who is
my neighbor?’’ Jesus—himself a Jew—told the parable of the
Good Samaritan, who bound up the wounds of the injured wayfarer, while the priest and the Levite did nothing to help. In directing the scribe to ‘‘go and do likewise,’’ Jesus challenges all
his disciples to show kindness to those of different races, nationalities, and religious affiliations.
Jesus noted that Elijah and Elisha had worked miracles for the
widow in Sidon and Naaman the Syrian (Luke 4:25–28); he
praised the Ninevites who did penance in response to the preaching of Jonah (Matt. 12:41). Though his own mission was only to
the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. 15:24), Jesus by exception worked miracles in response to the ardent pleas of the
Roman centurion (Matt. 8:10) and the Canaanite woman (Matt.
15:28), and congratulated them on their faith. Encounters such
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as these pointed forward to the universality of the coming Kingdom (Matt. 8:11–12).
A second distinguishing feature of the teaching of Jesus is his
emphasis on mercy. ‘‘Blessed are the merciful,’’ he says (Matt.
5:7). He tells a warning tale about a rich man who feasted sumptuously in his lifetime but failed to respond to the pleas of the
starving beggar who wanted to be fed with the scraps that fell
from the rich man’s table (Luke 16:19–31). In another parable,
Jesus describes the fate of a steward who had been forgiven an
immense debt by his master and then refused to defer repayment
of a relatively small debt owed to him (Matt. 18:23–35). The lesson is always the same: that we must be generous and forgiving
toward others as we want God to be toward us.
The third feature to which I wish to call attention is that Jesus
calls for a beneficence that extends not only to friends but also
to enemies. It is not enough to love one’s neighbor and hate
one’s enemies, as some Pharisees were apparently teaching. We
must love our enemies and pray for those who persecute us, as
Jesus did in his own Passion (Matt. 5:44; cf. Luke 23:34). This love
of enemies involves doing good to them, as the Lukan version of
the Sermon on the Mount explicitly declares (Luke 6:27).
It might be thought that Jesus, in calling for love and mercy, is
thinking only of spiritual favors, such as prayer for the needy or
preaching the gospel to sinners. But Jesus gives primary emphasis
to concrete and tangible acts. In the great parable of the Last
Judgment, he mentions six types of action that qualify people as
righteous: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to welcome the stranger, to clothe the naked, to care for the sick, and
to visit the imprisoned.
All this teaching of Jesus on beneficence toward the stranger,
the undeserving, and the enemy is difficult to put in practice. We
instinctively prefer to help family members, friends, and persons
who are in a position to help us in return. We are naturally disinclined to reach out to aliens and enemies. In order to follow the
gospel in its fullness, we stand in need of conversion. Jesus, aware
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of this, proposes motives that could bring about a radical change
of heart.

Theological Motivation
If we had eyes to see the intrinsic worth of each human person,
that would, I suppose, be motivation enough. Some of us might
spontaneously achieve, with the help of the Holy Spirit, a truly
Christ-like love for people to whom we are not naturally attracted. But moral intuition and spiritual enlightenment usually
need to be reinforced by intelligible reasons. The Gospels themselves provide a number of theological motives.
To overcome our ethnocentric tendencies, Jesus points to the
example of God, who makes his sun shine and his rain fall upon
the just and unjust, upon friend and foe, upon Jew and Gentile
(cf. Matt. 5:45). Since God is perfect, and since we are called to
be perfect, we should seek to make God’s attitudes our own.
Then again, as I have mentioned, Jesus challenges his fellow Jews
by recalling the example of prophets such as Elijah and Elisha,
who worked miracles for Gentiles (Luke 4:23–27).
To induce us to reach out even to enemies, Jesus reminds us
that God shows love and mercy toward us, even when we sin and
are alienated from him. Since God gives us far more than we
deserve, we ought to be generous toward others who depend on
our mercy. If we are merciful toward others, we will be disposed
to receive God’s mercy, but if we are cold and pitiless, we forfeit
God’s mercy to us. In the Lord’s Prayer, Christians are bidden to
pray that God will forgive them as they forgive their debtors.
Still another motive is the way in which Jesus identifies himself
with the needy. In the famous parable of the Last Judgment, as
recounted in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, Jesus makes the
point that the merciful deeds done to the poor and marginalized
are in effect done to him. What is done to the least of his brethren, he counts as done to himself (Matt. 25:40, 45).
A further motive, closely connected with the preceding, is
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human accountability. We are not our own masters, but we have
a divine Master to whom we must one day render an account of
all that we have done in this life. When we die, we will be judged.
If we have obeyed the commandments of God, we will enter into
the joy of everlasting life, but if we have been disobedient and
have failed to obtain forgiveness, we will be cast into the outer
darkness to pay the full price for our misdeeds.
The final judgment, according to Jesus, is universal. It is not
only Christians, but also men and women of every race, nationality, and religion who will have to encounter the Son of Man as
their divine judge. All the nations of the earth will be gathered
before his throne (Matt. 25:32; cf. Rom 2:15–16).
Hope of reward and fear of punishment are not the highest
motives for doing good and avoiding evil. It is far better to act
out of pure love for God and for our fellow men and women. But
if our love is not yet strong enough, it is better to rely on somewhat selfish motives than to commit injustices. To do good for an
imperfect motive is better than not to do good at all.

Summary Answer
At this point I have sufficiently answered, I hope, the objection I
raised at the beginning of this chapter. The realization that this
life is but a preparation for eternity does not make us neglect
the importance of our deeds here and now. On the contrary, it
increases our sense of responsibility because we are conscious of
acting in the presence of God who will judge us according to
what we have done or failed to do in this life. We do not save
ourselves by being rich and comfortable, but by making use of
this world’s goods in order to do the will of God. The rich are
not condemned for being rich, but are admonished not to allow
the pursuit of wealth, honors, and comfort to distract them from
their duty to love and help others who are in need. The fact that
the poor can save their souls without becoming rich does not

AVERY CARDINAL DULLES, S.J.

13

excuse the rich and powerful for failing to help them in their
distress.
The Christian teaching on humanitarian action is not just theory. It takes practical effect in the way faithful Christians live. I
frequently hear of students, alumni, engineers, carpenters, social
workers, physicians, and dentists who take time to travel to poor
and even dangerous parts of the world where their services are
most desperately needed. Every year the Jesuit Volunteer Corps,
for example, sends young college graduates for a year or several
years of their lives to help the impoverished to help themselves.

Institutional Involvement
Thus far I have been speaking especially of humanitarian action
on the part of individual persons. This aspect is sufficient for
establishing the principles and the motives. But Christian experience through the centuries has shown the indispensability of organized efforts. In the complex world of our day, the major social
problems cannot be effectively met without collaboration on a
large scale. When there are disasters such as floods, earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, plagues, or terrorist acts such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, those who wish to help must
band together. Christians of various denominations gladly contribute to secular nonprofit organizations such as the Red Cross,
the United Way, and Bread for the World. The Second Vatican
Council urged lay Christians to reach out to every person in need
and to cooperate with all people of good will.5
The possibility of engagement in nondenominational charities
does not eliminate the attraction of charitable organizations that
are explicitly religious and bear a Christian or Catholic label.
Many of the faithful want to bring the full weight of Christian
motivation and the full guidance of Christian doctrine to bear
on their efforts. They feel that in this way, they can better serve
God, for whose sake they are making sacrifices.
In Christian antiquity, the monasteries were outstanding for
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offering care and hospitality toward the sick, travelers, and the
poor. In the second millennium, many religious orders established orphanages, homes for the sick and elderly, and apostolates to prisoners and captives. Early in the nineteenth century,
under the harsh conditions of the Industrial Revolution, a number of new social movements took their rise. In 1833, the French
layman Frederic Ozanam launched the Society of St. Vincent de
Paul. Shortly afterwards Adolf Kolping in Germany started the
associations for Catholic workers, which are still known in his
honor as the Kolping movement. Lay-founded organizations
such as these have spread to other parts of the world and have
endured. In the United States, saints such as Elizabeth Ann
Seton, Frances Xavier Cabrini, and Katherine Drexel have recently been canonized for their heroic works of love in the fields
of education, hospital care, orphanages, service toward immigrants, and charity toward neglected minorities such as African
Americans and American Indians. The Missionary Sisters of
Charity, founded by Mother Teresa to minister to the terminally
ill in Calcutta, have become active all over the globe.
I cannot speak with competence about non-Catholic Christian
organizations. I will, however, make my own the assertion of Vatican II that Protestant Christianity has ‘‘produced many organizations for the relief of spiritual and bodily distress, the education
of youth, the advancement of human conditions, and the promotion of peace throughout the world.’’6
History seems to testify that church-administered charities
have generally developed from below, through the initiative of
lay persons and members of religious congregations who have
been inspired to go out and help the needy. The National Conference of Catholic Charities, in the United States, was founded
at the suggestion of leaders in the St. Vincent de Paul Society,
who saw the desirability of a coordinating agency on the national
level. In a similar way, the Catholic Hospital Association was
founded to assist the many Catholic hospitals that had been
founded by private associations, including religious orders. Catholic Relief Services, by contrast, was established by the United
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States bishops in 1943 to continue the overseas relief work that
had been initiated on the eve of World War II for the sake of
resettling refugees and supplying food, clothing, and human services to ravaged areas. Since that time Catholic Relief Services
has continued to take up collections and assist victims of disasters
in all parts of the world.
On November 20, 2002, the day of the symposium that was the
basis for this book, The New York Times carried a four-column story
about the labors of half a dozen orders of Catholic religious sisters who have sent members of their communities to the Mississippi Delta to help out in destitute towns. They do not evangelize,
but they serve as teachers, nurses, doctors, counselors, and community organizers among the poor and almost entirely black and
Protestant population. The story concentrates on the town of
Jonestown, Mississippi, where the Sisters of the Holy Name are
credited with bringing hope to people on the verge of desperation.7

Dual Finality
Institutions that are specifically Catholic have a dual finality. On
the one hand, they seek to further the purposes of the church,
which are necessarily related to supernatural salvation. Privately
founded Catholic schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions operating under the aegis of the church make significant contributions to the work of the church in preparing for the full
realization of God’s Kingdom. Christ came announcing the arrival of the Kingdom of God in his own person. In his healings,
his exorcisms, his feeding miracles, and his raising of the dead,
he made signs indicating the inbreaking of that kingdom. The
church is called to follow in this healing and serving ministry,
making herself a sign and sacrament of the coming kingdom,
and thereby realizing her inmost essence. Thanks to her manifest
fruitfulness in good works, the church becomes, so to speak,
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transparent. People looking upon her and her members become
aware of the dynamic presence of God’s Kingdom within her.
On the other hand, church-sponsored activities are intended
to achieve the particular social goals correlated with their specific
nature as institutions of education, health care, or welfare, as the
case may be. Schools exist to produce educated students; hospitals and medical organizations, to produce healthy people; social
service institutions, to promote human well-being. Those who
staff such institutions must have the requisite training and aptitudes in pedagogy, therapy, social service, or whatever their field
may be.
Seeing themselves not only as instruments of the church but
also as part of the community’s educational, health, and social
service resources, these institutions have one foot planted in the
Catholic Church and the other in our pluralistic society. In a
speech of the dual identity of such institutions, Cardinal Bernardin stated:
The clients they serve, the contributors they approach, the staff
and governing bodies they rely on include both Catholics and,
increasingly, those who are not Catholic. They depend on federal,
state, and local governments for such things as charters of incorporation, regulatory statutes, licensing, tax exemption status, and
funding, They are also held accountable by government and the
public, not only by the church.8

Standing as they do at the intersection between the church
and secular society, these institutions cherish their Catholic identity as giving an added dimension to their work. Their personnel
are likely to be motivated by religious convictions, and thereby
inspired to work more eagerly, more altruistically, and more fully
in accord with God’s design. But, generally speaking, these organizations do not engage in direct evangelization, since this would
interfere with their specific purposes, as already described. They
would seem to meet the specifications laid down for government
programs of public support for faith-based charitable initiatives.
John Paul II, in an address to the Pontifical Council ‘‘Cor
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Unum’’ on April 18, 1997, confirmed this point. He stated that,
‘‘Actions of aid, relief, and assistance should be conducted in a
spirit of service and free giving for the benefit of all persons without the ulterior motive of eventual tutelage or proselytism.’’9 In
an address to Catholic Charities U.S.A. in San Antonio a decade
earlier, the Pope had declared that such organizations exist essentially to spread Christian love. He encouraged his hearers by
his concluding words:
For your long and persevering service—creative and courageous,
and blind to distinctions of race and religion—you will certainly
hear Jesus’s words of gratitude: ‘‘You did it for me’’ (Matt. 25:40).
Gather, transform, and serve! When done in the name of Jesus
Christ, this is the spirit of Catholic Charities and of all who work
in this cause, because it is the faithful following of the one who did
‘‘not come to be served but to serve’’ (Mark 10:45). By working for
a society that fosters the dignity of every human person, not only
are you serving the poor, but you are renewing the founding vision
of this nation under God! And may God reward you abundantly!10

While keenly interested in the charitable organizations that operate under her auspices, the Catholic Church keeps herself formally distinct from them. As stated in Vatican II’s Constitution
on the Church in the Modern World, the church must always
keep in view her strictly religious, supernatural goal, which is to
lead men and women to eternal salvation.11 But to be faithful to
her Lord, who attached salvation to loving service, she encourages her members to practice works of charity, both individually
and in groups. She directs charitable organizations that claim to
be Catholic, and oversees them so that they do, in fact, operate
according to authentic Catholic principles. These organizations,
if they are truly Catholic, willingly accept the teaching and direction of the Church.
Ecumenical Implications
The church’s humanitarian initiatives have ecumenical and interreligious dimensions, which are especially pertinent to the
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goals of the present book. At the dawn of the ecumenical movement in the early twentieth century, leaders in the Life and Work
Movement coined the slogan, ‘‘Service unites, doctrine divides.’’
I have never liked that slogan, perhaps because it overlooks the
unitive capacity of doctrine and the inseparability between doctrine and authentically Christian conduct. Yet, without minimizing the importance of doctrine, we may acknowledge that
humanitarian action is, and could increasingly become, a unitive
force among Christians and indeed among all human beings.
Catholic charitable activity is one of the areas mentioned by
the Second Vatican Council as having great potential for ecumenical rapprochement with other churches. The words of the
Decree on Ecumenism deserve to be repeated:
Since in our times cooperation in social matters is very widely
practiced, all men without exception are summoned to united effort. Those who believe in God have a stronger summons, since
they have been sealed with the name of Christ. Cooperation
among all Christians vividly expresses the bond that already unites
them, and it sets in clearer relief the features of Christ the Servant.
Such cooperation, already begun in many countries, should be
ever increasingly developed, particularly in regions where a social
and technical evolution is taking place. . . . Christians should also
work together in the use of every possible means to relieve the
afflictions of our times, such as famine and natural disasters, illiteracy and poverty, lack of housing, and the unequal distribution
of wealth.12

Since its birth in the early decades of the twentieth century,
the ecumenical movement has had two principal expressions:
Faith and Order, concerned with matters of doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, and Life and Work, concerned with the promotion
of peace and justice. These two expressions continue to supplement and stimulate each other. In times of social crisis, practical
cooperation for humanitarian goals becomes especially important. In recent years, Catholics and Protestants have worked together in North Ireland to overcome the deep-seated hostilities
and dispose people to accept peaceful solutions. In Catholic-
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Orthodox relations, dialogues about doctrine and polity have
predominated, but not to the exclusion of social teaching. It is
significant that Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Bartholomew I of
Constantinople, at a difficult juncture in the Catholic-Orthodox
theological dialogue, saw fit to issue, on June 10, 2002, a major
joint pronouncement on the need for a code of environmental
ethics.13

Interreligious Dimensions
The experience of the fifty years since the Council not only confirms the validity of its teaching on ecumenical humanitarian initiatives, but suggests the growing importance of involving the
various religions. Interreligious cooperation has been promoted
by organizations such as the World Conference on Religion and
Peace, which held its first world assembly in Kyoto in 1970. From
the Catholic side, organizations such as the Community of San
Egidio in Rome and the Focolare Movement, which has its headquarters in Rocca di Papa near Rome, have promoted fruitful
collaboration among different religions for objectives such as
peace and social development.
Practical cooperation to meet moral and social challenges
should be possible among the great religions. Cardinal Francis
Arinze has memorably written: ‘‘After all, there is no separate
Catholic drought, or Jewish epidemic, or Muslim urbanization,
or Buddhist inflation, or Sikh poverty, or Hindu embezzlement
of public funds.’’14
All too often in the past, and even now in some places, religions have proved to be divisive. The history of humankind is
plagued by chronicles of religious wars. The very memory of such
conflicts provokes present antagonisms, thus feeding the seemingly endless cycle of violence. This record should make us
ashamed. For the good name of religion and for the very survival
of civilization, it is urgent that religious faith becomes a force for
peace and universal friendship. As Pope John Paul II said in As-
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tana, the capital city of Kazakstan, shortly after the events of September 11, 2001:
From this city, from Kazakstan, a country that is an example of
harmony between men and women of different origins and beliefs, I wish to make an earnest call to everyone, Christians and
followers of other religions, to work together to build a world without violence, a world that loves life, and grows in justice and solidarity. We must not let what has happened lead to a deepening of
divisions. Religion must never be used as a reason for conflict.15

I would hope that all of us might be able to agree with these
lofty principles. Each of the major religions, I believe, embodies
valuable elements for a program of universal reconciliation.
Even without benefit of revelation, normal people sense that
they ought to love and do good to one another. They spontaneously judge that there is something inviolable about the human
person—a mystery of subjectivity that cannot be reduced to any
definition or objective concept. I have tried to show that Christian doctrine reinforces this spontaneous sense, giving added
motives for serving the universal good and helping persons in
situations of need and distress. From my own perspective as a
Catholic I am convinced that the Christian doctrines of creation,
incarnation, grace, and eternal life clarify the dignity of the
human person and provide singularly powerful reasons for humanitarian action. I believe, in fact, that the world will achieve
peace and justice to the extent that it follows the teaching and
example of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace and the King of Justice, and enjoys the assistance of his Spirit.
Subsequent chapters will offer the views of representatives of
other faiths and beliefs. It will be exciting to learn whether they,
from their several points of view, come to practical conclusions
similar to my own, as I suspect they will. If this proves to be the
case, humanitarian action could be recognized as a particularly
stable platform on which to erect programs, dialogue, and cooperation among the major faith traditions.

2

For the Sake of My Kin and
Friends: Traditions, Values, and
Humanitarian Action in Judaism
Rabbi Harlan J. Wechsler
For the sake of my kin and friends,
Please, I pray for your peace.
Psalms 122:8

Judaism is an old religion, and its traditions and values construct
a framework of life and a form of living that encourages people
to help one another. I shall look at the humanitarian perspective
of Judaism based on three of the theological ideas that are part
of the bedrock of the faith.
First, I shall examine the nature of creation in classical Jewish
theology. What is Judaism’s view of human nature? What is its
view of human destiny and man’s existential reality? And how do
we learn about man from what we learn in Scripture about his
Creator?
Second, classical Judaism is a religion that deals with God’s
will, or, as it is referred to in religious parlance, revelation. Here,
I will suggest some ways that revelation can serve the purpose of
bringing the human community together rather than splitting it
apart. As well, I would like to look at a few examples of Jewish law
to see what they say about the social relations between human
beings.
The third category derived from classical Jewish thought is redemption. Judaism is the religion of the exodus from Egypt and is
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also a faith that hopes in a future redemption. Redemption
thrusts the nature of man (creation) and the will of God (revelation) onto the stage of history, and since human beings operate
on that stage we will need to see how Judaism views history and
how history can ennoble the hopes we invest in humanity.

Creation
In contrast to the creation stories that were widely taught in the
ancient world, the Biblical story of creation tells us nothing about
God before He begins to create. And, in contrast also to the view
of Aristotle, who describes the activity of God as one of self-contemplation, the Biblical story of creation tells us of a God who
decides to reach beyond Himself.
Imagine this: If there is a perfect being, and that perfect being
is God, then Aristotle offers the compelling suggestion that such
a perfect being would wish to spend His time in the contemplation of perfection. Since there is no perfection like divine perfection, then God, in Aristotelian terms, contemplates Himself.
Not Contemplation but Self-Giving
In contrast, the first thing we learn about the God of the Bible is
that He takes an extraordinary step outside of Himself! 1 Abraham
Joshua Heschel, the twentieth century Jewish philosopher, calls
this the Divine Pathos.2 He creates a world. The very act of creation, even before we examine its nature, is an act of going beyond the self. And it is certainly an act that shows a God who is
willing to take an enormous risk: the risk of creating a world that
is imperfect, the risk that there will be a world that is profoundly
separate from divinity and, alas, the risk that the world will be a
place for sin.3
The metaphor of creation is the metaphor of the artisan. In
contrast to other religions where creation comes into being by
virtue of the god giving birth to the new world, the Bible pictures
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God not as a begetter but as an artisan. In paganism, for example, the begetter and the begat are, as in any birth situation, remarkably alike. There is a sameness of their substance. But in
Judaism, God is utterly different from the world. We only know
that God’s creativity and something of his spirit is manifest in the
world—just as we know that every artisan manifests his creativity
and his substance in the creation he makes.4
Created in the Image of God
The Bible says, nonetheless, that ‘‘God created man in His
image.’’5 To Judaism, that means that there is something about
man that connects him to God. Various Jewish thinkers throughout the ages have speculated on what that something is. Maimonides, for example, understood it to be man’s intellectual
faculties.6 The tenth century Babylonian thinker, Rabbi Saadiah
Gaon, understood the image to mean rulership. Just as God rules
the world, so is man given dominion over all that is.7
Going beyond Saadiah and Maimonides, Heschel suggests that
the image of God testifies to the essential dignity and nobility of
man. ‘‘The basic dignity of man is not made up of his achievements, virtues, or special talents. It is inherent in his very being.’’8
Whether we attribute that dignity to intellectual capacities, as did
Maimonides, or to his nobility as controller and shaper of the
world, we are supremely conscious of the unique nature of the
human creation.
We have seen, so far, that the act of creation is an act of divine
reaching out, an act of love and a great risk. The human creature
is in the image of God as a statement of the extraordinary value
of human life.
Nobility and Humility
The Bible portrays the creation of man at the end of a whole
series of created things, progressing from the first day to the
sixth. Implicit in this description is a hint of progress. Beginning
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with the inanimate objects and moving from there to the plant
world, the simple animals, and the more complicated beasts, the
Bible constructs a description where the end of it all is a human
being, the pinnacle of the process.
But there is another way to read the story. As the Talmud
points out, human beings are created on the sixth day in order
to guard against arrogance. For, ‘‘if a man’s mind becomes
proud, let him be reminded that the gnats preceded him in the
order of creation.’’9 The story of creation both emphasizes
human nobility and grandeur and, at the same time, the finite,
broken, and lowly nature of the creatures—for even the gnat
came first.
Moreover, chapter two of Genesis describes the human being
as created from the dust of the earth. Of course, God blows into
him the breath of life, and that emphasizes the paradoxical dynamic of human creation: on the one hand, the spirit of God is
in him. On the other hand, he is of the dirt of the earth.10 When
God decides to create man, the text says, He said: ‘‘Let us make
man in our image.’’ To whom did God address His statement:
‘‘Let us’’? The medieval commentator Nahmanides says that He
was speaking to the only other parts of creation that were there,
namely: nature. For the human being is a combination of the
Godly and the natural, both mixed together.11
Not Alone but in Community
But there is one more piece to this existential reality: it is the
pain of loneliness, which is apparent as soon as the creation is
completed. Adam is alone.
Now it is possible for a person to be alone and to be happy.
But the Bible tells us that the natural state of human existence is
unhappy in its aloneness: ‘‘It is not good for a human being to
be alone.’’12 And so Adam looks to the animals of the garden as
the way in which he will, perhaps, overcome his aloneness. Adam
gives them names, and even though he does that, even though,
as a superior creature he is able to classify them as he likes, it
does not help him to be less alone.
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Only another divine creation is able to overcome Adam’s
aloneness. God makes another creature who is like Adam in
some ways—they share the same bone—and the other human
being is absolutely different from Adam in other ways. As the
Bible says, God puts Adam to sleep and then fashions the second
creation. Therefore, the second one is filled with God’s mystery,
filled with all the enigmas of being a separate creature, and yet
Adam says that this is finally good: Bone of my bones and flesh
of my flesh. And he is satisfied.13
The story of God and the story of man, as we learn about them
in the Bible, thus parallel one another. Each is unhappy to be
alone. Each enters into a relation filled with promises and risks.

Social Ethics
‘‘Give me friendship or give me death,’’ the Talmud says.14
Human existence finds its meaning in a world with others.15
The Talmud reminds us that when God created the world, He
created one human being. Why? ‘‘For the sake of [the different]
families, that they might not quarrel with each other.’’16 Similarly, so that no one can say, My father is greater than your
father.17 There is a commonality to all human beings. We are all
related. None of us has more distinguished forbears than the
other. For, though we may have gone our separate ways a long
time ago, we all go back to the same root. Rabbi Meir used to add
his own angle to this by pointing out that in the rabbinic tradition, Adam was formed from dirt gathered together from various
places throughout the world. Therefore, no place can claim it
has richer soil and produces a better human being. Rather, there
is a unity to all of humanity.18 And, as well, man was created as a
single creature in order to show that each human being is
unique. For ‘‘if a man strikes many coins from one mold, they
resemble one another, but the supreme King of Kings, the Holy
One Blessed be He, fashioned every man in the same stamp of
the first man, and yet not one of them resembles his fellow.’’19
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Human Freedom
The human being, bearing upon himself the divine likeness, subject to nature and living in community with others, is conscious
of the will of God and yet remains free and able to decide how it
is that he will forge his destiny. As the story is told in Genesis, the
human beings are given one commandment: ‘‘Of every tree of
the garden you are free to eat, but as for the tree of knowledge
of good and evil, you must not eat of it.’’20 And, of course, they
eat of it.
Crucial to the Jewish understanding of the nature of man is
that man is free. He controls much of his own destiny. Man has
the knowledge and the wisdom to be aware of the divine calling
that is addressed to him. Man can surely blaze his own path,
choose his own way, and either do right or wrong. For better or
for worse, that is how God created the world.
God created man as a free human being. While of course he
does not choose to be born, nor to have the inheritance, both
physical and cultural, that he receives, man has both the intellectual and personal qualities to perceive God’s will and to create
his life in response to it. Therefore, while God has created the
world, He has also created latitude for human beings to be able
to exercise their free will.
In the Bible, no sooner is there a world than there is murder.
Cain kills Abel; and by the time we arrive at the story of Noah,
God has repented of all that He has made and decides to undo
the creation and to try again.
Realize what Scripture is saying: there appears to be an unknown and ever-unfolding reality once the creation is made.
God, too, learns about it as it unfolds. And God is filled with
disappointment about what He has made.21
Theological Anthropology, Not Predeterminism
I have summarized this story of creation and underlined its main
points because the beginning of the Bible possesses what to Jews
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is a theological anthropology. This reading of Scripture would be
misinterpreted if it were to be understood to say, for example,
that all future human beings suffer for the sin of Adam and Eve.
To Jews, the Biblical story is important not because it describes
the punishments and future limitations of humanity as a result
of our ancestors’ choices. It is, rather, a snapshot picture of what
we consider human nature and human significance to be.
To describe that snapshot: Man is of absolute value. Every
human being is unique. All human beings are of equal value.
Man is self-conscious, aware, and incomplete as he comes to recognize his existential loneliness. Man is a creature endowed with
will and the freedom to exercise it as he sees fit.
But as a human being searches for the meaning of his destiny,
he is engaged in a quest that will be satisfied only as he lives not
alone, but with others—other people and God.

Revelation
Man lives a twofold existence: both as a creature alone, separated
from God and even separated from other people. And man also
lives an existence in relationship, in relationship to God and to
other creatures. In each case, man must listen beyond himself to
be able to be aware that the call of the other is there. In each
case, as well, the other, in dialogue, in conversation, and, ultimately, in revelation, becomes the necessary desideratum to
man’s fulfillment; the other gives meaning to his lonely existence.
God and Man Both Live in Relation
Martin Buber spoke of I-and-Thou and I-and-It. The basic words,
he said, are paired words for they define the quality of different
relationships. When we experience the other as an ‘‘it,’’ then the
other is distant from us. At best, we know him objectively—
though we do not bridge the gap that leads to intimacy. When
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we do, that relationship is I-Thou, a relationship that does not
allow us distance or objectivity. It is marked by intimacy, empathy, and by meaning. And in every I-Thou between human beings, there is the Eternal Thou, the Thou of our relationship with
God, who can only be understood as Thou, never as It.22
Meaning in existence is achieved in relationship, and nowhere
is that more true than the meaning achieved in life with God.
God has a relationship with human beings that manifests itself in
many ways. For Jews, there is one aspect of that relationship that
exceeds all others. As a result of God’s love, God decides that He
will create a people that has a covenant with Him. Abraham is
the first Jew, but it is not until the later epoch of Moses and the
redemption of the Jewish people from Egypt that, on Mt. Sinai,
the covenant between God and the Jews is given clear and specific content.
The Covenant
It is important to know what the covenant is and what it is not.
The covenant is a way of describing the unique relationship between God and the people of Israel, and it places upon the Jews
the obligation of living according to the Law that was revealed as
its content. As with all covenants, it involves obligations and benefits. God gives a Law to the people of Israel and, if they abide by
His Law, which is His will, then it will be good for the people of
Israel.
The covenant is an expression of Love. The Torah is the love
letter of God to Israel. The Torah is the content of that relationship; it provides the way for Jews to come close to their Father in
Heaven. ‘‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,
with all your soul, and with all your might,’’23 we say twice a day,
quoting Scripture in our daily prayers; those words are immediately followed by another Scriptural passage, which says: ‘‘If you
will abide by my commandments . . .’’24 The theological idea is:
First accept the fact that there is a kingdom of heaven. Then,
accept the yoke of the commandments.
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It is inaccurate to interpret the Law as being somehow inimical
to love. The Law is the expression of God’s love.25 And it is
through the Law that a Jew draws near to God. Secondly, the love
of God, known through the revelation of the Torah, does not
preclude a unique relation that God will have with every human
being and, potentially, with all cultures on the face of the earth.
The covenant with the Jews does not put any limitations on the
rest of humanity to develop a relationship of love and of content
with the God of the world.
In addition, classical Judaism maintains that, just as there is
one God of all the universe, He makes certain demands on all
human beings. Judaism assumes that all people are obligated to
observe a universal law. That law, spoken of as the Seven Noahide
Commandments, is applicable to everyone. These laws are: (1)
the establishment of courts of justice so that law will rule in society, and the prohibitions of (2) blasphemy, (3) idolatry, (4) incest, (5) bloodshed, (6) robbery, and (7) eating the flesh of a
living animal.26
It is important to realize the implications of believing in a universal covenant as well as the particular covenant between God
and Israel. It means that Jews do not believe it is necessary for
others to convert to their faith. Maimonides and subsequent decisors all make it clear that ‘‘the pious of all the nations of the
world have a place in the world to come.’’27 A basic tolerance that
is the result of the brotherhood of mankind is therefore expanded, rather than limited, by such an idea of covenant. There
are many paths that may lead to heaven. But there are some
shared ideals on all of those paths.
Transcendent Truths
It is important to realize that such a view of God’s will provides
for a universally appreciated transcendent truth. It means that
people of all faiths can and must share certain understandings
with each other. It means that underlying a sense of the possibility of the human community to create a just world is a community
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in which there is a universal appreciation for the divine gifts that
are universally at the source of the meaning of all of our existences.
Let me spell that out more directly. I think that it is widely
thought today that religion is a major impediment to the working
of a universal mankind. Many, particularly in our Western society, assume that if religion withered away, there would be universal bliss. No doubt, there is much reason to point to the strife so
often the result of religious expressions. At the same time,
though, I think that it is crucial for us to appreciate the need for
a universal recognition of certain transcendent truths in order
for there to be any universal law or any universal community.28
Let us take the popular idea that all the nations, to know what
is right and just, would simply vote on it. The result of that would,
while enticing, be an opportunity for every idea, be it bad or
good, to be the source of a universal brotherhood. It could easily
justify the murder of some while protecting others. It could justify economic systems, for example, that try to equalize wealth at
the expense of the sacred rights of the individual. This was the
basis of communism and its mass killings throughout the twentieth century, a system of murder justified for economic reasons.
The murder of millions was in the service of a secular, not a religious, ideology, I note. While monotheism presupposes that
there is a possibility of human community, it also requires the
community to reach a consensus on a transcendent, universally
acceptable truth that will reinforce the essential dignity of God’s
creation of humanity.29
I would therefore like to make a plea to all faiths, a plea that
we engage in dialogue with one another so that we can, in each
other’s presence, communicate the power of the revelations we
have received from God. Not so that we can become adherents
of each other’s faiths but so that, by bearing witness to the God
of the world, we will hone, slowly but surely, a deeper respect
for the universal truths that must be at the basis of a universal
community.
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The Law in Action
Fundamentally, the Law embodies the values of the tradition. Let
us look at some examples, therefore, to probe their meaning and
to see how traditions and values are constructed out of the building blocks of ancient words.
Leviticus 19, verse 32, contains a very simple admonition that
a person is supposed to ‘‘rise up before the aged and give respect
to those who have white hair.’’ The rabbis studied this and, placing it together with the Biblical verse that requires ‘‘honoring
one’s father and mother,’’30 they elaborated a rather detailed series of laws that tell us how we are to treat the old.31
The treatment of the old is divided into two types of old:
namely, one’s parents and those who are not one’s parents. Perhaps surprisingly, the commandment to honor parents is not
seen in our tradition as principally directed toward young children, but rather toward adult children who have elderly parents.
Honoring a parent means giving them food and drink, dressing
them and covering them, bringing them in and taking them out.
We are obviously talking here about parents who can’t do these
things for themselves.
When the Torah mentions standing up before the old, the Talmud discusses whether there are any limitations on who is old.
If, for example, an old person is not a learned person, are we still
required to treat them with such deference? The answer is, of
course, yes. As the Talmud says: All the old have learned from
the troubles that life has meted out.32
Now one might, therefore, think that Judaism is a religion that
thinks, without any hesitation, that it is good to get old. And
while that is generally true, the trials and tribulations of aging
are carefully noted, both in the Bible and in the Talmud. The
pain of arthritis, hair loss, vision, hearing, and digestive problems
are all carefully documented in the texts.33 So what one might
have thought—that perhaps the ancient rabbis never really knew
old people but rather imagined that old age was good since no
one ever got to the ages we know—this is just not true.

32

FOR THE SAKE OF MY KIN AND FRIENDS

According to the Talmud, the average life span of someone
who made it past childhood was seventy years of age. Of course,
a very large number of people never made it past childhood. But
those who did were assumed to live to a reasonably old age.
Though, as described, it was far from golden.34
But here is the crucial insight: The human being is created in
such a way that, inevitably, the finite processes that make us work
cease to function well and, finally, to function at all. A disjunction
is created between a theological idea and the experience of everyday life. The theological idea is that the created person is
noble and of enormous, infinite worth. But what does experience
teach? That age brings with it pain and suffering. Therefore, a
person’s own experience belies the religious value that is at the
basis of the tradition.
What happens? When his own body doesn’t work, other people
begin to stand up in his presence. You see, just as one’s self-image
begins to plummet on the physical scale, Scripture requires the
society to take over and to reinforce the lofty nature of human
creation.
When you need help, it is the job of other people to help you.
Creation is noble and creation is also fragile. The community of
people, working together, removes the rust that accumulates on
the creature’s wheels. Only other people can do that.
The Evil Tongue
A second example, Leviticus 19:16, states: ‘‘Do not go about as a
talebearer among your people.’’ This is one of the most difficult
laws of the Torah to observe for it is the prohibition against gossip. In the Jewish religious tradition, gossip does not mean the
telling of false tales about someone else. The law against defamation prohibits false tales. Tale bearing is the sharing of information that is true, not false. So what could be wrong with sharing
true information? Simply that it is nobody else’s business.
There is a high value placed on privacy in Judaism and there
are many ways that people can cheapen each other’s lives. Talk-
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ing about others is one of the ways we take away their importance
and lower the esteem in which they are held.
In Judaism this simple verse leads to laws concerning ‘‘lashon
hara,’’ the evil tongue, for the tongue is seen as an instrument
that can do more damage than the most potent poison arrows.
Words are the vehicles of our interpersonal lives, and the way in
which we either respect or cheapen each other’s value is frequently the result of the words we use.35
Just think of the current status of words. What are our words
causing us to do to each other? In our modern world, much of
our culture is media generated. It knows few inherent rights of
privacy. It uses words and advertising to create needs that, frequently, we should not have; it molds us into opinions that frequently encourage us to hate each other, rather than to cultivate
mutual respect. Words are cast out onto the airwaves; pictures
may accompany them. Arrows shoot around the world in ways
that would impress a Nazi propagandist.
It is the function of religion to sensitize human beings to the
destructive power of their tongues, just as it is the job of religion
to encourage us to use our tongues for the betterment of the
world.
The Value of Life
The Law embodies the value of human life as one of the supreme
values in Judaism. Since man is in the divine image, few things
could be worth more. One may suspend nearly all the laws of the
Torah to save a human life. The Sabbath and even the Day of
Atonement may be transgressed.36
But there are situations where life may be forfeited. If a person
were to be forced to commit idolatry, a sexual act forbidden by
the Torah, or to commit murder, then, in very limited circumstances, it would be obligatory to give up one’s life.37
War is permissible, but it must be conducted according to certain rules that, among other concerns, protect non-combatants
and offer the option of peace to an enemy. Judaism abhors the
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phenomenon of terrorism. It is opposed to suicide for any reason. The use of suicide to commit murder is doubly abhorrent.38
Ritual and Ethics Are Totally Intertwined
The Torah of Israel, and by the Torah I mean the tradition that
begins with Scripture and continues even to our own day, that
Torah is concerned with the welfare of human beings just as it is
concerned with people’s relation to God. The Ten Commandments were written on two tablets. The first tablet tells us to believe in God and not to make or worship idols, not to bear the
name of the Lord in vain, to observe the Sabbath, and, finally, to
honor parents. Tablet one symbolizes the Law’s concern with the
relation of man to God. The fifth commandment provides a
point of transition: honoring parents brings us from the realm of
relating to God to the realm of relating to human beings. The
second tablet concerns entirely ethical mandates: not to murder,
commit adultery, or steal, neither to bear false witness nor to
covet.
The section of the Torah from which I drew the examples of
respect for the aged and the prohibitions of the evil tongue is a
perfect example of the total intertwining of ritual and ethics in
Judaism. The nineteenth chapter of Leviticus says that a Jew
should strive to be holy because the Lord, God, is holy. Judaism
is a religion of commandments between man and God and commandments between man and man. But they are all God’s will,
meaning that our relations with each other are not only our concern, they are God’s concern as well.
This holiness spans the two paradigmatic relationships, man
and God as well as man and his fellow man. Thus in Leviticus 19,
the Torah commands reverence for parents and the Sabbath and
then condemns the worship of idols or the making of molten
gods. That is followed by laws of sacrifices and immediately thereafter by the law to leave the edges of a harvested field for the
benefit of the poor and the stranger. No stealing, no defrauding,
no favoritism in judgment. Hate not your kinsfolk in your heart.
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Take not vengeance or bear a grudge. Love your neighbor as
yourself.39
The challenge to be holy because God is holy is a challenge
met by acts of devotion toward God and practical responses that
embody the sanctity of every human being. Thus the image of
God—a human being—is, while not worshipped, made clear and
certain as the holiest of all creations. Loving devotion to our fellow human beings is the clear and abiding will of God. The love
of God in the covenant demands a corresponding love for
human beings.
Imitation of God
The greatest devotion involves imitating God. Imitating God results in service to human beings. Thus Rabbi Simlai in the Talmud points out the value of lovingkindness, for the Torah begins
with lovingkindness and ends with lovingkindness. At the beginning it is written: ‘‘And the Lord God made garments of skins for
the man and the woman and He clothed them.’’40 And at the end
it is written: ‘‘And He (God) buried him (Moses).’’41 What God
does is what man is supposed to do, and both engage in loving
acts of devotion to others.42
Similarly, Rabbi Hama, son of R. Hanina, said:
How does one explain the text: ‘‘Ye shall walk after the Lord your
God’’?43 Is it, then, possible for a human being to walk after the
Divine presence; for has it not been said: ‘‘For the Lord thy God
is a devouring fire’’?44 But the meaning is to walk after the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He. As He clothes the naked,
for it is written: ‘‘And the Lord God made for Adam and for his
wife garments of skins, and He clothed them,’’45 so do thou also
clothe the naked. The Holy One, blessed be He, visited the sick,
for it is written: ‘‘And the Lord appeared unto him by the oaks of
Mamre,’’46 so do thou also visit the sick. The Holy One, blessed be
He, comforted mourners, for it is written: ‘‘And it came to pass
after the death of Abraham, that God blessed Isaac his son,’’47 so
do thou also comfort mourners. The Holy one, blessed be He,
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buried the dead, for it is written: ‘‘And He buried him in the valley,’’48 so do thou also bury the dead.49

Maimonides, in his monumental Guide for the Perplexed, concludes the volume with a discussion of imitating God’s ways.
Here, in a philosophical exposition of the tradition, the same
conclusion is drawn: love of God is realized by acts of kindness to
human beings.
Maimonides recalls the verses in Jeremiah: ‘‘Thus saith the
Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the
mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his
riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me.’’50 In a verse that we might have read as a
directive to only know God, both intellectually and experientially, Maimonides explains it with a surprising twist.
The Divine acts which ought to be known, and ought to serve as a
guide for our actions, are lovingkindness, justice, and righteousness. . . . The object of the passage [of Jeremiah] is, therefore, to
declare, that the perfection in which man can truly glory, is attained by him when he has acquired—as far as this is possible for
man—the knowledge of God, the knowledge of His Providence,
and of the manner in which it influences His creatures in their
production and continued existence. Having acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to seek lovingkindness,
justice, and righteousness, and thus to imitate the ways of God.

Imitation of God is, therefore, the highest level of religious
experience, and imitation of God consists of devotion to our fellow human beings.
Redemption
Human beings need to work together for the common good, finally, because Judaism has a notion of history that is grounded
in the experience of redemption.
Because God is an active participant in history, history itself
has meaning and is moving in a direction that, as it unfolds, bears
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witness to God’s wish for the world to be redeemed. There are
some views of history that see it as a wheel that continues to turn
around. In that way, there is no beginning and no end, nor any
real progress at any point. What was yesterday will be again tomorrow.
Judaism is a religion that locates the relation of God and man
on a continuum of time that has both a beginning and an end.
The beginning is creation. The end is the Coming of the Messiah, the End of Days, when all strivings for a better world will
finally be welcomed in the era of perfection. And hope is pointed
in that direction, ‘‘to perfect the world into the Kingdom of the
Almighty.’’51
Judaism believes that the world, as we know it, is an unredeemed place. It is a place where perfection, righteousness, and
peaceful living can be worked for; they can be partially, but not
completely, achieved. All of life as we know it is inevitably tinged
with pain and disappointment, with the certainty that, as good as
it might become, it will never achieve perfection. The unredeemed world is a world in which one must accept less than the
best. It is a world in which utopian hopes inevitably lead to disastrous consequences, for their expectations will not be fulfilled.
Unfortunately, because these hopes become the center of people’s faith, they often lead, instead, to great devastation and destruction.
The belief in the ideal future, in the end of days that is characterized by an era of peace is, however, the guiding light. Without
a beacon, there is no vision in a world of fog and sometimes
darkness. Without hope, there is no striving. All of humanity
needs to grow toward the sun that gives it energy and strength.
Creation Is a Partnership Between God and Man
Judaism views history as a field of deeds in time where the possibilities of human beings, possessed with free will, can change the
course of events. Free will thus allows man to be an active agent
in history. Ours is not a view of history where all is decreed from
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above. God’s will becomes evident in history. It is a will that leads
toward a messianic future. But it doesn’t remove man’s responsibility from playing a crucial role.
Human activity, therefore, has value, and there is an ongoing
creation that is a partnership between man and God. The rabbinic midrash makes the point in this way. Tyranus Rufus, a
pagan Roman general, asks Rabbi Akiba whose deeds are more
becoming, those of God or those of human beings. Rabbi Akiba
replies that man’s deeds surpass those of God. Surprised, Tyranus
Rufus says: Behold the heavens and the earth, can any human
being make something that compares to them?
Rabbi Akiba then brings together sheaves of wheat and loaves
of bread. The sheaves are God’s creation, the loaves, man’s.
Akiba does the same with flax and the beautiful clothing made
from it.52
Rabbi Akiba was teaching the Roman that God and man both
work to continue the creation of the world. Man is God’s partner
in that task. History is the context in which this partnership is
played out, day after day, eon after eon.
As Rabbi Norman Lamm notes in his study of Jewish social ethics, ‘‘When R. Shelomoh Eger, a distinguished Talmudist, became a hasid, he was asked what he learned from R. Menahem
Mendel of Kotzk after his first visit. He answered that the first
thing he learned in Kotzk was, ‘In the beginning God created.’
But did a renowned scholar have to travel to a Hasidic Rebbe to
learn the first verse in the Bible? He answered: ‘I learned that
God created only the beginning; everything else is up to man.’ ’’53
Human beings have a role in the creation and, although they
should not expect perfection, they should always labor to bring
it about. As Rabbi Tarfon teaches in the Talmud: You do not have
to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.54
Historical Memory of the Exodus
Since history is a place where communal meaning is found, the
exodus from Egypt becomes a historical event in the life of the
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Jews that not only evokes memories, but requires an ongoing response. The response is one of requiring acts of love and fellowship toward other human beings.
Jews, for example, are required to be kind to the stranger.
Why? ‘‘You shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in
the land of Egypt.’’55 On the Sabbath, not only a Jew must rest,
but also his servants and the strangers living in his midst. Why?
‘‘Remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt, and
that the Lord your God brought you out from there with a
mighty hand and with a stretched-out arm.’’56 Similarly, when an
indentured servant goes free, ‘‘You shall furnish him liberally out
of your flock, and out of your threshing floor, and out of your
winepress; of that with which the Lord your God has blessed you,
you shall give to him. And you shall remember that you were a
slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God redeemed you;
therefore I command you this thing today.’’57 The widow and the
orphan are protected, together with the stranger, for precisely
the same reason: because you were slaves in Egypt.58 Likewise, the
poor shall be left their gleanings. Again: ‘‘You shall remember
that you were a slave in the land of Egypt; therefore I command
you to do this thing.’’59
Historical memory is therefore a basis for humanitarian action.
The End of Days
It should also be noted that in classical Judaism, the final end of
days is not only spiritual in nature. It will witness a resurrection
of the dead. Therefore, the perfection of the end of days involves
not only the perfect soul, but it involves the embodiment of a
soul in the world of matter. Matter that heretofore had been inimical to perfection is now the realm of perfection.
No circumstances of human experience can possibly offer evidence to deny the hope in the future that is grounded in faith.
Therefore, when Jews were sent to the gas chambers by the Nazis
during World War II, it was common for them to repeat Maimonides’s statement of belief in the Coming of the Messiah: I believe

40

FOR THE SAKE OF MY KIN AND FRIENDS

with perfect faith in the Coming of the Messiah. And though he
tarry, still I believe.
The experience of history, though filled with many disappointments, provides the ground on which to realize the doing of the
commandments and the continual redemption of the world.
This redemption is universal. The Messianic age is to be enjoyed by all of humanity and all will gather in Jerusalem to proclaim that the Lord is King over all the earth, that He is one and
that His name is one.60
Its blessing is peace. The Biblical blessing that the priests are
commanded to utter before the people ends with a prayer for
peace: ‘‘May the Lord lift His face to you and grant you peace.’’61
The prayer that is central to Jewish liturgy and is repeated three
times daily ends with a prayer for peace. Great is peace, for the
prophets have taught us to care for nothing as much as peace.
Great is peace, for it is given to the meek; as Scripture says, ‘‘But
the humble shall inherit the land, and delight themselves in the
abundance of peace.’’62 Great is peace, for it outweighs everything else. The morning prayers say, ‘‘He creates peace and creates everything.’’ Therefore, if there is no peace, there is, so to
speak, nothing left in creation.63
For the Sake of My Kin and Friends
Lonely and disappointed is the God of the world unless there is
hope for humanity. And the very fact of creation, the very
involvement of God in it, is an intimation that God was willing to
take the risks because it was worth it in the long run. This is God’s
promise, even to his people who are exiled: ‘‘Keep your voice
from weeping, and your eyes from tears, for your work shall be
rewarded, says the Lord. Your children will come back from the
land of the enemy. And there is hope for your future, says the
Lord.’’64
For God’s presence and concern, God’s relation to the world
and His hope for it, devolves upon the noble but flawed humanity that is in His image. It is for the sake of the other, for the sake
of my kin and friends, that God creates the hope for peace, the
hope that sustains the world.

3

Strategies for Disagreement
His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal 1
The religious dimension of cultural misunderstanding is
central to all discussions of the issue at this time. In speaking of
interfaith conversations, it is the process that concerns me—
conversations between the adherents of the faiths, not between
the faiths. Such conversations do not touch on creeds and metaphysics. It is necessary that one side respect what is sacred to the
other; and, in the words of Imam al Shatibi, nu’adhem al-juwaame’
wa nahtarem al-furooq (we enhance what is universal and we respect what is different).
Where respect does not exist, the problem arises of how to
engender it; where creeds and metaphysics are discussed, the
problem arises of how to accommodate contradictions. The theory espoused by numerous well-intentioned peace activists and
promoters of interfaith and intercultural dialogue revolves
around—in spirit, at least—the familiar notion that ‘‘to know is
to love’’; that mutual awareness and knowledge, the often-heralded fruits of education, help to humanize the other, creating a
better understanding of his or her fears and trials, and eventually
lead to empathy among former adversaries. Of course, while this
may be true as far as it goes, we must bear in mind that some of
the bloodiest and most brutal conflicts have occurred between
people who know each other only too well and have little mutual
empathy as a result, including—alarmingly—co-religionists.
Let us look at some examples of confrontation among co-religionists and co-nationalists. In the Caucasus, for instance, Christian Russia backed Muslim Abkhazia against Christian Georgia,
while Muslim Iran played off Christian Armenia against Muslim
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Azerbaijan. The list continues: Ossetians against Georgians (both
Christians); Lezgins against Azeris; Circassians against Karachai
(both Muslim). Elsewhere, in Lebanon, savage battles raged between Muslims, Christians, and Druze, all of whom knew each
other sufficiently well; but the most savage of all battles often
took place within each sect. In the Balkans, too, where for each
conflict pitting Muslims against Christians, there was another
conflict involving co-religionists; for instance, Moldovans versus
Russians; Hungarians versus Romanians; Macedonians versus
Greeks; Serbs versus Croats.
Familiarity, therefore, does not always eradicate enmity. It is
perfectly possible for us—for people—both to know and hate
each other. And my call is for a civilized framework for disagreement.
I believe that only by accepting responsibility for words and
actions at all levels will this ever be possible. Whether or not history has come to an end or whether or not we are heading for a
clash of civilizations is not really the point. If we want to clash we
will clash. What is needed is to create programs and ideas that
bring certain unacceptables to an end—war, terror (with or without its ‘‘isms’’), violence, and disregard for the inherent dignity
of man.
The notion of international implementation of a code of
human responsibilities to balance the code of human rights most
widely accepted in the form of the United Nations Declaration
of Human Rights (UNDHR) has received a considerable amount
of attention lately. The work of Hans Küng has been especially
noteworthy in this regard. The Declaration toward a Global Ethic
that he coordinated, approved by the Parliament of the World
Religions, promoted much discussion on the issue and is published alongside a ‘‘Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities.’’2 As the preamble of the Declaration of Responsibilities
states:
The initiative . . . is not only a way of balancing freedom with
responsibility, but also a means of reconciling ideologies, beliefs,
and political views that were deemed antagonistic in the past. The
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proposed declaration points out that the exclusive insistence on
rights can lead to endless dispute and conflict, that religious
groups in pressing for their own freedom have a duty to respect
the freedom of others.

Part of any implementation of the Declaration of Responsibilities to reconcile antagonistic views must be the re-explication of
the specific values in each tradition and culture that support and
confirm the principle of living in freedom while respecting the
freedom of others to be different without necessarily reconciling
differences. The difficulty of observing the principle of reciprocity in freedoms and rights—the polar opposite of vengefulness,
as it were—was well expressed by the Christian historian, Arnold
Toynbee, when he wrote just before his death in 1973:
In the biosphere, life has found for itself a habitable but inhospitable setting, and life’s reaction has been grasping and greediness.
The Buddha held that grasping (tanha) is the root cause of suffering. All the higher religions call, with one voice, for renunciation.
But renunciation is a still greater tour de force than the self-assertion
that has been life’s original response to the inhospitability of the
biosphere.3

The promotion of the ‘‘value of peaceful disagreement’’ thus
requires not only the establishment of institutions such as conflict avoidance centers and citizens’ conferences, and sustained
educational and media support at each step, but also the backing
of religious leadership with reference to their faith and cultural
traditions. Religions have always emphasized the responsibilities
of man toward self, other, society, and environment; have attempted to teach values (such as humility, moderation, altruism)
and institute mechanisms (such as fasting, alms-giving, and zakat)
that will minimize selfishness and graspingness; and in some
cases have provided for the fact that disagreements inevitably do
arise.
The media and educational programs must, simultaneously,
address the role of perceptional revisionism. As an essential component of education—especially in the troubled Western Asian re-
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gion—we must examine reciprocal perceptions among Jews,
Christians, Muslims, and other faiths—including secularism. As
yet we do not have access to an analytical concordance of values
in the three holy books, let alone a document aiming at coordination of traditions worldwide. Meanwhile, the role of responsible scriptwriters for the media and for the world of informatics,
in distance-education, in literature, in mass communication, in
textbooks, in religious and scholarly works, in the performing
arts, in the visual arts, in ethnographic materials, and others, is
hugely important in minimizing artificial differences or differences that arise from misunderstanding or blind assertions.4
Part of this program is the dissemination of a philosophy of
positive difference, of progress and refinement through difference. As President Muhammad Khatami of Iran has written:
. . . it is possible to eliminate differences, except for those which
are natural, for people are by nature different; we do not all think
alike, and we do not have identical interpretations. Therefore, in
light of agreements and numerous common elements, we can
minimize differences and render them a means to perfection and
progress. Similar thoughts never confront each other. To have two
ways of thinking set against each other is not only problem-free,
but they ought to confront each other, for this causes the evolution and perfection of the thought. What is important is that the
dichotomy of thoughts not turn into disagreements, contradiction, aggression, and war.5

President Khatami goes on to call for wisdom and rationality
in dialogue to avoid the scenario threatened in the last sentence.
In the absence of wisdom and rationality in many human encounters, it is necessary to devise and to put into practice institutional and legislative means to address the globalization of
communications and power, the threat of a ‘‘clash of cultures’’—if not Huntington’s infamous ‘‘clash of civilizations’’—
and the fact that, with the proliferation of every kind of weapon,
violent disagreement is becoming easier than ever before. Realpolitik and petro-politics must at all costs give heed to an overarching ethic with human welfare as its center and goal.
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The education of these values in society begins with the individual and his or her relationship with the institution. Religious
schools have a particular responsibility to foster pluralist and international thinking. The famous Jesuit education provides a well
known, if controversial, example. Father Peter-Hans Kolvenbach,
Superior-General of the Society of Jesus, spoke at Santa Clara
University in the year 2000 on the topic of this Christian educational tradition and today’s changes:
For 450 years, Jesuit education has sought to educate ‘‘the whole
person’’ intellectually and professionally, psychologically, morally,
and spiritually. But in the emerging global reality, with its great
possibilities and deep contradictions, the whole person is different
from the whole person of the Counter-Reformation, the Industrial
Revolution, or the twentieth century. Tomorrow’s ‘‘whole person’’
cannot be whole without an educated awareness of society and
culture with which to contribute socially, generously, in the real
world. Tomorrow’s whole person must have, in brief, a well-educated solidarity.

The argument for an educated solidarity is one that I have
made myself many times.6 Without a global ethic of human solidarity, cultural misunderstandings and political expediencies will
continue to tear us apart, both between and within communities.
Yet to educate only the idea of solidarity is not enough when, in
so many encounters, basic disagreements cannot be negotiated
without degenerating into attempts to dominate, by force or violence. It is necessary, therefore, to educate further, ideally
through personal experience, the possibility of civilized disagreement within a wider structure of agreed values.
What means to promote non-violent disagreement already
exist? Moreover, to what extent may previously workable mechanisms have become invalid or ineffective in the larger, globally
connected, and widely informed societies in which we live? In
all discussions, we now have to take account of the fact that the
previously dependable relationship between the human being
and natural geography—the ‘‘size of the world’’—has been removed from or altered in every equation that had previously
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served mankind’s interests in promoting and negotiating traditions, values, and humanitarian action.7 We lack the exact experience with which to deal with this fact, but we do have numerous
records of intercultural and intracultural advice with which to
work to expand the sphere within which we may safely disagree
and still work toward common goals.
It should be emphasized that the promotion of mechanisms
enabling peaceful disagreement goes hand in hand with both
educating our capacity also to agree (through universal values,
varied debate, responsible media activity, formally placing value
upon diversity in society, etc.) and, very importantly, enforcing
international norms and standards of humanitarian law as they
already exist. Indeed, if all Abrahamic believers really believed in
and implemented Moses’s Ten Commandments, I suppose no
need would have arisen for the symposium that led to this book.
A complete catalogue of traditional injunctions to find civilized means to disagree would be an extremely useful resource
and will surely form part of any global matrix of religious and
philosophic values. It may be useful, as a starting point, to note
some possible Islamic beginnings from which to develop a global
‘‘framework for disagreements.’’
I open with the Qur’an and a late surah which is rendered in
English as follows:
Say, ‘‘O you unbelievers!
I do not worship what you do,
Nor do you worship what I do.
Neither shall I ever worship what you do,
Nor indeed shall you worship what I do.
You have your own religion, and I have my own!’’

This is explained as an instruction to Muhammad to turn down
an offer by non-Muslims that he should worship their gods and
that they worship Allah in return. It constitutes a refusal to compromise or syncretize Islam, and also an acknowledgment of fundamental division between religious beliefs. The surah does not,
however, demand that the unbelievers shall worship Allah—even
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though, in its context, Islam is the true religion. It is not a missionizing exhortation; it is a statement of the status quo constituting a recognition that some differences are not to be papered
over, ignored, nor resolved.
This is a step that may not be omitted from any attempt to
engage in dialogue toward solidarity—the formal recognition
and agreement that there are areas of utter difference. Here, I
do not refer to situations such as political negotiations over land
disputes, water use, or the right of return of refugees, in which a
compromise acceptable to both sides is sought. Non-negotiable
difference in the cultural and religious sphere does not necessarily result in mutually incompatible demands or stalemate.
To accompany the surah cited above, and supporting the ideas
of seeking peaceful agreement throughout diversity and implementing extant laws and norms, the Qur’an again states:
(2:256) There shall be no compulsion in religion.
(6:106) Follow that which has been revealed to you from your
Lord, other than Whom there is no God, and turn away from the
polytheists.
(107) Had Allah willed, they would not have joined partners to
Him. We have not appointed you as their controller, nor are you
a guardian over them.
(108) Do not revile those [deities] which they invoke besides
Allah, lest they revile Allah aggressively and unknowingly. Thus
We have caused every group to see their deeds pleasant in their
eyes. Then they will return to their Lord, who will tell them what
they used to do.
(10:99) Had your Lord willed, all those who are on earth would
have believed. Can you force people to be believers?
(16:125) Call [people] to your Lord’s path with wise and tactful
preaching, and debate with them using a gracious way of speech.
(17:53) Tell My servants to use good speech in their parlance,
because Satan arouses animosity between them. Truly, Satan is an
avowed enemy to man.
(25:56) We only sent you [Muhammad] as a boder of good tidings
and as a warner.
(57) Say, ‘‘I am not asking you a reward for [my message], except
that you walk in the way to your Lord, if you so wish.’’
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(25:63) The servants of the Merciful One are those who walk
gently on the earth, who, if the ignorant speak [badly] to them,
they say ‘‘Peace’’ [in reply].

Other Muslim thinkers have developed upon these themes.
The mystic Sufi Muslim tradition’s long history of ‘‘connectivity’’
with other religions is exemplified in the following lines of Jalal
ad-Din ur-Rumi—one of the great poets of the Islamic world,
born in a happier Afghanistan in the thirteenth century—who
said:
Come now whoever you are!
Come without any fear of being disliked.
Come whether you are a Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew.
Come whoever you are!
Whether you believe or do not believe in God.
Come also if you believe in the sun as God.
This door is not a door of fear.
This is a door of good wishes.

A Muslim tradition of Jesus (who is highly revered as God’s
prophet before Muhammad) reports as follows:
Jesus said, ‘‘Leave people alone. Be at ease with people and ill at
ease with yourself. Do not seek to earn their praises or merit their
rebuke. Perform what you have been commanded to do.’’8

‘‘Leaving people alone’’—accepting the existence of radically
opposed views to one’s own without feeling threatened—
requires trust that the other will, in turn, permit one’s own views
to continue to exist. I speak here not only of the fear of the other
that follows our mistrust of difference and—for those who dare
to engage in dialogue or inclusionist discourse—the fear of the
folks back home and what they will say or do, but also the paradoxical fear of peace itself. It is ironic, but all of us, in our close
exclusionist circles, share a certain agoraphobia, a fear of open
spaces, which amounts to a fear of peace with the other.
Too often, as a consequence, we find defensiveness, self-arming, and the threat of force. The Qur’an is well known to take up
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issues of punishment and use of force, including military force,
in the defence of one’s Muslim beliefs against attackers. The
reader should also note that this religious scripture uniquely asserts the rights of prisoners, especially women and children, in
any such scenario. Implicit in the idea of minimal mutual trust is
a notion of a shared governing value: that profound disagreement is acceptable and that peaceful disagreement without
threat is the acceptable norm. Hence the importance of instituting a global ethic of human solidarity so that forceful self-defense
becomes absolutely the last resort.
Problems arise when expressions of the value of ‘‘non-negotiable difference’’ run into the value of ‘‘universal human rights’’
(and when both values are rejected in favor of a claim to superior
authority or force). We see such situations in the Muslim world
today in debates over—for example—freedom of conscience, the
implementation of strictly literal Shar’ia criminal law and, more
generally, women’s rights. Further problems arise when the
‘‘right to be different’’ that is argued to preclude certain accusations of human rights infringements defends the idea of an innate, non-negotiable superiority—that ‘‘Islam’’ rather than
‘‘human rights’’ (in one form or another) is the only correct and
acceptable code. Conversely, any suggestion that ‘‘human rights’’
are the only acceptable code and must supersede ‘‘Islam’’ is unlikely to meet with approval.
The idea of unity as an essential attribute of God, to be reflected by mankind who was created from a single soul and its
mate, is very important in Islamic thinking. Disunity, by contrast,
is of the devil. What is needed is an awareness that unity does not
mean identity and that differences need not disappear within a
variegated whole. The Qur’an emphasizes the variety of creation,
the alternation between day and night, the striped and changing
colors of rocks and animals and the different tastes of fruits irrigated by the same water. B. A. Dar has commented beautifully on
the Qur’anic treatment of this topic, and for ease of reference, it
seems worthwhile to quote him at some length:
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The Qur’an aims at establishing a peaceful social atmosphere
where people belonging to other faiths can enjoy freedom of conscience and worship (2:256) . . . It is as a consequence of this
attitude of tolerance that, according to the Qur’an, all those who
believe in God and the Last Day and practice righteousness,
whether they are Muslims, Jews, Christians, or Sabaeans, shall get
their reward from their Lord (2:62; 5:72).9
The disvalues of discord and disunity are the result of the denial
of the unity of God (59:14). The unbelievers and those who associate partners with God are always subject to fear and lack a sense
of unity and harmony (2:151; 8:65). It is the devil that incites people to discord (7:200; 41:36) and, therefore, the Qur’an very forcefully forbids people to be divided among themselves (3:103), and
looks upon disunity as the result of lack of wisdom (59:14). It
denounces divisions and splits in religion (6:159; 30:32; 42:13)
and disagreements among different sects and schisms through insolent envy (42:65; 45:17). Similarly, all those acts which tend to
spread mischief and tumult after there have been peace and order
are condemned because they tend to create disorder, disunity,
and disharmony in life (2:191–92, 205; 7:85; 11:85).10

Dar was writing in the early 1960s, a more hopeful time perhaps than today; but the ‘‘opposition’’ so often dwelt upon in the
images and soundbites fed us by our various more-or-less propagandistic media is still by no means an opposition of monoliths.
There is a great variety of opinion within the ‘‘Muslim world’’
concerning human rights and their implementation, and the
idea of cultural relativism itself derives from the same Western
intellectual milieu that brought forth the UNDHR. Indeed, the
interpretation of the UNDHR in the context of issues of national
sovereignty, religious majority, or social integration is problematic for the Western nations who first approved the document.11
However, criticisms of today’s ‘‘universal’’ human rights have
from the beginning focused on the idea that their definitions
and statement were characteristically Western, not universal.12
With regard to the idea of Muslim variety, dialogue within the
Muslim communities and between different branches and sects
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of Islam is seriously lacking today. The four schools of Sunni
Islam and two schools of Shi’a Islam are not engaged in conversations to clarify similarities and acknowledge differences and, consequently, there was no unified Muslim stance on the terrible
attacks of September 11, 2001. Part of the solution lies in acknowledging that internal differences also exist and emphasizing
that these differences are not a threat to the existence of Islam
and that the traditional process of ijtihad, or careful analysis and
reform of Islamic thinking, is by no means incompatible with orthodoxy. The cultural differences that have inevitably grown up
in far-flung communities of a global religion need not preclude
unity of faith but should be recognized by all when discussing
cultural clashes. Muslims too were killed in the bombing of New
York’s World Trade Center.
Muslims themselves need an education that will convey some
grasp of the analyses, commentaries, and reforms that have characterized the history of Muslim philosophy and political thinking. With reference to the proliferation of extremist Islamist
groups today, and the supposed opposition between ‘‘Muslim’’
and ‘‘Western’’ values it would be helpful to recognize that, to
the Mu’tazilites, the Sufis, and indeed to some of the modernizing thinkers who lay behind the nationalist movements in the
Arab world, there was not necessarily any incompatibility to begin
with.13 During the second half of the twentieth century, disagreements between ‘‘Western’’ and ‘‘Muslim’’ culture were framed
in terms of purpose and rationale rather than rational scientific
methodology, which was promoted as an approach shared by
both. Indeed, in one of the most beautiful allegories of the
Qur’an, the light of God is compared with the luminous rays cast
by a lamp whose oil itself verges upon the luminous and comes
from an olive-tree ‘‘neither of the east nor or the west.’’14 This is
fuel for centrist thinking.
I hope that we can take a rational approach in developing the
four basic principles of A Global Ethic, as the Declaration of the
World’s Parliament of Religion underlined, to forming a minimum common ethical understanding between current religions
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and the cultures adopting them. It is interesting to note that both
the ‘‘Dialogue of Civilizations’’ and A Global Ethic have, if not
their origins in modern Islamic thinking, at least an integrated
and inherent Islamic component.
Controlling anger and ‘‘opening the gates of ijtihad ’’ means
teaching people to allow for the possibility of fundamental disagreement and to realize that agreements continue to be possible as many bridges across few divides. Rigid adherence to the
notion of a monopoly upon the truth is the basis of exclusionism
whether propagated by a Muslim or a Western secularist. Thus
ijtihad is an activity to be cultivated not only by Muslim thinkers
in the course of intra-Islamic and interfaith debate but also by
proponents of Western values, whose roots in the Renaissance
and Enlightenment surely demand the continuation of a rigorous and vigorous self-questioning. At these times of simultaneous
globalization and polarized thinking, open markets and blind
faith, it may be that the formal process of ijtihad and the idea of
providing cross-faith and cross-cultural rules and guidelines for
how to disagree will be very useful contributions from Muslim
thinking to the world.

4

The World of the Dinka: A Portrait
of a Threatened Culture
Ambassador Francis Mading Deng

Introduction
Culture is an embodiment of values that have evolved over a
long period of time and have become crystallized into institutionalized patterns of behavior. Cultures and the values they engender are what give human beings their innate dignity and social
cohesion. While cultures are dynamic and change with the imperatives of experience, they also provide predictable standards
for prescriptive behavior. The result is a normative system that
reinforces perspectives, expectations, and conformity. Change
then takes the nature of discrete reforms, with occasional revolutionary zeal, prompted primarily by prophets, inspired leaders,
or crises of grave magnitude. Otherwise, life is evolutionary and
predictable.
Applying these concepts to the African scene, it is obvious that
the continent has suffered a trauma that has severely damaged
its structures, perspectives, behavior patterns, and expectations.
Politically, economically, culturally, and spiritually, the peoples
of Africa were assumed to be in a void that had to be filled by
imported concepts, values, and aspirations for self-enhancement
through the emulation of the supposedly superior outsiders.
Rather than see development as an evolution or a process of selfimprovement from within, Africans began to see it as a commodity alien to them that had to be imported, with indispensable
assistance from outsiders.
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Of course, judged by objective modern criteria of the gross
national product or per capita income, or by the social indices of
life expectancy, literacy, and the benefits of science and technology, indigenous Africans can appropriately be described as poor.
But from a subjective standpoint, a people whose aspirations, expectations, and patterns of life were adapted to their environment, and who, to give the example of herding societies, may
possess large herds of cattle and sheep and fertile soil endowed
with sufficient rainfall for subsistence farming, far from seeing
themselves as poor, may, indeed, view themselves as blessed and
perhaps even envied by others. Linkage to the outside world and
opportunities previously outside their purview can begin to damage these self-gratifying assumptions. But it is, in fact, the destructive intervention of the outside world, often manifested in
devastating violence, that begins to impoverish the communities
that, in their splendid isolation, had thought themselves in a
worldly paradise.
The Nilotics of the Sudan—Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, among others—have been well documented by anthropologists as an exceedingly proud people, who glorified in their livestock, their
land, and their culture, resisted any foreign influences, much of
which they deemed inferior to their culture, and, as a result,
lagged behind the process of modernization.1 Once they realized
that education and socio-economic development had become essential to their status and welfare in the modern context, the
same values that had inhibited their adaptation to change suddenly provided them with the incentive to adapt and modernize.
But then an even worse source of destruction than the invasion
of foreign ideas came in the form of a devastating civil war, whose
core is the competition for the soul of the nation. Indeed, the
Dinka and the indigenous peoples of the Southern Sudan are
more known today for the humiliating humanitarian tragedy that
the devastating civil war that has raged intermittently since 1955
has imposed on them than for the pride and dignity for which
they had been known.
While they are now set on a course of radical change from
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which there is no return, tradition remains a force in the life
of most Dinkas. Tradition emanates from experience, and that
experience is not ancient history; it is a significant part of the
present. And although it is now threatened by various forces, it is
a system that is still observable, definable, and useable to reinforce the people’s sense of worth and a self-motivated development from within. This is why it is described in the present tense
in this chapter, despite the radical changes traditional society is
undergoing. Exceptions will be made only in those cases where
the past tense is clearly called for.
Building on the case of the Dinka, this chapter presents their
indigenous value system, the way it has interacted with the adventitious Arab and European influences, and the challenge it poses
for building a pluralistic nation that should be enriched by its
diverse legacies, instead of continuing to be torn apart by conflicting visions for the nation. But the challenge is more than
political and touches on a contextualization of the principles of
democracy, human rights, and equitable development from
within. Although the focus is on the Dinka, the evidence and the
arguments provided are arguably applicable to other indigenous
groups in the Sudan and elsewhere in Africa.

The Dinka and Their Values
Overview of the Dinka World
The Dinka are the largest ethnic group in the Sudan, numbering
about four million in a country of around thirty million people
and several hundred tribes. Though they engage in agriculture
and grow a wide variety of crops (sorghum, millet, maize, sesame,
beans, groundnuts, pumpkins, okra, and tobacco), their culture
is dominated by cattle (and to a lesser extent by sheep and
goats), to which they attach a social and a moral significance far
beyond their economic value. Their land, a flat configuration of
thick forests and open plains, lacks stone, iron, or any material
resource of significant durability. This is perhaps why their cul-
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ture is poor in visual arts but strikingly rich in verbal skills. Poetic
abilities and the powers of articulation and persuasiveness are
inculcated and encouraged in a child from the earliest years, and
continue to be highly prized as determinants of intelligence,
character, influence, and social stature. And yet, the Dinka are
excellent builders, constructing huts and cattle-byres that have
circular mud walls reinforced with wattles and conical roofs with
rafters of remarkably smooth thatching. Their houses, indeed,
have been described as among the best native dwellings on the
African continent.2
The world of the Dinka is a combination of environmental attractions and hardships. During the dry season, which lasts for
six months from November to April, the blazing tropical sun
bakes the land, killing virtually all vegetation and turning the
area into a thirsty arid zone, with shimmering mirages of pools
and lakes separated by a cracking pavement of dark clay soil.
With the coming of the rainy season, which lasts for the remaining six months from May to October, the land is miraculously
transformed: first, with the early rains, deep green grass carpets
the plains; lush natural vegetation follows, and the world suddenly becomes alive with the hustle and bustle of birds3 and insects of all shapes and colors, the flashing of plentiful fish in the
rivers, the concerted tunes of frogs and crickets, combined with
the characteristic bellowing of cows and the bleating of goats and
sheep. Despite the hardships of the extreme climatic conditions,
the Dinka have a burning love for their land, and, until the late
1950s when the allurements of modernity began to pull them
toward urban centers, to leave Dinkaland was considered a depraved action that was almost certain to provoke a slanderous
song.
The Dinka are spread out over a vast territory covering over
one-tenth of the nearly one million square miles that make the
Sudan the largest country in Africa. Territorially, the Dinka are
organized into tribes, sub-tribes, sections, clans, and lineages
(which are factions of clans) determined by descent from a common ancestor. Dinka residential patterns are also widespread.
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There are usually several miles between clusters of huts and cattlebyres in settlements or villages, each accommodating only a few
families whose homesteads are also well separated. Large in numbers, widespread in settlement, and segmented by the topography of their land, the Dinka are a conglomerate of some twentyfive independent groups that are also divided into autonomous
subgroups, all of which share a striking pride in their race and
culture.4
The Age-Set System as an Institution of Identity and Dignity
A vital institution that reinforces territorial identification among
the Dinka is the age-set that every Dinka joins on coming of age,
usually in his mid-teens, after undergoing an initiation ceremony. This is a painful ordeal that, in most tribes, involves scarring deep lines across the forehead varying in number from
seven upward, according to the height of the forehead and the
bragging courage of the young man. Some tribes exempt women
from this ordeal, although they are organized into age-sets that
correspond to those of their male counterparts.
Painful as initiation is, the aesthetic and social dignity associated with it is a source of great joy and gratification for every
Dinka. It allows a young man to graduate from the status of a
boy, dhol (or dhok, depending on the dialect), to that of adheng, a
word with the positive connotation of ‘‘gentleman.’’ To see a
young Dinka man before and after initiation is to witness the
remarkable power of symbolism and ritual, as the dignity of bearing, the responsible conduct, and the overall poise of a gentleman take over the carefree, servile status of boyhood.
Age-setting is essentially a system of military regimentation
aimed at developing courage and fighting abilities in young warriors. That is why age-sets are functional institutions of the territorially determined sub-tribes as the warring units. Within the
sub-tribe, fights may break out between the sections or the lineages, but only clubs, not spears, are used. In the more serious
fights between the sub-tribes and the tribes, spears and shields
are used.
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Age-setting is correlatively also an institution of intergenerational competition and succession. On graduation from initiation, members of the preceding age-set compose and perform
mock insult songs against the newly initiated set, provoking them
into an institutionalized fight called biok, which is in part a game
but can result in serious injuries.
Biok is not only training for warfare, it is also a manifestation
of rivalry between age-sets both for the position of military dominance and for the attention of the girls. As a rising generation of
young, robust, and eligible men, the newly initiated warriors are
seen by their seniors as a threatening group that must be humbled, if only playfully, to keep them in their place.5
While the functions of the generations change with age and
status, the age-set system confers a lifelong corporate identity,
comradeship, and mutual dependency on its members. They
grow from warriors to family men and gradually age to be tribal
elders with an authoritative voice in public affairs.
The Family and Its Spiritual and Moral Dimensions
Although territorial organization and the age-set system are the
pillars of Dinka political order, the central unit that injects the
blood of life into all the organs of Dinka social structure, whether
based on territory, descent, or age, is the family. To the Dinka,
the family is the backbone of society and the foundation of its
social, moral, and spiritual or religious values. The overriding
goal of every Dinka is to marry and produce children, especially
sons, ‘‘to keep the head upright,’’ koc nom (or nhom), after death.
Dinka religion does not promise a heaven to come, and although
the Dinka believe in some form of existence that conceptually
projects this worldly life into a hereafter, death for them is an
end from which the only salvation is continuity through posterity.
The British anthropologist who specialized on the Dinka, Godfrey Lienhardt, noted, ‘‘Dinka fear to die without male issue, in
whom the survival of their names—the only kind of immortality
they know—will be assured.’’6 When a man dies without issue
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to carry on his name, members of his family are under a moral
obligation to marry a woman for him, to live with a relative and
beget children to his name. Equally, a man who dies leaving behind a widow of childbearing age devolves a moral obligation on
his kinsmen to have one of them cohabit with her to continue
bearing children to his name.
This worldly orientation of religion has the effect of making
the Dinka intensely religious, with high standards of moral values. The consequences of good and evil for the Dinka are not
deferred; they are here and now. And every illness or misfortune
is believed to have some moral cause in the actions of the victim,
a close relative, or an evildoer. Charles and Brenda Seligman observed, ‘‘The Dinka, and their kindred the Nuer, are intensely
religious, in our experience by far the most religious peoples in
the Sudan.’’7 Major Titherington, whose encounter with the
Dinka went back to the early days of colonial rule, wrote of the
‘‘higher moral sense of the Dinka.’’8 In the words of Godfrey
Lienhardt:
God is held ultimately to reveal the truth and falsehood, and in
doing so, to provide a sanction for justice between men. Cruelty,
lying, cheating, and all other forms of injustice are hated by God,
and the Dinka suppose that, in some way, if concealed by men,
they will be revealed by him. . . . God is made the final judge of
right and wrong, when men feel sure that they are in the right.
God is, then, the guardian of faith—and sometimes signifies to
man what really is the case, behind or beyond their errors of falsehood.9

The hierarchy of spiritual authority in this world is headed by
the father as the representative of God and the ancestors. God is
believed to create every person in the mother’s womb, using
man’s ‘‘urine of birth,’’ and although this means that both parents are partners in creation, the values of ancestral continuity
give the father seniority over the mother. But dominant as men
are in Dinka society, women occupy a paradoxically pivotal role,
not only because they are the main source of wealth through
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marriage, but especially because society depends on them to rear
the children and inculcate in them the values on which the lineage system is founded. Because the relationship between the
mother and child is so intimate during the formative years of
infancy and childhood, her influence is critical. A Dinka mother
will nurse for two to three years, during which period she must
devote her full attention to the child and avoid any sexual relationship with her husband. To violate this taboo is believed to
cause a spiritual contamination that may bring illness and perhaps death, not only to the child, but also to other babies in the
neighborhood.
On reaching the age of weaning, a child, whether male or female, especially a first-born, is sent to the mother’s relatives,
where the maternal connection is reinforced. The relationship
between a child and the maternal relatives, especially the grandfather and the uncle, is regarded as very special. Maternal relatives are generally believed to spoil their daughter’s children.
This is why the maternal grandfather and uncle are believed to
be uniquely effective in their power to bless or curse, for they
give a great deal that must affect the child’s conscience, in which
is rooted the efficacy of the curse.
And yet, while they develop in the child a special regard for his
maternal side, the influence is not directed toward turning him
against his paternal kin. On the contrary, the maternal relatives
realize that his position in society is dependent on his role in his
father’s family and how well he manages to promote the interest
of his clan. It is by succeeding among his parental kin that a child
can best project the image of his maternal relatives.
Of course, the Dinka, including the women, recognize as a fundamental premise the continuity of the male line and the way
it subordinates women to men, but mothers, both directly and
through their male relatives, exert such a dominating influence
on their children that society must guard against their potential
threat to the male-oriented ancestral values.10 The Dinka resolve
this paradox by recognizing two modes of filial love and affection
and ways of expressing them. Love for the mother is understood
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to be a function of the heart, which everyone knows a child feels
but which society dictates should not be too conspicuously expressed or displayed. On the contrary, a child is expected to be
very discreet about showing love and affection toward the
mother, avoid calling her ‘‘Mother,’’ and address her by her
name. From an early age, a child is required to resist his mother’s
influence, especially if it detracts from the ancestral ideals of family unity and solidarity.
On the other hand, since love for the father is considered a
function of the mind, it is expected to be cultivated and developed in a child and should be more visibly displayed, to make up
for any deficiency in the natural sentiments of love. One must
always refer to him as ‘‘Father,’’ never by his name, must obey
and revere him, and should take him as the model of what to be
and do in the service of ancestral ideals. As the symbol of unity
and solidarity around which family sentiments revolve, it is with
and toward him that all should identify and demonstrate unreserved loyalty, even if that should entail an open disavowal of the
sentiments for the mother and maternal connection. By and
large, the mother and her kin-group will understand that this in
no way detracts from their closer bond with the child.
The delicate balance between the collective interest of the family and the exclusive interest of the individual member is obvious
in the manner in which marriages are celebrated.11 Generally,
the Dinka recognize two parallel procedures in the performance
of marriage. Legal, social, and material formalities are left to be
arranged or negotiated by the elders, while courtship aimed at
winning the love, or at least the consent, of the girl is left to the
man and his friends or members of his age-set. Theoretically,
these two sets of roles should complement one another, but, in
fact, they do not always go together; indeed, they often come into
conflict. When they do, the position of the elders ideally should
prevail; but disregarding the wishes of young men or women is
not without risk. Quite often, to counter the position of their
elders or otherwise to assert themselves, young people will resort
to such alternatives as pregnancy, elopement, abduction, and,
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rarely, especially for women, suicide, more often than not as a
threat. Since Dinka social attitudes allow a considerable measure
of freedom for young men and women to meet and socialize,
there is always the opportunity for a couple to plan and do whatever they wish. It is therefore both pragmatic and prudent to
cater to their wishes.
The Social, Moral, and Spiritual Value of Cattle
The most important aspect of marriage among the Dinka is the
exchange of cattle. Conversely, one of the most significant values
of cattle is that they are directly responsible for the continuation
of the lineage and the race, since it is with cattle that men procure wives to beget children and perpetuate the ancestral line.
When a man is killed, whether intentionally or accidentally, his
relatives are compensated with cattle, which must be used to find
a wife who will live with one of them to beget children on behalf
of the dead man. Because they are so important to the attainment of their overriding social and spiritual goals, the Dinka regard cattle as sacred, approximating human beings in value.
They are indeed regarded as God’s special gift to the Dinka, and
therefore the most noble form of wealth.
Dinka mythology has it that at the beginning of things, God
gave the Black Man, by which they mean the Dinka, a choice
between the cow and a secret thing called ‘‘What.’’ When the
man reached for the cow, God warned him to consider carefully,
for there were great things in the secret of ‘‘What,’’ but the Dinka
kept eyeing the cow. God then said, ‘‘If you insist on having the
cow, then I advise you to taste her milk before you decide.’’ The
Dinka tasted the milk and declared, ‘‘Let us have the cow and
never see the secret of ‘What.’ ’’ That secret was later given to the
other races and became a source of their inquisitive minds, which
eventually led them to scientific and technological inventiveness.
The Dinka, on the other hand, has continued in his obsession
with cattle.
And yet, except for the sacred bulls, which are consecrated to
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the ancestral spirits and are kept in the possession of the family
head as studs, the most important animals from the viewpoint of
aesthetic cultural preoccupation are oxen, which have the least
economic value, but with which young men identify themselves
and are identified by the society. This is why they are known as
‘‘personality oxen.’’ Ownership of personality oxen is determined by their colors. The Dinka distribute all conceivable color
patterns to the male members of the family according to their
mother’s seniority of marriage and their own order of birth. Any
bull born into the herd or accruing through marriage automatically goes to the person whose color pattern it is. Once initiated,
a man is then formally recognized as the owner of the ox or oxen
with his color pattern, or is otherwise presented with one; and
from then on, the ox becomes a symbol of the young man’s personality, individuality, and social status. Both in terms of courtesy
and intimacy, he becomes known by a metaphoric name derived
from the color pattern of his ox and otherwise fully assimilates
himself into a world of poetic imagery and fantasy associated with
his ox in any way, color, or shape.
While young men view personality oxen as symbols of virility,
power, and defiance, a personality ox is a bull castrated from
early calf-hood and, therefore, also symbolizes docility and submissiveness to the will of the ‘‘father,’’ a term the Dinka apply to
the relationship between the owner and the personality ox. The
castrated bull-calf is raised by an owner who may ultimately not
be the one to derive aesthetic pleasure from the full-grown bull.
Once the ox has reached maturity, it may be kept by a member
of the family or bartered for a cow. Usually, the prime mover is
not the owner of the ox but a man interested in acquiring a personality ox, for which he is willing to give the more materially
valuable cow-calf. Bartering for a bull is itself an important event
celebrated by song, dance, and—ironically—a festive slaughtering of other animals for feasting.
The Ideals of the Dinka Social and Moral Order
Despite the warlike profile of the Dinka, their moral values emphasize the ideals of peace, unity, harmony, persuasiveness, and
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mutual cooperation. These values are highly institutionalized
and expressed in a concept known as cieng (pronounced
‘‘cheng’’), which is fundamental to Dinka moral and civic order.
Godfrey Lienhardt wrote of cieng: ‘‘The Dinka . . . have notions
. . . of what their society ought, ideally, to be like. They have
a word, cieng baai [baai meaning home, village, community, or
country], which used as a verb has the sense of ‘to look after’ or
‘to order,’ and in its noun form means ‘the custom’ or ‘the
rule.’ ’’12 Father Nebel, who lived among the Dinka and became
a leading expert on their culture and way of life, translated morals
as ‘‘good cieng’’ and benefactor as a man who knows and acts in
accordance with cieng. He also translates cieng to mean ‘‘behavior,’’ ‘‘habit,’’ ‘‘nature of,’’ or ‘‘custom.’’13
At the core of cieng are such ‘‘human’’ values as dignity and
integrity, honor and respect, loyalty and piety, and the power of
persuasiveness. Cieng does not merely advocate unity and harmony through attuning individual interests to the interests of
others; it requires assisting one’s fellowmen. Good cieng is opposed to coercion and violence, for solidarity, harmony, and mutual cooperation are more fittingly achieved voluntarily and by
persuasion.
Cieng has the sanctity of a moral order not only inherited from
the ancestors, who had in turn received it from God, but also
fortified and policed by them. Failure to adhere to its principles
is not only disapproved of as an antisocial act warranting punishment, but, more importantly, as a violation of the moral code
that may invite a spiritual curse—illness or death, according to
the gravity of the violation. Conversely, a distinguished adherence to the ideals of cieng receives temporal and spiritual rewards. Although cieng is a concept with roots in the heritage of
the ancestors who still sanction adherence to its principles, it is
largely an aspiration that is only partially adhered to and, indeed,
often negated. Hence, it can be improved upon even through
innovation.
The contradiction between the requirements of cieng and the
violent reputation of the Dinka can be explained in terms of the
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gap between the ideal and the real, institutionally manifest in the
differences between generational roles. While elders strive to live
by the ideals, the young warriors find self-fulfillment, social recognition, and dignity in their valor, fighting ability, and defensive
solidarity. Consequently, they tend to overindulge in militancy,
often provoking wars that must then be fought by all. Nevertheless, frequent and pervasive as it is, warfare reflects a negation of
the ideals, an alternative that should only be resorted to when
peaceful methods have failed.
By the same token, chiefs, even when young, must be men of
peace. One chief, reacting to the assertion that, traditionally,
force was the deterrent behind Dinka social order, articulated
the delicate balance between the violence of youth and the
peacemaking role of chiefs: ‘‘It is true, there was force. People
killed one another and those who could defeat people in battle
were avoided with respect. But people lived by the way God had
given them. There were the Chiefs of the Sacred Spear. If anything went wrong, they would come to stop the . . . fighting and
settle the matter without blood . . . Men [chiefs] of the [sacred]
spear were against bloodshed.’’14 And in the words of another
chief, ‘‘There was the power of words. It was a way of life with its
great leaders . . . not a way of life of the power of the arm.’’15
While it was not always easy for the elders to control the overzealous warriors, it was a clearly established principle that the
warriors should adhere to the will of their chiefs and elders.
When they had to confront aggression and justifiably go to war,
they were blessed by their spiritual leaders, chiefs, instructed on
the ethics of warfare, and, trusting in the justice of their cause,
counted on their ancestral spirits and deities to ensure their victory against the forces of evil. Among the ethical principles of
warfare were that the enemy must not be ambushed or killed
outside the battlefield and that a fallen warrior covered by a
woman for protection [women accompany men in battle primarily to help the wounded] must be spared, as harming women and
children in war was strictly forbidden.
It is particularly noteworthy that despite the lack of police or

66

THE WORLD OF THE DINKA

military forces, civil order was maintained with a very low level
of crime, other than those incidents associated with honorable
fighting or pursuit of self-help forms of justice. Major Court
Treatt, who traveled in Dinkaland in the late 1920s, described the
Dinka as ‘‘a gentleman’’ who ‘‘possesses a high sense of honor,
rarely telling a lie,’’ and with ‘‘a rare dignity of bearing and outlook.’’16 And Major Titherington, who served as a colonial administrator among the Dinka also in the late 1920s, wrote of ‘‘the
higher moral sense which is so striking in the [Dinka]. Deliberate
murder—as distinct from killing in fair fight—is extremely rare;
pure theft—as opposed to the lifting of cattle by force or stealth
after a dispute about rightful ownership—is unknown; a man’s
word is his bond, and on rare occasions when a man is asked to
swear, his oath is accepted as a matter of course.’’17 Sir Gawain
Bell, who served as District Commissioner among the Ngok
Dinka in the 1950s, observed, ‘‘I can’t remember that we ever
had a serious crime in that part of the District. Among the Baggara [Arabs] . . . there was a good deal of serious crime: murders
and so forth; and the same applied to the Hamar in the North
. . . The Ngok Dinka were a particularly law-abiding people.’’18
One of the ways in which Dinka culture sustains a level of conformity and continuity is by providing alternative access to dignity that accommodates and institutionalizes even elements of
what would otherwise be a violation of the norms. As already
mentioned, an initiated man is adheng, a ‘‘gentleman’’; his virtue
is dheeng (pronounced ‘‘thëng’’). But initiation is only a key or a
point of entry to the complex values of dheeng and their varied
avenues to individual and social dignity. Dheeng is a word of multiple meanings—all positive. As a noun, it means nobility, beauty,
handsomeness, elegance, charm, grace, gentleness, hospitality,
generosity, good manners, discretion, and kindness. Except in
prayer or on certain religious occasions, singing and dancing are
dheeng. Personal decoration, initiation ceremonies, celebrations
of marriages, the display of ‘‘personality oxen’’—indeed, any
demonstrations of aesthetic value are considered dheeng. The social background of a man, his physical appearance and bearing,
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the way he carries himself, walks, talks, eats, or dresses, and the
way he behaves toward his fellowmen are all factors in determining his dheeng.
From its various meanings, one can discern at least three kinds
of dheeng or dignity. The first derives from birth or marriage into
a family with already-established status. The second is the status
people acquire through material resources and social responsiveness, which is measured not only in terms of generosity and hospitality, but also by personal integrity and responsible conduct.
The third is more sensual in nature and stems from physical attractiveness and various forms of aesthetic display.
To the Dinka, power and wealth must serve moral and social
ends, or else they do not confer dheeng on the holder. The word
for chief, beny, also means ‘‘rich,’’ or ‘‘wealthy,’’ but a man of
wealth who is stingy or frugal is ayur, the opposite of adheng, and
his indignity is yuur. Conversely, a man of modest means who is
generous and hospitable is praised as adheng, and even as beny.
On the other hand, a man who is exaggeratedly generous or hospitable far beyond his means is considered vain and a show-off,
alueth (a word which also means ‘‘liar’’); although he is not despised in the way a stingy person with means would be, his performance falls short of dheeng. The ideal behavior is for a person
to have the means and to display a social consciousness commensurate with them. That is adheng in the ideal sense.
Divine Leadership and Intergenerational Dynamics
A final set of concepts crucial to the values of leadership are dom,
establishing control over a group, muk, maintaining and sustaining the group, and guier, improving the lot of the group. Each of
these concepts connotes the observance of the principles of cieng
and dheeng. A chief establishes control and ‘‘holds’’ the land for
the people, not only by the mere fact of wielding legitimate
power and authority, but also by using his position wisely to ensure peace, security, and prosperity. The continuity and stability
of that state of affairs is maintained through muk, which literally
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means ‘‘keeping,’’ a word also applied to child-rearing, including
handling, feeding, looking after, protecting, and raising. Guier
goes a little further to imply improvement of the existing situation, whether through reconstruction or reform within the
framework of existing societal norms. These values are mutually
reinforcing and cyclic in nature. When a chief has taken over the
reins of power (dom), has stabilized his benevolent control over
the situation (muk), and has introduced reforms to ensure a constructive and stable leadership (guier), he is described as having
held (dom) the land.
Traditionally, a Dinka chief is not a ruler in the Western sense
but a spiritual leader whose power rests on divine enlightenment
and wisdom. In his installation ceremonies, people raise his right
hand toward the sky, symbolizing the will of his people and acceptance by the divine powers above. In order to reconcile his
people, the chief should be a model of virtue, righteousness, and,
in Dinka terms, ‘‘a man with a cool heart,’’ who must depend on
persuasion and consensus rather than coercion and dictation.
The word for ‘‘court’’ or ‘‘trial,’’ luk, also means ‘‘to persuade.’’
Godfrey Lienhardt wrote on this aspect of the Dinka:
I suppose anyone would agree that one of the most decisive marks
of a society we should call in a spiritualized sense ‘‘civilized’’ is a
highly developed sense and practice of justice, and here, the Nilotics, with their intense respect for the personal independence and
dignity of themselves and others, may be superior to societies
more civilized in the material sense. . . . The Dinka and the Nuer
are a warlike people, and have never been slow to assert their
rights as they see them by physical force. Yet, if one sees Dinka
trying to resolve a dispute according to their own customary law,
there is often a reasonableness and a gentleness in their demeanor, a courtesy and a quietness in the speech of those elder
men superior in status and wisdom, and attempt to get at the
whole truth of the situation before them.19

Paul Howell, who served as District Commissioner among the
Dinka in the 1950s, observed that the chief ‘‘represents the ‘voice
of the people’ and articulates . . . moral values inherent in the
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social system. He has the power to curse but is not expected to
use his powers to his own ends and certainly does not impose
his authority by threat or curse, unless, in so doing, he is in fact
representing the opinion of the more level-headed elements.’’20
Despite the ideals of Dinka concepts of power, a conspicuous
factor in their law was the minimum effectiveness of the chief
prior to the advent of colonial government and the reinforcement of the spiritual authority by the secular power of the state.
But it would seem consistent with the ideals of the system to view
violence as a negative aspect of an otherwise positive system of
values, or as the outcome of the upheavals of the nineteenth century when, in local perception, the world, as they knew it, was
‘‘spoiled’’ and the fundamental role of the warrior became an
exaggerated necessity. As Major Titherington expressed it, ‘‘That
the system worked at all speaks well for the higher moral sense
which is so striking in the [Dinka].’’21
Tradition and the Cyclical Stability of Society
A good illustration of the self-contained viability, stability, and
continuity of the system is that there are hardly any words in the
vernacular language that approximate the concept of ‘‘development’’ in modern usage. The notion of endeavoring to elevate
society or individuals to a yet unrealized higher (and better) level
of existence through a process called ‘‘development’’ was traditionally foreign to the Dinka. Individual and societal goals, even
to the optimum degree, were considered part of experience,
which was achievable, and, indeed, at one time or another, actually achieved. Cieng and related values are seen as part of a heritage that has proved its worth over generations and has become
sanctified and elevated, even though it may have negative aspects. Such negative aspects are hardly ever visible to the Dinka.
When a Dinka was asked what he thought was negative in his
people’s ways, he responded with an expressive silence, a puzzled
look, a smile, and then said, ‘‘How can there be anything bad in
the Dinka way? If there were, would it not have been abandoned
long ago?’’
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Dinka Self-Perception of Wealth
While certain objective factors are globally accepted as indicators
of affluence or poverty, whether individuals or groups perceive
themselves as rich or poor may not always be a matter of objective
determination. Subjective factors attributable to culture may play
a vital role in the way people view themselves in terms of wealth
or poverty. Global perspectives on poverty imply both integration
into the comparative framework and marginalization or exclusion
within that framework, which then closely corresponds to a state
of poverty or relative deprivation. From a policy standpoint, there
are both positive and negative implications to the way people are
classified or perceive themselves. To be labeled poor is to establish
a case for corrective measures toward poverty alleviation, which is
positive; but it could also breed apathy, self-pity, and dependency.
A positive self-perception might breed complacency, which would
be negative; but it could also enhance the sense of worth as a
resource for self-reliance.
Self-Exaltation in Reverence to the Ancestral Legacy
Dinka self-perceptions of wealth reflect their cultural values,
which are intrinsically geared toward a positive self-image as a
legacy of reverence for the ancestors. The goal of immortalizing
a person in an ancestral chain through remembrance depends
largely on continued social esteem and veneration. To the Dinka,
poverty implies a demeaning status that is inimical to the exalted
image required for honoring the dead through living memory. A
corollary of this is the social, moral, and spiritual value the Dinka
place on cattle as the resource for ensuring the continuity of the
lineage through bridewealth. And indeed, while there are no reliable statistics, the Dinka are probably among the wealthiest in
cattle on the African continent. The average bridewealth (i.e.,
what a man pays in marriage) is around fifty cows, while the bridewealth for daughters of prominent families can go as high as
two hundred cows. Bloodwealth (i.e., compensation paid for
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homicide) is normally estimated to be the equivalent of the average bridewealth as it is intended to be used in obtaining a wife to
beget children to the name of the deceased, or, in the case of a
female, to compensate for the loss of potential bridewealth or
reproductivity. The distribution system itself fosters a degree of
social equity through the exchange of cattle in marriage and
other reciprocal kinship obligations.
The Dinka always exalt their forebears as the ideal model of
their cultural values—material, social, moral, and spiritual. No
Dinka ever claims to have done better than his forebears. Traditionally, no Dinka would even entertain such a thought. What
one does, and however successful one is, tends to be seen as an
effort to live up to the standards set by the forebears. These lines
indicate the extent to which the Dinka brag about their forebears
as the epitome of prosperity:
My father, Ring, was called by his father
He seated him down by his side
Affectionately rubbed his head
And left him these words,
‘‘Son, Ring, there are the cattle.
Cattle are the prosperity of man.‘‘
My great father had a cattle-camp
His house became rich with herds
The cattle-byres were full.22
*******
Our clan has never been in need
The clan of Ajong de Monydhang has never been in need of cattle
From our ancestor, Jok,
To Achai, our girl with the River Spirits
Prosperity has remained forever with us.23
*******
When my father left me
I was only a small child,
But I grew up and matured
To revive the legacy of my father.
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While the dependent members of the family are subordinated
in the control over cattle, wives and dependent sons compensationally preoccupy themselves with cattle symbolized by personality oxen. For male youth, status is enhanced not only by the
man’s identification with his personality ox, but by the exaltation
of his ancestry and the lineage through which he acquires the
ox.
When I rise to sing [over my ox], gossipers disperse
I am like my forefathers
I rise to be seen by my ancient fathers
I rise to be seen walking with pride
As it was in the distant past
Where our clan was born.24

The payment of cattle as bridewealth accounts for the stability
of marriage and the rarity of divorce. Bridewealth is contributed
by a wide circle of a man’s relatives and distributed among a correspondingly large circle of relatives on the bride’s side. If a divorce should occur, unless the marriage has been stabilized
through children (in which case divorce is even less conceivable),
bridewealth cattle must be returned; traditionally, the original
cows and their offspring were traced and returned. Since some
of them would have been passed on for the bridewealths of other
relatives, one divorce could threaten other marriages. Divorce is
therefore viewed as a tragedy to be avoided, except in the most
compelling cases of extreme incompatibility.25
As important as cattle are to the Dinka, land has an even
greater intrinsic value to them, not only because they depend on
it in a wide variety of ways, including farming, gathering, and
grazing, but also because it is associated with the ancestors. A
Dinka will swear on the land to establish his truthfulness, symbolizing his submission to the judgment of the ancestors. Before
drinking or eating, especially in a new setting, one must offer to
the ancestors portions on the ground. And before adults can
share in the consumption of new crops, festive offerings must
first be made to the ancestors. These rituals, which are associated
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with the value of ancestral land, have a bearing on the rules favoring perpetuity in traditional land tenure.
The Conservative Implication of Self-Perception of Wealth
The outcome of these values and processes is that the Dinka traditionally saw themselves as members of a society whose reciprocal relationships were mutually beneficial; a people endowed
with a land of plenty and blessed with the ideal wealth—cattle.
As one Dinka elder proudly expressed it, ‘‘You are the Dinka
inhabiting this vast territory of rich grassland and the keeper of
cattle.’’26 Another elder went further: ‘‘It is for cattle that we are
admired, we, the Dinka . . . All over the world, people look to us
because of cattle. And when they say, Sudan, it is not just because
of our color, it is also because of our great wealth; and our wealth
is cattle. . . . It is because of cattle that people of other tribes look
to us with envy.’’27 Yet another elder saw Dinkaland as the source
of wealth and sustainability for the country: ‘‘One day, should
tragedy befall this country, the survival of the black people will
start here . . . Should we abandon this land with all its blessings,
our descendants will blame us.’’28 And that was before oil was
discovered in their land.
Dinka pride in their culture, cattle wealth, and land has been
heavily documented and given to explain their conservative attitude. A Christian missionary observed in 1949: ‘‘One of the determinants of the rapid or slow spread of Christianity in the
South [Sudan] has been provided by the contrast between seminomadic, cattle-breeding Nilotic tribes (Shilluk, Nuer, and
Dinka) and the settled agriculturists. The life of the former is
bound up with a cow economy, this animal being a veritable god.
They are intensely conservative and very proud of their civilization.’’29 The anthropologist, Audrey Butt, also wrote of the Nilotics: ‘‘They consider their country the best in the world and
everyone inferior to themselves. For this reason they . . . scorn
European and Arab culture . . . They are self-reliant and extremely conservative in their aversion to innovation and interference.’’30
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But Nilotic conservatism has been grossly exaggerated. It has
now become apparent that throughout earlier historical phases,
they rejected what they considered not worth adopting and selected what they considered desirable, assimilating it into their
own culture to the point where it eventually lost its foreign character. Their so-called resistance to change was indeed augmented
by the colonial policies, which kept the tribes isolated and tried
to preserve traditional cultures. As a result of intensive cross-cultural interaction and of modern education, the process of adopting foreign ways has been accelerated and revolutionized so
much that the Nilotics are demonstrating more adaptability to
change than could have been predicted only two decades ago.
One can hypothesize that the same values of pride and dignity
that had made them resist change may well provide them with
the motivation to enhance their status and self-image through
modernization.

Modernity and Diminishing Self-Image
Colonialism brought the various groups in the Sudan together
within the modern state, but kept them apart and introduced
modernization selectively and discriminatingly, especially as between the North and the South. In the South, limited social services in the fields of education and health care were provided
through the Christian missionaries, whose primary objective was
proselytization. There was also some exposure to the market
economy and labor migration into towns.
The Impact of Labor Migration
Labor migration elicited a mixed response. It provided young
men with the opportunity to acquire independent wealth, but
paid labor was seen as servility, an indignity that was inappropriate for a ‘‘gentleman.’’ They mitigated this indignity by migrating
for labor far away from the Dinka context and in a country where
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one was unknown. The Dinka saying goes, ‘‘Dheeng, Dignity, remain; yuur, indignity, let us travel,’’ which means pocketing one’s
pride in a foreign land. Another saying states that, ‘‘Adheng, a
nobleman of one’s tribe is not known to a nobleman of another
tribe.’’ Despite the mitigating factor in labor migration, the conditions experienced in the urban setting were considered inimical to Dinka values, especially the solidarity of kinship ties:
I have become a slave,
Laboring in a foreign land,
Cracking my back-bones like a captured bird,
I worked in the cotton field until my hair turned grey,
It was not the grey of age;
It was the bitter pain of the words in our heads,
As we wasted away in foreign lands.
O Marial, what I have found, I will not say. . . .31
The riches that I hear of in towns;
People live to old age buying and selling . . .
The family has lost its value;
Blood ties have been severed in the pockets,
Even a son of your maternal aunt
When you ask him for help
Will first invoke the name of God,
‘‘May I die, Brother, see my pocket
If you find a millieme (a penny), you are lucky.‘‘
In towns, people dance to the drums in their pockets
If one has nothing, one goes with nothing.32

The Devastations of the Civil War
The civil war that has raged intermittently for nearly five decades
between the Arab-Muslim North and the more indigenously African South has been perhaps the most radicalizing and destabilizing factor in Dinka life. And by creating conditions of extreme
deprivation and degradation, it has ironically been a source of
motivation in the quest for a modernizing change.
It is now estimated that the war has cost the South over two
million lives, displaced over four million Southerners inside the
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country, and forced half a million into the neighboring countries
as refugees. Quite apart from its death toll, the war has inflicted
on the people of the South unprecedented conditions of deprivation and degradation. Even the life of a refugee, which ensures a
reasonable level of protection and assistance from the international community, is a source of great indignity for a people who
had grown up thinking of themselves and their country as second
to none. These lines from a song of lamentation during the first
phase of the war are illustrative:
Gentlemen grind grain in the land of the Congo;
The Arab has remained at home
He has remained in our land.
We left our herds in the cattle-camps
And followed Deng Nhial.
Gentlemen beg in the land of the Congo;
A Congolese said, ‘‘Dinkas are matata.’’
I asked Ngor Maker,
‘‘What does matata mean?’’
Ngor Maker replied,
‘‘He says we are bad.’’
My heart was destroyed
And I thought of Anger, the daughter of Wol Ayalbyor,
I wish I could see her again.33

The current war is revealing another side of the people of the
South. Unlike the 1955–72 movement, which called for secession, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A),
which has championed the Southern cause since 1983, has postulated the goal of creating a New Sudan that would be free from
any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or culture.
This is perceived as tantamount to the reversal of Arab-Islamic
hegemony in favor of a more African identity for the country.
Although Southerners would overwhelmingly choose secession
and the call for a new united Sudan is perceived by many as a
euphemistic disguise of separatist aspirations, radical ArabIslamic elements in the North took the threat from the South
seriously and began to counter it by organizing and mobilizing
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Islamic revivalism, which eventually seized power in 1989
through a military coup. Their success in radicalizing Islam politically has only led to the polarization of the nation in a militaristic contest for the soul of the country. The competing vision from
the South rejects any scheme of power sharing that would give
Southerners only local control: ‘‘What about the Sudan, to whom
shall we leave it?’’34 The Arab is now seen as an intruder who
must give way to the true owners of the country:
It is Omdurman which we shall contest
It is Khartoum which we shall contest
It is Sudan which we shall contest
O people, the land is our land.35

This positive self-assertiveness by the freedom fighters tells only
an aspect of the story, one that is perhaps spotlighted by its military fervor and the nationalist aspirations that it represents. In
the broader social context, a more tragic process of self-doubt
and diminishing self-image appears to be the consequence of
change and its dehumanizing integration of the indigenous population of the South into the state framework, dominated by the
Arab-Muslim North. As a consequence of their relegation to an
inferior status in the modern Sudanese and global contexts, the
Dinka now appear to have accepted that their traditional culture
and way of life are indeed wanting. Since their religious thought
dictates that everything has an intrinsic meaning, ultimately related to the origin of things and the manifestation of God’s will,
they have begun to internalize this new awareness into their belief system to give it a convincing explanation. A body of oral
literature has begun to emerge in which the Dinka are beginning
to rationalize their relegated position. Even the myth of their
original acquisition of cattle as the most noble symbol of wealth
is being seen more as an explanation of their scientific and technological backwardness, attributed to their original choice of the
cow in preference to the thing called ‘‘What,’’ which is now being
perceived to have been later given to the Europeans and the
Arabs and became the source of their material superiority and
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power. In the following lines, the singer attributes the hardships
of urban labor to the inequitable distribution of resources
among the races at the time of creation.
God hates us for the things of the past.
The ancient things he created with us,
When he gave the black man the cow
Leaving behind the Book of his father,
Our curse goes to the elders of the original land;
The man who threw the Book away,
Is it he who gave us into slavery?36

Another myth explains that the black man was relegated to a
status inferior to his white and brown brothers because his
mother favored him, forcing their father to plead with God to
take care of the disadvantaged children. As one elder commented, ‘‘That has remained a curse on us. Our father did not
show us the ways of our ancestors fully. . . . Otherwise, we would
have known more things than we know.’’37
Godfrey Lienhardt analyzed the process by which the Dinka,
who had taken their superiority for granted, came to accept a
significant degree of inferiority. ‘‘The Dinka view of age-sets,
based on a cyclical notion of local history, begins to be displaced
by a dynamic view of history, accompanied by a philosophy of
progress, and with teleological overtones.’’38 The new notion of
‘‘getting ahead’’ begins to be directed toward some distant, more
universal end, defined in foreign terms and for a society based
on foreign models, rather than one conceived of by the Dinka.

The New Challenge for the Dinka
As the impact of the outside world on the Dinka intensified, traditional pride began to wane, occasionally resurfacing defensively, but otherwise submerging in the quest for selfimprovement through development. In a series of interviews conducted in the 1970s with chiefs and elders from different parts of
Dinkaland, this ambivalent merger was most striking. The seven-
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teen-year civil war (1955–72) had just ended with the Addis
Ababa Agreement that granted the South regional autonomy.
Development was projected as a national ideology that would replace the war psychology. The ruling socialist revolution had
abolished native administration in the North and, although it was
allowed to continue in the South, chiefs had reason to be apprehensive that they, too, might be affected. That presumably added
to their determination to prove themselves capable of meeting
the demands of development.39
As a result of this new challenge, the principle of continued
identity and influence, essentially geared toward a backwardlooking veneration of the ancestors and the forefathers, with age
as the source of knowledge and wisdom, began to be reconceptualized in a forward-looking emphasis on educated youths and
their contribution to building the future. Chief Arol Kachwol articulated this in terms that delicately balanced tradition and
change:
It is God who changes the world by giving successive generations
their turns. For instance, our ancestors, who have now disappeared, by the way their world began and the way they lived, they
held the horns of their life. Then God changed things; things
changed until they reached us; and they will continue to change.
When God comes to change your world, it will be through you
and your wife. You will sleep together and bear a child. When that
happens, you should know that God has passed to your children
borne by your wife the things with which you lived your life.40

Arol Kachwol was even more empathetic about the generational change:
Our stories are gone. New stories will now begin with you. The
ancient stories you were asking us about have had their turn. The
time has now come for your own stories to begin. So, instead of us
being the story-tellers, it is now for you to be the story-tellers. It is
also for you to bear your children for the stories you are now about
to tell.41

In response to the question of how he saw the future relations
between the North and the South, Chief Arol Kachwol re-
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sponded: ‘‘It is not really for you people to ask us that question
. . . It is you people who know the good things that will come out
of this. And it is you people who know what may go wrong in it
. . . It is also for you to tell us, ‘Our people, this is the way we can
make our country go ahead.’ ’’42
Chief Ayeny Aleu addressed himself to the prevention and
cure of human and animal diseases, the procurement of tractors
for cultivating the fields, the provision of potable water, and the
promotion of education. Chief Thon Wai also spoke on education, agriculture, marketing, and health services:
Let all the chiefs speak about opening schools. Let them speak
about cultivating crops. Crops provide food as well as products for
sale . . . to provide cash which can be used for developing the
country . . . Diseases are on the increase. There is a disease called
kalazaar, which is killing people, and a disease which causes headaches . . . Diseases which did not exist at the time of our grandfathers. And what brought them? It is because those foreigners
came and other foreigners came and people intermingled. All the
disease which were absent are now amidst us. For these we need
hospitals.43

And yet, some of the old self-perceptions of the Dinka as
wealthy linger on, as evidenced by the fact that the chiefs consider their people capable of financing their own development.
Chief Thon Wai posed a question and provided the answer: ‘‘And
with what money will [schools and hospitals] be built? They will
be built with the money of [our] people. The chief must collect
the money, . . . ask his people to build houses and then say to the
government, ‘We want a doctor to be brought.’ ’’44 So radical
have the Dinka become in their commitment to development
that, according to the chiefs’ accounts, there is now a striking
willingness to change the traditional Dinka ways, including their
attitude toward cattle. According to Chief Makuei Bilkuei: ‘‘I told
all my people, ‘The North burned down our villages during the
war. Everything is now gone . . . You people are going to remain
behind. When I come back from Juba, I want the cattle to be
made use of. We have to make use of our cattle.’ ’’45
Development, the chiefs contend, requires considerable self-
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sacrifice as an investment in a better future. In line with their
procreational values, the present generation is called upon to
sacrifice for the benefit of generations to come: ‘‘We have to
leave them in a cleared field [where] no scrubs will pierce their
feet and no thorns will hurt their faces and nothing . . . will happen to them . . . nothing like the things we are now experiencing.’’46
Whether it is a manifestation of characteristics hitherto hidden
by their isolationism, the result of the impact of the civil war, or
simply adaptability to their present circumstances, the Dinka are
demonstrating a degree of commitment to development that
would surprise the observers of the 1950s. Development appears
to be both an objective pursuit and a subjective resort—a material
and moral defense against current insecurities. At the initial stage,
focus appears to be on the provision of social services, such as
education and health, but the long-term objective is the transformation of society in modern terms, sadly impossible under the
prevailing war conditions.

From the Cow to the Pursuit of ‘‘What’’
The civil war that has ravaged the Southern Sudan since 1955 has
inflicted upon the people one of the worst humanitarian tragedies and indignities of modern times. To the world, the Dinka
are now known not for their cattle wealth, cultural pride, and
general self-esteem, but rather for their destitution, starvation,
and even the indignity of slavery.
In response, the Dinka not only yearn for peace and security,
but have become keenly aware of the need to improve their lot
and try to catch up with development, previously alien to their
culture, but now voiced with an almost obsessive sense of purpose. And yet, not once did any of the chiefs and elders interviewed describe their condition as one of poverty. Quite the
contrary, what comes through is a paradoxically positive determination to overcome their predicament, with considerable self-
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confidence that they possess the human and material resources
to do so. It is that self-confidence in both the conversion of cattle
to the cash economy and the mobilization of human resources
that makes Dinka positive self-perception a significant asset for
development. The Dinka now demonstrate willingness to give up
the cow in pursuit of the thing called ‘‘What,’’ given a conducive
environment of peace, security, and the power to determine
their own destiny.
Will a downward slide in self-perception lead the Dinka to recognize that they are poor, or will they sustain a degree of positive
self-image, even as they recognize their underdevelopment and
the need to improve their lot by modern standards? The answer
to this question will probably depend on the outcome of the civil
war and the post-war strategy for reconstruction and development. If the South succeeds in achieving self-determination,
whether within the framework of a united Sudan or through separation, and if their program of reconstruction and development
is culturally oriented as a process of self-enhancement from
within, then it is possible that Dinka tradition could not only sustain a positive self-image in the process, but could indeed be a
vital resource in a self-reliant development. Appreciating these
options is essential to the conceptualization, formulation, and
implementation of appropriate development policies and strategies.47
Although all that is now being shattered by the civil war, the
premise of this chapter is that notions of wealth and poverty are
only meaningful within a given cultural context. Attitudes similar
to those of the Dinka have been observed among pastoral peoples throughout Africa, and, while the poverty of the continent is
taken for granted, there are voices throughout Africa that resist
this blanket classification, invoking the wealth of the continent
in untapped natural resources, vibrant indigenous cultures, and
dynamic human potential. For policy purposes, a positive selfimage is, in itself, a vital resource for self-reliant development.
To be constructive, development policies and strategies must be
appropriately contextualized to make effective use of people’s
traditional values and institutions behind a positive self-image.

Part 2
The traditions and customs of different occupations and professions
have evolved over thousands of years and greatly influence both
individual and societal reactions to humanitarian crises. For example, a physician might respond to the exact same challenge in a
manner quite at odds from that of a policeman, and yet there are
universal values that can be found in almost any occupation. Honesty, dependability, loyalty, respect for others and for the land are
common traits in every field. In this part, I asked highly respected
representatives of four different disciplines to view humanitarian action, and its needs, from their own unique professional viewpoint.
Major General Timothy Cross has had a distinguished military
career with involvement in most of the major wars in the last three
decades. As a good soldier must, he has been formed by the practices and customs that sustain armies as cohesive fighting forces. He
also has had the opportunity to work with humanitarian agencies in
relieving civilian hardships in the midst of armed conflict. He contributed a chapter on the interaction of military and NGOs in crises
to a sister volume (Emergency Relief Operations) in this series.
Joseph A. O’Hare, S.J., to whom this book is dedicated, was a
missionary teacher and editor before assuming the presidency of a
large urban university. He knows the constraints as well as the potential of academia and reminds us that in intellectual debate and
the search for truth, the goals of institutions of higher learning, the
old virtues of respect and civility, must prevail.
Tom Brokaw, the leading television network news anchor in the
United States, documents the price his profession must be prepared
to pay in order to maintain the basic freedom that we expect from
our press and communication system. He brings to society a per-
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spective grounded partially in the skills of reporting the daily news,
and partially in the proud traditions that bind journalists into a
global family.
Finally, I include in this part a chapter on my own profession,
medicine. In Western medicine, we trace our clinical approach back
to ancient Greek physicians. But the foundations of healing, the
emphasis on respect for the patient, on confidentiality, on the need
for a scientific assessment, and continued efforts to maintain competency by continuous study are common in almost all other cultures. I have asked a colleague, Eoin O’Brien, M.D., to not only
present the traditions and values of medicine but to reflect on how
our noble profession might improve its capacity to contribute to
humanitarian actions.

5

Military Values and Traditions
Major General Timothy Cross, CBE, FCIT, FILT
Every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been
a soldier.
Dr. Johnson
The safety and honour of Britain depend not on her
wealth and administration, but on the character of her
people. This in turn depends on the institutions, which
form character. In war, it depends, in particular, on the
military institutions which create the martial habits of
discipline, courage, loyalty, pride and endurance.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
Walker Trust Lecture on Leadership, 1934,
before the University of St. Andrews

Introduction
I have been asked to write on the values and traditions that the
military bring to the world of complex emergencies and humanitarian operations. But before setting out my stall, I must first lay
some foundations.
I write as a professional soldier of over thirty years, and as a
British Commander who has taken part in a number of deployments around the world; Northern Ireland on bomb disposal
work in the 1970s; Cyprus with the United Nations in 1980; the
1990–91 Gulf Campaign as the Commander Supply of the U.K.’s
1st Armoured Division; and the Balkans with NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), and Kosovo
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Force (KFOR), the latter bringing me in particularly close contact with the international aid agencies and nongovernmental organizations in Northern Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo. As I
write this chapter, I am also heavily involved in the planning for
potential operations in the Gulf again.
While this all gives me some experience in the world of complex emergencies, I do recognize, as H. G. Wells once said, that:
The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind. No man of high intellectual ability would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.

I am such a man! And my thoughts set out below must be set
in that context!
That said, I must first stress that there is no such thing as ‘‘the
military’’—no more than there is ‘‘the NGO.’’ We are not dealing
here with a single, generic, and impersonal organization, but a
mix of professional and amateur, effective and non-effective, efficient and inefficient. All organizations are made up of unique,
individual people, and that applies to the military as well as any
other. And around the world there are many types of military
organizations. Some are conscript; some are full-time professionals. Some are a part of the state’s governing machine, be that a
dictatorship or military regime; some are servants of a democratically elected government. Some military are in well-paid careers;
others forced into poorly paid, short-term ‘‘contracts.’’ In some
continents the military are the cause of the problem; in others,
they are but a part of the solution. And there are many different
values and traditions.
I can only write about the values and traditions of the British
Forces, primarily the British Army, which I happen to believe is a
pretty professional, effective, and efficient organization. It is an
organization with wide operational experience across the globe
stretching back many centuries, from fighting wars to assisting
with disaster relief, and one with credibility and reputation. But
we—like every other army—have good and bad attributes. Within
our ranks, at all levels, are officers and soldiers who range from
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the brilliant, lateral thinking, and open-minded, to the less brilliant, orthodox, and somewhat less open-minded—men and
women whom H. G. Wells would instantly recognize! There is,
therefore, a danger that the picture I will now paint is an overrosy one. The reader must be the judge of that. My aim, nonetheless, is to establish a reference point against which the right military values and traditions can be judged—recognizing that all too
often, the reality is different. Throughout, I will refer mostly to
the army and soldiers, noting that it is largely they who engage
in land operations—but the arguments apply across all three services.

The Military Community
To assess the professionalism of any military organization, U.K.
defense policy says we must consider three components of fighting power. The first of these is the physical component—their
equipment, training, and logistic sustainability. The second is the
conceptual component—their understanding of warfare; how
they think, how they develop their concepts and strategies, and
how they have put them into practice historically. And the third
is the moral component—their leadership, values, ethics, and
culture. In one sense, this chapter is about all three, because values and traditions are nothing without the right equipment and
training, and the ability to use that equipment wisely and to good
effect; to bring relief to bear—to make a difference. But my real
focus here is on the moral component of fighting power. For it is
the strength of the moral component that, first, separates out the
‘‘good’’ military from the ‘‘bad’’ and, secondly, separates out the
military from the non-military players involved in complex emergencies and operations. Napoleon once said, ‘‘the moral is to the
physical as three is to one.’’ My own experience confirms that the
ability to get things done, to achieve success in any operation or
in any task, is as much, if not more, a state of mind as a piece of
equipment or an intellectual understanding of how to use that
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equipment. War, as Van Crefeld has said, is, before anything else,
a question of psychology; we must bear that in mind if we are to
understand military traditions and values.
The British Army is very committed to the concept of the
moral component, taking it very seriously indeed. One of the
most recent concrete examples of that is the publication in
March 2000 of the Values and Standards of the British Army booklet.
This booklet, which comes in two parts (one for Commanders
and one for every soldier), was issued by the then Chief of the
General Staff to reinforce that commitment, and to formally codify the standards of conduct essential to sustain the moral component of fighting power.1

The Military Versus the Non-Military
I will take my two earlier premises in reverse order. First, what
separates out the military from the non-military players?
Let me stress at the outset that the soldier is not chiefly a military figure; he/she is primarily a social figure, influenced by
home, upbringing, and historical traditions. A soldier is a soldier
(or sailor or airman) only because military training has imposed
a certain fixed pattern of behavior; above and beyond that the
soldier is a citizen of the nation. The army is inevitably (and
rightly) woven into the social fabric of a nation and it is, or
should be, an integral part of that nation. The true and ultimate
strength of a nation lies in its people, in their capacity to work,
in their vitality; in their national character. This national character helps produce the fighting soldier—and gives the soldier
many of the attributes he/she brings to an operation. The national character is therefore of immense importance, for anything that weakens the national character weakens the army.
Notwithstanding the impact of national character, and no matter what may be instilled, the soldier will nonetheless retain
much of his/her individuality. In part, this individuality is derived from what I call the ‘‘hardware’’ of life—genetics, the raw

MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY CROSS

89

building blocks that make up human inheritance. But genes do
not dictate, control, or direct life; they simply permit and limit—
they are, in effect, the cards that make up the hand we have been
dealt by the Almighty. How we play those cards is another story.
That is the interplay with the environment in which we are nurtured—the ‘‘software’’ of life. A soldier’s individual character,
like that of everyone else, is thus a blend of the ‘‘hardware’’ and
‘‘software’’ of life; it includes the environment of their upbringing, their national character, and their uniqueness—their own
particular gifts and abilities.
Now the world of nation-states is largely focused on the two
sectors that, on the face of it, are all that is needed to run a
successful society. The state and the economy, the government
and the market, politics and economics. The state/government/
politics is about society as a collective body; collectively the citizens agree to abide by certain laws, recognizing that it is their
collective but also (largely) individual interest to do so—we may
survive running a red light occasionally but most of us recognize
that our luck will run out if everyone were to do so on a regular
basis! The economy/market is about society made up of private
individuals who are free to choose to do what they like within the
framework of the law; to buy and sell as long as there is someone
willing to sell to them or buy from them. That’s the essence of it.
Power mediated through government, laws, politics, and the
courts; exchange mediated by money and the markets. Nations/
societies of any shade or color around the world have approached the execution of these two over the centuries in different ways, but most would still argue that any problem can be
solved by one or other, the state or the individual.
The military is, of course, bound into these two as well, getting
its legality and resources from both in turn. But the British military, like all military organizations within democratic societies, is
apolitical in its allegiance—my commission is from my Sovereign,
Her Majesty the Queen, not the British Government of the day—
and, to some degree, at least, the military lies outside the normal
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economic cycle; it does not (not yet, anyway) run a profit or loss
balance sheet! But it stands aside in a much more important way.
The military is usually a distinct community within society. The
individuals who together make it up are separated from the rest
of society by, on the one hand, military law—distinct and separate from civilian law2 —and, on the other hand, by a strong sense
of identity. Unlike politics and economics—which are essentially
zero sum games—the strength of the military comes from words
that lie within the moral component of fighting power; words
like integrity, honor, duty, commitment, trust, friendships, loyalty, and love. Jonathan Sachs, the British Chief Rabbi, calls such
things spiritual goods—as opposed to other goods, which we
label economic wealth or political power. Such spiritual goods
can’t be accounted for in terms of politics or economics, but they
are enormously powerful drivers in their own right. Sachs cites
friendship as an example. Suppose someone were to help me
because there were a law that says that in certain circumstances
they have to; then they are not helping me as a friend. Or suppose someone were to help me because I pay them; then again
they are not helping me as a friend. You cannot analyze friendship in terms of the law or the market; it is more than that. Nor
can you analyze integrity or duty in such a way. Yet on such goods
rests much of the values and traditions of the military community—labeled, under the umbrella of the moral component, as
ethos and culture as well as values and traditions.
Now the military is not the only institution that deals with spiritual goods—clearly religious institutions like the church do so,
too, as do other communities in their many different ways. But
society as a whole is less focused on such goods; there is less deference to authority and a greater awareness of individual rights.
It is also a less cohesive society, one in which traditional, shared
values are less effectively transmitted and concepts such as honor
and loyalty are, if still present, less well understood. Yet these
values are not abstract concepts to the military. Together they
must be nurtured in peace to ensure that they survive the testing
ground of battle. And this is why the military is different. Being
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made up of communities within a single community, regiments
and battalions, ships and air force squadrons with rich, individual
and collective histories, come together within a wider community
whose principal endeavor is unique.
Before looking at that principal endeavor, consider first the
regimental histories and traditions.

Regimental Tradition/Spirit and Comradeship
The men did not expect every officer to be a brilliant
leader, and they strongly hoped he would not be a
‘‘pusher,’’ but they expected him to put more than the
next man into the general reservoir of courage. They
did not look to him for ringing words of inspiration,
but they liked to be reminded that they were the best
mob in the line. No subaltern on the Western Front
had read, or heard of, Wolseley’s Pocket Book, but all
grew to recognize the truth which Wolseley set out:
‘‘The soldier is a peculiar being that can alone be
brought to the highest efficiency by inducing him to
believe that he belongs to a regiment that is infinitely
superior to the others round him.’’ That was the Old
Army’s source of strength; and that faith in the regiment could be agreed through twenty battalions with
very little dilution.
E. S. Turner, Gallant Gentlemen

A Polish Jew was once asked how he gained the courage and
strength to survive the horrors of a concentration camp. He replied that while character is the sum of many things, much of it
stems from all we do and learn in our early years. He explained
that Jewish history is full of examples of tragedy but also of individual and collective courage, from the Exile in the Old Testament to the purges/pogroms throughout the centuries. As a
child and a young student, he had learned all about that history,
and he had resolved that if a testing time should ever come to
him he would do his utmost to stand firm. He learned the lessons
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of the past and he carried them with him through his life; and
when the testing time came he did, indeed, stand firm, in conditions that most of us can never, if we are honest, really comprehend.
The traditions and regimental histories of the British Armed
Forces have always tried to provide this same kind of resolve. Military traditions around the world are built around historical successes (and, sometimes, failures). All young officers and soldiers
quickly become rooted in their regiment/battalion’s past in
order to help them maintain and uphold their honor in the future. Embedded in their lives today, men and women within
army regiments, naval ships/submarines, or air force squadrons
have a sense of the history that precedes them; through it they
find pride, both in the unit’s particular history and in the collective history of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in which they serve.
Regimental spirit is the soldier’s pride in the values and traditions of his/her regiment and the determination to be worthy
of those values and traditions; and it can be a powerful driver.
Remembering, with thanksgiving, the lessons of the past, bringing the lessons of the past into the present, and then carrying
them with us into the future.
But there is a difference between comradeship and regimental
spirit. Comradeship develops between a small group of men and
women who live and work and fight together. It is the spiritual
good of ‘‘friendship’’ that Sachs speaks of and, if regimental traditions are a powerful driver, comradeship is even more powerful. In the crisis of battle, the majority of soldiers will not derive
encouragement just from the glories of the past, but will seek aid
primarily from their leaders and comrades of the present. In
other words, most soldiers do not fight hard simply because their
ancestors fought well at the Battle of Minden two centuries ago,
but because their particular platoon or battalion has good leaders, is well disciplined, and has developed the feeling of comradeship and self-respect among all ranks on all levels. It is not
devotion to some ancient regimental story that steels men and
women in crisis; it is devotion to the comrades who are with them
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and the leaders who are in front of them. Soldiers learn to have
faith in each other. Comradeship is a great antidote to fear—of
which more later—because it gives a person friends; true friends
forged in adversity from whom a soldier will derive strength from
their presence and be anxious not to let down in battle. Everyone
has within them a streak of generosity and unselfishness—a
touch of nobility—and these qualities will be brought out in their
attitude to their friends. Friendship causes soldiers to give of
their best. It surrounds them with an atmosphere of warmth and
strength at the very moment when they are feeling cold and
weak. It encourages their finest instincts, and the demands of
friendship serve to strengthen them in battle.

The Soldier’s Purpose—The Principal Endeavor/The
Operational Imperative
Regimental spirit and comradeship are important because the
armed services exist to conduct operations on behalf of the nation, if necessary by engaging in battle—to fight the nation’s
wars. The aim of any army is to achieve success, usually in battle
against the enemies of the nation, sometimes in other ways. Everything is directed toward this end, and it must never be forgotten. An army’s professional competence is measured in
adversarial times; we win or we lose. There is no competition; to
be second is to lose. Those books listing and comparing nations’
navies, armies, and air forces, or describing all their equipment,
or those parades—or the modern equivalents, like exercises,
when we show ourselves off—do not in themselves foretell the
future or the outcome of employing those forces. The test is war
and battle. The measure: triumph or defeat; life or death. If the
outcome were measurable in terms of the quantity and quality of
means (the physical or conceptual components), then probably
we would not have wars. But we do have them.
Operations are, by their very nature, physically and mentally
demanding, extremely unpredictable and potentially danger-
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ous—characterized by uncertainty, fear, fatigue, and discomfort,
all of which have to be faced and overcome. ‘‘War,’’ said General
Rupert Smith in his 2002 lecture to the Kuwait Staff College, ‘‘is
the province of uncertainty.’’ Such operations are a group activity, whether the task is a full-scale war or a peace support operation or support to the civil authorities in a time of crisis (like a
fire strike or a natural disaster). Everyone is a part of the team,
and the effectiveness of the whole depends on each individual,
seen or unseen, playing his or her full part. The military is a
fighting organization, molded by discipline and controlled by
leaders. And this is the key point. It is by discipline that a military
unit is welded into a fighting weapon, and it is by leadership that
it is led to victory; leadership that is decisive when in action and
calm in a crisis. And leadership that recognizes and seeks out
what timely decisions need to be made, is comfortable about
making them, and disciplined about implementing them. This is
what separates us from the other, non-military players.3
Let me expand on this, considering each in turn. First, leadership.

Leadership
War is pre-eminently the art of the man who dares to
take the risk; of the man who thinks deeply and clearly;
of the man who, when accident intervenes, is not
thereby cast down, but changes his plans and disposition with the readiness of a resolute and reflective
mind, which so far as is possible has foreseen and provided against difficulties.
Brigadier Maunsell
Extract from the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst study, ‘‘Morale, Leadership, Discipline’’

There are many forms of leadership. Political parties have their
leaders, so does every organization in industry or commerce and,
at the other end of the scale, so do dance bands and youth clubs,
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and so do gangs of thieves and smugglers. There are many qualities that apply equally to every type of leader, but we are concerned here with one particular type of leadership—and that is
leadership on the battlefield; where it has to be exercised under
conditions of great difficulty and considerable danger, in conditions of fatigue and fear, uncertainty and ignorance, and often in
isolation. That is what makes it extremely difficult, and that is
why leadership in the military calls for the very highest qualities.
We constantly look for and reward good leaders, and we search
for those few who are commanders. Remember, we lead and
command in adversity. We succeed by changing the situation. We
are not looking for the comfortable man; we are looking for the
man who does it differently with the confidence of his subordinates; leaders who can practice the art of war within the science
of war.
The difficulties, dangers, and discomforts inseparable from the
battlefield make soldiers cry out for leadership they can do without in times of peace. At such moments they are too weak to
stand alone; they find the burdens too great to bear and their
own selves unequal to the task. Everyone is afraid at one time or
another, to a greater or lesser extent. In moments of fear we
band together and look for guidance; we seek a person to give
decisions; we look for a leader.
The leader himself accepts the burdens of others and by doing
so, earns their gratitude and the right to lead them. The soldiers
recognize in their leader some quality that they themselves do
not possess; that quality is ‘‘decision.’’ Fear makes men sluggish
and indecisive, unable to decide or act for themselves. The leader’s power is based on the ability to cut through this ‘‘fear paralysis,’’ and in so doing, enable others to escape from it. The
rightness of the decision taken by the leader is irrelevant. What
matters is that the decision should be taken and that the leader
should shoulder the responsibility for that decision. The leader
must convince his soldiers of its rightness, even though he himself may be uncertain of his own judgement. If the leader will
decide, others will follow and will fight. If there is indecision,
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they will hesitate and flee. In short, ‘‘fight and survive’’ or ‘‘fear
and be slain;’’ the leader decides.
Leadership in such circumstances is a lonely business. Field
Marshal The Viscount William (Bill) Slim, perhaps the greatest
British field commander of World War II, tells of a moment late
in the retreat from Burma in the face of the Japanese in 1942
when he faced his staff, and a number of Chinese staff officers:
They stood there silent and looked at me. All Commanders know
that look. They see it in the eyes of their staff and their men when
things are really bad, when the toughest soldiers want holding
up and they turn where they should turn for support—to their
Commander. And sometimes he does not know what to say. He
feels very much alone.

I, too, in much smaller ways, have found myself in such positions. From the 1970s on the streets of Northern Ireland as a
bomb-disposal officer amid the rubble of a bombed-out restaurant or on a lonely, cordoned-off road with suspect cars to be
dealt with; through to the 1990s in Kuwait/Iraq and in the hills
of Bosnia around Kupres and Sipovo with IFOR/SFOR; and later
with KFOR in the north of Macedonia, faced with the tens of
thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees flooding across the
border.
The leader’s power of decision results from his ability to remain imperturbable in the crisis. His greatest asset is the ability
to act normally in abnormal conditions, to continue to think rationally when those under him have ceased to think; to be decisive in action when they are paralyzed by fear. The object of
military training is thus, first, to select those who possess within
them these qualities of leadership and, secondly, to give them
responsibilities that enable them to develop their leadership
qualities. To learn to guard against becoming unduly elated by
success or depressed by failure; to never take counsel of their
own fears. To learn that there are no hopeless situations; when
things look bad and difficulties loom large, leaders must be
cheerful, reasoned optimists; and when success has been
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achieved not to pause, but to exploit it to the full. And when that
success has been exploited, to focus their first thought and action
on the welfare of their troops; the leaders’ own comfort and rest
must come last. This is not an easy business. The key is to develop
leaders who, before they learn to lead others, must learn to lead
themselves—to understand the blend of ‘‘hardware’’ and ‘‘software’’ within themselves. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, written
around 350–500 B.C., said: ‘‘If you know the enemy and know
yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.’’4 and
General Franks, the Commander of 7 U.S. Corps in the 1990–91
Gulf War, commented in a lecture to a recent British Higher
Command and Staff Course that ‘‘Commanders must observe
themselves, learn from themselves, and gain valuable insights
into themselves, for an understanding of who you are and what
you are made of is essential.’’5 Once leaders and commanders
can learn to understand themselves, acknowledging their own
strengths and, more importantly, their weaknesses, then they
gain the confidence to lead and command well, and to be loyal
to themselves and others.
Loyalty is an essential quality in a military leader; it extends to
subordinates as well as to superiors. Never sheltering behind the
shortcomings or mistakes of subordinates, when plans for which
they are responsible go wrong they must take the blame, correcting the mistakes of the subordinates themselves. Every military
leader has the right to express his or her views to superiors on
any question under consideration, but once a decision has been
reached, it must be supported loyally with every means in his or
her power, and an immediate stop must be put to any criticisms.
If it can be got right, military leadership is a finely tempered
sword and shield, a dynamic, confident, assertive, and ‘‘up-front’’
style—but not arrogance!—with an understanding heart for
those being led. As Yen Tzu (493 B.C.) said of Ssu-ma Jing Chu:
‘‘His civil virtues endeared him to the people, his martial prowess
kept his enemies in awe. The ideal commander unites culture
with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combina-
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tion of hardness and tenderness.’’6 The hardness, and indeed the
tenderness, stems from discipline, which we must consider next.

Discipline
To obey God’s orders as delivered by conscience—that
is duty; to obey man’s orders as issued by rightful authority—that is discipline. The foundation of both alike
is denial of self for a higher good. Unless the lesson of
duty be first well learned, the lesson of discipline can
be but imperfectly understood.
Sir John Fortescue, A Gallant Company

The word ‘‘discipline’’ has a somewhat nasty smell to some people, perhaps more so today than ever before. Many simply do not
understand what is meant by it, which is unfortunate because the
idea of discipline, properly understood, underlies civilian life in
the same way as it is the basis of military life. In other words,
discipline is both a civilian and a military necessity, even if more
so for the latter.
Too often those outside the military community see discipline
as a mindless activity—harsh punishment or courts martial. It is
true that punitive measures are part of ensuring discipline, but
there is much more to it than that.
Discipline is the glue that holds men and women together in
the face of adversity. People of high morale and discipline triumph in adversity, and, remember, the military are trained to
operate in adversity. Discipline ensures the achievement of the
objective, whether expressed as an order or not, in the worst conditions. Put another way, it ensures that a soldier does what’s
right when it is easier to do what’s wrong. The military do not
consist of unthinking automatons, but men and women who
achieve their objectives with initiative, imagination, and resource.
The object of discipline in the military environment is the conquest of fear. The basis of fear is the awareness of danger. Sol-
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diers become aware of danger when they feel themselves up
against something more powerful than they are. It is here that
discipline shows its value, for it can help soldiers to lose their
own identity and become part of a larger and stronger unit; to
lose their individual feelings and become an integral part of the
battalion, division, and army to which they belong. In this way,
discipline will conquer fear. Fear acting through soldiers’
thoughts can so reduce their hard core of courage that they will
become nervous and fearful. Discipline strengthens the mind so
that it becomes impervious to the corroding influence of fear. It
teaches soldiers to confine their thoughts within certain definite
limits. It instils the habit of self-control. This corporate sense that
discipline creates helps soldiers to face the unknown, and the
method by which the conquest of fear is achieved is through the
obedience to orders. To get soldiers to give of their best, discipline seeks to instil into all ranks a sense of unity by compelling
them to obey orders as one man. This obedience to orders is the
indispensable condition of good discipline, and it is the basis of
all military effort. Soldiers learn to gain confidence and encouragement from doing the same thing as their fellows; they derive
strength and satisfaction from their company; their own identities become merged into the larger and stronger identity of their
unit. Soldiers learn to obey orders when all their own instincts
cry out for them not to be obeyed. They learn to obey orders in
times of stress so that they will do so in times of danger, and they
learn to carry out their tasks under any conditions and despite
all difficulties. In this way the mass of loose individuals, with their
fears and weaknesses, are welded into a united whole, ready to
act on the word of a leader.
Rather than being imposed from above, the basis of all discipline is self-discipline, which must come from within. Whatever
its source, it involves the idea of self-control and self-restraint.
This concept of self-restraint underlies the whole of Christian
(and most other religious) teaching on personal conduct, and it
is impressed on most, if not every, child from nursery days onward. Obedience to, for example, the Ten Commandments,
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means that we submit ourselves to the necessary self-discipline to
enable ourselves to carry them out. Discipline thus has a moral
foundation, and most in the military are not afraid to admit it.
Such discipline implies a concept of duty. Nothing will be accomplished in the crisis by the soldier without a sense of duty.
The sentry in an outpost holds ground in the face of an attack
because he has a sense of duty to those behind him. This sense is
instilled by discipline because it teaches soldiers to obey orders
as a matter of course, to know that it is wrong not to obey them,
and right—that is, their duty—to do so. For the soldier, this conception of duty does not embrace abstractions such as freedom
or empire or democracy. In battle, a soldier’s sense of duty
largely extends only to the friends who are around him.7
In brief, discipline seeks to conquer fear by welding soldiers
into a cohesive whole, united by obedience to orders. It aims to
create a body strong enough to carry each of its members
through dangers and difficulties that they themselves would be
unable to face alone, and in this way it promotes comradeship,
which although present in many parts of society is uniquely powerful in the military community. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen
thus agree to subordinate their own interests to those of the unit.
This is the immune system, the antibody to rampant, selfish individualism on the one hand (reflected in the wider economic life
of society) and the overbearing state on the other (reflected in
political power play).
Any military organisation today without such discipline is no more
than a mob, alternating between frightened sheep and beasts of
prey. Discipline, as the British soldier amongst others has demonstrated it in peace and war, is the old Christian spiritual virtue of
unselfishness; of standing by your neighbour, your comrade. It is
the sacrifice of a man’s comfort, inclination, safety, even life, for
others, for something greater than yourself. It is the refusal to be
the weak link in the chain that snaps under strain.8

The best traditions of the British military are rich in such leadership and in what I would call enlightened discipline. Take, for

MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY CROSS

101

example, the Royal Navy at Trafalgar in 1805. Consciously or unconsciously, Nelson, in those last weeks off Cadiz, was fashioning
a tradition and a legend that was to be of a priceless service to
England. He reminded the Navy that, whatever the bonds of authority, leadership was not a mere matter of transmitting orders
but of evoking the will to serve. Building on all that was the best
in the great naval tradition in which he had been nurtured, and
discarding all that was bad, he established an ideal of discipline
that was as revolutionary as it was practical. It was founded not
on a corporate abstraction, but on the individual who alone, as
he saw, embodied the principle of life. Its ideal was liberty in a
framework of discipline—a liberty that worked and was grafted,
in the English mode, on nature. Captain Fremantle testified how
pleasant it was, after Lord Nelson’s arrival, to be given constant
change of scene and occupation, freedom of choice and method,
yet to know precisely how far one might go.
It was this that, as an officer said, double-manned every ship in
the line. Nelson was essentially a humanitarian who, wooing men
to duty, trusted them and had the imagination to see into their
hearts. By his reckoning, the best disciplinarian was he who most
loved and understood men, who remembered that they were
human beings and treated them accordingly. One of his first acts
was to order that the names and families of all killed and
wounded should be reported to him for transmission to the
Chairman of the Patriotic Fund, and that an account of every
man’s case should accompany him to hospital. In this spirit, he
allowed Sir Robert Calder to return in his own flag-ship to England to face a court martial, thus depriving the fleet of one of
its precious three-deckers at the very moment that he was fretting
for every gun to annihilate the enemy. ‘‘I much fear I shall incur
the censure of the Board,’’ he wrote to the Admiralty, ‘‘but I trust
that I shall be considered to have done right as a man to a
brother officer in affliction—my heart could not stand it.’’ It
would have been idle for authority to complain; such tenderness
and consideration were an essential part of Nelson’s success. He
could not discard them without ceasing to be Nelson.9
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There are many other examples. Nelson is of course the hero
of the Royal Navy. The British Army has many of its own:
From its earliest days, the efficiency and the success of the standing army of Great Britain have been largely derived form the high
qualifications of many of its officers. Practically every important
campaign has produced at least one great leader, and many good
ones; and almost all of them have been well educated. The training of some, such as Cromwell, Marlborough, and Clive, has been
altogether practical; their wits sharpened and their intellect
strengthened, as was also the case with Nelson and St. Vincent, by
long and varied experience. These, however, are the exceptions,
and it is not to be overlooked that their natural genius for war was
of the highest order. The majority, including Wolfe and Wellington, have been deep students of the military art, relying not
merely on the knowledge derived from their own personal practice and conclusions, but assimilating the practice and conclusions
of the great captains. The era of Napoleon, when war first became
a science, was peculiarly prolific, so far as the British army was
concerned, in characters so trained. Wellington’s lieutenants in
the Peninsula and his colleagues in India were as earnest and as
industrious as himself, and the tradition of hard work they handed
down, though at times obscured, was never completely lost to
sight. At no time was the importance of study more generally accepted as a guiding principle than at the end of the nineteenth
century. The brilliant successes of Moltke and his Prussians, due
almost entirely to a thorough knowledge of war and its practical
application, had rekindled the torch. Competitive examination
both for first commissions and the staff gave an impulse to intellectual activity; while the influence and example of Field-Marshal
Lord Wolseley, the best-read soldier of his time, who from 1882
onwards was the moving spirit in the path of progress, had a
marked effect upon the younger generation. Apathy became unfashionable, hard work the rule; study was no longer considered
useless; and the professional acquirements of the officers reached
a far higher standard than they had attained since Waterloo.
The standard, however, might easily have been higher still. Zeal
was never lacking in the army. The troops had always been well
disciplined and well drilled. The internal economy of the different
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units was everywhere admirable. The health and comfort of the
men were most carefully looked to; and the rivalry between regiments, and even between squadrons and companies, though confined to the exercises of the parade ground, to soldierly bearings,
and to good conduct, was a token not only of a strong esprit de
corps but of a strong sense of duty and professional pride among
the regimental officers. They were supported, it is true, by an excellent body of non-commissioned officers; but although these
men, who have been rightly styled the backbone of the army, furnished an invaluable link between the private soldier and the
higher grades, their powers were strictly limited; they were merely
assistants to their superiors; and it was impossible, under the system of regimental administration, that they could become their
substitutes. Thus between the company officer and the rank and
file no obstruction whatever existed, and in no army were their
personal relations, especially on foreign service, closer, or more
constant.10

The Good Military Versus the Bad
This is what separates out the military from the non-military players. What then separates out the good military from the bad?
A good military community is a community prepared for the
controlled use of force, but is also one tuned to show restraint
even when doing so involves personal danger, and to witness injury or death to friends and foe alike but still continue with the
task in hand. This requires courage—both physical and moral,
the latter being the more crucial. Courage to do what is right
even when it may be unpopular and to insist on the highest standards of decency and behavior at all times and under all circumstances. To maintain a sense of justice under fire is not easy,
which is why all forms of deceit or dishonesty, or breaches of
trust or confidence, are treated severely in the British military
and in some others. Such breaches constitute a lack of integrity,
and call into question whether an individual can be relied upon
to be loyal to himself, his friends/comrades, and the wider mili-
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tary community when the going gets tough. So the core values of
a good military organization include selfless commitment; courage; integrity; loyalty; respect for others (see note 1). A military
without these things is like a society without love or friendship,
trust or honor. It is like a city without homes, only hotels; a place
of strangers, not friends. I will develop just two; courage and integrity.
Courage
A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war.
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage

It has been well said that there is no man alive (or dead, come to
that) who, in his heart of hearts, wouldn’t rather be called brave
than have any other virtue attributed to him. And this elemental,
if somewhat unreasoning (and largely male), attitude is a sound
one. Field Marshal Bill Slim argues that courage is not merely a
virtue; it is the virtue. Without it there are no other virtues: ‘‘Faith,
hope, charity, all the rest don’t become virtues until it takes courage to exercise them. Courage is not only the basis of all virtue;
it is its expression. True, you may be bad and brave, but you can’t
be good without being brave.’’
Courage is self-evidently a mental state, an affair of the spirit,
and it gets its strength from spiritual and intellectual sources,
blended to produce essentially two types of courage. The first is
an emotional state that urges soldiers to risk injury or death—
physical courage. The second is a more reasoning attitude that
enables them to coolly stake career, happiness, perhaps their
whole future on their judgement of what they think is either
right or worthwhile—moral courage.
These two types of courage, physical and moral, are very distinct. Many men have marked physical courage, but lack moral
courage; some in high positions fail to be great in themselves
because they lack it. On the other hand, some men undoubtedly
possess moral courage but are very cautious about physical risks;
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that said, few, if any, with moral courage would not, when it is
really necessary, face bodily danger. Moral courage is a higher
and rarer virtue than physical courage. Slim argues that to be
really great, a person—or a nation—must possess both forms of
courage. And the good military certainly must.
Everyone has some degree of physical courage—it is often surprising how much. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill’s doctor, says
that courage is like having money in the bank. We start with a
certain ‘‘capital’’ of courage, some large, some small, and proceed to draw on our balance; courage is thus an expendable quality. It can be used up. If there are heavy and, what is more
serious, continuous calls on our courage, we begin to overdraw.
If we go on overdrawing, we go bankrupt—we break down. This
overdraft can be seen clearly in servicemen and women who endure the most prolonged strains in war: the submariners, the infantry platoon, the bomber crew. A growing impatience and
irritability; a hint of recklessness; a sort of ‘‘Oh, to hell with it—
attack!’’ spirit; next, real foolhardiness, what is sometimes called
‘‘asking for it’’; and last, sudden changes of mood from false hilarity to black moroseness. The crucial point is that if, before that
stage is reached, the soldier’s commander has spotted what is
happening and has pulled him/her out for a rest, then the soldier will recover and in a few months be back again as brave and
as balanced as ever. The capital in the bank of courage will have
been built back up, and he/she can start spending again.
Can courage be taught? In one sense physical courage can be,
by training soldiers not to draw too heavily on their stock of courage. Teaching them what to expect, not to be frightened by the
unknown. Bill Slim again:
If you send an untrained British soldier on patrol in the jungle,
every time a branch creaks, every time there is a rustle in the undergrowth when an animal slinks across the track, when a bush
moves in the wind, he will draw heavily and unnecessarily on his
stock of courage. And he will come back a shaken man, with a
report of no value. But if you train that man beforehand, let him
live in the jungle, teach him its craft, then send him on patrol, he
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will come back with his balance of courage unimpaired and probably a couple of enemy helmets into the bargain.

To teach moral courage is another matter—and it has to be
taught because so few, if any, have it naturally. The young can
learn it from their parents, in their homes, from school and university, from religion, from other early influences, but to inculcate it in a grown-up who lacks it requires not so much teaching
as some striking emotional experience—something that suddenly bursts upon him; something in the nature of a vision. That
happens rarely, and that is why most men and women with moral
courage learned it by precept and example in their youth. It is
thus very much a part of the soldier’s national character, and it
is certainly one of the important distinctions between the good
military and the bad.
After the death of Moses in the Old Testament, Joshua, his
deputy, found himself in command. As he prepared to lead the
people of Israel in the campaign to conquer the Promised Land,
God spoke to him:
No man will be able to stand up against you all the days of your
life; as I was with Moses, so I will be with you; I will never leave you
or forsake you. Be strong and of good courage; for you will lead
these people to inherit the land I swore to their forefathers to give
them. Be strong and very courageous, being careful to obey all the
law which Moses my servant gave you; do not turn from it to the
right or to the left, that you may be successful wherever you go.11

Be strong and of good courage, Joshua, because you will lead
your army through over forty physical battles in the coming campaign. You will need to be physically courageous to ensure victory. But be strong and very courageous, Joshua, because you will
lead your people in a continuous spiritual battle—moral battles
when you and the people you lead will be tempted to abandon
righteousness, and succumb to worldly temptation—and it is
these moral battles in life that are the most difficult, and often
require the greatest courage. As Clausewitz commented in his
treatise ‘‘On War’’:
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As the moral focus in one individual after another becomes prostrated, the whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on
the will of the Commander; by the spark in his breast, by the light
of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope must be kindled afresh in others.

Which leads us to integrity.

Integrity
I contend that fortitude in war has its roots in morality;
that selection is a search for character, and that war
itself is but one more test—the supreme and final test
if you will—of character. Character, as Aristotle taught,
is a habit, the daily choice of right instead of wrong; it
is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and
is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war. . . .
Man’s fate in battle is worked out before the war begins.
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage

The next value that separates the good military from the bad is
integrity; integrity within the leadership and with the men and
women they lead and with whom they work. Integrity—like honesty—cannot be compromised, cannot be altered. From such
honesty and integrity flows the ability to deal with the conflicting
realities of complex emergencies in a fair and balanced way. Lecturing recently in Lithuania, I was asked by an officer from Azerbaijan how, when the British Army was deployed to places like
the Balkans, we knew what side we were on. It took some time to
convince him that the whole idea was not to be on one side or
the other, but to be determined to be neutral and fair-minded to
all sides. Such an attitude is not new, for the British Army at least.
Bill Slim, in one of his lectures recalls the story of how, on one
sweltering afternoon in the Red Fort at Delhi, a company of British infantry was hurriedly falling in. There was a riot in the city,
Hindu against Muslim. Heads were being broken, men stabbed,
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shops looted and burned. As the troops struggled into their
equipment, an officer said:
‘‘Now remember, in this quarrel you are neutral.’’ A young soldier
turned to his Sergeant, ‘‘Wot did ’e mean by nootral, Sergeant?’’
he asked. ‘‘Nootral my lad,’’ replied the N.C.O., ‘‘Nootral means
that when you go down that adjectival bazaar, you’re just as likely
to be ’it by a Mo’amedan brick as by a ’Indue brick.’’

Unruffled by brickbats or bouquets, the good soldier has
marched in such a way across history. Success that might turn
another’s head he greets with studied understatement; disaster
that would appal most he meets with a jest; at its best with courage always laced with humor, a natural humor that is quick and
topical and good-natured through the centuries.12
But this is not just historical. A young civil servant working in
the recently created Defence Logistic Organisation in the U.K.
met its first boss, General Sir Sam Cowan, the Chief of Defence
Logistics, in the corridor of the headquarters. Explaining that
she and a number of others were beginning to meet for prayer
once a week, she wanted to know what to pray for him personally:
‘‘Pray for strength, that I can preserve my integrity,’’ he replied.
And they did.
Integrity, like moral courage, cannot easily be taught; but it
must be a part of the framework of the military community, built
into the architecture as it were. Thus, within the good military
organizations, issues like the Geneva Convention, the Laws of
Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, and the concept of the
Just War are both taught and debated.13 Civilized behavior requires self-control and self-discipline at the personal, group, and
corporate level. In the context of this chapter, it marks out the
civilized soldier/military from the brute. This does not mean that
there must be a superabundance of integrity in every soldier in
every unit—that is an impossibly tall order; but it does mean that
there is, within the organization, a desire and an intent that there
should be. It is too late to turn to such intent when the campaign/conflict is about to start. When the moment comes, the
responses must be instinctive.
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There are many examples of instinctive integrity that I could
quote. This one, told of the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO)
of the Gloucester Regiment during the Korean War, sums things
up rather well:
Nearby, I met Bob (the RMO) returning to the Regimental Aid
Post from a talk with the Colonel. The signallers had already destroyed their sets, and Harry was stamping on the ashes of the
codebook he had just burnt. We were all ready to move. In small
groups, the Headquarters split up and ran over the ridge. When
they had gone, I, too, came up on to the ridge crest and prepared
to descend the other side. Bob was standing alone by the path that
led to the steep slopes below us.
‘‘Come on, Bob,’’ I said. ‘‘We’re about the last to go; you ought
to have gone before this. The Colonel will be off in a minute and
that will be the lot.’’ He looked at me for a moment before saying:
‘‘I can’t go. I must stay with the wounded.’’
For a few seconds I did not comprehend his meaning: we were
all making our way out—there seemed a very fair chance that
some of us would make it: to stay here was to stay certainly for
capture, possibly for death, when the Chinese launched their final
assault on the position. And then I realised that he had weighed
all this—weighed it all and made a deliberate choice: he would
place his own life in the utmost jeopardy in order to remain with
the wounded at the time when they would need him most. Somewhere, the words appear, ‘‘Greater love hath no man than
this . . .’’ I knew now exactly what those words meant. Too moved
to speak again, I clapped my hand upon his shoulder and went
on.14

So What?
What does all this mean in practical reality? It means that the
good military demand clear leadership; calm in a crisis, decisive
when all around is chaos. They demand, too, leaders whose principal virtue is to serve those they have the privilege to command.
It is not by chance that the cap-badge of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, is ‘‘Serve to Lead’’ and the prayer is this:
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Almighty God, whose son Jesus Christ, the Lord of all life, came
not to be served but to serve, help us to be master of ourselves
that we may be servants of others and teach us to Serve to Lead.

Good military organizations seek leaders who build up self-belief in others and encourage the gifts that are present in everyone
to grow and to contribute to the needs of the team. Leaders who
confront wrong; recognize it and deal with it—not condoning it
or walking away from it. Leaders who have a sense of ‘‘spiritual’’
truth,15 and can recognize when it is right to lay force aside and
work to establish peace. To fight when necessary, for example in
the Falklands or the Gulf, but then to stop the shelling of the
retreating enemy, or ensure vehicles, food, and water are made
available to the captured POWs, or ensure equality of treatment
to all sides of an internal conflict, be that in Cyprus or the Balkans, in East Timor or Sierra Leone. Such soldiers stand aside
and are separate from those who slaughtered women and children in the Far East and Europe in WWII, or who ethnically
cleansed villages and towns throughout Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo, or in Cambodia or numerous other countries around the
world.
One of the most potent ways of recognizing the reality of this
in an organization is that when things pass beyond their own authority or initiative, everyone knows to whom to turn for further
direction, and doesn’t hesitate in doing so. If it is the right kind
of organization, soldiers will turn to their leaders in the confidence that they will get sensible and effective direction. And they
are not just efficient; they look efficient. If you enter the lines of
a regiment where the guard is smart and alert, and the soldiers
you meet are well turned out and salute briskly, you cannot fail
to get an impression of efficiency. You are right; ten to one that
unit is efficient and well disciplined. If you go into a headquarters and find the clerks scruffy, the floor unswept, and dirty teamugs staining flyblown papers on office tables, the unit may be
efficient, but I doubt it.16
These, then, are some of the values and traditions that the military brings to the world of complex emergencies. Leadership and
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discipline, courage and integrity. They are not virtues that all military organizations possess. Those that do possess them are
rightly proud of them. I stress, as I did at the opening, that this
chapter is about principles; the practice is all too often different,
even in the best of military organizations. But the best strive to
meet the principles, recognizing that they are the stuff of military
hyperbole and ideology. But take them away and you are left with
pure militarism. These virtues are not absolutes, but variables,
more often than not diminished between intent and actions—
varying between and within military units, the presence of danger, stress, physical deprivation and cognitive confusion and the
course of the battle or operation. But taken as a whole, the good
military organizations will recognize their need for them and display their intent to embed them in their men and women. And
when they are embedded, then history can recall the effect.
Two closing examples:

Waterloo
No incident is more familiar in our military history than
the stubborn resistance of the British line at Waterloo.
Through the long hours of the midsummer day, silent
and immovable the squares and squadrons stood in the
trampled corn, harassed by an almost incessant fire of
cannon and of musketry, to which they were forbidden
to make reply. Not a moment but heard some cry of
agony; not a moment but some comrade fell headlong
in the furrows. Yet as the bullets of the skirmishers
hailed around them, and the great round shot tore
through the tight-packed ranks, the word was passed
quietly. ‘‘Close in on the centre, men’’; and as the sun
neared his setting, the regiments, still shoulder to
shoulder, stood fast upon the ground they had held at
noon. The spectacle is characteristic. In good fortune
and in ill, it is rare indeed that a British regiment does
not hold together, and this indestructible cohesion,
best of all the qualities that an armed body can possess,
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is based not merely on hereditary resolution, but on
mutual confidence and mutual respect. The man in the
ranks has implicit faith in his officer, the officer an almost unbounded belief in the valour and discipline of
his men; . . .
Colonel Henderson, The Science of War

The Soldier Writes Home
Woolwich, February 26, 1793
Dear Mother, Brother, Sister, and acquaintances,
This is the last from us in Ingland. I have just received orders
for Germany under the command of the Duke of York, with 2,200foot guards. We expect to embark tomorrow with 1 Captain, 4
Subalterns, 8 non-comishened Officers and 52 gunners to go with
His Royal Highness as a Bodyguard of British Heroes. We are to
lead the Dutch Prushen and Hanover Troops into the field, as
there is none equal to the British Army. We are chosen troops sent
by His Majesty to show an example to the other Troops, to go in
front, & lead the combined army against the French which consists of 150,000 able fighten men. You may judge if we shall have
anything to dow. I had the pleasure to conquer the French last
war; but God knows how it will be this war. I cannot expect to
escape the Bullets of my enemies much longer, as non has ever
entered my flesh as yet. To be plain with you and not dishearten
you, I don’t expect to come off so cleare as I did last war. But it is
death or honour. I exspeck to be a Gentleman or a Cripel. But
you never shall see me to destress you. If I cannot help you, I never
shall destress you.
Dear Mother, I take my family with me. Where I go, they most go.
If I leave them, I should have no luck. My wife and 2 children is
in good health, & I in good spirits. Fear not for us. I hope God
will be on our side.
Your Loven Son & Daughter,
GEO. & MARY ROBERTSON
(Sir John Fortescue, Following the Drum)

6

The Academy and Humanitarian
Action
Joseph A. O’Hare, S.J.
Humanitarian action is ordinarily understood to involve a response to the needs of individuals and communities afflicted by
different kinds of calamities, both those that are natural, like
earthquakes and typhoons, and those that are the result of
human intervention, like wars and political repression. Some calamities, of course, represent a convergence of natural disasters
and human mischief; famine, for example, can be the result both
of climactic changes in a particular region and a flawed distribution system created by a world market dominated by a profit motive.
Humanitarian action can also be understood in a broader
sense, namely the continuing attempt to achieve a more human
world, one where wealth and opportunity are more evenly distributed among nations and among classes within nations. In this
sense, humanitarian action is the enduring effort to create a
world where a respect for human dignity and the inalienable
rights of the individual are the cornerstone of society.
At first glance, the world of the academy is more directly engaged in the second, broader meaning of humanitarian action.
The expansion and communication of knowledge, which is the
life of the academy, is more directly related to the continuing
search for wisdom and a vision of the human than to the more
episodic responses to the needs of victims of wars and famines.
At the present moment, however, the possibilities of direct humanitarian action in support of the afflicted in different parts of
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the world are limited and threatened by a new kind of world
conflict that is rooted in a clash of the fundamental values and
traditions that have always engaged the energies of scholars and
teachers. The possibilities of humanitarian action, in the conventional sense of a response to a crisis but also in the broader sense
of a continuing search for a more human world, are today linked
together in an unusual and more immediate relationship.
As an attempt to bring the perspective of the academy to bear
on the theme of this symposium, ‘‘Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action: Foundations, Fault Lines, and Corrections,’’ I
propose to first describe the special character of the present
world conflict that threatens the possibility of humanitarian action and the threat this conflict poses for the integrity of the
academy or, more specifically, the freedom of the university. I
will then argue that the dangers of the present moment underline the urgency of recognizing that the contemporary university
must be an international institution, one that fosters authentic
intercultural understanding and maintains an environment
where interreligious dialogue can take place and religious traditions can be renewed. One important dimension of this conflict
involves the inexorable process of globalization, which demands
that contemporary education must be international in character,
on every level in appropriate fashion.

The University and International Terrorism
The university, only the most typical institution of academia, encourages differences, believing that the free competition of ideas
is a necessary condition for the expansion of knowledge that can
lead to a glimpse of the truth and the best available wisdom to
guide our lives and our world. Given this inherent diversity, does
the contemporary university offer a distinctive perspective on the
possibilities of humanitarian action in a world where traditions
and values can be locked in conflicts that can seem insoluble?
The dangers of the present moment arise from a network of
international terrorists and terrorist organizations whose motiva-
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tion and objectives are far more obscure than the causes that
have, in the past, led nation-states into armed conflicts. International terrorism transcends national borders and political ideology. Its objectives appear vague and shifting, its passion rooted
in popular resentment rather than any patriotic cause, its vision
of the future vague and inarticulate. The amorphous character
of international terrorism—the absence of any proposal for an
alternative future coupled with its willingness to attack the innocent at random—only adds to the unsettling, because undefined,
character of its threat to international society.
In such a climate of fear and uncertainty, legitimate concerns
about national security can escalate into unnecessary restrictions
on civil liberties and the repression of legitimate differences on
how to meet the dangers of international terrorism. In the wake
of the terrorist attack of September 11, the desire to retaliate
overwhelmed the need to better understand the passions behind
this murderous assault. Debate on university campuses over the
Middle East crisis quickly became politicized, and the legitimacy
of conflicting views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was challenged. In the rush of patriotic feeling, many were impatient with
any call for an examination of the international posture of the
United States as the sole remaining superpower in the world.
Yet any attempt to contain and eventually eliminate the dangers of international terrorism must include a better understanding of its dark and tangled roots. This search for understanding
is the mission of the university. To fulfill this mission, however,
the university must protect its autonomy and encourage the kind
of academic freedom that is a condition of authentic discovery.
Such freedom, which encourages the competition of ideas, is not
a luxury that can be surrendered in a time of national danger,
but a necessity if we are to understand the nature of the danger
that surrounds us.
The Internationalization of Education
One source of the energy of international terrorism is resentment of the current division of wealth and power in the interna-
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tional community. Such resentment can create coalitions of
protest among groups with different agenda and ideologies. The
demonstrations against the present economic order that have
marred international meetings around the world have brought
together a wide variety of groups and organizations; religious activists calling for the cancellation of the debts of poorer nations
and anarchists seeking to undermine civil order, united only in a
resistance to the inexorable but bewildering process of globalization, driven by the dynamics of world markets and information
technology. In this new world economy that transcends national
boundaries, new wealth is created and whole societies can be
transformed, but the distribution of this wealth is uneven and
individuals and communities can be left behind and left out.
The very process of globalization seems to strip individuals and
communities of their autonomy and self-determination, and provokes the fury of those who consider its costs, both economic and
cultural, dehumanizing. These critics of globalization insist that
it has created a wider gulf between the rich and the poor, between nations and regions, and between classes within nations.
Meanwhile, distinctive cultural traditions are being undermined
by a homogeneous popular culture that comes with mass consumerism.
Resentment of the economic and cultural consequences of
globalization is a common passion that connects a broad array of
critics with different causes and agendas. The violent protests
that have exploded in recent years at several international meetings, e.g., Seattle and Genoa, have bewildered many, while legitimate questions concerning globalization have been obscured by
the destructive behavior of radical groups. But the process of
globalization, driven by the appeal of world markets and the revolution in information technology, cannot be reversed, nor
should it be.
If the university is to contribute to a better understanding of
both the challenges and the opportunities that globalization
presents, then the university must be transformed into an international institution, recognizing that in our contemporary world,
all education must be international in nature.
This does not mean that individual institutions must compro-
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mise their distinctive identities and missions. In the twenty-first
century we live in one world, whether we like it or not, but it is a
world of differences, and our challenge is not to diminish those
differences or paper them over in the interests of some superficial unity. On the contrary, the challenge for the university as an
institution is the same challenge that confronts all nations and
institutions in this new millennium: How to make our differences
a source of enrichment rather than division? How to better appreciate our own traditions and values by recognizing and respecting the traditions and values of others? How to redeem the
promise of cultural and religious traditions by a creative renewal
of their deepest meanings? How to find in the renewal of such
traditions a more human response to the opportunities made
possible by the technological revolution? How to make it clear
that modernization does not, in the end, mean Westernization?

The Development of Intercultural Understanding
The most obvious sign of the increasingly international character
of higher education is the growth in exchange programs that
bring students and scholars from other nations and cultures to
our campuses here in the United States and encourage faculty
and students from the United States to spend time at other institutions in other nations and cultures. But while the exchange of
faculty and students is necessary, it is not enough. The university
must encourage and support the development of authentic intercultural understanding.
The promotion of multiculturalism on American campuses
can be an easy target for those critics who see it as a surrender of
the defining values of Western civilization. It was with some chagrin that I learned some years ago of a campus debate here at
Fordham that posed the question: Multiculturalism versus the Jesuit educational tradition. We need only think of historic Jesuit
experiments at inculturation, like those that led to the Chinese
Rites controversy and the Paraguay Reductions, to realize that
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Jesuit education over the past four and a half centuries has always
been multicultural.
It is unfortunate that the debate about multiculturalism in
American education has too often been mired in arguments
about what texts should be included in college curricula in order
to include underrepresented groups. It is a debate that has often
degenerated into academic politics in its least appealing posture.
To achieve the goals of an authentic intercultural sensibility, a
program of immersion in another language and culture should
be part of the required curriculum in any program of liberal
studies. At the present time, for example, the Beijing Center for
Language and Culture offers a program for undergraduates at
Jesuit colleges and universities in the United States that is far
more demanding and far more rewarding in terms of an intercultural experience than prescribed readings, in translation, of a
faculty member’s favorite neglected author.
An understanding and appreciation of non-Western cultures
should enrich our understanding of Western civilization and not
diminish it. To achieve this end, however, the enduring goals of
a liberal education have to be continually affirmed and realized.
The study of other cultures should not lead to a collapse of community into separate national and ethnic enclaves but rather
should lead to a deeper and richer appreciation of the common
human values we share.
This process is assuredly not automatic. To be successful we
cannot shy away from cultural critiques and ethical judgments.
Accepting a bland moral relativism as the necessary corollary of
multicultural appreciation will not guide the development of a
more human world. At the same time, moral judgments that have
no appreciation of different cultural sensibilities will remain irrelevant abstractions.
The Challenge of Interreligious Dialogue
The university has always been an institution where tradition is
not only recovered and remembered but also renewed and trans-
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formed. In its classrooms, libraries, and laboratories, the wisdom
of the past should confront each day the questions of tomorrow.
In the life of the ideal university community, new questions are
not feared and suppressed but welcomed and debated. In actual
life, of course, university communities do not always resist the
narrow politicization of activists and advocates that declare what
is and is not acceptable thinking.
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack and the continuing violence in the Middle East, debate over the fundamental
causes of these conflicts has often become polarized and the legitimacy of dissident scholars challenged because of their political views. If the university is to fulfill its historic role as a forum
for competing views, we must insist on the conditions for civil
debate: mutual respect and honest recognition of differences. Civility does not compromise moral commitment, although this is
not obvious to campus activists who find demonstrations more
satisfying than debates.
The need to balance passion and civility is particularly acute in
the continuing conversation that should be interreligious dialogue. Perhaps the secular university is not the most congenial
environment for such dialogue, since the recognition of the importance of religious experience and the legitimacy of intellectual inquiry into such experience can be absent from the
prevailing ethos of the secular academy, the legacy of the children of the Enlightenment.
For the secularist, religion itself, with its absolutist claims, can
appear to be the source of inevitable conflict, and certainly
human history has demonstrated in many different ages that violence to the human spirit can be done in the name of religion.
The terrorist attack on September 11 was not the only instance
in history of the destructive purposes to which religious passion
can lead. To protect the purity of the faith, heretics were tortured
and beheaded in the name of Christendom. Closer to our own
day, we have seen false messiahs inspire mass suicides by their
followers.
Religious passion is a powerful flame that can inspire the radi-
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ant example of St. Therese of Lisieux and the heroic service to
the poor by generations of missionaries. But religious passion, we
recognize, can be turned to darker and more destructive purposes, as it surely was on September 11 when the terrorists committed the ultimate blasphemy of destroying the innocent in the
name of the Almighty.
All religious traditions, if they are to be continually renewed,
must be engaged in a dialogue with history. In the Catholic tradition, we speak of the development of doctrine, where the test
of continuity is applied to new understandings of the received
tradition. Every religious tradition, if the tradition is to be a living
tradition, must deal with the tension between fundamentalism
and modernity. There is no easy resolution of this tension; instead, it involves a continuing conversation, and the university
offers a privileged forum for such a conversation. This has been
the experience of Catholicism from the first development of the
university as an institution born from ‘‘the heart of the church’’
(Ex corde ecclesiae) in the medieval universities of Europe.
This challenge of renewal confronts the powerful tradition of
Islam. The dangers of Islamic fundamentalism can, in the end,
only be resolved within Islam itself. The renewal of Islam, as a
living religious tradition, must take place in that dialogue with
history and modernity that must engage all religious traditions.
The world of the university remains a privileged forum for this
indispensable conversation and renewal. Those universities that
are themselves animated by a living religious tradition would
seem to be a particularly congenial home for such dialogue.
In our observance of the first anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attack at Fordham University, interreligious memorial
services were held at each of our campuses. The readings for
these services were drawn from the New Testament, Buddhist
texts, and the Koran. Though obviously different in tone and
accent, all of these readings converged on the primacy of human
dignity as the test of any religious passion. Respect for those who
differ from us in national identity or religious belief does not
imply an indifference toward the truth. A healthy religious plu-
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ralism fosters the renewal of distinctive religious traditions and
respect for the truth claims they make, even when one chooses
to disagree with those claims. But the critical test of such claims
is their relevance to the dignity of the human person. Does this
religious vision recognize and enhance the human person or diminish and violate human dignity? While different cultures may
manifest different expressions of what it means to be human,
the assumption of liberal education is that there is a common
humanity we all share. To destroy the innocent on behalf of a
religious cause is the ultimate blasphemy. Religious passion,
then, becomes a vicious abstraction, demonic in origin rather
than divine. Part of the legacy of September 11 is the painful
reminder that religious faith can be betrayed by those who use it
to justify violence. The search for understanding among differences, the mission of the university, is an essential guardian of
religious integrity.
The fundamentalist instinct in all religious traditions, of
course, can slide into a kind of anti-intellectualism that resists
the kind of questioning of tradition that is part of the life of the
university. The university, as an institution of inquiry rather than
indoctrination, is suspect to the fundamentalist. The irony here
is that without such inquiry religious tradition can become distorted, frozen into harmless irrelevancy or distorted into the
more dangerous sense of absolute righteousness that can become
absolute ruthlessness. Dare one suggest that the blasphemous attack of September 11 was an extreme instance of a religious tradition that had refused the essential dialogue with modernity that
is the mission of the Catholic university and remains the best
hope of a creative renewal of the deepest truths of the Islamic
tradition?

Conclusion
The contemporary university should provide a context for humanitarian action in the broad sense of creating a more human
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world and enable individuals to respond to the needs of the afflicted in the more narrow sense of humanitarian action by fostering an authentic intercultural understanding and
encouraging the renewal of religious traditions, and particularly
the Islamic tradition, through interreligious dialogue. In a world
threatened by international terrorism, the university must resist
restrictions on academic freedom that would inhibit the task of
understanding the sources of the deep-seated, if inarticulate, resentment at the heart of such terrorist campaigns.

7

Is Any News Good News?
Tom Brokaw
In this new world in which we’re sailing across unknown seas,
navigating by the stars because so many of the familiar navigational guides are of little use, the role and the responsibility of
the press, both print and electronic, are critical to a successful
journey.
However, the very conditions that brought us to this perilous
and anxiety-inducing state are constantly in danger of blowing
up into a perfect storm in which the press is buffeted by primal
forces colliding with a ferocity that shatters the old landscape of
perceptions and expectations. It is a fierce wind made all the
more powerful by the accelerant of the ceaseless demand to constantly replenish the air waves, Web sites, print outlets. Judgments, declarations, interpretations, descriptions blow through
the greatly expanded universe of the traditional and new media
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in a dizzying fashion.
For those of us at the helm, navigating through these conditions
is challenge enough. To our viewers and readers, it can be overwhelming and disorienting.
In the West, the press is swept into an ancient culture anchored in another region, struggling to understand the new imperatives of a popular faith that, nonetheless, remains mysterious
in origin and practice to most of its viewers and readers. That
there is a struggle within that faith for its soul and future makes
the assignment all the more vexing to an outsider.
There are certain objective truths that provide a framework for
determining the direction and the mission of the media in this
bewildering new environment.
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First, the faith from which the violent acts emanated is not
monolithic, but it is indisputably popular. For most of the twentieth century, Christianity represented 30 percent of the world’s
population and Islam 20 percent. Given current birth rates, those
numbers will flip by the year 2025. The mass of Islam, however it
is interpreted, is a reality that demands more attention from
those outside the faith.
Next, the global war on terrorism has many layers, but a common theme: it is much more a war of cultures than a war between
sovereign nations. All of the conventional definitions of what it
takes to be successful in war—choosing the battlefield, standing
armies, great power in the air and sea as well as on the ground—
now compete with fanatical guerrillas who are nationally rootless
acolytes of shadowy figures who send them happily to their suicidal deaths with no remorse about the loss of innocent life, all
in the name of Allah.
So a primary function of the press in this new world is to not
just demonize a great faith but also not to ignore the cruel realities of too many of its interpreters. It is testimony to the power of
faith, spirituality, and fundamental human values that they retain
their place on the agenda of constant examination and explanation, more than holding their own in the presence of breathtaking advances in the expanding universe of physical sciences and
economics.
Simultaneously, the press, in all of its forms, must address the
issue of its own prisms. There has been at once a great expansion
and a great consolidation of media power in this new world. Even
a casual traveler to any remote corner of the globe quickly realizes that there are two realities: the one in the villages and fields,
in the temples and mosques of the region, and the other on the
small screen attached to a satellite dish taking in reports, commentary, discussion, and images from distant studios, almost all
of them centered in the West. Those images are at once welcomed, envied, and resented.
One of the most dramatic developments in this new era is the
rise of competing media outlets on the other side of the divide,
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so to speak. Al-Jazeerah, the satellite news service originating in
Qatar, is not a propaganda megaphone, but it does have a distinctly Arab point of view, just as outlets in Tel Aviv reflect the
Israeli culture or MSNBC, CNBC, CNN, and Fox News reflect
layers of the American culture.
It is all part of what I call The Big Bang of media expansion.
When I was a young man in Yankton, South Dakota, in the late
1950s, I was thrilled by the choices I had every evening: a fifteenminute newscast from Huntley and Brinkley, one local newspaper, and two local radio stations.
Now, were I teenager in Yankton, I’d have a greatly expanded
menu on NBC and CBS, but also ABC, Fox, CNN, MSNBC, Fox
News, and the BBC on cable or satellite. I’d still have the local
newspaper, but with a few clicks on my personal computer, I’d
also have access to the great newspapers on a real-time basis in
all the world capitals.
However, there is a striking difference between what’s available
to a teenager in South Dakota and to a young Muslim in Africa,
the Middle East, the Subcontinent, or Southeast Asia. Ninety-six
percent of the Internet use in the world is confined to 15 percent
of the world’s population. But even if we were able to wave the
twenty-first century version of the magic wand and assure Internet access everywhere, it would not be enough, for it does us
little good if we wire the world and short-circuit our secular souls.
There is no delete button for hate and intolerance, no cut and
paste to shift the values and ethos of one culture to another.
Just as we are outraged, puzzled, bewildered by the failure of
other cultures to understand ours, we must also remember that
there has been pitiful little appreciation for other cultures when
they are viewed through a prism looking from West to East. It
is here that the press has its most critical role. Just as there is
globalization in economics and consumer markets, it is equally
important to have globalization of the mass media marketplace.
That requires publishers and broadcasters, editors and producers, reporters and anchormen to rise above parochial origins and
examine a world of many colors, faiths, and economic and ideo-

126

IS ANY NEWS GOOD NEWS?

logical interests in an enlightened and engaging fashion. Examine and analyze, not merely reflect and regurgitate.
In the current environment, there is far too much of the latter
and too little of the former.
In this new universe created by The Big Bang of media expansion, there is always the danger of inciting rather than informing,
and it happens at warp speed. Once the chain reaction of misinformation and deliberate deceit begins, it is difficult to stop, and
the consequences can be disastrous.
Most of all, it is imperative that the primary media outlets remain fiercely independent, especially of government control, manipulation, and pressure. Those pressures come in many ways,
even in the so-called ‘‘free press’’ societies. One of the most pernicious is the pressure to conform to a single perspective or face
the lash of organized special interest groups, commentators, and
cultural conformity.
In societies where the news and information media in all of its
forms is directly controlled from the top down, the suppression
of the people’s right to know is a critical component in any evaluation of the human rights of the people involved. The ancient
call, ‘‘Let my people go!’’ is now as much about intellectual freedom as it is about physical freedom.
As we begin this new millennium with the world of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in such turmoil, we’ll do well
to remember that no superpower can administer just punishment or force societies to change their ways with military power
alone, however great that military application may be.
The old lessons endure. The battle for hearts and minds remains
as critical as the battles for streets and ports, skies and high
ground. Enlightened, courageous, and independent journalists
must be the honest brokers of this complex and dangerous new
world.
It is not an assignment for the timid.
As a founding member of the Committee to Protect Journalists, I long have been interested in improving the legal, political,

TOM BROKAW

127

and cultural climate in which journalists operate around the
world. It has been a constant struggle, and the following announcement from CPJ at the end of 2002 is a chilling reminder
of the price too many journalists pay for their courageous and
critical work.

Announcement from the Committee to Protect
Journalists
Nineteen Journalists Killed for Their Work in 2002
Lowest Number on Record; Russia, Colombia, and the
West Bank Top List
New York, January 2, 2003—A total of nineteen journalists were
killed worldwide for their work in 2002, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). This number marks a sharp
decrease from 2001 when thirty-seven journalists were killed,
eight of them while covering the war in Afghanistan. Of the nineteen journalists killed in 2002, most were targeted in direct reprisal for their work, and their killers had not been brought to
justice at year’s end.
This is the lowest number of journalists killed in the line of
duty that CPJ has recorded since it began tracking the deaths in
1985. The dramatic drop is partially attributed to a decline in the
number of world conflicts. According to CPJ research, a direct
correlation exists between the number of journalists killed on the
job and the incidence of violent conflict, which can give those
who target journalists the ability to do so with impunity because
of the instability that war fosters. In 1994, for example, sixty-six
journalists were targeted for their work while civil wars raged in
Algeria, Bosnia, and Rwanda.
Another factor in the decreasing number of journalists’ deaths
may be the result of the international attention that The Wall
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl’s kidnapping and murder
early last year garnered. In the wake of Pearl’s death, journalist
safety became a priority for news organizations; many sent their
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staff to hostile-environment training, and reporters were better
prepared in the field. At least two journalists survived being shot
in the West Bank last spring because they were wearing flak jackets, while in Venezuela, bulletproof vests saved the lives of two
more journalists.
Still, in 2002, journalists remained at great risk. In countries
such as Russia, Colombia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and the
Philippines, local journalists were murdered in direct reprisal for
their reporting on crime and corruption, most of them with impunity. Cameramen and photographers were especially vulnerable to cross fire and targeting by military forces—five were killed
in 2002, including two who were covering conflict in the West
Bank.
‘‘While we are encouraged to see the number of deaths decrease this year, journalists are still being targeted and assassinated for doing their jobs,’’ said CPJ executive director Ann
Cooper. ‘‘Drug traffickers in Brazil, paramilitary groups in Colombia, and corrupt politicians in the Philippines are trying to
silence journalists through intimidation and murder, and it has
to stop.’’
In addition to the nineteen cases described in this report, CPJ
continues to investigate four journalists who are missing and thirteen others whose killings may have been related to their professional work.
Russia and Colombia: Perennial Offenders
Some statistics fluctuate from year to year, but others remain constant in such countries as Russia and Colombia, where journalists
die virtually every year because of their work. Three journalists
were killed for their work in Russia in 2002: An editor of a newspaper known for its coverage of organized crime was shot eight
times at point-blank range; a cameraman died in cross fire covering the fighting near the Chechen border; and a business reporter was bludgeoned to death on her way home.
In Colombia, three journalists also died in the line of duty:

TOM BROKAW

129

The owner of a radio station and host of programs that criticized
all sides of Colombia’s civil war was pulled from his car, shot,
and killed; a newspaper columnist who wrote about human rights
abuses was shot in the head while walking to work; and a cameraman was killed in cross fire while covering fighting between the
army and a paramilitary group.
The following list is a brief summary of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of each of the nineteen journalists killed for
their work in 2002. For a more comprehensive list, go to: http://
www.cpj.org./killed/killed02.html.

BANGLADESH: 1
Harunur Rashid, Dainik Purbanchal, March 2, Khulna
Rashid, a crime reporter for the Bengali-language newspaper
Dainik Purbanchal, was ambushed by gunmen while riding his motorcycle to work. He was later brought to a hospital, where he
died from a bullet wound to his chest, according to one account.
Rashid, known as Rashid Khukon, wrote several stories exposing
official corruption and linking criminal syndicates with outlawed
Maoist guerrilla groups. He had received anonymous death
threats throughout his career.
BRAZIL: 1
Tim Lopes, TV Globo, June 3, Rio de Janeiro
Lopes, 50, an award-winning investigative reporter with TV
Globo, was kidnapped, tortured, and brutally murdered by drug
traffickers while on assignment in an impoverished community
on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro. Working undercover with a
hidden camera, Lopes was investigating a story about drug traffickers abusing drugs and minors. According to two suspects,
Lopes was kidnapped, beaten, shot in the feet to keep him from
escaping, and sentenced to death at a mock trial. A known drug
trafficker then stabbed him with a sword and killed him, said the
suspects.
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COLOMBIA: 3
Orlando Sierra Hernández, La Patria, February 1, Manizales
Sierra, 42, a deputy editor and columnist for the newspaper La
Patria, was shot in the head on his way to work and died two
days later. Sierra wrote a popular Sunday column that criticized
corrupt local party bosses and highlighted human rights abuses
committed by leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and
state security forces.
Héctor Sandoval, RCN Televisión, April 12, outside of Cali
Sandoval, a cameraman with RCN Televisión, died of gunshot
wounds sustained while covering a firefight between the Colombian army and leftist rebels. He and his crew came under fire
while traveling in a mountainous area where the army was pursuing rebel fighters who had just kidnapped a group of lawmakers.
The crew had decided to turn back when an army helicopter
opened fire on their vehicle, killing Sandoval and the vehicle’s
driver.
Efraı́n Varela Noriega, Radio Meridiano-70, June 28, Arauca
Varela, a radio host and station owner of Radio Meridiano-70,
was killed while driving home after gunmen yanked him from his
car and shot him in the face and chest. Varela hosted news and
opinion programs that criticized all sides of Colombia’s long-running civil war. Most recently, he had told listeners that right-wing
paramilitary fighters had arrived in the area and were patrolling
the streets.
INDIA: 1
Ram Chander Chaterpatti, Poora Sach, November 21, Sirsa
Chaterpatti, editor of the Hindu-language newspaper Poora Sach,
died from injuries sustained one month earlier, when gunmen
fired several shots at him. According to officials, members of a
religious sect ordered Chaterpatti’s murder after he wrote several
articles about sexual abuse and other crimes allegedly committed
in the sect’s compound. Police have arrested three suspects.
NEPAL: 1
Nava Raj Sharma, Kadam, June 1, Kalikot
Sharma, editor of the Nepali-language weekly Kadam, was kid-
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napped and later killed by Maoist rebels who are fighting a guerrilla war to overthrow Nepal’s constitutional monarchy. Sharma’s
badly mutilated body was found in mid-August; his eyes had been
gouged out, his hands and legs cut, and he had been shot in the
chest. One local journalist said Sharma had resisted pressure
from rebels to turn Kadam into a Maoist propaganda organ.
PAKISTAN: 2
Daniel Pearl, The Wall Street Journal, date unknown, Karachi
Pearl, 38, South Asia bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, was
abducted while on his way to an interview at a restaurant in downtown Karachi on January 23. A group claiming responsibility for
his kidnapping sent several e-mails to news organizations containing photographs of Pearl, calling him a spy, and threatening to
kill him if a list of demands were not met. In late February, a
graphic video received by U.S. government officials confirmed
that Pearl had been brutally murdered by his captors. Four suspects were tried and found guilty of his murder in July.
Shahid Soomro, Kawish, October 20, Kandhkot
Soomro, a well-respected correspondent for the Sindhi-language
newspaper Kawish, was assassinated in reprisal for his reporting
on abuses committed during general elections held two weeks
earlier. Three men came to Soomro’s house at night and tried to
abduct him. When he resisted, they shot the journalist at least
nine times, killing him almost instantly. Members of an influential local family have been detained for questioning.
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY TERRITORIES: 3
Raffaele Ciriello, freelance, March 13, Ramallah
Ciriello, an Italian freelance photographer on assignment for the
Italian daily Corriere Della Sera, was killed by a burst of machine
gun fire from the direction of an Israeli tank during the Israeli
military offensive in the West Bank and Gaza. According to a
journalist accompanying Ciriello, the photographer was trailing
a group of Palestinian gunmen at the time of the incident. An
Israel Defense Forces spokesman had no information about the
shooting.
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Imad Abu Zahra, freelance, July 12, Jenin
Zahra, a Palestinian freelance photographer, died after being hit
by Israel Defense Forces gunfire in the West Bank town of Jenin.
Together with a colleague, he had gone to photograph an Israeli
armored personnel carrier (APC) that had slammed into an electricity pole. They were facing two Israeli tanks when they started
taking pictures of the APC. Moments later, gunfire erupted from
the tanks, according to his colleague. Zahra was hit in the leg,
and died the next day.
Issam Tillawi, Voice of Palestine, September 22, Ramallah
Tillawi, a journalist and program host for the official Palestinian
National Authority radio station, Voice of Palestine (VOP), was
killed after being shot in the head by Israeli gunfire during protests in the West Bank city of Ramallah. According to Palestinian
sources, Tillawi was both covering and participating in demonstrations against the Israeli army’s siege of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s compound. VOP officials said he was wearing a jacket
marked ‘‘press.’’
PHILIPPINES: 2
Edgar Damalerio, Zamboanga Scribe and DXKP Radio, May 13, Pagadian City
Damalerio, 32, managing editor of the weekly Zamboanga Scribe,
and a commentator on DXKP Radio, was shot and killed while
driving home from a press conference. Two witnesses in the car
identified the gunman as a local police officer, but he was only
briefly detained and was never charged. Damalerio was known
for his critiques of corruption among local politicians and the
police.
Sonny Alcantara, ‘‘Quo Vadis San Pablo’’ and Kokus, August
22, San Pablo
Alcantara, 51, a newspaper publisher and cable TV commentator,
was shot in the forehead and killed by a lone gunman near his
home. Investigators believe at least one accomplice informed the
gunman by cell phone of Alcantara’s departure. He had recently
broken a story on his cable TV program about a local politician
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in a corrupt land deal, while his newspaper covers politics and
community affairs. No one has been charged with the murder.
RUSSIA: 3
Natalya Skryl, Nashe Vremya, March 9, Rostov-on-Don
Skryl, 29, a business reporter for the newspaper Nashe Vremya,
died after being attacked from behind while walking home at
night. She was struck in the head about a dozen times with a
heavy, blunt object and died in the hospital the next day. Skryl
reported on local business issues and was investigating an ongoing struggle for the control of a local metallurgical plant. Although none of her money or jewelry was taken, local officials
initially announced robbery as the motive of the murder before
closing the case in September.
Valery Ivanov, Tolyatinskoye Obozreniye, April 29, Togliatti
Ivanov, 32, editor of the newspaper Tolyatinskoye Obozreniye, was
shot dead at point-blank range while entering his car outside his
home. The gunman used a pistol with a silencer to shoot Ivanov
eight times in the head and fled the scene on foot. Colleagues
believe the killing is connected to the newspaper’s reports on
local organized crime, drug trafficking, and official corruption.
No one has been charged in the case.
Roddy Scott, Frontline, September 26, Galashki Region, Ingushetia
Scott, 31, a British freelance cameraman working for Britain’s
Frontline television news agency, was killed following clashes between Russian forces and Chechen fighters near the border with
Chechnya in Ingushetia’s Galashki Region.
UGANDA: 1
Jimmy Higenyi, United Media Consultants and Trainers, January
12, Kampala
Higenyi, a student at United Media Consultants and Trainers,
was covering an opposition rally as part of his journalism course
work when he was killed. All political activity is banned in the
country, and soon after the large group gathered, police fired
into the crowd, killing Higenyi. Police acknowledge responsibility
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for the shooting, but no disciplinary action had been taken
against the responsible officers at year’s end.
VENEZUELA: 1
Jorge Ibraı́n Tortoza Cruz, 2001, April 11, Caracas
Tortoza, 48, a photographer for the Caracas daily 2001, was shot
while covering violent clashes between opposition demonstrators
and government supporters. He died later that same evening.
The journalist was carrying his camera and a vest identifying him
as a member of the press when he was shot in the head. Eyewitness accounts and videos of the scene implicate both the Venezuelan National Guard and the Caracas Metropolitan Police in the
shooting.
Documenting the deaths, CPJ researchers apply stringent guidelines and journalistic standards to determine whether journalists
were killed on assignment or as a direct result of their professional work. By publicizing and protesting these killings, CPJ
helps change the conditions that foster violence against journalists. The death toll that CPJ compiles each year is one of the most
widely cited measures of press freedom worldwide.
For more information about journalists killed in 2002, visit
CPJ’s Web site at http://www.cpj.org or call CPJ communications
coordinator, Abi Wright, at (212) 465-9344, ext. 105.
The journalistic profession paid a very high price for covering
the war in Iraq. For an updated list of those killed, consult the
CPJ website.

Conclusion
If ignorance is enforced at the point of a gun or the threat of
long imprisonment, all of us are diminished, for that ignorance
is a cancer on the fundamental right of everyone everywhere to
freely decide what they need and want to know about the world
they occupy.
It is not just the freedom to make informed political judg-
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ments, but also the freedom and the necessity to make informed
personal judgments without fear of reprisal from the state, the
culture, or the community.
Only a vigorous and independent free press in all of its
forms—from broadcast to print and the Internet—can provide
that antidote to intellectual oppression.
As Thomas Paine wrote in The Rights of Man, ‘‘. . . though man
may be kept ignorant, he cannot be made ignorant.’’

8

Human Rights and the Making of
a Good Doctor
Eoin O’Brien, M.D.
Public health professionals are among the most educated and, occasionally, the most respected members of
the community. Yet, except when an issue impinges on
their particular interest, their impact on government
policy is miniscule. . . . By mutual sharing, the good
physician becomes part of the body and soul of the person he serves. If that trust and confidence are not
abused, and if, with warmth and humility and competency, the doctor proves his worth over time, the bond
becomes as durable as love. When people and nations
can agree on little else, those common bonds may become the bridge to understanding and peace. There is
certainly no reason not to utilize this bridge, especially
in the light of the dismal record of standard diplomacy.
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., A Bridge to Peace 1

The Center for International Health and Cooperation was
founded to promote the ethos that the physician in society can,
as the above quotation illustrates, be a bridge between politicians
and peace, or as an earlier publication put it, if every politician
has a doctor, is this not a great ‘‘untapped resource,’’ a resource
with the potential to influence for the good? That is assuming, of
course, that the doctor in society is prepared for such a role.2 In
The Untapped Resource (edited and introduced by Kevin Cahill),
Hugh Carey, then a member of the United States Congress, said:
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‘‘In fact, a review of our own history will show that when we had
less we did more proportionately. When we were not so strong,
we were more generous to the weak. When we were less well fed,
we helped others fend off famine.’’ He went on prophetically
(this was 1971): ‘‘If our country is not to act as a policeman of
the world and wield the bomb as a club, then perhaps it is in our
own interest and in the interest of humanity we might consider
ourselves as corpsman to mankind, bearing the balm of healing
and helping. Exporting our know-how in health care at relatively
little cost to ourselves should be an attractive alternative to some
high-cost, low-yield programs of foreign aid that we now support
under the name of mutual security.’’3

The Traditional ‘‘Good Doctor’’
This book has within its shell three strata of discussion—
‘‘foundations, fault lines, and corrections.’’ The doctor must be
seen as indispensable to the ‘‘foundations’’ of any tradition in
humanitarian rights, but more importantly, I hope to show that
‘‘corrections’’ are needed, and needed urgently, if the doctor is
to fulfill his/her potential in contributing to humanitarian action. In short, the good doctor in today’s world must be versed
in human rights, and if this is to happen, the undergraduate student has to be taught the subject.
The doctor in society has been a figure of immense influence
since the beginning of time. The physician has been portrayed
in literature, music, film, and caricature, not always with kindness, but the status of the physician in society has greatly exceeded that of other professions, probably even exceeding that
of the cleric. Many assumptions are made in the portrayal of the
doctor, and many commentators fail to acknowledge that a doctor is as susceptible to the failings of humankind as anyone else.
Or, as Shaw would have put it: ‘‘Doctors, if no better than other
men, are certainly no worse.’’4
The good doctor has to be all things to all men. He has to
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fulfill the requirements of a taxing undergraduate curriculum;
he then has to undergo a postgraduate period of betterment,
which, depending on his chosen specialty, can be very arduous;
he must then be trusted by his patients; accepted by his peers;
fulfill the dictates of the jurisdiction in which he practices; acquiesce with the dictates of his professional bodies so as to gain admission to them; and perhaps, depending on the role he casts
for himself, also be a scientist and researcher prepared to write
and present on his chosen avocation; be a teacher; head a large
department; be an administrator; be capable of communicating
with his patients, his colleagues, and scientific peers; be prepared
not only to keep himself abreast of advances in an ever-changing
discipline, but to have his knowledge and skills assessed regularly;
be able to cooperate with colleagues in the delivery of health
care and with colleagues abroad in the furtherance of science;
be willing to work antisocial hours and to adjust his private life
accordingly; he must not contract an illness that might endanger
his patients’ health; he must be prepared to face the medicolegal consequences for incompetence, real or imaginary; and
above all, and most difficultly, he must acknowledge the Socratic
dictum, ‘‘Know thyself.’’
Not many, one would think, could be attracted by such a job
description, yet, thankfully for society, many are. My advice will
add to the burden of the good doctor by calling for a further
quality that carries an inevitable demand. In a world faced with
humanitarian strife and with large populations in turmoil seeking refuge in stable and more prosperous nations, today’s good
doctor must be alert to the complex discipline of human rights,
which brings the inevitable moral imperative of being aware of
the prejudices that doctors, as others in society, inherit through
the cultural, religious, and ethnic influences of their formative
environment.
I suspect more has been written on the making of a good doctor than what makes, for example, a good solicitor, fireman, or
accountant. Apart from numerous books, there are university
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courses devoted to the topic; for example, the Northeastern Ohio
Universities College of Medicine offers a course over two months
entitled, ‘‘In search of the Good Doctor.’’5 The British Medical
Journal saw the subject as one of such importance as to merit an
issue devoted to ‘‘What’s a good doctor and how do you make
one?’’6 The editor accepted at the outset that his journal faced
an impossible task, but one that nonetheless was worth undertaking. This in-depth analysis, running to some 50,000 words, discusses, among other relevant issues, the making of a good doctor
as seen from the perspective of the patients, nurses, medical students, women, and doctors; it assesses the expectations of society,
governing bodies, and the health services; and considers the necessity for the good doctor to be able to communicate, to remain
knowledgeable and skilled, and to be subject to assessment of
competency. However, only in the correspondence columns (a
letter from Khartoum Hospital) can any reference be found to
the need for a good doctor to be aware of human rights issues:
‘‘In the developing world with its deficient facilities and patients
who need to eat before they need medical care, the medical profession needs input from a belief in humanity and the ethics of
the job more than scientific professionalism.’’7
The journalist, Polly Toynbee, reviewing the qualities that the
General Medical Council sees as necessary in the making of a
good doctor, had this to say:
What makes the perfect modern doctor? The General Medical
Council has drawn up new guidance for medical schools as a
framework on which to base their curriculums and assessments.
Tomorrow’s Doctors is an idealistic compendium of the best qualities
every new doctor should acquire. If medical schools could, indeed, turn out doctors molded to this template, then we should
expect a new generation of scholar saints and gentle scientists—
wise, knowledgeable, sensitive, collegiate, humble, and good beyond imagining.8

In short, the traditional good doctor as epitomized by Luke
Fildes in his famous Victorian painting, The Doctor.9
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The Humanities in the Making of a Good Doctor
If human rights and humanitarian affairs seem to be neglected
in the making of a good doctor, it does not seem to be the case
with the teaching of the humanities, which has seen a remarkable
resurgence in the last few decades, especially in the U.S. The
Internet provides a truly remarkable compilation of curricula,
such as the New York University on-line syllabi of courses in medical humanities,10 or the U.K. equivalent ‘‘Medical Humanities Resource Database,’’ compiled by the Centre for Health Informatics
in Multiprofessional Education, University College London.11
The importance of this is not so much the relevance of the humanities to human rights, but rather that an awareness of the
former serves as a means of bringing students close to the moral
dilemmas of medicine. An acquaintance with the humanities, especially literature, imparts an appreciation of the profundity of
human existence and a deeper realization of the human condition. Literature is not only enjoyable, but when it enables us to
discover how great writers view illness, suffering, and death, it
becomes an enriching formative experience.
Take, as an example, Samuel Beckett writing on the humanitarian tragedy of Saint Lô, the small town in Normandy that was
devastated in one night by an allied bombing blitz that left hardly
a house standing,12 and the efforts of a bewildered group of Irish
physicians grappling with all that was so foreign to them:
And yet the whole enterprise turned from the beginning on the
establishing of a relation in the light of which the therapeutic
relation faded to the merest of pretexts. What was important was
not our having penicillin when they had none, nor the unregarding munificence of the French Ministry of Reconstruction, . . . but
the occasional glimpse obtained, by us in them and, who knows,
by them in us (for they are an imaginative people), of that smile
at the human condition as little to be extinguished by bombs as
to be broadened by the elixirs of Burroughes and Welcome, the
smile deriding, among other things, the having and not having,
the giving and the taking, sickness and health. . . . I suspect that
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our pains were those inherent in the simple and necessary and yet
so unattainable proposition that their way of being we, was not
our way and that our way of being they, was not their way. It is
only fair to say that many of us had never been abroad before.13

Or if one moves forward to read of a unique tribute paid by
maestro Leonard Bernstein to his physician:
It is hard not to love Kevin; it is equally hard to know which Kevin
you are loving. He is that complicated creature once called a
‘‘Medicine Man,’’ a term that presents us with a host of dualities:
pillar of society/leprechaun; medieval alchemist/medical master;
shaman/clinician; witchdoctor/psychologist; juggler/saint. I have
observed him in all three phases, I think; I have appeared at his
office in despair, begging for some magic pill, only to leave like
Fred Astaire, lighter than air, with not even a placebo to con me
on my way. How does this happen? What went on in there during
that hour or more, aside from a cardiogram, some palpation, and
what I think of as the Stethoscopic Follies, the shortest show in New
York. Oh, yes, the prerequisite blood sample; but all that surely
didn’t take an hour plus. Of course not; we talked.14

These quotations from a rich literary archive are chosen
merely to suggest that the humanities can at least prepare the
intellectual soul of the doctor-in-the-making for the tougher stuff
of human rights. The artist can hone the sensitivities, kindle a
desire to participate, even contribute toward the betterment of
the panorama of living and dying in which the doctor is always
center-stage. The arts cannot teach us to be good human beings
but they can kindle in us a desire to try to be more humane, to
banish prejudice, to be kinder and more considerate of the foibles and irritations that constitute the non-medical presentation
of all clinical dilemmas. Put another way, medicine demands
compassion and feeling, or such, at least, would be the public’s
perception of the good doctor. Paradoxically, the practice of
medicine makes the exclusion of sentiment a prerequisite for the
survival of self, and the process, begun in early studentship, soon
becomes so integral a part of the scientific persona that the dissipated gems of idealism, among which, of course, may be found
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compassion, become unrecognizable. The years of training so
carefully constructed by our institutions initially blunt and, finally, pervert the purity of avocation and the sensibility of youth,
essences to be found in most medical students but so few doctors.
It is chastening but not necessarily a balm to existence, to have
this protective wall around one annihilated. At least being aware
of the contradictory influences that will confront the doctor in
society places the medical student at an advantage in choosing
the correct moral stance.

Human Rights and the Undergraduate Curriculum
The need for the teaching of human rights in medical schools
has been long recognized. For example, in 1992, the British Medical Association (BMA) declared: ‘‘We recommend that all medical schools incorporate medical ethics into the core curriculum
and that all medical graduates make a commitment, by means of
an affirmation, to observe an ethical code such as the WMA’s
(World Medical Association) International Code of Medical Ethics.’’15 In 1993, the General Medical Council in the U.K. stated
that a core-objective of the undergraduate degree in medicine
included a ‘‘knowledge and understanding of . . . ethical and
legal issues relevant to the practice of medicine,’’ as well as an
‘‘awareness of the moral and ethical responsibilities involved in
individual patient care.’’16 In 1999, the World Medical Association resolved that in so far as medical ethics and human rights
form an integral part of the work and culture of the medical
profession, and of the history, structure, and objectives of the
World Medical Association, ‘‘it is hereby resolved that the WMA
strongly recommends to Medical Schools worldwide that the
teaching of Medical Ethics and Human Rights be included as
an obligatory course in their curricula.’’17 Moreover, the United
Nations has published, among other documents relating to the
topic, Guidelines for National Plans of Action for Human Rights Education, in which it envisages human rights education as being part
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of the education of ‘‘pre-school and primary, secondary, university, and other institutions of higher learning levels of education.’’18 The many international declarations and standards on
medical ethics and human rights are available in a number of
compilations.19,20 However, these recommendations have fallen
largely on deaf ears. Despite these prestigious and authoritative
mandates for the teaching of human rights to medical undergraduates, there appears to be no systematic human rights education within the curricula of the U.K.’s twenty-seven medical
schools.21

Doctors and Prejudice
Why should doctors, particularly those living in affluent, stable
societies, have to concern themselves with humanitarian issues?
The New Dictionary of Medical Ethics has postulated four reasons:
First, as citizens of the modern world, they should know about
the most dynamic, complex, and challenging modern movement;
after all, their own rights and dignity as well as those of their patients are at issue. Second, health policies, programs and practices, and clinical research may inadvertently violate human rights.
Thirdly, violations of each of the rights have important adverse
health effects on individuals and groups. Finally, promoting
human rights is now understood as an essential part of the efforts
to promote and protect public health.22

No one can disagree with these recommendations, but do they
go far enough?
To me, there would seem to be at least three other reasons why
aspiring doctors should be taught human rights. The first is that
young doctors (and some old ones) are fundamentally good and
even better than good, they are idealists who are often anxious
to give back some of what society (or parental affluence) has
given to them. Or as Shaw (who said so much so well nearly a
century ago) put it: ‘‘Unless a man is led to medicine or surgery
through a very exceptional technical aptitude, or because doctor-
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ing is a family tradition, or because he regards it unintelligently
as a lucrative and gentlemanly profession, his motives in choosing the career of a healer are clearly generous. However, actual
practice may disillusion and corrupt him, his selection in the first
instance is not a selection of a base character.’’23 If the idealism
of the young doctor is not exposed, at least in theory, to the calamities of humanitarian crises in the world and the means of alleviating them, the fire of youthful idealism is denied.
A second more practical reason is that the movement of populations is such today that the doctor practicing even in the most
settled and affluent of societies is likely to be called upon to care
for displaced people. Or as a group of bodies involved in human
rights expressed it:
Throughout history, society has charged healers with the duty of
understanding and alleviating causes of human suffering. In the
past century, the world has witnessed ongoing epidemics of armed
conflicts and violations of international human rights, epidemics
that have devastated and continue to devastate the health and well
being of humanity. As we enter the twenty-first century, the nature
and extent of human suffering have compelled health providers
to redefine their understanding of health and the scope of their
professional interests and responsibilities.24

Finally, and most importantly, the teaching of human rights
should serve as a means of dispelling, or at least of bringing into
focus, the prejudices that are present in us all, and which can
lead to discrimination at many levels of health care. A report to
the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
presented alarming evidence that decisions about access to investigations and treatment in the U.K. are sometimes motivated by
who the patients are rather than by their health care needs. The
report highlights serious shortcomings in protecting the international right to the highest attainable standard of health as a consequence of which some doctors discriminate against vulnerable
groups, such as the elderly, prisoners, patients with HIV/AIDS,
people with learning disabilities, and, surprisingly, women with
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coronary heart disease are denied the treatment facilities afforded to men.25
At an international level, the former High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has identified discrimination
and stigmatization as important impediments in the global battle
against HIV and AIDS. ‘‘HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest human
rights and health challenges facing the world today. HIV/AIDSrelated stigma and discrimination—including discrimination in
health care settings—continue to be the primary driving forces
behind the epidemic by undermining prevention, treatment,
care, and support . . . Health care professionals have a crucial
role to play in ensuring respect for human rights, and the right
to health and to nondiscrimination in particular.’’26 Indeed the
issue of discrimination in medicine is one of considerable concern globally, and is evident not only in the U.K. but also in the
U.S.,27 in India,28 and no doubt in any country that cares to examine the issue.
What many doctors will not know, simply because they have
never been told, is that discrimination contravenes a number of
ethical codes. First, it violates the Hippocratic Oath, which anticipated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by nearly 2.5
millennia, and which is just as relevant to contemporary international law today as it was in 400 B.C.29 Second, it violates one of
the six nonderogable obligations within Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which
asserts the human right of each individual to the highest attainable standard of health.30
However, there are some promising happenings that augur
well for dealing with the problem of stigmatization in medicine.
The appointment of Paul Hunt from the Human Rights Centre
of the University of Essex as Special Rapporteur on The Right to
Health to the UN Commission on Human Rights, whose overall
brief is to ‘‘promote and protect the international right to
health,’’ suggests that after a long period of neglect, ‘‘the human
rights system, WHO, and other members of the UN family are
beginning to treat seriously the international right to health . . .
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Nobody can be sure of the implications of the renewed international interest in the right to health. But I suspect the implications are long-term and, at least for some countries, farreaching.’’31 The impressive Publications Program of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), which addresses training and education in human
rights for ‘‘indigenous peoples, minorities, professional groups,
and educational institutions,’’ is another welcome move.32 The
launch of a global campaign to integrate health and human
rights in undergraduate and postgraduate medical training in an
effort to ‘‘expunge stigmatization from medical practice’’ can be
seen as another step in the right direction.33 All the more reason,
therefore, for the medical schools of the world to join in and play
their crucial role in the international move to establish a right to
health for all.

What Should Medical Students Be Taught
on Human Rights?
Human rights is a complex discipline in its own stead, but not
one that has yet developed into a specialty in the traditional manner in medicine, whereby an expert becomes a head of a department attracting others with a kindred interest to devise a suitable
curriculum for undergraduate teaching. So, at least for the immediate future, even if the deans of medical schools were prepared to introduce the subject into the undergraduate curricula,
most universities would simply not have the staff with the necessary interest or expertise in the subject to prepare and teach its
many complexities. The British Medical Association (BMA) has
examined the issue in detail by concentrating on: (1) the composition and scope of ethics and human rights training; (2) what
doctors need to know; (3) how they can obtain that knowledge,
and (4) how they can use that knowledge effectively.34
As all medical schools have a course on medical ethics, the
BMA begins logically by examining the mutually complimentary
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roles of ethics and human rights. Ethics helps students to understand why abuse should be resisted, and human rights should
help them discover what should be done and how to resist abuse.
Though there is considerable overlap between ethics and human
rights, ‘‘ethics teaching needs to be supplemented by human
rights guidance.’’35 Medical ethics has been taught in medical
schools for many years in most countries of the world, but the
quality of the courses available varies greatly and herein lies a
further caveat for the teaching of human rights; the content and
standard of the courses are related to the availability of teachers
with the knowledge and enthusiasm to inspire their students, and
various bodies have responded by producing case-based teaching
packs, evaluated through workshops.36
Three conclusions that may be drawn from the comprehensive
BMA review relating to medical ethics are: (1) many of the current courses on medical ethics are in need of revision; (2) the
teaching of medical ethics and human rights should go hand-inhand, but be designed in unison so as to avoid the repetition that
seems inevitable if they are designed in isolation; and (3) the
achievement of the later objective would serve as an ideal opportunity for effecting the former.
At first glance there appears to be a wealth of teaching material
available for the teaching of human rights to medical students,
but more careful assessment shows that the material is fragmented and lacking the collaborative cohesion that should be
possible with contemporary distance learning techniques, which
is likely to be the key to success. Moreover, it must be borne in
mind that the teaching of medical ethics and human rights on an
international scale must be sufficiently flexible to take account of
the political, religious, and social mores that will to some extent
govern the national attitude to human rights issues, though this
should not be taken as implying that international principles governing human rights can be compromised, but rather be seen
as a means of influencing doctors within the sensitivities of the
environment in which they will later practice and face abuses to
human rights.
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The range of material available for human rights education
extends from that which medical organizations produce for doctors practicing in societies in which particular human rights
abuses occur, for example, the International Rehabilitation
Council for Torture Victims (IRCTV) based in Denmark has established training programs dealing with the rehabilitation and
care of torture survivors in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, and Latin
America. Likewise the Asia-Pacific Forum runs teaching programs and rehabilitation services in Australia, Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Nepal, New Guinea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua,
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Specific programs in ethics and
human rights for prison officers have been established in the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The organization International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) works
closely with the International Federation of Medical Students
concentrating on human rights issues from the perspective of
conflict prevention. Another medical student initiative, Human
Rights Union for Medical Action (HURUMA), grew out of the
work undertaken in Africa by the International Federation of
Medical Students and African student groups.37,38 The Commonwealth Medical Association (CMA) has developed an ethics training manual for developing countries,39 which integrates ethical
principles and extracts from human rights conventions with the
aim of making it necessary for all health professionals to attend
one training module annually as part of the requirements for
renewal of the license to practice.40 Moreover, the CMA has taken
the innovative step of linking each statement of ethics to the provisions of the various UN human rights conventions and declarations, thereby allowing that while doctors in developing countries
would not necessarily share the same cultural standards or views
about medical ethics, they should nevertheless be aware of an
obligation to respect the health-related human rights specified
in international instruments that their governments have legally
ratified.41
After the fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986,
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the new government made a strong commitment to promote
human rights through education, and this resulted in a framework for human rights education that ‘‘has been seen by some
commentators as a useful model of who should be involved and
what can be achieved.’’42 The Consortium for Health and Human
Rights, with a mandate to carry out education, research, and advocacy work, consists of the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for
Health and Human Rights, Global Lawyers and Physicians, Physicians for Human Rights, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Each of the constituent bodies of the
Consortium has produced training courses in various aspects of
health care and human rights.43 In the Netherlands, the Johannes Wier Foundation has produced a teaching module designed
for doctors, nurses, and paramedics, which, using a case study
approach, places students in ‘‘real life’’ situations with victims
of violent crime, torture and death in custody, rape in wartime,
forensic anthropology, and the administration of justice.44
Most of the material I refer to is designed for specific groups,
or for doctors working in areas where human rights abuse is
likely to occur. What is happening in the medical schools? A survey of medical schools in the U.K. and U.S. showed a willingness
to consider human rights in the curriculum, but there was considerable confusion between what constituted medical ethics and
human rights, and overall these surveys revealed that, in reality,
little was being taught on human rights.45 Indeed, there is some
evidence that in countries in which human rights abuses occur,
the medical schools and medical organizations are active in
teaching awareness of human rights, examples being Turkey,
India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nepal.46 Increasingly, the pressure and impetus for the teaching of human rights
has come from medical students’ organizations even though
they, like their deans, are very conscious of the demands being
made for more subjects to be compressed into an already overloaded curriculum.47 In many medical schools, the students organize work experience in areas of need and deprivation, which
may impart more about human rights than didactic teaching.
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In the U.K., Physicians for Human Rights,48 in conjunction
with Rachel Maxwell and Derrick Pounder, has developed a crossdisciplinary course entitled, ‘‘Medicine and Human Rights,’’
which is available free on the Internet and has been adopted by
the University of Dundee as part of the undergraduate curriculum, and has now been taken up by other medical schools in the
U.K.49 This module on the Internet is designed ‘‘for those with
no prior knowledge about human rights as they impact on the
practice of medicine.’’ It deals with issues that include medical
involvement in torture, the diagnosis and rehabilitation of torture victims, doctors’ involvement in the death penalty, human
rights and public health, women’s rights and rape in war, mechanisms of redress for human rights abuses in member states of the
European Community, and seeking asylum.50 The module had
been used in Russia, India, and Israel to teach human rights to
lawyers and scientists, as well as to medical students. It has also
been incorporated by the Centre for Enquiry into Health and
Allied Themes (CEHAT) into a one-year diploma in the Civics
and Politics Department of Bombay University,51 and into an intercalated BSc in International Health at the University College
London.52
Another initiative that differs from other available options is
one that cuts across the boundaries of academe and makes no
distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate status, the
younger or older participant, but seeks rather to educate those
working, or contemplating work, in the field of humanitarian crisis relief. The International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance,
which is conferred by the Center for International Health and
Cooperation at Fordham University, the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, and the University of Geneva, has been conferred on more than 400 graduates from over eighty nations. The
one-month intensive residential course has a distinguished faculty that comprehensively covers the ethical and human rights
aspects of humanitarian assistance including, among many topics, the historical background to humanitarian assistance, coping
with humanitarian crises and protecting human rights, interna-
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tional law and human rights, planning and management of humanitarian relief in strife-torn communities, preventive
diplomacy, law and ethics, environmental health, torture, land
mines and trauma, sexual violence and rape, the military aspects
to humanitarian crisis, the role of the media, and the psychological and personal health of international relief workers.53
If the growing imperative for teaching human rights to medical students is to be achieved, rhetoric and the passing of international resolutions will not solve the problem. The biggest
difficulty for the deans of medical schools will not be any lack
of acknowledgement of the importance of human rights for the
doctors graduating from their medical schools, or, indeed, of
willingness to introduce the subject, but rather the impossibility
of implementing a meaningful and well-structured course without having suitable teachers. In this regard, medical schools
would do well to take heed of what has been achieved in the
Open University with distance learning, and the international experts in human rights would do well to pool their expertise in
producing electronic learning modules in medical ethics and
human rights for incorporation into the undergraduate curricula
of medical schools across the world. In this regard, it is of relevance to note that European Biomed funding was obtained in
1996 to produce distance-learning workbooks on core themes in
medical ethics for use across Europe. This project, known as the
European Biomedical Ethics Practitioner Education (EBEPE)
project, was co-coordinated by the Imperial College School of
Medicine in London in partnership with the Instituut voor Gezondheidsethick in Maastricht, the Instituto Psicoanalitico per la
Richerche Socali in Rome, the Zentrum fur Ethik in der Medizin
in Freiburg, and the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Turku in Finland. The training pack was published in 1999
with the objective of encouraging health professionals to assess
differing approaches to resolving dilemmas by illustrating how
the same ethical challenges are handled in different European
countries.54
In concluding, it would not be unreasonable to ask skeptically
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if there is any evidence that the teaching of human rights to medical students makes them better doctors. Intuitively my response
would be affirmative, but we live in a world where evidence is
demanded for all statements, and to be fair, the incorporation of
human rights in the medical school curricula, as I have stressed,
is not one to be undertaken lightly. A few international surveys
have indeed shown that the teaching of human rights to medical
students does increase awareness by allowing doctors to detach
themselves from the prejudicial influences of their social background, but where doctors are faced with human rights abuse
education alone will not solve their dilemmas, and the need for
collegiate support then becomes necessary.55 More evidence on
the value of teaching human rights is clearly needed but in fairness may be difficult to obtain, at least until the teaching of the
subject is standardized to internationally accepted minimum
standards.
If medicine, with its long-established tradition of caring, has
been slow in acknowledging human rights, I hope I have not so
much excused the profession for its shortcomings in this regard,
but rather enunciated the real difficulties it faces in achieving
what it recognizes as an urgent imperative. The symposium, ‘‘Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action,’’ has served as a timely
stimulus to assess the place of humanitarian action within the
tradition of medicine, not merely as an audit of the current state
of affairs within the undergraduate curriculum, but as the impetus to develop structures for the future implementation of
human rights in the training of doctors. The teaching of human
rights will not, of course, abolish the worldwide abuse of human
rights, but it is an essential component in the fight to make the
world a better place for all to live.

Part 3
Civilization cannot survive without the stimulation provided by the
movement of goods, ideas, and people. There are problems associated with mass human migrations but, historically, the benefits
have far outweighed the price of a policy of isolationism. I include,
therefore, a chapter on immigration in the Foundations section of
this book. There is another chapter in the Fault Lines section. In
this section, Ambassador Jan Eliasson presents the positive, even
necessary, aspects of immigration in an area, Europe, where misunderstanding, and even manipulation of economic statistics, have
caused serious political tensions.

9

Immigration in Europe: Promise
or Peril?
Ambassador Jan Eliasson1
We should strive towards one single global set of principles for all types of migration in the long run. In an
ideal world, international migration would not be more
difficult for the individual than migration within countries.
Swedish State Secretary for Migration Affairs,
Gun-Britt Andersson2

The European Union (EU) is basically a project of common
values aimed at creating a life in dignity for all its inhabitants.
Granted, this is often overshadowed by economic and political
matters; by the enlargement process, the development of the
Euro zone, and other issues that make up the substance of the
construction of a union.
Even though the Union began as an economic association, its
founding partners always viewed it as an important tool to ensure
that Europe would never again be torn apart by war, or fall back
into totalitarianism. Economic and political integration, it was
thought, would make war between members unthinkable, and
improve living conditions for their populations.
As such, it has performed remarkably well. The EU has successfully worked to reduce differences between member countries
through a redistribution of resources from the wealthier members to the less affluent. And the Union is now in the process of
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enlargement, attempting to bring the same positive effects to the
Eastern and Mediterranean parts of Europe.
In a similar vein, the EU is one of the biggest donors of development and humanitarian aid in the world. The only five countries to live up to the goal promoted by the United Nations (UN)
of giving 0.7 percent of GDP as foreign aid are all European—
Norway and EU members Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden.3
Over the years, the EU has been a major supporter of international humanitarian assistance and action, mainly through the
UN. All EU members have joined the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention. Europe has
made a collective effort of enforcing human rights through the
European Convention on Human Rights, and the European
Court of Human Rights. The EU as a group has been a strong
supporter of most major international treaties on humanitarian
issues such as the rights of children, migrants, and women, and
is today a driving force behind the International Criminal Court.
The European Union’s traditional support for humanitarian
values may now be challenged, as an effect of reactions to recent
developments in the area of immigration. Attitudes toward immigrants appear to be increasingly negative. According to human
rights organizations, EU support for the absolute right of asylum
is wavering.
The direction the EU chooses to go on the issue of immigration will have strong ramifications not only on life in Europe, but
also on the whole international climate in a day and age when
religion and ethnic origin increasingly become dividing rather
than uniting factors. There is an urgent need internationally to
define common values across religious and ethnic divides.

The Immigration Crisis
Throughout history, individuals, groups, and peoples have
moved to Europe and within Europe. The continent has also
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been a huge area of origin for migrants. Millions of Europeans
left for America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Migration has always been a major feature of European life.
When different cultures come into contact with each other,
none of them are left unchanged. Thus, migration has helped
form our countries as they are today. But this is a simple fact of
life and history that seems all too easily forgotten. It certainly
appears to be held in little regard in the current period.
In recent years, a wave of xenophobia has again affected the
European continent. Country after country has seen populist
anti-immigration parties spring to prominence, calling for restrictions on immigration, tougher guidelines for immigrants,
and sometimes for their forcible expulsion.
These messages have hit a raw nerve and received favorable
responses from parts of the electorate. Fear appears to have set
in among the political strategists. Fear of losing power and control. Fear that this apparent right-wing surge would turn into
something ugly. Europe has seen it all before, and the memories
are frightening.
Certainly, some have also seen it as an opportunity.
In order to fight these tendencies, or to exploit them, many
political parties have moved to the right on immigration issues,
embracing some of the ideas of their anti-immigration colleagues, while rejecting their ideologies. Several left-of-center administrations have been swept from power in what began to look
like a major political shift to the right in Europe. It has become
conventional knowledge that Europe is in the midst of an immigration crisis, facing masses of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.

Time for a Different Argument
Anti-immigration parties claim that the crisis with immigration
stems from the numbers, that there are too many immigrants in
our societies.
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We will argue that this image of immigration is false and that
the opposite is true. Europe needs more immigrants.
Europeans are growing older and are having fewer children.
Without immigration, the population of most EU countries
would already be sinking. For Italy, this is already the case. Our
economies are sluggish. Diversity is seen by many as threatening,
at the same time that business schools are teaching diversity management and extolling its many benefits. Many thousands of immigrants go unemployed, yet there are large skill gaps in the
labor market.
The effort to close the door to illegal immigrants and asylum
seekers is creating a conflict of conscience for many humanitarian-minded Europeans. Our support for global solidarity, human
rights, and equality makes it difficult to justify sending people
back to unstable countries or abject poverty. Policies of restriction may also add to xenophobia, in fact legitimizing it.
Taking a tough stand on illegal immigration and border controls may pick up votes in the short run. However, it may hurt
long-term goals such as securing European growth and welfare,
fighting racism and xenophobia, and projecting generosity and
humanity.
Recent actions and statements indicate that this is already clear
to large segments of the political and business sectors. However,
they have been ineffective in communicating these arguments in
the public forum. The arguments for immigration need to be
stated clearly and honestly, without avoiding a discussion of the
problems and risks involved. Otherwise, the field will be left open
for populist rabble-rousers to continue to ply their trade.
Nevertheless, increased immigration is not a solution to the
fundamental causes of global migration, for example, the fact
that many millions of people feel compelled to leave their home
countries in search of freedom and better opportunities to live
decent lives.
Therefore, it is also high time to strengthen the dialogue and
the partnership with the immigrants’ countries of origin. In an
overarching sense, large-scale immigration can be seen as a symp-
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tom of deep-seated development problems that industrial and
developing countries have to address in close cooperation. If we
can successfully promote global economic and social development, migration does not have to be a desperate and risky activity, but a strong engine for flexible and growing economies.
The Recent Historical Framework
We believe that Europe should absorb more immigrants than we
currently allow, both for humanitarian reasons and for reasons
of self-interest. At the moment, this is a matter of dispute in Europe. A brief review of the postwar era may shed some light on
why.
The current political environment of immigration did not develop overnight. Some of the far-right parties now enjoying political successes have roots in the ideologies that tore Europe apart
in the 1930s and 1940s.
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe did not have an inclination for racism and xenophobia. There was a continent to rebuild, and lost years to recuperate. During the following two
decades of recovery and growth, local labor markets could not
supply enough workers, especially in Northern Europe. Immigrants were actively recruited, mostly within Europe. Hundreds
of thousands of Greeks and Italians—and, later, Turks—moved
north, to countries like Germany and Sweden.
Most labor immigrants were expected to be temporary visitors,
but many chose to stay permanently. In a climate of low unemployment and rapid standard-of-living increases, they were
needed, and societies had relatively few problems absorbing
large numbers of foreign workers.
End of a Golden Era
Much of this changed with the oil crisis and the stagnation of the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Unemployment rose as economies
faltered. Labor immigration in Europe declined drastically.
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The end of the 1980s and the early 1990s brought a new
trend—large numbers of refugees fleeing from conflict zones inside and outside of Europe. The lifting of the Iron Curtain and
the end of the cold war brought unforeseen consequences. Old
rivalries and animosities, frozen by decades of ideological, superpower struggle, now heated up again.
Places like Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Somalia erupted in violent ethnic and religious conflict. Asylum seekers flocked to the
EU in previously unprecedented numbers. At the peak in 1992,
675,460 people applied for asylum in the EU.4 A decade later, in
2001, the number was only about 57 percent of that, or 384,530
applicants.5
In 1992, immigration to the EU reached top levels. Family reunification immigration soared, and Germany opened up a generous return program for ethnic Germans from the former
Soviet bloc. All in all, three million people migrated to the EU in
1992,6 compared to an average over the ten years since then of
around 1.4 million per year.
States were not prepared for this sudden influx. They started
amending asylum regulations that were deemed too generous,
and increased efforts to curb illegal immigration. Anti-immigrant
sentiments grew.
In a European-wide EU survey of racism and xenophobia, the
Eurobarometer opinion poll of 1997, 65 percent of respondents
agreed that there were already enough minority residents and
that accepting more would cause problems. Twenty percent
agreed that all immigrants, legal and illegal, and their children,
even those born in the EU, should be sent back to their country
of origin.7
It has become increasingly clear that drawing political capital
on the fear of strangers has made a comeback with a vengeance.
Taking a Stand against Xenophobia . . . and Failing
The 1999 national elections in Austria created a crisis for the EU.
Joerg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party won massive support and
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was invited into a coalition government. Haider had expressed
sympathies for aspects of the Nazi regime in Germany, and his
party used and encouraged xenophobia to gain votes. Critics
warned that this would legitimize and give a boost to xenophobia
across Europe. It was seen as an intolerable development and an
embarrassment to the Union.
The EU reacted strongly and imposed sanctions on Austria’s
participation in EU affairs in 2000. However, the move was controversial, with many predicting that it would be counter-productive. After seven months of divisive debate, the sanctions were
lifted. The Freedom Party remained in power.

In Search of a Response
Less than a year later, when media mogul, Silvio Berlusconi, became Prime Minister of Italy with the help of the ex-fascist National Alliance and the xenophobic Lega Nord, the response
from the EU was restrained. As Danish Foreign Minister Mogens
Lykketoft observed: ‘‘I believe we learned a lesson from Austria.’’8
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR) has criticized Italy repeatedly for being the only EU
country without adequate asylum legislation. In August 2002, a
new asylum law was finally enacted. But the Bossi-Fini law
(named after its sponsors, the leaders of coalition members Lega
Nord and the National Alliance) is controversial. It has drawn
strong criticism from the UNHCR, among other things, for not
allowing appeals to halt expulsion.9
By current EU standards, however, Italian immigration policies
now appear more mainstream in character. In a very short period
of time, the focus on the immigration issue has shifted from the
fight against racism to the fight against illegal immigrants and
asylum abusers.
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If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them?
In France, President Jacques Chirac, after facing off with surprise
opponent, extreme right-winger Le Pen, has made it his top priority to fight crime, an issue closely connected to immigration in
Europe these days. Meanwhile, Spanish Prime Minister José
Maria Aznar says he will restrict immigration in order to prevent
the rise of a Spanish Le Pen. Similar signals have come from British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder, among others.
At the European Council summit in Seville in June 2002, the
fifteen member countries debated efforts to deal with the problem of illegal immigration and the large numbers of asylum seekers. Measures were adopted to make border controls more
effective and improve cooperation with transit countries and
countries of origin. Uncooperative countries may find that their
relationship to the EU will suffer. On the whole, the emphasis lay
clearly on reducing the total numbers of people reaching the
Union.10
In other words, national leaders and the EU have chosen to
respond to the recent rise of the populists on the right by trying
to steal the wind from their sails.

Trying to Cut the Numbers
The shift in attitude toward immigration has had concrete effects
on policy in many countries. Denmark, previously known for its
liberal immigration policies, has been strongly influenced by the
populist momentum. The anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party
(DPP) received 12 percent of the vote in last year’s national elections. The government, relying on DPP support in parliament,
has openly declared a policy partly aimed at discouraging some
groups of potential asylum seekers.11
During the first six months of this year, asylum applications in
Denmark almost halved. The Danish authorities claim to save 200
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million Euro per year as fewer people apply for asylum.12 In the
meantime, neighboring Sweden and Norway have seen substantial increases in applications during the same period.
In Austria, a law has been proposed that could mean that nonEU citizens could be expelled if they fail to pass a German language test within four years of their arrival.13 Similar tests, and
other proposals that would serve to ‘‘force’’ integration on immigrants, have been on the agenda in several EU countries, most of
which have recently acted to curb immigration or make conditions for immigrants less generous.
Instances such as Le Pen’s elevation to second-round presidential candidate, Fortuyn’s provocative statements about Islam, and
Berlusconi’s similar ones have met with strong official protests.
But the fact remains that the official position of most EU countries on immigration and asylum has moved toward rejection of
the many in favor of selection of the few.
In connection with Seville, the weekly political magazine, The
Economist, suggested, under the headline, ‘‘Huddled Masses,
Please Stay Away,’’ that the inscription on a European Statue of
Liberty might read: ‘‘We have vacancies for a limited number of
computer programmers and will reluctantly accept torture victims with convincing scars. Migrants looking for a better life can
clear off.’’14

‘‘Fear Is Not a Good Basis for Making Policy’’15
While there has been much discussion about creating a uniform
EU asylum policy, harmonizing legislation, and setting common
standards, governments mostly have been unwilling to commit to
this process. Rules vary within the Union, causing frictions between countries.
Human rights watchdogs like the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and Amnesty International have been
highly critical of recent EU immigration policy. They have
claimed that the lofty declarations and the specific proposals do
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not match, and have expressed concern that a sense of crisis has
been created when in fact there is little cause for alarm.
The focus on border controls and the fight against illegal immigration may be creating a climate, they say, in which people’s
irrational fears are validated. ‘‘The term ‘illegal immigrant’ will
too easily be seen to fit everyone, and create the risk of criminalization and discrimination,’’ writes Amnesty.16

The Public Image of Immigration
The public image of immigration is a problem. All across Europe,
election results show that anti-immigrant sentiments have grown
stronger, as immigration has moved to the top of the political
agenda, not least after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001.
Much of what has been brought forward by the main political
parties, however, has not had an anti-immigrant bias in itself.
Moreover, it is understandable that many sensitive political issues,
including immigration, are now viewed through a security lens.
But taken as a whole, the political discourse has built up a sense
of impending crisis on the immigration front.
A similar phenomenon has been evident in the media.
Whether reporting on immigrants dying on Europe’s borders,
the failure of integration policies, racist attacks on immigrants,
or crimes perpetrated by immigrants or their children, an overall
image of immigration and immigrants as a problem has been
created.
According to a comparative study by the European Research
Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), the
news media tend to focus on ‘‘negativity, problems, crime, and
conflict’’ when reporting about migrants and ethnic, cultural,
and religious minorities. The study examined media practices in
all of the fifteen EU states during 1995–2000. While practices
vary from country to country, some common themes were
found.17
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When immigrants or ethnic minorities are involved in crimes,
their origin is often linked, directly or indirectly, to their criminal
behavior. Crimes are sometimes presented in more dramatic
terms and are often related to a specific minority group (Russians
in Finland, Albanians in Greece and Italy, etc.).
In several countries, the study found a tendency to report in
terms of ‘‘us and them,’’ where ‘‘we’’ are the victims and ‘‘they’’
are the problem. The arrival of asylum seekers was often described using metaphors like disasters and invasions—presenting
immigration as a national threat.
Negative media reporting was not balanced by positive images.
Only rarely did media focus on individual immigrants or minority members or offer perspectives on their everyday lives. Immigrants were presented as dishonest and ungrateful abusers of
welfare and asylum systems. Reporting on illegal immigration
tended to include references to police action and supposed criminality, reinforcing a negative image.
According to the study, stereotyping was common, especially
in countries where large-scale immigration is a relatively new occurrence. Stereotypes were especially prevalent and negative for
Roma and Muslims.
Open racism disappeared from the media in most countries
during the 1990s, while subtle racism sometimes remained. The
problem of reporting on immigration and minorities was discussed, and some measures were taken. Minorities and immigrants have had more opportunities recently to offer their
perspective in the media. Unfortunately, this may add to the negative picture, as those stories, again, tend to focus on problems.
The main conclusion of the ERCOMER report is that the
media tends to overemphasize negative aspects of immigration
and minority cultures. The focus on problems risks reinforcing
prejudice and negative opinions.
In a situation characterized by hardening economic conditions, the threat of foreign terrorism, and political leaders dramatizing immigration, there is fertile ground for misunderstanding.
An often stated or implied message that immigration is a prob-
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lem can easily be misconstrued as immigration being the
problem.
Immigration is a highly emotional subject on which many people have strong feelings and opinions. Unfortunately, opinions
are not always based on facts. They may reflect long-lived myths,
sometimes conveyed through the media, that tap into our inherent skepticism of strangers. They provide scapegoats and suggest
easy solutions to difficult problems. They are the staple ammunition of the populist. ‘‘It’s the immigrants’ fault. They are not like
us. If we get rid of them, everything will get better.’’
A rational discussion of immigration and its consequences for
Europe should be based on facts, not myths. So, let us look at
some of the notions that are in sway and being spread.
‘‘Immigrants Are Swamping the Continent’’
Many seem to believe that we are currently experiencing record
levels of immigration in the EU, and that the numbers of immigrants in our countries have reached critical mass.
As we have seen, immigration actually peaked over ten years
ago, in 1992, and is down significantly compared to then. Asylum
applications rose during the late 1990s from very low levels. But
in 2000 and 2001, they decreased: in 2001 there were 384,530
applications.18
There have been some attempts to encourage labor immigration, but the numbers are small. In any case, skilled immigrants
moving directly into the job market are unlikely to concern most
people; illegal immigration does. Illegal immigration is naturally
hard to measure with any amount of certainty. It is estimated that
around 500,000 people enter the EU clandestinely each year. Despite all the drama, it has not been substantiated that illegal immigration is increasing.
In comparative terms, the EU is not receiving a uniquely large
number of immigrants. Over the last ten years, total yearly immigration into the EU has averaged about 1.4 million people. In
the same period, 2.3 million have immigrated to the U.S. every
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year.19 With about 90 million less inhabitants (290 to 380 million), the U.S. is, on average, absorbing almost one million more
immigrants per year than the EU.
Finally, the EU does not have an unusually large share of foreign-born residents. At 5.3 percent, it is quite low compared to
some other countries. In the U.S., it is around 11 percent, and in
Australia it is as high as 25 percent. If these countries can manage, then our smaller share of foreigners should not be an insurmountable threat, even if it increases.20

‘‘. . . Abusing the Asylum System’’
There is a persistent argument that very few of the refugees or
asylum seekers who come to our countries are really qualified for
refugee status. First-review numbers are often quoted to show
that only a small percentage of those seeking asylum are accepted, leaving room for speculation that as many as 90 to 95
percent lack sufficient grounds. So, the argument goes, a large
majority of them are just abusing the system.
This is a misrepresentation of the reality of the asylum process.
The first review is, by definition, not the end of the matter. There
are further investigations and appeals, and the number of refugees finally allowed to stay is significantly higher.
For example, the U.K. decided almost 120,000 asylum cases in
2001. In about 9 percent of them, 11,180 cases, the applicants
were granted asylum, while 19,845 people, or 17 percent, were
allowed to stay for humanitarian and other reasons. The remaining 74 percent were rejected. But 75 percent of rejected cases
were appealed and, of the appeals reviewed in 2001, another 19
percent were granted asylum.21 Assuming that these numbers can
be applied to refugees arriving in 2001, almost 40 percent of asylum seekers were finally allowed to stay.
Higher numbers can be seen in other countries. A Swedish
study found that of all asylum seekers who arrived in 1997, as
many as 65 percent had received some sort of residency status in
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Sweden by 2000.22 This is not to say that unfounded applications
are not a problem. They, no doubt, undermine public support
for the right to asylum and put strain on already burdened migration authorities. But the problem is highly exaggerated.
Also, a look at UNHCR statistics reveals that in the last decade,
the top ten countries of origin for asylum seekers in the EU were,
in descending order: the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.23 All of these
countries have been the stage for violent conflicts or repressive
regimes in the last ten years, as have most of the major countries
of origin.
Asylum seekers generally do not come from safe and secure
countries. Granted, some are economic migrants looking for better opportunities rather than protection. But the lines between
these two groups are blurred, and the distinction may not always
be clear to asylum seekers.

‘‘. . . Undermining the Welfare System’’
Another common complaint is that immigrants come to our
countries to live off welfare and are not interested in working or
contributing to society.
There is, indeed, a higher rate of welfare dependency among
the foreign-born than in the native population. For example, a
study of welfare in Germany found that in 1996, 23.5 percent of
recipients were foreign-born, at a time when they made up 8.9
percent of the population.
However, the study also found that this over-representation was
entirely due to demographics. Immigrants were generally less educated, younger, and had more dependent children, factors that
made them more prone to rely on state assistance.24
Studies in the U.S. have seen results along similar lines. A Carnegie project reached the conclusions that working-age non-refugee immigrants have the same rates of participation in welfare
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use as working-age natives. Immigrants with incomes below the
poverty line actually use less welfare than natives in the same situation.25
Welfare dependency is not a factor related to ethnicity, religion, or some innate quality that the diverse group of immigrants
shares, but to integration in the job market. Immigrants are just
as willing to work as natives, but they have a harder time finding
a job.
Illegal immigrants are likely the most work-seeking group in
society overall. As they are not covered by welfare systems, they
have to earn their way from day one. They come to work hard,
and often to send money home to relatives. Their lack of legal
status steers them toward the ‘‘gray’’ economy, and they often
end up working for low pay under substandard conditions.
However, there is one group of immigrants that stands out.
Refugees have distinctly higher rates of welfare dependency than
other immigrants, on both sides of the Atlantic. The reasons for
this are obvious. Asylum seekers are usually forbidden to work
for several months after their arrival. Moreover, refugees, unlike
legal immigrants, are not admitted because of any special skills
they hold and they usually do not have sponsors or relatives who
can support them. They are offered protection because they are
fleeing from persecution, frequently arriving in ill health, sometimes traumatized by their experiences, and often without financial resources. It is hardly surprising that this leaves them
vulnerable and more dependent on state assistance.

‘‘. . . Stealing Our Jobs’’
Eventually, immigrants enter the job market and as they do, competition increases. An increase in labor supply has been shown to
decrease wages. This will hurt some groups in the labor market,
especially in sectors requiring less education.
Still, immigrant labor is not responsible for the high unemployment in much of the EU. Most experts would rather put the
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blame on the inflexible nature of the labor market. The U.S.
admits almost one million more immigrants every year into a
smaller population, and still has an unemployment rate that, at
5.7 percent, is well below the EU average of 7.7 percent.
Immigrants have also been found to compete asymmetrically
in the labor market, filling high-end jobs where there is a skill
gap, and low-end jobs that most natives would rather avoid. Providing labor is just one of many ways in which immigrants contribute to the economy of their host countries.

Immigrants and the Economy
While attitudes toward immigration have much to do with emotions and social adaptation, it is also to a high degree an economic matter. As previous eras have shown, immigrants are more
welcome when times are good and unemployment low.
Unfortunately, this is not the case at present in Europe, where
non-growing economies cause concern and probably contribute
to xenophobia. The European Commission reported in November 2002 that the average growth rate for the Euro area is estimated at only 0.8 percent in 2002. Growth for 2003 is forecasted
at 1.8 percent, much lower than the 2.9 percent predicted in the
last Commission report. The expected recovery is being pushed
further into the future.26
In this environment of unsatisfactory growth and job creation,
the burden of immigration on state finances becomes a recurrent
argument for the populists. Immigration, it is said, siphons off
money from the state that could be better used to provide for the
citizens already living there.
Clearly, it is costly to receive, house, and investigate asylum
seekers. They need somewhere to live and something to live off
while their applications are reviewed. This usually means welfare,
as asylum seekers are often not allowed to work for a period of
time after their arrival. The Swedish Migration Board reports that
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in 2001 it spent roughly $220 million (SKr2 billion)27 handling
23,520 asylum applications.28
However, considering only the immediate costs does not give
us a fair idea of the overall economic effects of immigration. It
fails to take into account factors that, in a longer perspective, are
positive for the economy. In the long run, immigrants who are
accepted into society will contribute in the same way as the rest of
us, by living their lives, working, spending, paying taxes, raising
families, and participating in society.
In spite of the multitude of stories about impoverished minority ghettos and welfare dependency, there are thousands of success stories as well. When Time magazine surveyed immigration
in 2000, it found that 16 million immigrants in Europe earned
more than $460 billion each year, opening businesses, creating
jobs, and fueling the economy. They bring an entrepreneurial
spirit, which is much needed in Europe.29 In addition, their remittances to various home countries have a number of effects
that are positive for the international economy.

Taxes versus Welfare Benefits
What is the effect of immigration on state finances? The findings
are mixed. A study by the Institute for Economic Research in
Dresden, Germany, stated that immigrants pay $150 billion in
taxes every year in Germany, surpassing the $120 billion they receive in welfare benefits.30
Similar reports in the U.K. in 2001 and 2002 reached the conclusion that immigration is an economic plus. In 1999/2000, migrants in the U.K. paid £31 billion in taxes and consumed £29
billion in tax-supported public services, generating a fiscal surplus of £2 billion.31
In Sweden, Jan Ekberg has studied the effects of immigration
on the Swedish economy. Up until the 1980s, predominantly
labor-oriented immigration contributed to the economy. Growth
was high, unemployment low, and the need for foreign labor
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great. More recently, immigration has had a somewhat negative
influence on the overall Swedish economy. Recent immigrants
have had a hard time entering the job market, making welfare
costs outstrip tax income.32
Immigration does not have to be a drain on state finances.
Evidence suggests that under the right conditions, it is a positive
factor. But access to the job market is essential.

Filling the Gaps
Immigrants and state finances would not be the only beneficiaries of better integration into the job market. As many European
firms have found out, labor shortages can be very costly. In 2001,
the International Labor Office in Switzerland found that unfilled
vacancies in the information technology (IT) sector alone had
cost EU member states approximately $106 billion in lost GDP
growth.33
This is already a problem in Europe. With the baby boom generations about to retire in large numbers, it is a problem destined
to grow. Immigration can provide a partial solution. This is well
known to European governments. Several of them have already
tried various programs aimed at particular professional groups,
such as computer programmers or health care workers.
Germany introduced the first European ‘‘green card’’ scheme
in 2000, issuing 12,500 five-year work permits to non-EU computer specialists between August 2000 and July 2002.34 The U.K.
has set up special categories for high-priority migrants, such as
managers, students, artists, investors, and academics. There is a
fast-track work permit system in place to attract desirable workers, like nurses and midwives. France has had a similar system,
especially geared toward IT workers. The Netherlands has given
priority and special treatment to IT and telecommunication industries, and has recruited nurses from abroad.35
In Sweden, the newly re-elected Social Democratic government has rejected targeted labor immigration. Prime Minister
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Göran Persson has declared that efforts should first be made to
integrate those immigrants who are already in the country. A
Swedish think tank argues that targeted labor immigration misses
the goal. As the baby boomers retire, the effects will be felt across
the entire economy. Countries will not need just the elites, but
people of all kinds.36
In Willing Workers, a study on illegal Mexican migration to the
U.S., Daniel Griswold reports that, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, demand for less skilled labor will continue to
grow in the years ahead. Meanwhile, the supply of American
workers suitable for such work will decrease through aging and
increasing education levels.37 Considering Europe’s demographic situation, this effect should be felt even more strongly
there.
The skill gap is not just something that affects high-tech industries or specialized professions. In the developed world, there are
vacancies not only for doctors and programmers, but also for
waiters and gardeners. Therefore, if we are to manage migration
flows, the task is much more complex than just prioritizing specific categories of skilled labor.

Lowering Wages, Stimulating Growth
Apart from alleviating skill gaps, an increase in the supply of
labor can be expected to lower the costs of labor. This is controversial, as it hurts those who see their wages go down or rise less
than they otherwise would. But for the economy in general, it is
usually considered positive, stimulating industry and growth.
In Heaven’s Door, a recent book by a leading researcher in the
area, George Borjas, the author confirms that immigration increases the U.S. labor supply and that as an effect, wages and
prices are lowered. This process increased U.S. GDP by about $8
billion in 1998. The cost of providing public services to immigrants exceeded the taxes they paid, according to Borjas, who
concludes that the positive economic contribution of immigrants
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is limited. He finds that the effect of immigration is largely distributional, shifting $160 billion a year from workers whose wages
are depressed to employers who benefit from lower wages and
consumers who benefit from lower prices.38
As argued by Griswold, immigrant labor can also serve as a
flexible buffer for the economy, providing labor that can be mobilized quickly to serve fluctuating needs. It makes the economy
more efficient and stimulates growth. Under current rules on immigration in Europe as well as the U.S., this is especially true of
illegal immigrants, who are very demand-sensitive. He suggests
that encouraging temporary migration could achieve the same
effect in a legal way.39
Immigration actually could be a better economic proposition
for Europe than for the U.S. The skill shortages are higher, making larger gains possible. On average, immigrants to Europe also
tend to have higher educational levels than their U.S. counterparts. Realizing these advantages will, however, require an open
and well-functioning internal market. This is a critical area for
the EU. If the internal market is successful, coping with immigration will be considerably easier.40
The U.K. treasury has produced studies that suggest that immigration contributes to economic growth in the U.K., adding an
extra quarter-point of growth each year.41 This may not appear
impressive, but 0.25 percent growth is not an insignificant number, especially not in Europe.
And even though costs to some native workers are real, the
benefits to the entire economy, and to immigrant workers who
achieve significant wage increases, far outweigh them.

Entrepreneurship and Diversity
There are other possible positive effects. It is often argued that
immigrants, by virtue of having taken the leap and settled in a
new country, are a more entrepreneurial group than the general
population. The decision to migrate cannot be an easy one. As it
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carries considerable costs, economic as well as social, it takes
strength and confidence to leave one’s native country. After all,
those that take the chance are a select minority. They tend to be
younger and have higher skills and education than the average
population of their home countries.42
Diversity management is now a standard topic at many business
schools. Its proponents argue that companies and organizations
have a lot to gain from encouraging and welcoming diversity and
different cultures in the workplace.
The same can be said for countries. Historically, the most vibrant and successful societies have not been the ones that closed
their gates to the world, but those that became meeting places
where different cultures and influences could interact. That is
the sort of environment in which new ideas thrive and a society’s
long-term vitality is preserved.
In previous eras, nations like France and England became
focal points of science, industry, and culture, giving birth to the
enlightenment and the industrial revolution. Today, our eyes naturally turn to the U.S. While the great melting pot may have its
blemishes, it continues to be an economic and cultural powerhouse.
As Tony Blair said recently, ‘‘In the modern world, an open
and tolerant society that welcomes newcomers is a condition for
growth and prosperity.’’43

The Socio-Cultural Dilemma
The first two years of the twenty-first century will not go down in
history as a great time of tolerance and openness. The horrible
terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the war on
terrorism, and new terrorist attacks in 2002 have been detrimental to the relations between the Western and Islamic worlds.
Recent tragic events have added to old prejudices and suspicions and fueled xenophobia on all sides. The fear of international terrorism, closely associated with Muslim fundamentalists,
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is now the top perceived threat listed by both Americans and
Europeans, according to a study by the German Marshall Fund
and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.44 And American
flags are burning on Arab streets in the Middle East again.
What we see is not a clash of civilizations, but Muslims are currently the most visible immigrant group in Europe and have been
the focus of many anti-immigration campaigns. In some of them,
denunciation of Islamic culture and promises to curb Muslim immigration were cornerstones of anti-immigration party strategy.
Muslims and other non-European immigrants are targeted because they differ in many respects from natives, as well as from
earlier groups of immigrants. One generation ago, most immigrants came from within Europe. Overall, the socio-cultural differences were not overwhelming.45
Modern immigration has brought with it new cultural challenges. Today, a large and increasing portion of immigrants
come from outside of Europe, from Africa and Asia. They stand
out more and the societies many of them come from are built on
different foundations and history. They bring their own traditions, values, and ideas on culture, society, politics, and family.
Integration has proven more difficult for a number of reasons,
prejudice and fear not least among them.
Immigrants challenge our lifestyles, our traditions, and, to
some degree, our values. But why should this be perceived as
necessarily negative? Societies have always thrived on the exchange of ideas and influences, on diversity, not on uniformity.
And if we never need to defend our own values, they may lose
their relevance and content and turn into empty phrases.
Some people argue that immigrants threaten social cohesion
by challenging and undermining traditions and values that are
essential to native culture. According to proponents of this view,
the purity of a culture is indicative of its relative worth and vitality. We would argue that the opposite is true, that interaction
strengthens a culture and that it withers in isolation.
The notion that any culture can be preserved in some sort of
pure condition is far-fetched and dangerously ethno-centric, es-
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pecially in our time of global communications and interdependence. But even earlier in history, cultures have always been
works in progress. What it means to be European or American
today is not the same as it was one hundred years ago. Cultures
evolve and respond to outside stimuli. The culture that a purist
may want to preserve is itself a product of this process of evolution.
This is not to say that the mixing of cultures, religions, and
ethnic groups cannot put strain on the social fabric. But strain
does not have to be negative. The world is constantly changing,
and we need to change with it.
Of course, minority groups cannot be allowed to place themselves outside of our legal systems or democratically accepted
norms. For example, in the Western world there are laws against
female circumcision and laws guaranteeing the equality of
women. These and other aspects of human rights are essential to
our systems and must be equally respected by all inhabitants of
our countries.
On other matters, it would serve us well to show more flexibility. Why, for example, the desire to wear a turban or a veil should
be considered a threat and sometimes lead to legal action is a
mystery to us.
However, you can argue against immigration on socio-cultural
grounds without being a cultural purist. On the practical side,
critics point out the failures of integration—the segregation in
housing, high immigrant unemployment, crime rates, and cultural collisions over women’s rights and other issues—and claim
that immigration must be curtailed.
Across the EU, immigrant or minority ‘‘ghettos’’ are familiar
features of most large cities. Sometimes, the problems are severe.
In some European suburbs to big cities, the unemployment rate
can be as high as 50 percent, criminality out of control, and police afraid to respond.46 People in such areas probably feel little
positive connection to the rest of society. Subcultures may develop, where values are different than those of society at large,

178

IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

and language skills may suffer. Integration then becomes very
difficult indeed.
Social marginalization can bring with it unemployment, drug
abuse, and criminality, independent of ethnic, religious, or cultural background. Many of the problems afflicting such immigrant communities are not related to any specific cultural or
religious background. This situation is not just a failure on the
part of immigrants, but also a failure for European integration
policies.
We should do our utmost to break social marginalization,
which is undermining the positive contributions that these communities have to offer. It is important not only for their sake but
also for ours. Romani Prodi, President of the European Commission, has called immigration, ‘‘a fountain of vitality and energy
that is indispensable for a Europe that’s aging.’’47

The Demographic Challenge
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the serious
demographic development in Europe. The UN population projections for 1995–205048 calculated that during the first half of
the twenty-first century, the populations of most European countries are likely to become smaller and older as a result of low
fertility rates and increased longevity. The European median age
will increase from 37.7 to 52.7 years. The support ratio may decrease to two workers per retiree. These are dramatic developments, which will have considerable implications for both the
economy and public policy.49
The U.S. situation is radically different. In the past decade, the
U.S. has taken in over eleven million legal immigrants, up from
six million in the 1970s and seven million in the 1980s. In addition, another eight million may have entered the country illegally, many of them staying permanently.
Most of these immigrants, both legal and illegal, come from
Mexico and other Latin American countries. As the fertility rate
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for Latin-Americans in the U.S. is roughly 3.0, this infusion gives
a tremendous boost to population. Compared to Europe, in 2050
the U.S. could be younger, more ethnically mixed, and more dynamic.50
Of course, a large and young population is not in itself a guarantee for economic well-being. But the opposite can be a real
problem for societies who are accustomed to high levels of public
assistance in times of ill health or old age. Basically, it means that
there will be fewer people who pay for the welfare system, and
more who expect to receive from it.

What Can the EU Do to Deal with this Situation?
Specific reforms, for example creating more robust pension systems, would be an important contribution. In certain countries,
measures designed to increase the female participation rate
would also be helpful. Some governments are discussing ways to
increase birth rates. Moreover, increased economic growth can
offset rising costs for pensions and health care. But it seems unlikely that this increased growth will materialize.
On the contrary, growth can be expected to fall as the population ages, for a number of reasons. Retirees will leave gaps in the
work force that will be hard to fill. Burdens on health care systems may force increases in taxes. National debts may increase if
the tough choices of cutting benefits or raising taxes are not
faced. An older population is also generally assumed to be less
dynamic and inventive.
We will not be able to find the people we need inside the existing EU. All the EU countries are experiencing roughly the same
trend of declining birth rates, event though some, like the
United Kingdom and France, will be less affected than others,
such as Italy and Spain.
The EU is about to embark on another round of enlargement,
and will probably include ten new members within the next few
years. Can this be a solution to the demographic dilemma?
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According to the EU’s own estimates, around 335,000 people
will migrate each year from Eastern Europe to Western and
Northern Europe once the borders are opened. Of these,
100,000 will be of working-age. This migration will close some
labor gaps but will not have a significant effect on the overall
situation.51
The population trends of the candidate countries are similar
to EU trends, and they too are becoming receiving countries,
rather than sending countries. Thus, new labor will have to come
from outside of Europe, probably from Asia and Africa, where
the youth bulge provides large numbers of people with somber
prospects in their home countries.

The Makings of a Win-Win Situation
In many developing countries, the challenge governments face is
quite different. Instead of growing numbers of retirees, they face
the advent of a youth explosion, that is, a disproportionately
large part of the population being fifteen to twenty-nine years
old. This creates its own problems.
The labor force of the developing world is expected to grow
rapidly from 1.7 billion people in 1998 to 3.1 billion in 2025. It
is highly unlikely that there will be sufficient job opportunities to
meet demand.52 Governments will find themselves in a difficult
situation, with social upheavals as distinct possibilities.
Migration has traditionally worked as a safety valve in such situations, and continues to do so today. Emigration is a favored escape route for the disaffected. It can relieve social and political
pressures that follow when you have an expanding and largely
unemployed youth group.
What we have here is a win-win situation. Europe can alleviate
its own demographic problems and at the same time assist parts
of the developing world by receiving immigrants. Immigration is
the reason why the EU population has not already begun to decline. But Italy, with the lowest EU birth rate of just 1.1 children
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per woman, provides an example of what is to come. Its population is already falling, despite an influx of 70,000 immigrants per
year.53
According to UN calculations, the EU as a whole will be able
to offset population decline with immigration maintained at
about the level it has today. In order to prevent the number of
people of working age from declining, the EU would have to
receive significantly larger, but still feasible, numbers of immigrants.
However, in order to counter population aging and maintain
support ratios at where they are today, very large numbers of immigrants would be needed. Germany alone would need three
million immigrants per year in order to maintain its current ratio
of workers to retirees in 2050, if the current trends hold. At twice
the total yearly immigration to Europe over the last ten years,
this is a level of immigration that is unlikely to be practicable, or
acceptable to citizens.54
Immigration is no panacea. It cannot eradicate Europe’s demographic problems. But it will help take the edge off the problem, and allow more time for reforms, such as increasing the age
of retirement or creating a more flexible labor market.

The Need for a Balanced, Humanitarian Approach
Finally, when it comes to immigration, we are talking about more
than numbers or statistics. We are talking about people. This
brings a whole new range of arguments into play; moral arguments, that present us with an ethical dilemma. Perhaps part of
the intensity of the current debate has less to do with actual numbers than the unease that many experience when confronting
this issue.
When it comes to asylum seekers, it is clear what is expected of
us. We have a moral as well as legal obligation to offer protection
to those in need, stemming from our commitment to the 1951
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Refugee Convention. We are expected to protect the right to asylum, avoiding measures that may undermine it.
Some critics say we are not doing that today. Commenting on
the focus at the Laeken summit on border controls and curbing
illegal immigration, ECRE writes: ‘‘Regrettably, this exemplifies
a trend witnessed in the asylum work of the European Union
during the last two years, whereby deterrence rather than protection seems to be the key priority of the majority of Member
States.’’55
For example, the UNHCR has recommended that visa requirements not be used for countries where there are civil wars, generalized violence, or widespread human rights violations. Yet, the
EU has visa requirements in place for most of the major refugeegenerating countries, according to ECRE.56 Usually, it is impossible to get a visa in order to apply for asylum, and it is often not
possible to apply for asylum at embassies or consulates.
Further, asylum seekers may be sent back to countries they
passed through before reaching the EU, according to the ‘‘safe
third country’’ policy. This, says ECRE, penalizes countries for
being close to conflict areas, it encourages destruction of travel
documents and smuggling, and it is time-consuming and expensive. It also puts the burden of refugee protection on countries
ill equipped for the situation. The poorest nations already care
for the largest numbers of refugees.57
Amnesty goes further, warning that the EU may be in breach
of international human rights and refugee law by refusing access
to EU territory and fair asylum processes.58

Illegal Immigration Equals Suffering
The lack of legal options and the efforts to restrict access to Europe opens up the door to illegal immigration. Both asylum seekers and economic migrants are willing to face the risks and costs
involved in order to achieve entry, slipping across borders or traveling on temporary visas and then overstaying them.
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This has created a market for human smuggling, which, like
trafficking, has rapidly become a global concern. Hundreds of
thousands of migrants are willing to pay smugglers considerable
amounts of money for assistance in reaching affluent Western
countries. And many people are trafficked against their will for
purposes of sexual exploitation or forced labor.
In 1994, research by the International Center for Migration
Policy Development showed that 15 to 30 percent of all illegal
migrants to Europe paid a smuggler or trafficker to get into a
European country. Three years later, the German Federal Refugee Office stated that about half of their asylum seekers were
smuggled into the country. The Dutch Immigration Service put
the number for the Netherlands in the 60 to 70 percent range in
the late 1990s.
Illegal immigration leads to human suffering, even deaths.
There have been numerous reports of illegal immigrants suffocating in the back of trucks, drowning in the Mediterranean, or
freezing to death on the Bosnian border. The tragedy of the fiftyeight Chinese immigrants who were found suffocated in a truck
in Dover in 2000 is perhaps the single, most well-known example.
Members of the Chinese community in Rotterdam say that it was
not the first time. Many have left for the U.K. and never been
heard from again.59
The waters off Spain are said to have claimed even more victims. Four thousand people may have died in the Strait of Gibraltar and in the Atlantic waters between Africa and Spain’s Canary
Islands in the last five years alone.60
And the immigrants’ troubles are not over once they arrive.
Those illegal immigrants who do not apply for asylum often end
up in the underground economy, pushed there by their illegal
status. There, they work for low pay under bad conditions, with
no legal protection. Exploitation is common.
As we have seen, the EU response has been to focus on border
controls and cooperation against illegal immigrants. The argument that allowing for more legal immigration might lower incentives for illegal entry, however, has not found much support.
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‘‘We know from America’s experience that allowing lots of legal
immigration does not put a stop to illegal immigration,’’ observed one EU diplomat, quoted by The Economist.61
The EU seems less inclined to draw another possible lesson
from the U.S. experience; that intense and expensive border controls only yield limited results. The U.S., in spite of strict border
controls, is estimated to receive about as many illegal immigrants
as the EU per year, around 500,000.62
A policy solely focused on restricting access is costly, ineffective, and morally dubious. It encourages illegal activity and drives
hundreds of thousands of people into a twilight existence of exploitation and lack of legal protection. With more legal options
at hand, fewer people will probably be attracted to the dangerous
and costly option of illegal immigration. And fewer people can
be expected to abuse the asylum system.
But the most efficient way of combating illegal immigration is
by improving conditions in transit and origin countries. This
means building decent reception systems and efficient border
control systems. It also means helping weak societies create environments where people can hope to improve their lives. For this
to be successful, however, those countries need to be willing to
change and reform. And they must be supported in their efforts.
Focusing on transit countries and countries of origin must not
be used as a pretext for turning people away before they reach
our borders. Rich countries must carry their part of the burden
for global refugee problems. In this era of global and instant
communications, we cannot claim ignorance of the difficult conditions in which most people of this world live out their lives.

Conclusion—Turning the Corner
Immigration is less of a problem than it is currently made out to
be. Immigrants are an integral part of European society, and an
important social and economic phenomenon. They have been so
for a long time. The recent public discussion has been overly
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focused on problems and negative aspects, neglecting the positive contributions immigration can bring to our societies.
To recapitulate, immigrants by many accounts constitute a positive factor for the economy. Tax revenues from immigrants
roughly equal or surpass the costs of the welfare benefits they
receive as a group. Their contribution to the economy increases
GDP, not dramatically, but still significantly so. Diversity is in itself a positive factor. As long as the transfer to the labor market
functions, immigration is a good economic proposition for all
involved.
Demographically, Europe is facing a development that, in the
medium to long-term range will seriously threaten growth and
living standards and, at the very least, necessitate painful reforms.
At present, immigration is the one factor that is keeping the population of many EU countries from declining. To prevent the
working-age population from declining as Europe ages, we will
need considerably higher levels of immigration than today. To
preserve our welfare systems as we know them, we will also need
to reform our pensions and welfare systems. Immigration is not
the whole solution. But it can reduce the size of the problem,
and help pay for reform.
On a humanitarian level, we must not jeopardize the absolute
right to asylum by wavering in our commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention. We believe that too many steps have already
been taken in that direction, and that the EU should live up to
its oft-stated promise to balance restrictive and preventive measures with guarantees for access and protection. Much could also
be gained by opening additional legal avenues for immigration
to Europe.
Socially, some can perceive immigration as a threat. We need
to be receptive to the needs of those groups in society that pay
the most direct cost of immigration through depressed wages
and increased competition in the labor market. They are already
vulnerable and may constitute a willing audience for populist
messages promising easy solutions, blaming immigrants for the
nation’s problems.

186

IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

The voters’ rights to a voice in immigration policy must be
respected. But politicians must also take their role as public educators seriously. Political leaders have two options before them
when dealing with the growing resentment of immigration.
They can respond by making immigration the problem. We
would argue that this populist tactic has exacerbated the situation and is leading us down a dangerous path. We are now confronted with a situation where xenophobic parties are making
gains in several EU countries.
The other approach would be to reject simplistic arguments
and easy solutions, and put the blame where it belongs. Most of
the difficulties afflicting immigrant communities are effects of
weak economies, social marginalization, and lack of access to the
job market. Leaders of politics and business who already see the
benefits of immigration need to communicate this insight. Surely
we are not willing to give up the idea that people of different
cultural, religious, or ethnic backgrounds can coexist peacefully
and gain from this association?
What is needed in Europe and elsewhere is a comprehensive
approach that deals with issues of asylum, immigration, integration, and development in an integrated manner. More efforts
must be made to develop a generous, common policy on asylum
and immigration. This should be combined with an active dialogue with the immigrants’ countries of origin, focusing on stimulating growth, the rule of law, and human rights.
What is needed now is a common policy that sees immigration
as a promise, not a peril. If this is to be successful, mutual respect
for traditions and values must be the guiding norm.

FAULT LINES

Part 4
The Fault Lines section of this book examines some of the major acts
that individuals and, more significantly, states commit that cause
serious, and sometimes permanent, damage to the very foundations on which civilized society rests. Some fault lines are fundamental evils while others are in response to new challenges. In this
part, four topics are presented as universal fault lines.
Professor Timothy Harding is a forensic pathologist who has had
worldwide experience examining the maimed bodies and corpses
of torture victims. His comprehensive chapter provides a frightening picture of the cruelty of man, of the role of doctors, lawyers,
and government officials in perpetuating an evil that has been condemned in international conventions and humanitarian law.
We are living in the midst of a ‘‘war on terrorism,’’ and no one
can accurately predict the next phase or set a timetable for its end.
To make matters worse there is often no agreement on the definitions of basic terms or concepts in this war. Even job titles change.
My own duties as a Professor of Tropical Medicine and Director of
an Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs now include an
added jurisdiction; I serve as the Chief Medical Advisor for Counterterrorism in the New York Police Department, partially because I
have had significant experience with diseases such as anthrax and
smallpox, diseases that can be used as bioterrorist weapons.
In this part, Professor Paul Wilkinson, director of a famed academic center for the study of terrorism, provides a thoughtful and
thorough chapter reviewing the history, typology, and effectiveness of both traditional and new forms of terror and political violence. Larry Hollingworth spent thirty years as an officer in the
British Army before joining the United Nations High Commission
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for Refugees. He has worked, on the ground, for long periods, at
the very center of many of the worst conflicts and disasters in modern history. His reflections on the reality of officially sanctioned terror, as seen by a field worker serving civilians under siege, provide
an added insight into the tragic fault line of terrorism.
Finally, in this part, Ambassador Nancy Ely-Raphel cites a sordid
fault line, gender exploitation, that is both a cause and consequence of trafficking in human beings. The most vulnerable,
women and children, are still held in bondage and forced to work
as prostitutes, as domestic servants without compensation, or
under incredibly harsh conditions as slave laborers in fields around
the world. The Ambassador then details the multi-pronged effort
of one government, the United States of America, to right these
intolerable wrongs.

10

Torture
Timothy W. Harding, M.D.

Introduction
Torture has been and remains a constant in human society; its
history is closely linked to the evolution of state powers and the
exercise of authority.1 In all circumstances, the notion of torture
has two essential elements: the purposeful infliction of pain, usually described as excruciating, and an ulterior motive in the interests of the authority responsible for the torture.2 The pain can be
either physical or psychological in nature, and most authorities
would accept that provoking intense fear through mock executions or threats to family members can be considered a form of
acute psychological pain. Furthermore, the notion of humiliation is considered by many authorities as central to the process
of torture, being antinomic to the principle of human dignity at
the origin of modern concepts of human rights.
The most frequently cited motive for torture is the extraction
of a confession or the obtainment of information during interrogation. The Japanese word for torture, gōmon, is made up of two
kanji, the first, rather rarely used in Japanese language, meaning
‘‘to flog’’ or ‘‘to beat,’’ and the second a commonly used kanji
meaning ‘‘to question.’’ However, torture is also used as a form
of punishment, intimidation, and coercion outside the interrogation process. The use of torture on a large segment of the population, including rape and mutilations, is recognized as a means
of intimidation against populations or minorities.3
The word for torture in most European languages is derived
from the Latin ‘‘to twist’’ or ‘‘to distort,’’ reflecting techniques of
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torture involving forcible extension of the body or twisting of
limbs, provoking intense musculo-skeletal pain. The word can
also be taken to reflect the fundamental distortion in the human
relationship between the torturer and the tortured person. It
should be recognized that, as well as the tortured person losing
his or her fundamental human dignity and suffering long-term
consequences, both psychological and physical, the torturer is
also debased and humiliated by his activity. A key question, therefore, is why individuals are prepared to torture. At one time, it
was thought that only particularly sadistic individuals were capable of committing torture. However, psychological experiments
show clearly that most normal individuals are capable of inflicting even apparently intense pain under experimental conditions.4 It is the perception of the victim and his or her difference
and inferiority, as well as dangerousness, that allows individuals
with a normal psychological make-up to commit acts of torture.
A striking example is the systematic rape of civilian women by
soldiers during armed conflict, for example when the Japanese
Imperial Army entered Nanking in 1937,5 or, more recently, by
Serb forces during the war in Bosnia. In both instances, there
was an open permissiveness and even encouragement by senior
military officers, as well as a perception of Chinese or Muslim
women as racially inferior.

Brief Historical Review
Paradoxically, it is easier to provide a well-documented account
of torture in early civilizations in ancient Greece and Rome, as
well as in the Middle Ages in Europe up until the eighteenth
century, than in the modern world.6 This is because torture was
openly practiced and was part of judicial procedure, both during
investigation and as part of punishment. In both ancient Greece
and Rome, slaves were systematically tortured if they were involved in a judicial procedure, whether as accused or simple witnesses, in order that their testimony could be heard in court. The

TIMOTHY W. HARDING. M.D.

193

earliest debates about torture come from Roman times, when
both Seneca and Cicero criticized the torture of free men as
being likely to lead to false confessions: ‘‘Even the innocent may
lie when tortured.’’ This is a utilitarian and legalistic argument
against torture, rather than a moralistic or humanitarian opposition. Saint Augustine is often cited as the first to oppose torture
on the grounds of its moral perversity. However, even his opposition is centered on the risk of punishing a person for a crime
falsely confessed under torture. He did not take a clear position
against the humiliation and infliction of pain during criminal
procedures or as part of punishment.
The late Middle Ages and the period of the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation saw an institutionalization and a reutilization of torture; many woodcuts of this period give explicit details
of torture instruments and methods. The use of torture was common during times of religious divide (see the example from sixteenth-century Geneva at the end of this chapter). The use of
torture during the period of the Inquisition in Spain has probably been exaggerated and its main victims were not religious dissenters but the Jewish and Moorish minorities.
In the eighteenth century, during the period of the Enlightenment, the first clearly enunciated oppositions to torture on moral
and humanitarian grounds were published by Voltaire, Rousseau,
and Hobbes. Their philosophical position was linked to the new
concept of the relationship between the individual and the state
enshrined in the American Constitution and the Declaration of
Rights of the Citizen following the French Revolution.
Torture was first abolished in Sweden in 1734, and almost all
European countries had abolished torture from the provisions of
criminal procedure by the early nineteenth century.
There is surprisingly little written about the effects of this prohibition on interrogation procedures, and only fragmentary accounts of torture exist after its abolition in nineteenth-century
Europe. Many political activists claimed to have been beaten or
subject to prolonged solitary confinement, particularly in czarist
Russia. In North America and Europe, the term ‘‘third degree’’
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method came into use for police questioning of difficult suspects,
and certainly involved methods that today would be considered
as torture. It was the unprecedented and systematic abuses committed by the Third Reich and the Japanese Imperial Forces in
the form of genocide, other forms of mass murder, human experimentation, and abuse of prisoners that led to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the outright prohibition of torture in any form.
It is therefore just over fifty years ago that torture was prohibited in a series of interlocking provisions of international law;
nevertheless, all objective assessments about the prevalence of
torture in the world today lead to the conclusion that systematic
torture occurs in one form or another in the majority of states
despite the fact that they have confirmed their adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and have ratified the
United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Article 7 of this covenant reads: ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment.’’7 Torture is also prohibited in times of armed
conflicts by the Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.
It is outlawed by the 1994 United Nations’s Convention Against
Torture. In the statute of the International Criminal Court, torture is recognized as a crime against humanity when it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population.
Torture is, therefore, one of the few issues in which international human rights and humanitarian law is unambiguous and
for which no exceptions are provided. For example, under the
European Convention of Human Rights, any high contracting
party may take measures derogating from its obligation under
the convention in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. However, no derogation is permitted
for Article 3, prohibiting torture.8
The provisions of international law prohibiting torture did not
give clear definitions of what would constitute torture. In most
texts, the concept is linked to that of inhuman and degrading
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treatment, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) indicates that being subjected to medical or
scientific experimentation without free consent is a particular
form of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
The definitions were to come from several sources; first,
through the work of the European Court of Human Rights (and
later the subsidiary European Convention for the prevention of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of
1989). In the decision concerning the case of Ireland versus the
United Kingdom over techniques of ‘‘interrogation in depth’’
carried out by the British Army in Northern Ireland, the court
ruling included a detailed account of wall standing, hooding,
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food
and drink, which were considered as a violation of Article 3 of
the European Convention. The reports emanating by the CPT
(the committee set up by the 1989 Convention) also give some
detailed consideration as to what constitutes torture.
Second, the reports of the special reporter of the UN Commission of Human Rights investigating torture on a global scale also
provide descriptions of the wide variety of abuse and treatment
that should be considered as torture.
In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration on Protection from Torture, in which torture is defined
as ‘‘an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.’’ The essential elements in
the definition are the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, at the instigation of a public
official. Torture is thus defined as an intentional act under the
authority of the state with the purpose of obtaining information
or a confession, but also as a punishment or to intimidate. The
1984 United Nations’ Convention Against Torture has a closely
similar definition, although the role of a ‘‘public official or other
person acting in an official capacity’’ is widened to include not
only direct infliction, but also instigation, consent, or acquiescence. Both definitions from the United Nations exclude ‘‘pain
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or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful
sanctions.’’

Case Study: The Angelova Affair9
In 1996, a seventeen-year-old boy was seen by the police hanging
around parked cars in a small town in Bulgaria. He was chased
and apprehended by a policeman and was then seen by members
of the public handcuffed to a tree while the police carried out a
search of the area. He was taken to the local police station. No
written detention order was issued and the register did not have
an entry for him. The following morning, the boy was taken by
the police to a local hospital, where he was pronounced dead
shortly afterwards. An autopsy established that the cause of death
was internal bleeding in the brain as a result of a fractured skull
around the left eyebrow. The autopsy report established that the
trauma had occurred between four and six hours prior to his
death. There were also marks of recent trauma on several other
parts of the body. The medical legal conclusions were therefore
clear: the boy had died as a result of a blow received while in
police custody, furthermore, there had been a delay of several
hours before the boy was brought to hospital; when he arrived, it
was too late to provide any care.
Since the police were involved, the criminal investigation into
the boy’s death was taken over by a military investigator, who appointed five medical experts from the police and military to reexamine the conclusions. Without providing any fresh evidence
or arguments, the experts concluded that the trauma could have
been received more than ten hours before the death, and, therefore, prior to his arrest. On this basis, the investigation was terminated. No administrative or discipline reaction of any kind was
taken.
So ends a typical case of death in custody, giving rise to serious
suspicions of ill treatment and possible torture by the police, investigated by another state authority, which concluded clearly
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that no abuse had occurred. If we add that the victim belonged
to the Roma ethnic group, a minority subject to discrimination
and social exclusion in many Eastern European countries, we can
understand easily why such a boy could be subject to abuse by
the police and why the government’s investigation was so halfhearted and inconclusive.
The story would normally end there, had Bulgaria not ratified
the European Convention of Human Rights in 1992. With the
support of an NGO and a human rights activist lawyer, the boy’s
mother made an application to the European Court of Human
Rights on the basis of Article 2 of the European Convention,
which guarantees the right to life. The mother complained simply of an unexplained death in police custody, the failure to provide adequate medical care, and the ineffectiveness of the
subsequent investigation. The proceedings before the court established that the police had manipulated the detention records
and that the government’s explanation of the death was implausible. The police had delayed provision of medical assistance and
this contributed in a decisive manner to the fatal outcome.
Therefore, there had been a violation of the state’s obligation to
protect the life of persons in custody. Furthermore, the court
considered that the investigation carried out by the military authority lacked the ‘‘requisite objectivity and thoroughness.’’ In
particular, the police officers were never asked to explain why
detention records had been forged and why they had given false
information on the boy’s arrival at the hospital.
The court went further in its condemnation of the Bulgarian
government by concluding that the injuries shown at the autopsy
were clear signs of inhuman treatment. It was therefore concluded that a violation of Article 3, which prohibits torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment, had also occurred.
Finally, the court considered the mother’s complaint that the
police’s abusive treatment was based on their discriminatory perception of him as a gypsy was grounded on ‘‘serious arguments,’’
but proof beyond the reason brought out had not been provided.
The mother received 19,000 Euros in nonpecuniary damages.
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This case is recounted in some detail in order to demonstrate
how easy it is for inhuman treatment amounting to torture and
death to occur while in custody, particularly when the victim is
from a minority group; and how difficult it is to investigate and
bring to account the perpetrators.

Allegations, Denial, and Impunity
Despite the clarity of legal prohibition of torture, the Angelova
case illustrates the problem of investigation, which, in turn, leads
to the widespread problem of impunity and denial. On each occasion, when reputable human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch provide welldocumented reports of torture in a particular country, there is a
ritual exchange of documented allegations followed by official
denials.
One example of such an exchange: on Monday, February 12,
2001, the BBC World Service reports as a main news item:
‘‘The human rights group Amnesty International says torture and
ill treatment of prisoners and detainees in China has become
widespread and systematic;’’ the victims are members of the
banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, Muslim separatists in
Xenjiang, prisoners in Tibet, many of whom who were reported
to have died in custody. Amnesty suggested that the Chinese government’s commitment to curb torture was often undermined by
its directives to use ‘‘every means’’ in anticorruption campaigns
and political crackdowns. Furthermore, the torture and inhuman
treatment were often carried out almost publicly in order to ‘‘instill fear and discipline.’’

The message is therefore clear: commitments to end torture
do not survive government drives against political opponents or
what are perceived as dangers to the fabric of society such as
corruption or separatist or religious movements.
The following day, Tuesday, February 13, 2001, the BBC World
Service News carried the rejection by China’s Foreign Ministry of
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the report by Amnesty International. ‘‘The allegations are totally
groundless,’’ the Foreign Ministry’s spokesman was quoted as saying. Later in the same week, the BBC News carried a further item
in which a senior Chinese government official denied the allegations of torture and inhuman treatment of members of the Falun
Gong spiritual movement. This spokesman accused Falun Gong
of being politically motivated and ‘‘maiming and killing people.’’
He gave the example of the recent immolation of five Falun
Gong members in Tiananmen Square as a testimony to the
group’s inhumanity and deadliness. Furthermore, the official
protested about the interference from outside in China’s internal
affairs, in particular the protests by the European Parliament at
that time concerning violation of human rights in Tibet, the destruction of mosques, and the arrests of teachers of the Koran.
We can see therefore that the problem of torture is not limited
to individual occurrences of ill treatment in police custody, prisons, or other state detention centers, however common they may
be. Torture is intimately linked to the powers of the state, the
belief by those in authority of the need to defend, at all costs, the
state’s authority and policies, and the perception of individuals
and groups as dangerous to the state. The denial of torture by
governments is always accompanied by reminders of threats
against the state and the dangerousness of certain minorities.
The unspoken message is, of course: if torture does occur, it is
because it is necessary to defend the state.
The ritual waltz between human rights organizations and governments, with its well-defined, pre-arranged steps of allegation,
denial, denial, occurs dozens of times every year. China, Egypt,
Burma, Israel, Russia, Guantanamo, Turkey—the list goes on and
on, and the dance always remains the same. And, to be honest,
our own perception of these allegations is invariably related to
our feelings about the regime concerned. The ritual exchange
quoted here took place early in 2001. More recently, of course,
the ritual has evolved further: every government response to allegations of torture mentions the threat of terrorism.
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Is the Prohibition of Torture in International
Human Rights Law Credible?
The issue of torture today therefore exposes not only the deepseated fault line about the relationship between the state and
vulnerable individuals or groups, but also the very credibility of
International Human Rights Law. We have to ask the question
whether we are not living an illusion. The unequivocal outlawing
of torture in human rights instruments has become a cruel farce
in relation to what actually happens in police commissariats, interrogation centers, and prisons in most countries of the world.
By participating as lawyers, medical experts, international civil
servants, or academics in the ongoing debates and processes at
an international level, while ignoring what really happens in the
shadows of states’ power and structure, we are actively participating in this farce. Would it not be more honest to face up to the
ineffectiveness, the impotence, of International Human Rights
Law in the face of the power and prerogatives of individual
states?
Such a position might seem heretical to most observers of the
human rights scene and participants in international organizations and NGO militants. It would be seen as an acknowledgement of defeat, a surrender, or, in more subtle terms, an
appeasement. However, such a position would be more in line
with historical reality. Torture has existed under all civilizations.
(We should perhaps pause a moment to note the paradoxical
nature of this simple statement: can torture really be part of a
civilization? Or does civilization necessarily imply some form of
state authority that, in turn, opens the way to torture and inhuman treatment?) Well, according to historical perceptions of civilization, torture has almost always been an integral part of it; the
question is whether it always will be. As indicated above, for most
of recorded history, torture has been a formal part of judicial
procedure, used for obtaining information, forcing confessions,
and also for punishment and execution. In China and Japan, torture practices are reflected in specific language and terminology,
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which was found also in the detailed, almost obsessional, inventory of torture techniques and instruments developed in Europe
in the late Middle Ages and during the Inquisition.
The persistence of torture in the so-called modern era of
human rights since 1948 leads us to two kinds of analysis. First,
whether torture is the inevitable response of the state under
threat, for example in time of war, when faced with acts of terrorism or deep-seated social ills, and second, how it is that the complex and wide-ranging provisions of international law are so
consensual in public discourse and so ineffectual in reality. Law
can only be understood in a historical context, and International
Human Rights Law is no exception. The preamble of the Universal Declaration describes the context clearly: ‘‘Whereas disregard
and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind. . . .’’ It is therefore a reaction to the horrors of the Third Reich and the Japanese Imperial occupying armies in the middle of the last century.
The preamble also places the inherent dignity of all members of
the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice, and
peace in the world.
This was a period when the concept of the state was undergoing a fundamental change. Keynesian economics and the foundation of the Welfare State was changing the relationship between
the individual citizen and the authorities. It was clearly seen that
genocide, torture, mass rape, and abusive human experimentation undermined the dignity not only of victims, but also of perpetrators and the state itself. Eleanor Roosevelt described the
‘‘basic character’’ of the Universal Declaration in these terms: ‘‘It
is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement; it is not . . . a
statement of law or of legal obligation; it is a declaration of
human rights and freedoms . . . to serve as a common standard
of achievement for all peoples of all nations.’’ It was a time, therefore, that the people and the nation could be placed on the same
footing with an appeal to the dignity of both. The aim was clearly
to eradicate the kind of relationship that had existed between
the Nazi regime and Jews, gypsies, and the mentally ill, or the
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Japanese military forces and the civilian population in Nanking
or Manchuria.
The failure of International Human Rights Law to reduce substantially the practice of torture is part of wider failure of international public law. The proliferation of conventions covering
women, children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, the disabled, the mentally ill, and many others, are all floored by the
absence or the inadequacy of enforcement procedures. The special reporters of the United Nations Commission of Human
Rights are often hampered in their work by governments, and
there is more and more resistance to the idea of international
investigative powers and jurisdiction. The idea that International
Human Rights Law would progressively influence national law
has had some success, but there has been little success in fields
such as the investigation, exposure, and sanctions against torture.
Many government leaders express satisfaction about the growing
body of Human Rights Law, but are resistant to its direct application for vulnerable people. A substantial part of International
Human Rights Law is therefore essentially cosmetic.

The European Exception
The most fertile ground for the realization of the human rights
approach has proved, without any doubt, to be Europe. The political and economic context, the recent traumatizing experiences of the Second World War, lent themselves to a proactive
approach to human rights, going further than the hortatory tone
of the United Nations’ texts. Thus, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in
Rome in 1950 opens with the statement that the ‘‘Western European’’ governments were resolved ‘‘to take the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.’’ However presumptuous this might seem to
the rest of the world, it is undoubtedly true that investigation and
enforcement are excessively weak, if not entirely absent, from al-
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most all International Human Rights Law. It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that the investigation and punishment of torture is so
ineffective and weak at the national level. However, the European
Convention did put into place procedures that allowed for the
first time an independent supranational body to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by state parties
themselves. Furthermore, the complaints could be launched not
only by other state parties, but also by individuals. Thus, in 1978,
the court condemned the United Kingdom for systematic violations of Article 3 during the interrogation of Irish Republican
Army (IRA) suspects arrested and interrogated by military investigators in Northern Ireland. The court has rendered a number
of other decisions on the Article 3 of the Convention in recent
years, involving a number of former communist countries, one
case of which has already been cited.
It was rapidly recognized that the impact of the court was limited by its lack of investigative power, especially in situations of
detention and interrogation. The revelations at the end of the
1980s and in the early 1990s of abusive interrogation techniques
and falsification of evidence in cases against suspected terrorists
in Britain, which had led to prolonged imprisonment of many
innocent individuals, shocked many people.
It was at this time that the Council of Europe introduced a
new convention with extraordinary powers of access to places of
detention and with the explicit objective of preventing torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment: the CPT. In the early years
of the CPT’s work, visits and investigations were carried out,
which allowed, for the first time, a rather detailed picture of the
anatomy, physiology, and pathology of systematic torture to be
described. It is not surprising that the early reports of the CPT
on visits to Turkey have remained, for many years, unpublished,
or that the Spanish authorities were equally embarrassed by the
findings of visits to interrogation centers of the civil guard in the
Basque region. More recent visits, both in Turkey and in a number of decent European countries, reveal that interrogation
rooms, corresponding in almost every detail to the torture cham-
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bers found in Ankara and Istanbul in the early 1990s, still exist.10
Clearly, both the European Court and the CPT have much work
to do, especially as their remit now extends from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The commitment of the forty-odd members of the Council of Europe to collectively prevent and banish torture has
therefore achieved some impressive results. Furthermore, the
CPT has widened the scope of its work progressively to cover not
only police stations and prisons, but also psychiatric hospitals,
detention centers for immigrants, and juvenile detention centers.
However, from the earliest years of the Council’s existence,
there was a deeply hypocritical vein to this commitment. France
and Great Britain, the self-declared defenders of human rights
and democratic values, were becoming embroiled in long and
drawn-out colonial wars. We have now certain evidence of the
systematic and extensive use of torture and illegal killings as the
violent struggle for independence evolved in Africa and Southeast Asia. It is now clear that the most senior military commanders and government ministers were fully aware of these abuses
and, indeed, provided additional resources and expertise. Thus,
in both Malaya and Kenya, the British set up so-called re-education camps for terrorists, involving prolonged sensory deprivation, humiliation, mock executions, and unrelenting physical
abuse. France is trying to come to terms with the admissions by
most senior military officers of widespread torture and illegal killings during the Algerian war. The revelations and apologies or,
in at least one case, unrepenting justification are at the same time
moving and disturbing.
All these instances of documented and confessed torture help
us to understand better the nature of torture and the fundamental distortion of human relationships that are implied. The Bulgarian policeman’s perception of a Roma adolescent is of the
same order as the Japanese soldier’s perception of a young
woman in Nanking when the Imperial Army entered in 1937, the
same as British interrogation officers’ toward Catholic terrorist
suspects in Northern Ireland, or of the British and French army
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faced with military uprisings by people who, until then, had been
colonial subjects.

The Medical Profession and Torture
It is widely believed that doctors can and should play an important role in the fight against torture.11 First, they have the competence and expertise to detect and document torture. When they
examine prisoners or ex-prisoners, they may observe physical lesions or the psychological consequences of abuse. Doctors who
work regularly in prisons or visit police stations can use epidemiological models to follow the incidence of certain kinds of injuries and draw conclusions about the overall prevalence of physical
abuse. They are also able to observe certain patterns of injury and
correlate them with types of torture. The forensic pathologist has
a special role for cases of death in custody, providing objective
and irrefutable evidence of traumatic lesions, their pattern, and
timing (see Table 10.1).
However, this role is limited by the fact that some doctors working for the state are not free to speak out and may be fearful of
authoritarian regimes. Indeed, there are many well-documented
cases of doctors who have spoken out about cases of torture who
have been arrested, mistreated, and even tortured themselves.
Doctors, who occupy a privileged position in all societies, should
be able to criticize the authorities more freely than ordinary citizens, especially if they have the support of professional organizations. However, this is not always the case, despite the fact that
most national medical associations are affiliated with the World
Medical Association, which has codified the responsibilities of
doctors in relation to torture in the 1975 Declaration of Tokyo.
Another limitation is the fact that many doctors are not trained
to carry out forensic examinations; few doctors can accurately
detect the signs of asphyxia and interpret different kinds of bruising or abrasions. The British Medical Association has been particularly active in leading the campaign of ‘‘doctors against
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Table 10.1

MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION OF TORTURE
1. Examination of acute lesions
• Skin—abrasions, contusions, lacerations, incised wounds, burns,
electrical injuries, gunshot wounds
• Asphyxia—signs of strangulation, conjunctiva hemorrhages
• Bones and joints—X-ray signs of fractures, dislocations
• Psychological—acute stress syndrome
• Autopsy
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Long-term effects
• Scars and deformities (difficult to assess)
• Special investigations—CT scan, bone scintigraphy
• Post-traumatic stress syndrome
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. Exhumation of victims
• Forensic anthropology
• DNA testing
• Ballistics

torture.’’ The association published a substantial report on torture in 1986,12 followed by a remarkable publication, Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human Rights Abuses,
published in 1992,13 in which the active role of doctors in a
process of torture and other human rights abuses is extensively
documented. The conclusions about doctors’ motives for participating in torture are probably applicable to other professional
groups working for the state, particularly police officers, army
interrogation experts, prison guards. The seminal study in this
field is Lifton’s account of the Nazi doctors, which puts emphasis
on the way in which societal pressures progressively distorted
medical ethical values.14 This view has been elaborated by Staub,
who also emphasizes the role of military training and obedience,
the tendency to ‘‘blame the victim,’’ and, above all, the discrimi-
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nation against and labeling or devaluing of a victim group.15 Nazi
doctors were thus living in a society where fundamental human
values had been denied; they, therefore, yielded to the psychological process of fear and threat of loss of their professional
identity by adopting the credo of assigning a subhuman status to
Jews, gypsies, and the mentally ill.
The report includes a summary of an account by a Chilean
doctor who became involved in a more recent period of torture
and abuses and spoke of ‘‘pressures and physical threats’’ leading
to ‘‘the desperate sense of isolation experienced by doctors . . .
in a closed society.’’ Other factors leading to medical complicity
in torture include ‘‘ideological sympathies with the objectives of
the torturers’’ and ‘‘accepting exaggerated accounts of the danger of particular prisoners,’’ combined with a social marginalization of a particular social or political group, which can lead to
individuals being regarding as subhuman and stripped of all
their rights. In other instances, doctors set out in their work with
prisoners to help and protect them, only to become aware later
of the extent to which ‘‘they have become compromised.’’
Much effort has, therefore, been made to introduce training
in human rights into the undergraduate medical curriculum and
to insure that the doctors working for state authorities, and particularly the police, the prison service, or the military, have the
full support of their professional colleagues. Forensic skills have
also been neglected in basic medical training, so that many doctors have found themselves on humanitarian missions confronted by apparent victims of torture or illegal executions and
unable to carry out the most basic forensic assessment.
An important stimulus to medical involvement in the fight
against torture has been the role of medical journals. Until 1985,
there were very few articles or editorials in the field of prison
medicine, human rights, or torture published in medical journals. Since then, the lead has been taken by certain editors, in
particular in the Lancet and the British Medical Journal, to open
their columns to accounts of torture by doctors working for humanitarian organizations, as well as to more scholarly accounts
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of torture victims. Overall, the number of papers on the subject
of torture (to be found in citation lists) has grown from between
ten and twenty in 1985 to well over a hundred articles published
each year since 2000. This professional and editorial interest provides a degree of vigilance with constant questions about the participation of doctors in detention and interrogation procedures.
(See, for example, recent exchanges concerning Turkey, Israel
and the territories, China, and Guantanamo.)16 The medical
commitment to fighting against torture has also led to a more
systematic repertory of torture techniques, which are summarized in Table 10.2.
Third, different types of medical documentation have been systematically described.
Much of the medical evidence of torture comes from centers
for the rehabilitation of torture victims, for example, in Copenhagen or Toronto. Since the centers often see torture victims
many months or years after the torture experience, much of their
work concerns the long-term effects of torture, in particular
chronic pain, persistent mental symptoms, but also neurological
and motor handicaps and sensory loss. The post-traumatic stress
syndrome, with criteria defined in the International Classification of Diseases,17 has often been used to document and describe
the chronic effects of torture. But many authorities now believe
that this syndrome is difficult to apply, particularly to those victims who have experienced many traumatic events in life and
who remain politically involved. The consensus is now that a multidisciplinary approach to treating victims of torture is needed,
rather than a single therapeutic model (Table 10.3).

Ambivalence
Torture and inhuman treatment are a fault line that runs deep
and long in almost every human society. Its history is as long as
the history of state power and its geographical distribution is
planetary. Since the prohibition of torture in International
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Table 10.2

METHODS OF TORTURE
1. Beating
Kicks, fists, truncheons, canes (lathi), whips (sjambok), electric cables,
plastic bags, falanga (beating of soles of feet), telefono (beating of
both ears with palms)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2. Postural
Prolonged standing
Extension
Suspension (Palestinian hanging)
Binding / fixed position
Confined space
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3. Burning
Cigarettes
Hot metallic objects
Acid
Hot water
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4. Electric shocks
Electrodes (with hand-driven generation)
Shock baton (battery driven)
Metallic bed (attached to main electricity)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5. Piercing
Genitals, tongue, hands, fingernails
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6. Asphyxia
Plastic bag
Gas mask (elephant)
Submersion (submarine, la banera)
Strangulation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7. Psychological
Pressure
Anticipation (in earshot of torture)
Threats
Humiliation, ridicule
Mock execution
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8. Extrajudicial killings
Faked suicide
‘‘Attempted escape’’
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Table 10.3

PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT OF TORTURE VICTIMS
1. Listening
2.
3.
4.
5.

Documentation
Avoid encounters reviving torture experience
Psychomotor approaches: relaxation / massage / exercises
Psychotherapy—cognitive, supportive

6. Psychopharmacology
7. Psychosocial rehabilitation

Human Rights Law, we can best describe the attitude of the state
authorities toward torture as ambivalent. The risk factors, to employ a public health model, are clear: detention for interrogation, deep-seated perception of inferiority of the victim, and the
conviction that the state is under threat (the so-called ‘‘war and
terrorism’’ syndrome) certainly increase the risk of torture of
those arrested as terrorist suspects.
Today, just as there are international networks of crime, money
laundering, corruption, and terrorism, there is also an international network of repression and torture. There is no doubt that
security forces, antiterrorist agencies, and secret police maintain
contacts and share information, not only about investigations
and suspects, but also about techniques of interrogation and torture. There is no doubt that the police officers and military investigators concerned believe sincerely that their corporation and
the resort to interrogation amounting to torture is justified,
whether in Chetchen, Israel, China, or Turkey. In every case, this
belief, this justification, is underpinned by a distortion in the perception of the human relationship concerned.
The pessimistic but realistic conclusion of this analysis is that
existing human rights law and procedures are powerful enough
to counteract this network. Despite this, it is fundamentally important to face up to the historical realities of torture, whatever
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political, religious, or national affinities may be. Thus, the case
brought against General Pinochet and the details of torture carried out under his regime informed public opinion both about
the reality of torture and also its underlying purpose as an instrument of state terror. Another case, which has had the same effect
of forcing a reluctant public’s attention, is that of Teniet El-Hhd,
who was born to a sixteen-year-old Algerian girl who had been
tortured and repeatedly and brutally raped by more than thirty
French officers in an Algerian internment camp. In 2001, a
French court awarded damages to the son, thus breaking the preexisting taboo about official recognition of torture and rape by
the French army in Algeria.
The final example of belated recognition of torture and illegal
killing is drawn from Geneva, Switzerland, home of many international and human rights organizations. Many visitors include
in their itinerary the impressive and monumental Wall of the Reformers, at the foot of the old town of Geneva, commemorating
Jean Calvin and his fellow Protestants. The visitor can have little
doubt of the pride that underlies such a memorial. Few visit another memorial, just next to Geneva’s medical school, which is
in memory of Michel Servet de Villeneuve d’Aragon, who was
tortured and burned at the stake in 1553, one of the many Catholic victims of the theocratic regime of Jean Calvin. The inscription reveals the deep-seated ambivalence that exists when
condemning torture: ‘‘Fils respectueux et reconnaissants de Calvin
notre grand réformateur mais condamnant une erreur qui fut celle de son
siècle et fermement attachés à la liberté de conscience selon les vrais principes de la Réformation et de l’Evangile nous avons élevé ce monument
expiatoire.’’ (‘‘Respectful and grateful sons of Calvin our great reformer but condemning an error which was that of his century
and strongly attached to the liberty of conscience according to
the true principles of the Reformation and the Evangile we have
erected this expiatory monument.’’) It is a clear illustration of
the ambivalence toward the perpetrators of torture and the failure to recognize the fundamental flaw in the relationship between the state and the individual, which underlies such abuses.

11

Terrorism: The Concept
Professor Paul Wilkinson
The concept of terrorism is often totally misused, as when employed as a synonym for political violence in general or when it
is used as a pejorative for any insurgency campaign of which we
disapprove. It is also frequently used loosely and inconsistently.
In this respect it shares the same problem of other key strategic
concepts, such as ‘‘revolution,’’ ‘‘imperialism,’’ and ‘‘democracy.’’ None of these concepts lends itself to universally agreed
one-sentence definition, yet all of them are indispensable for political discourse, and there is a sufficiently widely shared acceptance of the core meaning of such concepts for them to play a
central role in international political and social scientific debate.
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman have produced impressive
evidence of the extent to which a minimum consensus definition
of terrorism has become accepted among the international community of social scientists who study conflict.1 Equally significant
is the development of a whole body of international resolutions,
conventions, and agreements dealing with aspects of prevention,
suppression, and punishment of acts of terrorism2 in which there
is a near universal acceptance of the terminology used to describe the form of behavior to be condemned or prohibited.
Contemporary international academic, diplomatic, and juridical
debates no longer become bogged down in days of definitional
debate. The major disputes that arise concern culpability for specific attacks or for sponsoring or directing them, and over the
kind of international measures that should be taken in response.
Terrorism is neither a political philosophy nor a movement,
nor is it a synonym for political violence in general. It is a special
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means or method of conflict that has been employed by a wide
variety of factions and regimes. It is premeditated and systematic,
and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. The modern words terror and terrorism are derived from the Latin verb terrere, to cause to tremble, and deterre, to frighten from. Terrorism
and terrorist did not come into use until the period of the French
Revolution in the 1790s. The term was used by Edmund Burke
in his polemic against the French Revolution, and came to be
used to denote those revolutionaries who sought to use terror
systemically either to further their views or to govern, whether in
France or elsewhere.
A key feature of terrorism is that it is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims. It is one of the earliest
forms of psychological warfare. The ancient Chinese strategist,
Sun Tzu, conveyed the essence of the method when he wrote,
‘‘kill one, frighten ten thousand.’’ An inevitable corollary is that
terrorism entails attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians, in order to create a climate of extreme fear among
a wider group. Terrorists often claim to be carefully selective and
discriminating in their choice of targets, but to the communities
that experience the terrorist campaign the attacks are bound to
seem arbitrary and indiscriminate. In order to create the widespread sense of fear he or she seeks, the terrorist deliberately uses
the weapon of surprise and disproportionate violence in order to
create a sense of outrage and insecurity. As Raymond Aron observes: ‘‘an action of violence is labeled ‘terrorist’ when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical
result. . . . The lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if
no one in particular is a target then no one can be safe.’’3 It is
the characteristic that differentiates terrorism from tyrannicide
and individual political assassination.
As Hannah Arendt has observed, the belief that one could
change a whole political system by assassinating the major figure
has clearly been rendered obsolete by the transition from the age
of absolutist rulers to an age of governmental bureaucracy.4 In
all but a handful of regimes today, real power is wielded by the
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bureaucratic elite of anonymous or faceless officials. Arendt provides a powerful explanation for the fact that the age of bureaucracy has coincided with burgeoning of political terrorism.
Terrorism has become, for its perpetrators, supporters, and sponsors, the most attractive low-cost, low-risk, but potentially highyield method of attacking a regime or a rival faction. The bomb
plot against Hitler, had it succeeded, would have been an act of
tyrannicide not terrorism. Who could deny that Hitler was the
linchpin of the Nazi system? Is it possible to find an analogous
case today where the removal of an all-powerful dictator would
dramatically change the system? Some have argued that Saddam
Hussein is one such case, but others have suggested that if he
were assassinated, he would be succeeded by a powerful Ba’thist
general of comparable brutality.
The concept of terrorism used in the contemporary academic
literature is essentially political. What about the use of terrorism
in the name of religious causes? Or of the purist of criminal
gains? It is true that militant religious fundamentalists have often
throughout history waged holy terror as part of a holy war, and
there is much concern about the rise of contemporary fanatical
Islamic fundamentalists groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and
al-Gama’a Al Islamiyya and al Qaeda. But the major reason why
moderate Muslim leaders and secular movements see these particular fundamentalists groups as such a threat is precisely because their revolutionary Islamic agenda aims not merely at the
purifying of religious practice, but at the overthrow of existing
governments and their replacement by fundamental theocracies.
Hence these movements are inherently religious and political.
The worrying trend whereby powerful criminal gangs, such as the
Italian Mafia5 and the Latin American narco-barons6 have
adopted some of the tactics and weapons of terrorist groups, does
pose grave problems for the relevant law-enforcement authorities. But it does not detract from the value of the core concept
of political terrorism. In reality, the overwhelming majority of
perpetrators of contemporary terrorism use the weapon to influence political behavior.
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Typology
It is important to note the above defining criteria of political terrorism are broad enough to encompass states’ use of terror as
well as that performed by group. Typologically it is useful to distinguish state from factional terror. Normally, in the literature, a
state’s use of terror is referred to as terror, while substate terror
is referred to as terrorism. This distinction is employed throughout this chapter. Historically, states have conducted terror on a
far more massive and lethal scale than groups. They have employed terror as a weapon of tyranny and repression and as an
instrument of war. Another important distinction can be made
between international and domestic terrorism: the former is terrorist violence involving the citizens of more than one country, while
the latter is confined within the border of one country, sometimes within a particular locality in the country. This distinction
is useful for analytical and statistical purposes. However, in reality, it is hard to find an example of any significant terrorist campaign that remains purely domestic; any serious terrorist
campaign actively seeks political support, weapons, financial assistance, and safe haven beyond its own borers.
Once we move beyond these very broad categories, it is useful
to employ a basic typology of contemporary perpetrators of terrorism based on their underlying cause or political motivation.
Nationalist Terrorists
There are groups seeking political self-determination. They may
wage their struggle entirely in the territory they seek to liberate,
or they may be active both in their area and abroad. In some
cases, they may be forced by police or military action or by threat
of capture, imprisonment, or execution to operate entirely from
their place of exile. Nationalist groups tend to be more capable
of sustaining protracted campaigns and mobilizing substantial
support than ideological groups. Even those nationalist groups
that can only claim the support of a minority of their ethnic con-
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stituency—for example, the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and the
Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)—can gain political resonance because of their deep roots in the national culture for
which they claim to be the authentic voice. There is no sign that
groups of this kind are disappearing from the terrorist scene.
Ideological Terrorists
These terrorists seek to change the entire political, social, and
economic system either to an extreme left or extreme right
model. In the 1970s and 1980s studies of ideological terrorism
focused on the extreme left, because of the preoccupation with
groups such as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Red
Brigades in Italy. Yet, as Walter Laqueur observes in his magisterial general history of terrorism,7 the dominant ideological orientation of European terrorism between the world wars was fascist.
And it is neo-Nazi and neo-fascist groups that are behind so much
of the racist and anti-immigrant violence in present-day Germany
and other European countries. The Red Army groups so active
during the 1970s and 1980s have now largely faded away, victims
of their own internal splits, determined law enforcement by their
respective police and judicial authorities, and changing political
attitudes among young people in the post-cold war era. However,
in Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa, extreme left organizations using terrorism remain a significant challenge to governments.
Religio-Political Terrorists
The most frequently cited examples of this type of terrorism are
groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Osama bin Laden’s al
Qaeda network is clearly religio-political. At its core his agenda is
political, though it is dressed up in a language of Islamic holy
war.8 But it is important to bear in mind that militant fundamentalist factions of major religions other than Islam have also frequently spawned their own violent extremist groups. Striking
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examples can be found among Sikhs, Hindus, and Jews, and
there is a well-documented link between certain Christian fundamentalist groups and extreme right-wing terrorism in North and
Central America.9
Single Issue Terrorist Groups
These groups are obsessed with their desire to change a specific
policy or practice within the target society, rather than with the
aim of political revolution. Examples include the violent animal
rights and anti-abortion groups.
State-Sponsored and State-Supported Terrorists
States use this type of terrorism both as a tool for domestic and
foreign policy. For example, when the Iranian regime sent hit
squads to murder leading dissidents and exiled political leaders,
they did so for domestic reason, to intimidate and eradicate opposition to the regime. However, when North Korea sent its
agents to mount a bomb attack on the South Korean government
delegation on its visit to Rangoon, the communist regime was
engaged in an act of covert warfare against its perceived ‘‘enemy’’
government in the South, designed at furthering their foreign
policy aim of undermining the Republic of South Korea. State
sponsors may use their own directly recruited and controlled terror squads or choose to act through client groups and proxies.
They almost invariably go to some lengths to disguise their
involvement, in order to sustain plausible deniability. The ending
of the cold war and the overthrow of the East European communist one-party regimes and the former Soviet Union certainly removed the Warsaw Pact’s substantial network of sponsorship and
support for a whole variety of terrorist groups. But this does not
mean that state sponsorship has ceased to be a factor in the international scene. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria are still
heavily involved.10 Others, such as Libya, appear to have been
attempting to distance themselves from past major involvement
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in state-sponsored terrorism. The post-cold war environment has
made such sponsorship potentially far more costly because of the
likelihood of strong U.S. sanctions being imposed.

Effectiveness and Motivations
How effective has terrorism been as a weapon for attaining political objectives since 1945? History shows that terrorism has been
more effective as an auxiliary weapon in revolutionary and national liberation struggles. Most of the key modern theorists and
leaders of revolutionary insurgency, such as Mao Tse Tung and
Che Guevara, have recognized the dangers of depending on terrorism and have come down against giving it a major role in the
struggle for revolution. The few cases where terrorism played a
major part in bringing about sweeping political change arose in
a limited number of colonial independence struggles against foreign rule. Included in this group would be the circumstances surrounding the end of the Palestinian Mandate after the terrorist
campaign of the Irgun (National Military Organization) and
Stern (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), and the British decision to withdraw from the Suez Canal zone base together with
the campaigns that led the British to withdraw from Cyprus
and Aden, and the French to withdraw from Algeria. In all these
cases special conditions existed that made terrorism a more potent weapon: (1) due to humanitarian and judicial restraints, the
occupying power was unwilling to carry through draconian measures to wipe out the terrorist organizations; (2) in each case
there were intercommunal power struggles within the colony
which rendered peaceful diplomatic settlement and withdrawal
difficult if not impossible; (3) the terrorists who succeeded in
these conditions (as in Aden up until 1968) enjoyed solid if not
massive support from their own ethnic groups, and this created
an almost impenetrable barrier for the intelligence branches on
which the government security forces depended for success,
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and a vast reservoir of active and tacit collaboration and support
for their terrorist operatives. Even taking into account the influence of terrorism as an auxiliary tactic in revolutionary and independence struggles and in the rise of fascism between the First
and Second World Wars, the overall track record of terrorism in
attaining major political objectives is abysmal.
But if this historical assessment is correct, we are left with the
thorny problem of explaining why, at the beginning of a new
millennium, political terrorism remains such a popular weapon
among a wide range of groups around the world. There are at
least four hypotheses that may help provide an answer to this
question. They are by no means mutually exclusive: (1) some terrorists may be poor students of history and may continue to believe that they can repeat the success of the groups such as the
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in Cyprus and
the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, not realizing
that their own situations are not truly colonial in this sense and,
therefore, not comparable; (2) some may fully recognize the severe limitation of terrorism as a means of attaining strategic
goals, but may see sufficient tangible short-term rewards from
terrorism—such as huge publicity, the gaining of ransoms, securing the release of fellow terrorists from jail—to make it worthwhile to use it as an auxiliary weapon; (3) some may be motivated
by the expressive value of the activity rather than the instrumental/
operational value, and may wish to continue the campaign primarily because it is a relatively quick and easy way to express their
hatred of their opponents and of the justice of their cause; and
(4) some may be addicted to the business of terrorist operation
and material gain from extortion and racketeering and may be
unable to kick the habit. Politically motivated terrorism is generally justified to realize an alleged transcendental end (in Weber’s
terms,11 ‘‘value rational’’ grounds) (5); closely linked to number
(6) is the claim that extreme violence is intrinsically beneficial,
regenerative, cathartic, and an enabling deed regardless of the
other consequences; (7) terrorism can be shown to have
‘‘worked’’ in the past, and is held to be either the ‘‘sole remain-
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ing’’ or ‘‘best available’’ method to achieving success (in Weber’s
terms, ‘‘instrumental rational’’ grounds); (8) the morality of the
just vengeance, ‘‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’’; and (9)
the theory of the ‘‘lesser evil,’’ which assumes that greater evils
will befall us or our nation if we do not adopt terror against our
enemies.

The Significance of September 11
Prior to September 11, 2001, the conventional wisdom was that
the use of terrorism was endemic in low-intensity conflict around
the world but that it rarely, if ever, posed a strategic threat to the
security of a major power or the international community. Some
specialists in the study of terrorism did point out the use of weapons of terror as having a strategic impact on international politics, for example in the hastening of the withdrawal of colonial
powers from countries such as Cyprus and Algeria or derailing
the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.12
Others warned of the dangers of terrorists obtaining and using
a weapon of mass destruction, but these warnings were largely
ignored.13
September 11, 2001, changed these conventional attitudes
toward terrorism dramatically and irrevocably. These attacks had
enormous strategic consequences for both the U.S.A. and the
international community. At the time of writing, we are still too
close to these tragic events to make a proper assessment of their
wider impact and long-term implications. It is possible, however,
to identify some of the most significant consequences:
• The scale of the loss of life caused in the World Trade Center
attacks, unprecedented in the history of substate terrorism, led
the U.S. president, government, and the vast majority of U.S.
citizens to view them as an act of war rather than as crimes of
terrorism.
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• President Bush decided to respond by declaring a global war on
terrorism, not only against the perpetrators of the September
11 attacks, but also against other terrorist groups described as
having ‘‘global reach.’’ This obviously had huge implications for
U.S. foreign and security policy.

When President Bush took office, he and his advisors created
the impression that the new administration would be placing its
main emphasis on domestic issues, reducing foreign entanglements and avoiding new ones. This ‘‘Fortress America’’ approach
has been completely reversed since September 11. The U.S. administration has embarked on a policy of global activism and military intervention unparallel since the early days of the cold war,
and extending to a new doctrine of preemptive military attack
that President Bush seems determined to implement in order to
secure a ‘‘regime change’’ in Iraq.
President Bush, with the support of Prime Minister Blair of the
United Kingdom and other close allies, has enthusiastically, and
with a remarkable degree of success, sought to create an international coalition against terrorism. A remarkable feature of this
coalition is that it includes two major powers traditionally deeply
opposed to U.S. global activism, Russia and China. It is clear that
the leaders of Moscow and Beijing view the activities of al Qaeda
as a grave threat to their own national security. President Putin’s
demonstrated willingness to provide substantial assistance to the
U.S.A. in the struggle against al Qaeda, including permission to
overfly and use bases in Russia’s sphere of influence, has led to
much closer U.S./Russian relations.
Perhaps the most remarkable changes in the strategic environment caused by the September 11 attacks were the swift toppling
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had provided al
Qaeda with such a valuable safe haven and base, and the decision
by General Musharraf, the leader of Pakistan, to reverse his country’s policy of support of the Taliban, a policy that had helped
the latter to seize control of most of Afghanistan. Moreover,
against most predictions, the interim government in Afghanistan, set in place through the aegis of the UN, appears to have
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survived and is beginning the painful process of rebuilding Afghanistan’s shattered economy.

What Is ‘‘New’’ about the al Qaeda Terrorism?
Why Does It Still Pose a Serious Threat?
It would be foolish to try to assess the impact of the September
11 attacks without taking into account the responses of the
U.S.A., other major states, and the wider world. Yet it would also
be wanting to ignore the ways in which al Qaeda, the perpetrators, have changed the nature and severity of the terrorism
threat.
Al Qaeda, ‘‘the Base,’’ a global terrorist network largely created by bin Laden, can justifiably be characterized as the archetype of the ‘‘New Terrorism.’’14 Unlike the more traditional types
of terrorist groups, it is transnational in its fullest sense: it has a
universalistic ideology aimed not only at forcing the U.S.A. to
withdraw its forces from the Arabian Peninsula and to stop supporting Israel, but also at toppling the governments of Arab and
other Muslim states it accuses of collaborating with the U.S.A.
and its allies, and its ultimate aim is to establish a pan-Islamic
Caliphate. It is not dependent on any single regime or government for its survival and financial resources. It has a presence in
at least fifty countries. Its activists are drawn from a wide range of
Muslim countries, and some originate from the Muslim Diaspora
within Western societies.
Second, in addition to its central leadership and coordinating
committees on military, legal, media, and other matters, al
Qaeda has a worldwide network of operational and preparative
cells and affiliated organizations capable of being activated at any
time and carrying out terrorist attacks on their own initiative. It
is because of this, despite the major setback of losing its safe
haven in Afghanistan, that the global network is still capable of
continuing its terrorist campaign. This has been clearly demonstrated by a series of terrorist attacks, including a number that
have been thwarted by the authorities. The use of overseas sup-
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port networks and international terrorist attacks is, of course,
nothing new in the history of terrorism. What is new about the al
Qaeda network is the scale of its diffusion around the world, and,
as demonstrated in the September 11 attacks, the meticulous
long-term planning and terrorist tradecraft the network had
been able to deploy.15
Last, but not least, there are major differences between the
more traditional terrorist groups and al Qaeda regarding the nature and scale of the violence the latter employs. Through its suicide
airliner attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, al
Qaeda has been responsible for the most lethal acts of terrorism
by a substate group in history. It is no accident that bin Laden’s
network should have been the first substate group to have carried
out mass destruction terrorism. An American scholar once
stated, ‘‘terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.’’16 Sadly, for groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates,
this no longer holds. Therefore, while such deadly terrorist cells,
aimed and equipped to cause carnage on a massive scale, are
still at large, the threat to the U.S., the U.K., Israel, and other
designated ‘‘enemies’’ of the bin Laden network remains an everpresent reality. Moreover, it is important to note that al Qaeda
has carried out, planned, or attempted terrorist attacks in a wide
range of countries, including Singapore, Pakistan, India, Tunisia,
Morocco, Jordan, Italy, France, Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia,
Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. It is also very clear that a terrorist
group like al Qaeda, which sets out to kill as many civilians as
possible, would have no compunction about using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons if they manage
to weaponize the appropriate materials. Hence, the threat of
CBRN terrorism has been brought a step closer by the September
11 attacks.
Is ‘‘Traditional’’ Terrorism in Decline?
Does It Continue to Pose a Serious Threat?
It should be fairly obvious from the preceding discussion that al
Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a particularly intractable and
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dangerous challenge to governments and the international community. Indeed, the author shares the widely held view of specialists in terrorism studies that bin Laden’s network poses the most
serious threat to innocent life in the history of terrorist groups.
But what of the ‘‘traditional’’ groups? Are they being eclipsed by
the new terrorism and forced to retire from the scene? Sadly,
there is no real evidence of this. The roots of the ethnic, ideological, and religious conflicts that spawn such terrorism show no
signs of withering away, and in the eyes of practitioners and sympathizers, terrorism appears an attractive low-cost, low-risk, and
potentially high-yield weapon that they are unwilling to forgo.
One positive development is that, at least in a few of the cases,
the terrorism appears potentially corrigible, because a combination of political initiatives, diplomacy, and peace processes can
sometimes resolve even highly intractable conflicts. For example,
against all predictions, the Northern Ireland peace process,
though extremely fragile, is still surviving, and terrorist killings
in the Province have been dramatically reduced.17 Another remarkable example where a peace initiative has made a breakthrough is the Norwegian-inspired initiative in Sri Lanka, which
has led to a cease-fire between the Tamil Tigers and the government security forces and to peace talks, following a conflict which
has cost over 64,000 lives.
Unfortunately there are many deep-rooted conflicts that seem
stubbornly incorrigible, like those between the Israelis and the
Palestinians and the Indians and Pakistanis. In these situations
terrorism only helps polarize the conflict. In both of these cases,
terrorist attacks could all too swiftly escalate into full-scale wider
interstate war, with a significant risk that weapons of mass destruction could be used by the belligerents.

Conclusions
Certain conclusions follow from this brief analysis: first, both
‘‘new’’ and ‘‘traditional’’ terrorism pose a significant strategic
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threat to nation-states and to international peace and security
generally; second, because there are many different kinds of terrorism with a potentially international reach in the contemporary
world, it is a dangerous illusion to believe that they can all be
eradicated by ‘‘the war on terrorism’’ or by some simple military
or political solution; and third, in view of the risks of terrorism
triggering wider wars or escalating to the level where weapons of
mass destruction are employed, it is vitally important to develop
far more effective and widely supported conflict resolution and
peace-building initiatives, as well as methods of more effectively
preventing and combating terrorist violence.
Conflict resolution methods alone will not eradicate the terrorist violence of incorrigible groups fueled on hatred and revenge.
But by significantly reducing the underlying causes of deepseated conflicts, giving politics and diplomacy a chance to succeed, they can save thousands of lives.
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Terrorism: Theory and Reality
Larry Hollingworth
The semantics of studies on terrorism seem to strive more for
political correctness than for presenting an accurate picture of
the soil in which these terrible acts are usually born, gestate, and
explode. Definitions divorced from reality offer, at best, a two
dimensional view of a multifaceted problem. To focus solely on
acts of desperate individuals and to not equally consider official
or state terrorism is not only a simplistic approach but one that
fails to make the obvious linkage of violence to violence.
I have served as a humanitarian worker for refugees and displaced persons, and as a negotiator, in areas of armed conflict in
many parts of the world. I have personally witnessed the perverse
impact of occupying governmental forces on innocent civilians
in Srebrenica, Chechnya, Aceh, East Timor, Rwanda, and in Palestine.
Where there is an overt government policy to terrorize civilian
populations into a dependent, even supplicant, state, the silence
of the oppressed can be very deceptive. Hatred breeds where
homes, fields, schools, hospitals, water and electricity supplies,
and vital records are wantonly destroyed; when well-equipped armies use overwhelming force against entire townships, killing
and maiming women and children; when targeted assassinations
and torture instead of the rule of law are used by sovereign states.
In this chapter, I shall offer the reflections of a field worker on
some commonly used definitions in the ‘‘war on terrorism,’’ and
then provide a view of terrorism as perceived and experienced
on the ground by civilians under army occupation.
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Definition
Look up ‘‘terrorism’’ on the Web search engine ‘‘Google;’’ there
are more than fifty pages of entries, many clamoring to define
what it is. In the excellent book, Political Terrorism, the authors
Alex Schmid and Albert Longman offer twenty-six choices.1
Noam Chomsky, in one of his numerous papers on the subject,
offers two approaches to the study of terrorism: the literal and
the propagandistic. ‘‘Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by
determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances
of the phenomenon—concentrating on the major examples . . .
and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic
approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis
that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated
enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the
cases where they can be attributed (plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed, or
termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self defense.’ ’’ He adds, ‘‘It comes as no
surprise that the propagandistic approach is adopted by governments generally, and by their instruments in totalitarian states.’’2
The U.S. Department of State definition is, ‘‘Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant groups by subnational groups or clandestine
agents usually intended to influence an audience. International
terrorism is terrorism involving citizens of the territories of more
than one country.’’3
The U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction
pamphlet 525–37 of 1984 defines terrorism with a commendable
economy of words as ‘‘the calculated use of violence or threat of
violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological
in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.’’
Professor Igor Primoratz, a philosopher at Melbourne University, defines terrorism, ‘‘for the purpose of philosophical discussion . . . as the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use,
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against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other
people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.’’
Thus, he states, ‘‘terrorism has two targets. One person or group
is attacked directly, in order to get at another person or group to
intimidate them into doing something they would not do. In
terms of importance, the indirect target is primary and the direct
target secondary. The secondary, but directly attacked target is
innocent people.’’4
Professor Rakesh Gupta presents a simpler ‘‘philosophical’’ offering. ‘‘In any discussion on terrorism—whether it is criminal or
political—denial of the right of life would be the basic philosophical category of analysis.’’ This statement seems to suggest that
political terrorist acts may be legal. But Professor Gupta continues and clears up the doubt: ‘‘Since a terrorist action today is a
small group action against innocents and is against either national or international law, it is criminal.’’5
Back to Professor Primoratz to define who are the victims of
terrorism: the ‘‘innocents . . . persons not guilty of any action or
(omission) the terrorist could plausibly bring up as a justification
of what he does to them. They are not attacking him; therefore
he cannot justify his action in terms of self-defence. They are not
waging war on him, nor on those on whose behalf he presumes
to act; therefore he cannot say that he is merely waging war. They
are not responsible, on any plausible understanding of responsibility, for the (real or alleged) injustice, suffering, or deprivation
that is being inflicted on him or on those whose case he has
adopted, and which is so grave that a violent response to it can
be properly considered.’’6
Primoratz importantly further defines the ‘‘innocents’’: ‘‘In
the context of war, according to the mainstream version of just
war theory, this includes all except members of the armed forces
and security services, those who supply them with arms and ammunition, and political officials directly involved in the conflict.
In the context of a political conflict that falls short of war, the
category of the innocent has similarly wide scope: it includes all
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except government officials, police and members of security services.’’
This seems to imply that, at least ‘‘philosophically,’’ soldiers,
politicians, and police are ‘‘legitimate’’ victims of acts of terrorism.

Violence
The key word in most definitions of terrorism is ‘‘violence,’’ an
action that has been around since Cain slew Abel. Is there good
and bad violence; a violence that liberates and a violence that
enslaves? St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that, ‘‘violence is good
or bad depending on the use or purpose to which it is put.’’ In
his book, Violence, Jacques Ellul stresses the importance of who is
responsible for an act of violence and introduces the concept of
‘‘force’’ by quoting the well-known example used by the theologian Suarez: ‘‘a man cannot lawfully kill his neighbor, nor can
two men together, nor ten thousand, but a judge can lawfully
pronounce a sentence of death. His indisputable legitimate
power derives from the state. There is all the difference between
violence and force.’’7
Does this ‘‘force’’ absolve a state from a crime of violence? Not
all states and state decisions are necessarily just or right. The
power that condemns to death may be tyrannical or oppressive
or simply may make a mistake. How legitimate is the state? Did
the state or the ruler of the state achieve power justly or unjustly?
Does the state’s use of force conform to law—national and international? Jacques Ellul again: ‘‘Force used by a state is just when
its use conforms to the laws; when it does not conform to the
laws, it is still force—not violence—but unjust force.’’ Scant comfort for the victim but encouragement for retribution.
Ellul has five rules, which he cautions all who contemplate violence to remember:
1. Once begun there is continuity to violence
2. There is reciprocity: violence begets violence

230

TERRORISM: THEORY AND REALITY

3. Violence begets violence . . . and nothing else (I am not happy
with this one)
4. There is sameness to violence—there are proportions and
shades but essentially violence is violence
5. The perpetrators of violence always try to justify the violence
and themselves

The Cycle of Violence, . . . the Tandem of Responsibility
‘‘Who started it?’’ Is there a parent or teacher who has not asked
this question?
How often do we hear spokespersons, especially in parts of the
Middle East, say, ‘‘In response to . . . we have carried out. . . .’’?
In any major crisis over the past decade, it would be very difficult
to define when the crisis began and by whom: Sudan, Somalia,
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Aceh, and Palestine, and
I only choose some of those where I have served. But each and
every side can point to the last incident as the one that they must
revenge, and so the cycle continues. Once the violence begins it
is difficult to effect reconciliation. A leader at any level who is
prepared to attend talks with the other side risks the accusation
of weakness or collaboration. But unless both sides can at least
glimpse the view from the other side, there is no hope.
The French Franciscan Father Maillard, when Director of Freres
du Monde, published in their magazine: ‘‘It is always the violence
of the oppressor that unleashes the violence of the oppressed.
The time comes when violence is the only possible way for the
oppressed to state their case.’’ Again, speaking only from personal experience, I cannot fault this.8
The black power leader, Pastor Albert Cleage Jr., said after the
race riots in Detroit: ‘‘Now we are no longer afraid; now it is the
white man who is afraid.’’ The violence of the oppressed transfers
fear to the oppressor previously secure in his dominance. This is
particularly so today in Israel where the Palestinian retaliation
includes a weapon that truly frightens the Israeli population: the
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suicide bomb. Rattle the bars of a caged lion and you must expect
to be scratched or bitten.

The Perpetrator
Who is a terrorist? It depends on who applies the label. One
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Or, to quote
Noam Chomsky: ‘‘actions undertaken against oppressive regimes
and occupying armies (are) considered resistance by their perpetrators and terrorism by the rulers, even when they are nonviolent.’’9
Terrorists espouse a cause. The focus of the cause can be any
shade of the rainbow. They may represent: the have nots—no
land, no access to education, no money, no status, no resources;
the religiously oppressed; the racially oppressed; the politically
oppressed; or the culturally oppressed. More often they are to
the left of the political spectrum but some of the most virulent
are from the right wing. They can be from minority groups, fascists, racists. They come from all walks of life and all strata of
society.
Jihad and Martyrs
A number of terrorist groups operate in and out of states where
Islam is the major faith. Their campaigns are labeled ‘‘jihad’’ and
their dead are honored as ‘‘martyrs.’’
Jihad is the verbal noun of the verb to strive, to struggle, to
exert. While a number of other nouns can be linked to jihad to
give it different connotations, it is now best known in its meaning
‘‘armed struggle’’ and, more specifically, ‘‘armed struggle against
unbelievers.’’ In effect, it has the same meaning as ‘‘crusade’’!
Jihad is often mentioned in the Koran as is qitaal, which means
‘‘fighting.’’ The most relevant references are: K22:39, ‘‘Leave is
given to those who fight because they were wronged’’; K3:157–
158, which encourages participation in the fighting; and K169–
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172, which promises rewards in heaven to those martyrs
(shuhaada) who die in battle. K2:190–194 has a chilling relevance
in the Middle East today: ‘‘And fight in the way of God with those
who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors. And
slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel them from
where they expelled you.’’10
As scholars pore over holy books and interpret them in different ways, the Koran is no exception. There are at least two distinct schools, the Modernists and the Fundamentalists, and two
different ways of approaching the interpretations; one is to take
each verse in traditional order and to examine its content in
depth, the other is to gather together all the verses on one topic
and to examine their relationship. The latter produces the more
moderate interpretation.
Rebels
Professor Gupta is keen to point out the difference between a
terrorist and a rebel. He labels Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ‘‘who had
no fetish for nonviolence,’’ as ‘‘a mass leader and not an alchemist of revolution,’’ and similarly labels Mahatma Gandhi ‘‘a
rebel with his entire pacifist menace.’’ I am happy so far but have
reservations with his next statement that: ‘‘[a rebel’s] commitment is to the cause of his people and not to himself or his
group, which is the commitment of a terrorist.’’ This may be true
in the Indian examples he gives; I am not certain it is when applied more generally. I suspect that many, if not most, terrorists
believe that they represent the true voice of the people. They
may be deluded but their zeal is genuine.
Edward Herman and David Peterson, in Z magazine, introduce
the concept of ‘‘retail’’ versus ‘‘wholesale’’ terror. ‘‘Bin Laden
and his network . . . is a ‘retail’ terrorist network, like the IRA or
Cuban refugee terrorist network: it has no helicopter gun ships,
no offensive missiles, no ‘daisy cutters,’ no nuclear weapons.
Really large scale killing and torture—‘wholesale’ terrorism—is
implemented by states, not by no state terrorists.’’11
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State Terrorism
State terrorism is a taboo term. Politicians never utter
it. Newspapers rarely describe it. Academic ‘‘experts’’
suppress it. It is by far the most menacing form of terrorism.
John Pilger: www.mirror.co.uk
We must recognize that by convention—and it must be
emphasized only by convention—great power use, and
the threat of the use, of force is normally described as
coercive diplomacy, and not as a form of terrorism.
Michael Stohl, ‘‘States, Terrorism and State Terrorism,’’
ed. Robert O’Slater and Michael Stohl
(London: Macmillan, 1988)

There are states that support terrorism domestically, states that
support terrorism externally overtly, states that support terrorism
externally covertly, and states that do all three.
William Blum is the recorder par excellence of the activities of
the United States of America as a purveyor of state terrorism. In
his highly readable books he chronicles the participation of the
U.S. interventions around the globe. In Killing Hope, there is a
chapter for each intervention. And there are fifty-five chapters!12
The second book is entitled Rogue State. It has three sections:
‘‘Ours and Theirs: Washington’s Love/Hate Relationship with
Terrorists and Human Rights Violators’’; ‘‘United States and the
Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’’; and ‘‘A Rogue State versus
the World.’’13
Mavis Cheek, who chose the book as one of the books of the
year in the U.K. Sunday newspaper, The Observer, wrote, ‘‘William
Blum, once of the U.S. State Department, gives a chilling reminder that while there may be no justification for September
11, there may be reasons.’’
William Blum is not the only U.S. citizen to criticize U.S. policy. ‘‘The guiding principle, it appears, is that the U.S. is a lawless
terrorist state and this is right and just, whatever the world may
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think, whatever international institutions may declare’’ (Noam
Chomsky).
John Pilger, who is much more catholic in his range of targets,
writes in a Post Bali bombing report: ‘‘Today, largely unreported,
the Indonesian military, with the tacit approval of the United
States, Britain, and Australia, is terrorizing the populations of
Aceh and West Papua. Most of the ‘human rights violations’ in
these provinces—the euphemism for state terrorism—have been
part and parcel of ‘protecting’ the American Exxon oil holdings
in Aceh as well as the vast Freeport copper and gold mines and
BP holdings in West Papua.’’14 He refers to research by Edward
Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan: ‘‘Covering the period since 1965,
which points to the killing of several thousand people by nonstate terrorists such as al Qaeda, compared with 2.5 million civilians killed by state-sponsored terrorism. These include the
violence of the South African apartheid regime, the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the ‘Contras’ in Nicaragua, and other American-backed terrorist states.’’
The U.S. State Department, which, if Mr. Blum is right, should
know a thing or two about the subject, itself maintains an annual
list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
Is a state that pursues terrorism a terrorist state? Professor Primoratz: ‘‘I suggest we reserve this label for states that do not
merely resort to terrorism on certain occasions, but employ it in
a lasting and systematic way and, indeed, are defined in part by
the sustained use of terrorism against their own population.
These are totalitarian states.’’15
It is, however, important to note that a few non-totalitarian
states have used terrorism against their own populations.
Is there ever a need for external interference? Irving Kristol
believes so: ‘‘Insignificant nations, like insignificant people, can
quickly experience delusions of significance . . . In truth, the days
of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ are never over . . . Gunboats are as necessary for international order as police cars are for domestic
order.’’16
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A Case Study: Palestine
I choose Palestine for the simple reason that it is my most recent
field appointment. I was United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) Emergency Coordinator in Jenin Camp on loan from the Center for International
Health and Cooperation. I left there six weeks before writing this
chapter. I begin with a caveat: it is difficult to serve in an occupied Palestinian community and be true to the tenets of our humanitarian faith—neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
‘‘What is the difference between state terrorism and individual
terrorist acts?’’ asks Lev Grinberg of the Humphrey Institute for
Social Research at Ben Gurion University in an oft-quoted article
from the May/June 2002 Tikkun magazine. ‘‘If we understand
the difference,’’ he continues, ‘‘we’ll also understand the evilness
of U.S. policies in the Middle East.’’ He then answers the question he posed. ‘‘Israel’s state terrorism is defined by the U.S. officials as ‘self-defense,’ while individual suicide bombers are
called ‘terrorists.’ ’’17
Grinberg is not soft on Palestinian terrorists: ‘‘Suicide bombs
killing innocent citizens must be unequivocally condemned; they
are immoral acts, and their perpetrators should be sent to jail.
. . . However, they cannot be compared to state terrorism carried
out by the Israeli government. The former are acts of despair of
a people that sees no future, vastly ignored by an unfair and distorted international public opinion. The latter are cold and ‘rational’ decisions of a state and a military apparatus of occupation,
well equipped, financed, and backed by the only superpower in
the world.’’
‘‘Palestinian violence receives worldwide condemnation’’
(Chomsky18) with the silent rider booming in our ears that Israeli
violence rarely does.
It is bitterly ironic that the modern state of Israel, conceived
by a biblical promise, born out of a terrorist/freedom fighter
struggle, growing up with a population of victims of generations
of oppression and constantly led by leaders whose roots lie in the
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Holocaust, is not able to understand the aspirations and desires
of their neighbors with whom they share the land. ‘‘Do unto others what you would have them do unto you’’ is replaced with,
‘‘Do unto others what was done unto you.’’
It is sad that in the international arena ‘‘Palestinian’’ is associated closely with ‘‘terrorist,’’ in some circles to the point of being
synonymous. This image was beginning to change in the early
days of the Second Intifada with frequent television coverage of
the new ‘‘Davids’’ slinging stones at the new ‘‘Goliath’’ in his
armored vehicle. Unfortunately, a faction of militant Palestinians—how easy it is to label all actions as Palestinian—returned
to the suicide bomb as its most successful weapon. More unfortunate was the choice of target. If the suicide bombers had blown
themselves up at checkpoints, in Israeli barracks, and in Israeli
Defence Force Headquarters, and all their victims were military,
I am sure they would have maintained the tide of sympathy and
may even have earned admiration for their desperate courage.
Better still would have been protest suicides outside embassies or
other high-profile buildings where the suicide was the sole victim. Sadly, they chose civilian targets and killed and maimed innocent women and children. They have frightened the Israelis
beyond expectation, but have brought upon themselves a ruthless military retaliation and the return of the dreadful epithet
‘‘terrorist.’’
I was in Jenin in late April 2002 after the Israeli incursion. The
talk was of a massacre. A UN mission headed by Mary Robinson,
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, was refused entry
into Israel. The United Nations assembled in Geneva a team of
the most respected of international senior persons: Mr. Martti
Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland; Madame Sadako
Ogata from Japan, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees;
and M. Cornelio Sommaruga, former President of the International Committee of the Red Cross from Switzerland, to go to
Jenin to investigate what had happened. This fact-finding mission
was agreed to between the UN Secretary General and the Israeli
Foreign Minister and had the full support of the UN Security
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Council. The mission was refused entry into Israel! As well as an
insult, this was a grave strategic error. Human Rights Watch
(HRW), with a speed and accuracy that should be a model for all
agencies, produced in early May a comprehensive investigation
report that stated that there was no massacre but many severe
human rights violations. I will dwell no more on this incursion
but recommend the reader to view the HRW report, which is
available on the Internet and whose findings I fully support.19
I further recommend the more comprehensive and measured
report, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Shielded from Scrutiny: IDF
Violations in Jenin and Nablus, issued by Amnesty International on
November 4, 2002. This covers the period of April–June 2002.
I left Jenin in early June and returned in mid-August to a Jenin
under curfew. What did this mean? I soon discovered. The Israeli
Defence Forces occupied the West Bank. It was not possible to
get in and out without passing IDF checkpoints, which was timeconsuming for internationals and almost impossible for the majority of Palestinians. The curfew was an added inconvenience. It
was imposed either with warning or without. If with warning, the
start time was given but rarely the end time.
If it was without warning, tanks and armored cars swept into
the town, at least one with a loudspeaker. The population was
told, ‘‘It is forbidden to move around. Go home and close your
doors.’’ From then on anyone who moved risked being shot.
The population of Jenin camp is 13,900. Together the town
and camp number 41,000.
Forty-one thousand citizens were expected to clear the streets
and get home rapidly. Not too easy; very difficult when you take
into consideration that more than a third of the work force of
Jenin live in outlying villages. Clear the streets, clear a checkpoint
with no warning. Clear the schools, clear the hospital clinics. It
would be easy with a considerate occupying force. It would be
safe with an occupying force with tight rules of engagement: having clear rules of when they can shoot, at whom they can shoot,
and with what warning. With aggressive and often nervous troops
who were told that their own safety was of paramount impor-
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tance, bursts of machine gun fire were common. Fatalities and
injuries were frequent events. The terrorizing of the population,
constant. It is hard to imagine the fear a tank generates as it
growls along narrow streets sinisterly swiveling its main barrel
from object to object. And if the barrel stops on you, there is a
heart-stopping moment while you silently pray the tank commander has recognized that you present no threat. More than a
dozen innocent civilians were shot dead during my time in Jenin.
They included women and children. Some youths were shot dead
throwing stones at tanks. In every exchange of weapon fire between Palestinian and Israeli, the Palestinian was the underdog,
the odds-on favorite to lose. The Israeli response was so unequal,
so disproportionate. There was no weapon in any hands in Jenin
that was capable of penetrating tank armor. If there had been,
they surely would have used it. The IDF could have fired paint
ball or smoke or tear gas or rubber bullets and dispersed the
Palestinians at no risk to themselves.
After weeks of on and off violence, more on than off, the IDF
lifted the curfew and replaced it with a lesser imposition: closure.
This was a reward for a lull in the attacks on Israelis.
Closure meant that the town and camp were completely blockaded. There were heavy armored checkpoints at every entrance
and exit. Sounds easy. Stay within the camp and town and no
problem. But what about the third of the work force who live
outside the closed area? This includes doctors, dentists, nurses,
teachers, tradesmen, humanitarian agency staff, the mayor of the
town, the governor. And what about the staff of the schools and
the clinics and the university who live within the closed area but
whose workplace is in outlying villages? What about farm produce, grocery stocks, medicines, baby milk powder that comes
into the town from outside?
Did everything stop? No. So what happened? Everyone from
the mayor to the vegetable dealer used taxis to come into or out
of the town using fields, tracks, culverts, whatever cover was available. Did the IDF turn a blind eye? It knew that this must happen,
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had to happen. No, taxi drivers and passengers were killed and
wounded. Why?
Unfortunately, there were further suicide bombs, so closure
was revoked and a military operation mounted. This was curfew
and closure with a vengeance. Nothing moved. Houses with good
views were commandeered, snipers were placed at vantage
points, and armored vehicles were positioned at numerous static
checkpoints or roamed the town at will. Anyone on the streets
was shot at. It did not take many days before there was little food
in the town, no baby milk, and, very importantly, no water. Because of two or three suicide bombers whose mission was not
known by any more than a handful of controllers, 40,000 citizens
suffered severe deprivation. After a while, some pipelines for essential personnel were opened. Passing through these checkpoints was time-consuming and humiliating. Hundreds were
arrested; some interrogated and released, others disappeared
into Israeli detention centers. Few were charged. Fewer released.
Houses of known terrorists were demolished, their bewildered
families left homeless.
When the town was on its knees and morale at its lowest, the
operation ended, and, thanking the Lord for small mercies, we
gratefully accepted the comparative liberty of closure.
I handed the office over to my successor, another international. Seven days later, he was shot dead by Israeli gunfire in the
UN compound during an unannounced military operation. The
IDF delayed the arrival of an ambulance, not that it would have
been of any help.
It is hard to know where to begin categorizing the breaches of
human rights. It will be fairest if I end this chapter with an extract
from the list of recommendations of the Amnesty International
report. Although written to cover April to June 2002 in Jenin,
every observation is valid today.
It is not difficult to conclude that the population of Jenin is
terrorized by the IDF.
It is also indisputable that suicide bombers came from Jenin. It
is indisputable that there are terrorist cells operating within
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Jenin. It is indisputable that there have been bomb-making factories in Jenin. It is indisputable that there are armed men shooting at Israeli troops in Jenin. Perhaps they number fifty or sixty.
Because of them, 39,950 are collectively punished. IDF soldiers
killed more Palestinians than suicide bombers killed Israelis. No
one places curfews or closure in their towns. They are, however,
now fencing themselves in, creating prisons for themselves mentally and physically.
Their tactics are increasing the numbers of hardliners in the
camps and towns.
They fail to see that they escalate the cycle of violence. Suicide
bombs are a reaction to violence, not an initiator of violence.
Both sides have told me that there is no alternative to their tactics.
Sadly, the answer lies with the United States. As I write, an
Israeli team consisting of the Defense Ministry director general,
the Prime Minister’s bureau chief, and the Finance Ministry director general are in Washington to present a request for $4 billion for special defense aid and $8 billion in loan guarantees.
Few doubt that they will get it.
‘‘It is absurd that we are still witnessing, in the twenty-first century, a case of occupation where the dominant side is seen as the
victim’’ (Lev Grinberg).20

Summary of Amnesty International Recommendations
Amnesty International calls on the government of Israel:
• To ensure the IDF operations are conducted in full respect of
international human rights and humanitarian law
• To initiate a full, thorough, transparent, and impartial investigation into all allegations of violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law, including those documented in
this report, and to make the results public
• To cooperate with United Nations investigations
• To bring to justice those alleged to have committed serious vio-
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lations of international human rights or humanitarian law in
proceedings that meet international standards for fair trial
To ensure prompt and adequate reparation for victims of serious human rights or humanitarian law violations
To respect and protect the human rights of all persons living in
the Occupied Territories without discrimination
To include the practices of Israeli authorities in the Occupied
Territories in all reporting to UN human rights treaty bodies
To take immediate action to prevent the IDF from compelling
Palestinians to take part in military operations or to act as
‘‘human shields’’ and to take measures against any soldier or
military commander who undertakes or sanctions such practices
To fulfill its international legal obligations by ensuring that
medical staff and ambulances are allowed to carry out duties
without undue delays, and with safe passage
To ensure safe access for humanitarian and medical supplies
To immediately stop the use of lethal force to enforce curfews
To end collective punishments, including house destruction,
closures and curfews, and cutting off of water and electricity
To end torture or other ill treatment of those in custody
To end administrative detention and release all administrative
detainees unless they are to be brought to trial for a recognizably criminal offence in a trial which is in accordance with UN
fair trial standards
To accept an international monitoring presence in Israel’s Occupied Territories with a strong human rights component

Amnesty International calls on the Palestine Authority:
• To take all action to prevent anyone under its jurisdiction from
attacking or otherwise endangering the safety of civilians

Amnesty International calls on the Palestinian armed groups:
• To respect fundamental principles of international law that prohibit the killing of civilians
• To end any use of children in armed operations21
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Gender Exploitation
Ambassador Nancy Ely-Raphel

Introduction1
In this increasingly globalized world where people and cultures are intersecting with ever-greater frequency, human trafficking for both labor and sexual exploitation has become an
immediate concern for governments and individuals. Human
trafficking is referred to as a form of modern-day slavery whose
victims suffer sexual or labor exploitation involving indentured
servitude, debt bondage, chattel slavery, and peonage, among
other slavery-like practices.
This chapter examines gender exploitation as a consequence
of human trafficking, and the economic and social crises that
accelerate the exploitation of the disenfranchised, who are most
often women and girls. I also focus on the denial of women’s
basic rights and protections that is borne out of gender discrimination, and its devastating consequences to the social fabric. In
defining some important aspects of this problem, I will also highlight the U.S. government’s responses and proactive efforts, both
domestically and internationally.
Background
In October 2000, the U.S. government adopted into federal law
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (‘‘TVPA’’), Pub. L. No.
106–386, a multifaceted anti-trafficking law. The TVPA provides
numerous forms of assistance to combat trafficking on both a
macro and micro level. The harshest form of trafficking, for
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which maximum provision is made, is known as ‘‘severe forms of
trafficking in persons’’ and includes two parts: ‘‘sex trafficking in
which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not
attained eighteen years of age,’’ or, labor trafficking involving
‘‘the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force,
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.’’
Globally, more and more societies are experiencing human
trafficking. It knows no geographical, national, nor ideological
boundaries: traffickers may transport their victims within one sovereign nation or across international borders; and may target victims of any age, race, ethnicity, and gender. Human trafficking
may be caused by social or economic crisis in societies in which
women are already the victims of age-old gender discrimination;
by the destruction of social, cultural, and familial protections; or
civil and military conflict that displaces people and populations.
Large-scale social calamities have touched a good portion of the
world during the last twenty years, including civil wars in Africa,
the overwhelming epidemic of AIDS, the near-collapse of economies throughout Southeast Asia, and the increase in organized
crime in the former Soviet Union. These crises have contributed
to the tragic increase in human trafficking.
Traffickers target women, girls, men, and boys when exercising
their criminal plots. Sometimes, the particular purpose for which
they seek to traffick an individual is particular to one gender.
For example, young boys are abducted and conscripted as child
soldiers by rebel armies, or as camel jockeys, while adult men are
recruited into forced labor for work in rubber and cocoa plantations. Women and girls, for example, are often sought out for
work as domestic servants in the homes of diplomats and higherincome families, for work in clothing sweatshops, and for sexual
exploitation and pornography.
While specific figures regarding the percentage of female versus male victims have not been gathered, trafficking for the pur-
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poses of sexual exploitation is a prevalent form of human
trafficking, which indicates the destructive gender exploitation
and discrimination occurring throughout the world. Women
have struggled to gain equality and equity the world over, yet
where this is still lacking, they remain vulnerable members of
societies and easy prey for traffickers.
Trafficking in women and girls is a lucrative business for many
reasons, some of which include social tolerance for the degradation of women as second-class citizens, women’s changing roles
in the family, and the fact that women’s empowerment and decision-making authority has not increased proportionally to their
responsibilities within a society. Women and girls in countless
societies are subject to violence and abuse in the home and in
public, a violence against women that is seldom confronted
openly. Throughout the world, women have achieved greater equities in education and job skills, and more women are heading
households, especially in emerging or otherwise struggling economies. Yet, demand for their labor often turns exploitive as they
frequently bear the responsibility of providing for their families
in very weak economies with few opportunities, especially for
women. This plays into the hands of traffickers where women are
unable to reach a sufficient level of employment in their home
communities and they are forced to look elsewhere.

Gender Discrimination’s Contribution to the Causes and
Consequences of Trafficking in Women and Girls
It is important to put this theme into context through an actual
trafficking story. The woman described below was victimized by
traffickers and then subjected to continuing trauma throughout
her experience with the criminal justice system. Her case illustrates the role gender discrimination plays in creating conditions
for traffickers to target women and girls to a disproportionate
degree, and subsequently how these women and girls are stigma-
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tized by members of society who treat them as criminals, rather
than victims of trafficking.
Case Study: Nina
Nina was born in a Southeastern European country with a faltering economy, political instability, high unemployment, and rampant organized crime. She was raised by her mother, who was
mentally unstable. Nina could not find work that paid her
enough to survive and, without the support of her extended family, she was determined to find work abroad. At the age of nineteen, Nina was recruited by an acquaintance who offered her a
ride and assistance in getting a job in Italy. She went with him in
his car, yet, before they even left their country, the journey ended
at a brothel where she was sold and sexually exploited.
Nina was obstinate, and the traffickers beat her and drugged
her into submission. She often became ill, but she courageously
managed to escape once. Although fully aware of the dangers,
she returned home to her village for lack of any other place to
seek refuge. Soon after her return, the traffickers kidnapped her
and took her back. Ultimately, the brothel where she was working was raided and the police took her into custody as a prostitute, a minor offense in that jurisdiction. She told her story of
violence, rape, and forced prostitution to the police who, under
much international pressure, decided to investigate. Despite concerns over retribution by the traffickers, she agreed to be a material witness at the trial.
The criminal code had no articles about human trafficking, so
the defendants were charged with rape and other sexual offenses, as well as forced prostitution and pimping. Even with the
defendants in pretrial custody, Nina needed a safe and secure
location. None existed, so the police found her an apartment
and assigned police protection. The very police officer assigned
to protect her alerted the criminal gang of her whereabouts. She
was threatened and security forces mobilized to find another,
safer location.
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When the trial finally took place, judges and defense counsel
teased, mocked, and insulted her throughout the proceedings.
The government’s limited resources confined the trial to a courtroom so small that she shared a bench with the defendants. The
rules of procedure mandated that she ‘‘accuse’’ the defendants
in open court, the very men who beat, drugged, and raped her,
and she did so from that shared bench, physically brushing arms
with them. The criminal judicial proceedings only further victimized her as she was called derogatory names, her character and
past sexual history were degraded, and the defendants threatened her life in front of the panel of judges. The judges did nothing to stop this.
When the trial was finished, the defendants were found guilty,
but released from custody pending appeal. Again, they found her
at the ‘‘safe location’’ where she was staying and threatened her
life, even though she had twenty-four-hour protection. With the
trial over, she had to find a long-term solution for herself. She
could not return to her hometown and she could not remain
where she was. Thanks to personal efforts by foreign diplomats
familiar with her case, she was allowed to go to a third country as
a student, where she has assumed a new name, and now tries to
live a new life despite the horror of her victimization. She has no
social, emotional, or physical assistance. Though safe, she is
lonely and depressed, and desperate enough to consider returning home, despite the obvious dangers.
This graphic example is not unique, and illustrates the many
ways in which various levels of gender discrimination and exploitation lead traffickers to target women.
Poverty, Migration, and Women Nina’s economic situation forced
her to seek employment in a country with a stronger economy
and more opportunities for work. Her case is not unusual. Numbers of women under the poverty line and who are migrating
for economic reasons are increasing. These factors contribute to
sexually exploitative trafficking. According to U.S. State Department figures, even though women are widely considered a grow-
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ing majority of the workforce in export industries, women and
children today represent 70 percent of the 1.3 billion people who
live in absolute poverty. In many of these same societies, women
have little prospect of advancement, are prohibited from owning
or inheriting property, and are prevented from attending school
with the same opportunities as their male counterparts. Societies
that perpetuate this kind of gender discrimination in entitlements contribute to the vulnerabilities that encourage women to
leave their homes in search of a profitable livelihood.
In keeping with today’s economic realities, globalization
trends bring competition for goods and services to even the remotest corner of the globe. As such, even where women are well
represented in the domestic labor force, they often dominate informal economic and production sectors and produce goods that
are sensitive to external competition. Moreover, women often
work in clothing and textile industries, offering attractive skills to
labor traffickers. When female laborers cannot provide for themselves or their families, and when their societies do not allow
them to reap the fair profits of their work, they seek to migrate
for better work opportunities. This situation is then ripe for traffickers to recruit these laborers for employment, and then subject them to deplorable conditions, or even into slavery-like
conditions, such as Nina experienced.
Pervasive Violence Against Women While Nina’s case illustrates
how violence is a tool traffickers use to control victims, violence
against women in other parts of society pushes women into the
hands of traffickers. Where violence against women is pandemic,
domestic violence—most often unspoken—forces women to escape abusive situations in search of new opportunities and new
lives. State Department gender experts have looked closely at the
phenomenon of gender-based violence—violence targeted at individuals because of their gender—and have noted that, while
gender-based violence may affect both men and women, it principally affects women and girls. Gender-based violence exists across
cultures, but is particularly prevalent in areas of conflict. State
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Department refugee experts attribute this to specific, conflictdriven factors, including the frequent dissolution of the rule of
law and basic legal protections, lack of physical security, male
disempowerment, and the collapse of normal social roles and
family units. Gender-based violence, like violence against women,
operates as a factor pushing women out of their homes and societies and into the hands of traffickers who, at first glance, seem to
offer a path out of the violence and into a new life.
Women in Civil and Military Conflicts Civil conflicts have disproportionately negative effects on women and girls. In recent civil
disorders around the world, men, quite naturally, account for
the largest numbers of combatants while women and children
comprise the largest section of civilians affected by conflict. In
addition, U.S. figures indicate that up to 70 percent of the internally displaced persons and refugees around the world are
women and children. International reports tell of traffickers
preying upon these very vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons, luring or kidnapping them from refugee camps.
While peacekeeping missions are vital elements for securing
overall peace and stability, they may also bring with them an unfortunate byproduct when some police and soldiers deny their
role as protector and become the abuser—reports of which are
coming to light. In these same war-torn societies, local and regional criminal gangs often take advantage of the breakdown in
law enforcement and security. During the reconstruction phase
in many post-conflict societies, women have been marginalized
or excluded entirely from the decision-making process while decision-makers relegate women’s interests to a lower priority. Consequently, women seek a better life elsewhere. Hence, postconflict societies are often both source and destination points for
trafficking in women and girls.
Misunderstanding of Female Victims of Crime Prevailing misconceptions of female victims of sexual crimes lead to an atmosphere
that tolerates sex trafficking. Nina’s example showed how a traf-
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ficking victim might experience re-traumatization through the
judicial process if the people implementing the process lack appropriate sensitization and understanding of the crime and its
effect on the victims. Sexual crimes are subjects people are often
uncomfortable discussing in private, much less in public. Consequently, people remain ignorant of a woman’s victimization, believing that she was ‘‘willing’’ when, in fact, she was a victim.
Numerous case studies show that law enforcement investigators
do not properly question victims but rather treat them as criminals, when they should be pursuing the perpetrators exploiting
the victims. In the very few cases that advance to criminal judicial
proceedings, many court monitoring reports indicate serious
misperceptions about trafficking victims’ involvement in acts of
prostitution. Like Nina’s experience, documented case studies
tell of defense counsel taunting victims who testify, judges asking
degrading questions in trial, and inappropriate character evidence being allowed into the record. This misunderstanding of
victimization may make a woman fearful of reporting sex crimes
and, consequently, less likely to testify, thus allowing traffickers
to continue their criminal activities with little disincentive. Nina
was unusually determined; most victims give up or disassociate
themselves with prosecution efforts from the beginning.
Consequences
Gender exploitation as a consequence of human trafficking hinders governments’ abilities to effectuate adequate protections.
Many trafficking victims are afraid to return to their home countries for fear of being stigmatized as ‘‘unclean,’’ and viewed solely
as prostitutes. Many women also fear retribution and re-trafficking by the traffickers. Many victims are re-trafficked because police are unable or unwilling to protect against it. This
unwillingness may be a result of corruption and complicity in
trafficking, or perhaps a failure to prioritize such protection as
important. Where there is an unwillingness to protect, options
for victims to return home are compromised.
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Reintegration is also complicated by misunderstandings of the
needs of female victims of crime in general, and of sexual crimes
in particular. Like any victim of a serious and traumatic crime,
trafficking victims need rehabilitation, understanding, and the
ability to reinsert themselves into a society where they can develop strength and independence. Female victims of sexual trafficking may also suffer serious and debilitating illnesses,
including HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted illnesses.
Many suffer in silence and in the shadows, afraid of telling anyone their story for fear of accusations that they are worthless and
unclean. The continued social misperceptions about women and
girls who are sexually exploited sometimes prevent them from
seeking medical and psychological assistance.

The U.S. Response
The U.S. response to human trafficking is multifaceted. As the
TVPA institutionalizes the mechanisms necessary to comprehensively address human trafficking, each federal agency charged
with implementation is developing a wide-ranging plan to combat trafficking in its area. The section below offers details of just
some of these responses.
Overview
The TVPA was adopted into federal law to fight sexual and labor
exploitation both domestically and internationally. Combating
human trafficking is a priority for the U.S. government both at
home and abroad. According to the U.S. government’s Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR), women and girls were the predominate victims of human trafficking into the United States who received a
form of assistance from the federal government. According to
HHS’s fiscal year 2002 (FY02) annual report, 79.8 percent of trafficking victims who received ORR certification/eligibility letters
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were female. In HHS’s assessment, this figure highlights the fact
that women and girls tend to be the most vulnerable to these
crimes. The circumstances these victims endured included aspects of sexual exploitation, involuntary domestic servitude,
forced migrant agricultural labor, and sweatshop labor. The U.S.
government is working toward eradication of gender exploitation and gender discrimination in many ways, and its focus on
combating human trafficking is one part of that effort.
The U.S. government frames its response to trafficking within
three key areas: protection, prosecution, and prevention. The
following discussion provides a snapshot of some of the U.S. government’s efforts, each of which falls under one or more of those
key areas.
Coordinated Federal Response
The TVPA created mechanisms to assist and protect victims both
at home and abroad, and to ensure that the U.S. government
focuses on foreign governments’ responses. The TVPA mandates
the creation of an interagency task force chaired by the Secretary
of State. This high-level commitment is coupled with workinglevel implementation through a senior policy advisory group,
which coordinates policy and programs. The Departments of
Labor (DOL) and Justice’s (DOJ) Trafficking in Persons and
Worker Exploitation Task Force coordinates the investigation
and prosecution of domestic trafficking cases. It also supports a
toll-free complaint line for trafficking victims and has produced
brochures for law enforcement agents to give to victims. The Department of State (DOS), along with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), coordinates and monitors
significant assistance programs the U.S. is sponsoring worldwide
to address the prosecution of offenders, to offer protection to
victims, and to prevent victimization.
A federal regulation implementing section 107(c) of the TVPA
went into effect on August 23, 2001. It establishes overall implementation procedures and assigns responsibilities for the Depart-
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ments of State and Justice to identify and protect victims of severe
forms of trafficking in persons. Specifically it addresses: the identification and protection of victims of severe forms of trafficking
in persons; access to information and translation services for
these victims; legal mechanisms for allowing victims of severe
forms of trafficking in persons who are potential witnesses continued presence in the United States, as well as the right to work;
and development of appropriate training by the DOS and the
DOJ.
The U.S. government seeks to help trafficking victims heal
from the trauma they have experienced. Section 107(b)(2) of
the TVPA authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to
states, Indian tribes, units of local government, and nonprofit,
nongovernmental victims’ service organizations to develop, expand, or strengthen service programs for victims of trafficking
through the Office for Victims of Crime in the Department of
Justice. The HHS ORR is responsible for certifying victims and
ensuring they receive their benefits. Trafficking victims who are
certified as such receive benefits to the same extent as refugees.2
The ORR also provides grant support to organizations assisting
certified and/or eligible victims of severe forms of trafficking,
and provides local and community outreach. In addition, the Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, provides grant funding through a cooperative agreement with the
International Labor Organization’s Program on the Elimination
of Child Labor; these programs include awareness-raising campaigns, capacity building of governmental and nongovernmental
partners, provision of rehabilitation services to child victims, and
school or vocational training.
The State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons
The TVPA created the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
in Persons in the U.S. Department of State. The office is responsible for collecting information about all countries in the world
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with significant trafficking problems and for drafting the annual
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), which analyzes the
efficacy of governments’ response to their trafficking problems.
The TVPA ensures that elimination of human trafficking is,
and will remain, a global priority by mandating sanctions, unless
they are waived, beginning in 2003, including the termination of
nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance,3 against
certain countries based on the State Department’s TIP Report.
The sanctions will be applicable to those countries of origin, transit, or destination for a significant number of victims of severe
forms of trafficking whose governments do not fully comply with
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and are
not making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.4
Protection
The drafters of the TVPA understood that once an individual
falls into trafficking, she is at the mercy of ruthless traffickers.
When the victim is rescued and cooperates with law enforcement, she knows that she may never be able to return safely to
her previous life in her hometown or even country. The drafters
of the TVPA understood the dangers posed by traffickers back at
home both to the victims and their families, and provided victims
with protective options.
In addition to the many immigration benefits generally available to qualifying individuals, victims of severe forms of trafficking, in particular, may be entitled to specific tools to prevent
further victimization, including two new types of immigration
statuses. Availability of relief will be determined by the individual
circumstances surrounding the victimization and the specific eligibility requirements of the type of relief sought. While other
immigration relief exists for qualifying aliens in the United
States, the following options relate specifically to victims of severe
forms of trafficking in persons.
• Continued Presence. In order to effectuate the prosecution of traffickers, eligible victims who lack legal immigration status, but
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who are potential trafficking witnesses, may receive temporary
immigration relief under the continued presence provisions of
section 107(c) of the TVPA. Only a federal law enforcement
agency may petition the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for continued presence. INS has the discretion to
utilize one of several statutory and administrative mechanisms
to authorize the continued presence of victims of severe forms
of trafficking. Some of the mechanisms available to the INS for
this purpose include parole, stay of removal, and deferred action.
• T Status. T status may be available to victims of severe forms of
trafficking who have complied with any reasonable requests for
assistance in the federal investigation or prosecution of acts of
trafficking, and are physically present in the U.S. or a U.S. territory on account of such trafficking, and would suffer extreme
hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal.
While the TVPA requires an ongoing investigation for adult victims to qualify for a T status, minors under the age of fifteen
are not required to comply with requests for investigative assistance in order to be eligible for a T status.
• U Status. U status will be available to aliens who have suffered
substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of victimization
of certain crimes designated by the Violence Against Women Act of
2000 (VAWA)—including trafficking—that violate federal, state,
or local laws or have occurred while in the United States (including in Indian country and military installations) or its territories or possessions. The conditions required for eligibility are
defined in relevant law.

Recipients of both the T and U statuses are eligible for employment authorization and may be eligible after three years to adjust
their status to that of lawful permanent resident in accordance
with federal law and INS regulations, and perhaps eventually may
be eligible for citizenship. In appropriate circumstances, these
statuses may be available to family members of the victim. By statute, 5,000 T statuses and 10,000 U statuses may be issued to victims annually. These limits do not apply to family members.

AMBASSADOR NANCY ELY-RAPHEL

255

Prosecution
Federal criminal offenses that are established by the TVPA and
that may apply to trafficking in persons are related to slavery and
peonage, sex and labor trafficking in children and adults, and
the unlawful confiscation of a victim’s documents.5 In addition,
there are many federal criminal statutes that may be applicable
in trafficking cases. In brief, these include the crimes of: (1)
forced labor; (2) visa and document fraud; (3) kidnapping; (4)
transportation for prostitution or any criminal sexual activity
(Mann Act); (5) importation of aliens for unlawful activities, including prostitution; (6) organized crime and racketeering,
fraud and false statements, money laundering, and human smuggling.
Traffickers convicted of certain federal offenses under the
TVPA and other statutes may receive prison sentences of up to
twenty years for some offenses and up to life for others, they may
be required to pay substantial fines, and must provide restitution
to victims. They may also be subject to forfeiture of their property
used in the commission of the crimes or obtained with proceeds
from the criminal enterprise.
Prevention
The U.S. government seeks means to prevent trafficking before
it happens, in addition to protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers. The U.S. has focused global programming on remedying
the inequities of women’s unequal access to education and decision-making, their greater subjection to poverty, and on assisting
women in gaining access to essential social services, including
health care and legal advocacy. U.S. foreign assistance programs
address the gender discrimination and exploitation aspect of
human trafficking via programs targeted at women’s empowerment, ensuring they have the tools to be decision-makers in their
societies and homes. Respect for women’s rights is a non-negotiable demand of human dignity. Ensuring the basic human rights
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of women, and those of their families, strengthens democracy
and is at the core of building a civil, law-abiding society.
Effective prevention strategies require cooperative efforts. This
cooperation must occur bilaterally and multilaterally among various governments, but also between governments and civil society,
including NGOs. Efforts must involve governmental coordination on national counter-trafficking strategies, as well as coordination at a local level. Destination countries must work with
transit and source countries to stem the flow of trafficking.
Source countries must work not only to prevent trafficking, but
also to help with the reintegration of trafficking victims back into
their home societies. The United States’s international engagement, especially in the area of prevention, is focused on bolstering international political will to combat the issue, increasing a
dialogue among countries, and strengthening nations’ efforts to
fight trafficking.
The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development support international programs assisting governments, as well as nongovernmental and international organizations, worldwide on projects to deter trafficking and to assist its
victims. One avenue has been to build on existing resources such
as women’s shelters and legal advocacy programs for women.
The U.S. also supports new initiatives, such as victim-centered
anti-trafficking legal reform, job skills programs for at-risk populations, police and judicial sensitization training, police training
manuals that include techniques to investigate trafficking, and
migration information centers. Improving education, economic
opportunities, and the position of women and girls in society are
vital prevention efforts. Campaigns targeted to the at-risk are important, but must accompany efforts on the root causes and conditions that make victims vulnerable and the business lucrative
for traffickers.
Conclusion
The phenomena of trafficking and exploitation may not be new,
but the figures have grown and the faces have changed. The gen-
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der discrimination and exploitation aspects of trafficking highlight the destructive effects this evil has on affected societies. The
U.S. government’s approach recognizes that no one country can
solve the trafficking problem alone. Governments can eliminate
this transnational crime only by looking globally and understanding its complexities, including the aggravating role of gender exploitation. This pervasive criminality must be rooted out, but the
task requires serious examination of social, educational, and economic factors making women and girls particularly vulnerable to
traffickers. The global community cannot tolerate this violation
of respect for women, human values, and humanitarian beliefs.
Elimination of gender discrimination and trafficking are essential complementary goals for the twenty-first century.

Part 5
Some fault lines that can result in severely weakening or destroying
the foundations of society are the result of intemperate reactions to
new challenges. In the United States, the terrorist attacks of September 11 posed a very real threat to our way of life. But sometimes, as in medicine, one must make certain the cure is not worse
than the disease. In this part, four chapters carefully consider some
of the dangers in fashioning a secure society that continue to preserve the very reasons our country was founded.
Professor John D. Feerick, a distinguished constitutional lawyer,
takes us back to the earliest days of our nation and demonstrates
how our Founding Fathers carefully balanced the needs for security
and for personal freedom. Michel Veuthey, an international humanitarian law professor, argues forcefully in his chapter that abandoning the rules established in the Geneva Conventions because of a
new war on terrorism would be a tragic step backwards for the
world community.
Edward Mortimer, the UN Secretary General’s Director of Communications, reflects on a fault line in journalism, the difficulty in
fully understanding the complexities of an alien culture. Such a failure can result in biased or even prejudiced analyses and reporting.
Finally, I include another chapter on migration to complement the
one in the Foundations section of this book. The rapidly growing
number of migrants and asylum seekers poses political, economic,
and even cultural challenges that go to the very heart of national
pride and security. Kathleen Newland presents a comprehensive
and insightful analysis of this current global crisis in the traditions
and values of many societies that, until recently, prided themselves
on welcoming and helping those in distress.
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Balancing National Security and
Civil Liberties
Professor John D. Feerick
On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced the worst
terrorist attack in its history. It took the lives of almost 3,000 individuals of many different backgrounds and nationalities. It also
inflicted untold harm on the loved ones of those who lost their
lives, and on millions of others in every state and many nations
of the world.
The response to this act has been swift, strong, and sustained,
both militarily and legislatively. Freedoms heretofore enjoyed by
citizens and noncitizens alike have given way to the imperatives
of national security as seen through the eyes of officials in both
the executive and legislative branches of government. As a result,
substantial concerns have been raised regarding the reach of authority and the curtailment of liberty.
Some of these issues flow out of the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) passed by Congress
on October 26, 2001. The Act changed more than a dozen statutes designed to limit government surveillance of citizens and
noncitizens, and gave broad powers to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Other actions by government have included closed immigration hearings; the arrest and detention of hundreds of individuals from Islamic countries on immigration and criminal charges
and as ‘‘material witnesses’’; the deportation of individuals; the
limitation of access to government information; the denial of ac-
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cess to asylum seekers; the establishment of military tribunals for
the trial of suspected terrorists; the designation of citizens and
noncitizens as enemy combatants and therefore not covered by
the ordinary criminal justice system; and the arrest of hundreds
of citizens from other countries and the jailing of them at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without acknowledging their entitlement to
the protection of any particular law. Lower federal courts have
differed concerning the appropriateness of some of these actions, and debate on the issues presented has increased. The passage of the Homeland Security Act and the establishment of new
programs in the defense department and elsewhere in the
United States have added to the concerns expressed.
The legal framework from which to analyze many of these issues is murky and uncertain. In 1866, Justice Davis of the United
States Supreme Court, writing for the five-member majority in Ex
Parte Milligan, 4 Wallace (U.S.) 2, asked if there were one set of
rules for wartime and another for times of peace, and answered
that there was only one set for all times. Many years later, different sentiments were expressed by another Supreme Court Justice
who supposedly said that, in times of danger, ‘‘constitutional
rights only matter at the margins.’’1
Perhaps the time is ripe for another way of looking at these
issues. In attempting to do so, I do not sift through the current
issues specifically. Instead, I suggest a possible framework in
which the issues might be considered—a framework that draws
the Constitution of the United States more into the debate. Its
language is often drowned out by the rhetoric and passions of
the moment. For purposes of this chapter, my focus is on the
Constitution as seen through the eyes of the writers of The Federalist Papers.
Why The Federalist? For many years, these eighty-five papers
were the principal source upon which to draw to identify the
thinking of the Framers of the Constitution. Frequent references
to them can be found in the early decisions of the United States
Supreme Court,2 and in the great works on the Constitution,
such as those by Story, Kent, and Rawle. Published in l787 and
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1788 over the pseudonym of ‘‘Publius,’’ The Federalist were the
handiwork of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.
Thomas Jefferson described The Federalist as the best commentaries on the principles of government ‘‘ever written.’’3 George
Washington said they ‘‘merit the Notice of Posterity,’’ adding that
the ‘‘principles of freedom and the topics of government’’ will
always be ‘‘interesting to Mankind so long as they shall be connected in Civil Society.’’4
The revered Clinton Rossiter noted in his February 15, 1961,
introduction to an edition of The Federalist: ‘‘[T]he message of
The Federalist reads: no happiness without liberty, no liberty without self-government, no self-government without constitutionalism, no constitutionalism without morality—and none of these
great goods without stability and order.’’5 Abraham Lincoln put
the dilemma underscored by The Federalist this way: ‘‘Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people,
or too weak to maintain its own existence?’’6
Although I draw no specific conclusions from The Federalist as
to the current clashes between national authority and civil liberty, I do suggest that in wrestling with such issues, the views of
The Federalist writers are directly on point. Though expressed a
long time ago, at a fragile time in the history of the United States,
they are far from academic. Indeed, they deserve an informing
and guiding role in any discussions of foundations and fault
lines. They provide an important background for judging the degree of fidelity to the underlying principles of our constitutional
system. In that regard, they make clear that national strength is
an important object of the American Union, but always it must
be expressed with ‘‘inviolable attention to’’ liberty and the republican form of government. The Federalist state over and over again
that power under the Constitution is limited and that each
branch of government must play its constitutional role in order
to assure a free society, with a vigilant citizenry as the ultimate
safeguard. When any of these forces are silent, the potential for
erosion of the nation’s foundations is greatest.
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Before turning to a discussion of The Federalist,7 some background is both instructive and necessary.

History
The Bill of Rights
The Constitution was the culmination of a long struggle by the
American colonists against abuses of power and the deprivation
of their liberties. Their surge toward independence led to continental congresses in 1774 and 1775, the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the American Revolution, and then the Articles
of Confederation. In a few short years after that Revolution, rivalries, jealousies, and excesses of democracy so threatened the fabric of union that a Convention was called to render the Articles
‘‘adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation
of the Union.’’ The danger to unity was substantial, with a possibility, very real, of the states separating into three or four confederacies. In the process, the Articles were scrapped and, in
response to the claim that the Convention of 1787 had exceeded
its authority, Federalist no. 40 stated: ‘‘Let them declare, whether
it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of
America, that the articles of confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the
Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be
omitted, and the articles of confederation preserved.’’
The Constitution, in its original formulation, was rather quiet
on the subject of individual rights. It contained no bill of rights
for the reason that such a statement could be viewed as suggesting that government had more power than intended. The national government was considered limited, consisting only of
delegated powers. Pointing to the Preamble and its reference to
the blessings of liberty, Federalist no. 84 stated: ‘‘[H]ere is a better
recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms
which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of
rights. . . .’’ However, because a number of the states ratifying the
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conventions demanded that specific limitations in favor of liberty
be placed on the national government in the Constitution itself,
the First Congress proposed the Bill of Rights.
An interesting backdrop to the Bill of Rights was reflected in a
series of letters exchanged in the 1780s between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. In one of these letters, Thomas Jefferson
voiced strong support for a bill that would protect: ‘‘freedom of
religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting
force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of
the fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the laws of
Nations.’’ Madison responded that, ‘‘experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is
most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers
have been committed by over-bearing majorities in every
State. . . .’’ In a follow-up letter, Jefferson expressed his confidence in the ‘‘legal check which [the Constitution] puts into the
hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department, merits great our
confidence for their learning and integrity.’’8
Madison acted on Jefferson’s observation when, in introducing
the Bill of Rights in the First Congress, he stated: ‘‘If they are
incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they
will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of
rights.’’ (Annals of Cong. 1 [ed. Joseph Gales, 1790]: 456–57.)
The liberties referenced in the Bill of Rights, of course, enjoy
a long history. The Magna Carta of 1215 is the source of some of
them, especially the right to trial by jury, which appears in Article
3 and the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution, and
the imperative of due process of law, which appears in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. In its famous chapter 39, the
Magna Carta declared: ‘‘No free man shall be taken or impris-
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oned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except
by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.’’ The
principle of due process of law was proffered by Daniel Webster
as a law that ‘‘hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.’’9
Beyond the Magna Carta, there were other important constitutional milestones in English history. In l628, the English Parliament adopted a Petition of Rights that spoke to the importance
of the liberty of representation, strengthened the writ of habeas
corpus, and condemned the quartering of soldiers in homes, imprisonment without cause shown, and trials of civilians under
martial law in times of peace. Later in the century, the English
Bill of Rights affirmed the importance of the freedoms of religion and press and the independence of the judiciary.
As these developments occurred, the American colonists
staked out their own emphasis on liberty. They sought ‘‘unequivocal statements of the existence and extent of their liberties,’’10
and reacted strongly to their curtailment. In the Stamp Act Congress of l765, they demanded that there be no taxation without
representation and decried the removal of crimes from the ordinary courts to admiralty courts, thereby foregoing the requirement of a jury trial. They also expressed themselves forcibly on
the subject of liberty in the Declaration and Resolves of the First
Continental Congress, the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms of the Second Continental Congress, and,
finally, in the Declaration of Independence, which concluded
with the words, ‘‘we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our
fortunes, and our sacred honour.’’ Among the grievances cited
in the Declaration of Independence, as justifying a complete
break with England, were interference with the legislative process, taxation without representation, weakening of the judiciary,
placing military authority ahead of civil, obstructing the laws of
naturalization of foreigners, and eliminating the right to trial by
jury.
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Tensions Between Security and Liberty
Subsequent to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, moments appeared in American history when the demands of security and
the blessings of liberty have collided with each other. In 1798, a
war crisis with France led to the passage by Congress of four laws
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Three of the four dealt
with aliens, authorizing their deportation and detention and extending the period required for naturalization. The fourth prohibited false and malicious writings against the government.
Although no alien was deported, a number of persons were convicted and imprisoned for violations of the Sedition Act. It was
not long, however, before these laws, considered odious by many,
passed away.
During the Civil War, martial law was put in place in various
parts of the United States and the writ of habeas corpus was suspended by the President. On two different occasions, the Supreme Court took issue with the actions of the Executive. In Ex
Parte Merryman (Fed. Cases no. 9487 (1861), Chief Justice Roger
Taney admonished President Lincoln for suspending the writ of
habeas corpus without the sanction of an act of Congress, and in
Ex Parte Milligan, the Court set aside a conviction by a military
commission of a citizen from a state not in rebellion where the
civil courts had remained open. In finding the commission without jurisdiction, Justice Davis, speaking for the Court, said: ‘‘The
Constitution is a law for . . . all times, and under the circumstances . . . No doctrine . . . was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of the provisions can be suspended during any of
the great exigencies of government.’’
In the twentieth century, in the first of the world wars, the
Supreme Court upheld a statute that criminalized the printing
and distribution of leaflets urging resistance to the draft. Said
Justice Holmes, for a unanimous Court, ‘‘when a nation is at war
many things which might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight. . . . No court could regard them as pro-
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tected by any constitutional right.’’11 Although the Court in this
and another case was not receptive to the claims of civil liberty
violations, it nonetheless spoke to the issues presented. In World
War I, unlike during the Civil War, no trials before military tribunals took place, and the writ of habeas corpus remained available
to individuals accused of violating the Espionage Act.
Less than a quarter-century later, during the Second World
War, these issues returned to the Supreme Court, leading to six
important decisions. In Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942), dealing
with the arrest and prosecution by military commissions of German saboteurs, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the tribunals. In In re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1942), it upheld the power
of a military commission to try a Japanese general for offenses
under the laws of war. Subsequently, actions taken by the government against American citizens of Japanese ancestry, as well as
noncitizens of such descent living in the United States, led to
decisions that remain controversial in the history of our jurisprudence. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US 81 (1943), the Court
upheld a curfew regulation directed against such individuals, and
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 US 214 (1944), it upheld the
constitutionality of their confinement and subjection to military
authority. In doing so, in Korematsu, the Court expressed regret
for the discrimination based on race but noted the difficulty of
separating loyal from disloyal citizens, stating that ‘‘in time of war
residents having ethnic affiliations may be a greater source of
danger than those of a different ancestry.’’
But not every case went in favor of the government during
World War II. In Ex Parte Endo, 323 US 283 (1944), an American
citizen of Japanese nationality was released from confinement because he was able to establish his loyalty to the United States, and
in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304 (1946), the Court found
two German American citizens improperly detained, stating that
a statute passed by Congress did not intend to supplant civil authority in favor of military authority for all purposes in Hawaii.
Most significant is that in each of the six cases, the Supreme
Court reviewed the actions taken and expressed its view of the
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law. Indeed, in Duncan, the government cooperated in facilitating that review. History also records the disquiet some Justices of
the Supreme Court who voted in the majority felt about the outcome in Korematsu.12
And now, in the present, some of the pending cases are likely
to reach the Supreme Court, providing it with an opportunity to
express a twenty-first-century view of the applicable framework of
law to the battle against terrorism.13 The Federalist offers illumination.

The Federalist
In The Federalist, the notion of a strong national government with
‘‘inviolable attention to liberty’’ and the republican form appear
as dominant themes, with the rule of law as an animating force.
Law, said Federalist no. 28, was the only ‘‘admissible principle’’ of
the republican form of government.
No subject was more important to the Framers than that of the
peace and safety of the American people. Federalist no. 3 stated:
‘‘Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their
safety seems to be the first, . . .’’ and Federalist no. 8: ‘‘Safety from
external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct,’’ with even liberty having to give way to its dictates. In Federalist no. 41, Madison declared that, ‘‘security against foreign
danger . . . is an avowed and essential object of the American
Union,’’ and he added that, ‘‘a wise nation does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its
safety. . . . [but it] will exert all its prudence in diminishing both
the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be
inauspicious to its liberties.’’
On the subject of liberties, the authors of The Federalist cautioned that abuses of liberty were a greater danger than those of
abuses of power, pointing to the history of other countries, and
within the colonies themselves. In Federalist no. 1, John Jay spoke
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of: ‘‘a dangerous mask for the zeal for the rights of the people
[being] a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than [power].’’ Madison, in Federalist no. 63, said, ‘‘that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the
abuses of power . . . and that the former rather than the latter is
apparently most to be apprehended by the United States.’’14
Whenever speaking of the powers granted to the national government by the Constitution, The Federalist repeatedly noted their
far-reaching nature. Federalist no. 45 said that the ‘‘operations of
government will be most extensive and important in times of war
and danger’’; Federalist no. 31, that ‘‘a government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of
the objects committed to its care’’; and Federalist no. 59, that
‘‘every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation.’’ In Federalist no. 36, Alexander Hamilton noted his
‘‘aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency
might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.’’ In the conduct of war, Federalist no. 70 said, ‘‘the energy of
the executive is the bulwark of the national security.’’ Federalist
nos. 23 and 34 warned of the dangers involved in tying the hands
of the government, but they emphasized that government must
be ‘‘modeled in such a manner, as to admit of being safely visited
with the requisite powers’’ (no. 41).
The Federalist acknowledged the necessary, occasionally awkward, balance between power and liberty, and envisioned a system of government that accommodated the two. In the words
of Federalist no. 48: ‘‘It will not be denied, that power is of an
encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectively restrained
from passing the limits assigned to it.’’ ‘‘Mere demarkation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments,’’ said Madison, ‘‘is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands’’ (no. 48). Hamilton said in Federalist no. 33: ‘‘If the Federal Government should
overpass the just bounds of its authority, and make a tyrannical
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use of its powers, the people whose creature it is must appeal to
the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may
suggest and prudence justify.’’ As for the people, Federalist no. 84
declared: ‘‘the citizens who inhabit the country . . . will in all
questions that affect the general liberty . . . stand ready to sound
the alarm when necessary. . . .’’
The Federalist viewed the design of the government as reflected
in the Constitution as the model to provide the appropriate balance between authority and liberty. It placed powers with three
separate branches of government, powers adequate to accomplish the purposes of each as well as to protect against the ‘‘encroachments’’ Madison and others feared. ‘‘[U]nless these
departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each
a constitutional control over the others,’’ said Madison in Federalist no. 48, the separation ‘‘essential to a free government, can
never in practice be duly maintained.’’ In Federalist no. 51, Madison gave classic expression to the idea of checks and balances
when he said, ‘‘ambition must be able to counteract ambition.
. . . It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. . . .
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. . . . A
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on
the government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.’’
Under the Constitution, all branches were to bear the imprimatur of the people (the House of Representatives by direct election, the Senate [originally] by appointment by the state
legislatures, the President by selection by electors chosen in a
manner directed by the state legislatures, and the Judiciary by
the nomination of the President and confirmation by the Senate). Each branch of Congress would be a check on the other,
with the House reflecting the passions and feelings of the people
and the Senate bringing detachment and a broader outlook. The
war powers were shared by Congress and the President. As to
the Judiciary, The Federalist spoke of the ‘‘majesty of the national
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authority’’ being manifested through courts of justice (no. 16),
described as the ‘‘bulwarks of a limited constitution’’ (no. 78). In
the final analysis, however, the people would control the destiny
of the country, and had it within their power to do so through
elections and other expressions of their opinions and views.
What, therefore, might be drawn from this snapshot of the
Constitution from the vantage point of The Federalist as it bears
on the subjects of foundations and fault lines? I suggest the following:
First, a combination of strength, liberty, and republicanism was
to be the centerpiece of American society. Its strength was expressed by the power and energy given to the national government, power intended to be at its height in times of national
danger involving a serious threat to the safety of the people. Each
branch of government at the same time was given the responsibility to check the others when necessary in order to assure fidelity
to the purposes and objects of the nation. The country’s republican form of government, and most important liberty, was considered crucial, grounded as it was on individuals who were chosen
by the people, directly or indirectly, to exercise the powers of
government. Said Federalist no. 28: ‘‘The whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of
the people. This is the essential, and, after all, the only efficacious
security for the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in a civil society.’’
The system designed by the Framers was premised on a close
relationship between the governed and those who govern. The
need for government to hear from people and for people to express themselves was assured and is paramount in times of serious
conflict between the interests of public order and individual liberty. When governmental actions designed to promote public
order collide with individual liberties, it is for the judiciary to step
in and define whether constitutional limits have been surpassed.
Although past history suggests that courts are reluctant to speak
in times of war, the battle against terrorism may well become a
permanent state of life, requiring a more active involvement by
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American courts in dealing with these issues as a way of assuring
an appropriate balance between order and liberty.15
To put it in different terms, I would note that safety itself is an
important prerequisite for liberty. Without safety, the enjoyment
of liberty is not possible, and without liberty, the happiness of
people is not attainable. Both safety and liberty are values of the
highest importance in the foundations of the United States.
Safety alone, however, is not sufficient. It would be an irony of
history if, after the colonists fought a revolution to secure liberty,
important liberties were lost as the nation took upon itself the
long-term challenge of meeting terrorism on a global basis. In
facing this challenge, the words of Madison in Federalist no. 41
offer a useful signpost and bear repeating: ‘‘a wise nation does
not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become
essential to its safety . . . [but it] will exert all its prudence in
diminishing both the necessity and the danger of taking actions
which may curb liberty.’’ There is in these words an allowance
for the derogation of liberty depending on the exigencies of the
situation, but limited by a rule of necessity and principles of proportionality. Some liberties, of course, do not allow for derogation such as when the Constitution speaks directly to where
power lies, as, for instance, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Other liberties, such as the right of a free press, are key to the
proper functioning of a republican government and restraint on
such a press should have to meet a high burden of justification.
The right to counsel, the oldest of the common law privileges,
also has been an important ingredient in the success of the American democracy, not only in terms of individual rights but also in
enabling issues of constitutional limits to be presented to American courts.
Beyond the question of constitutional limits is the question of
what policies by government, even if constitutional, should be
adopted as they impinge on important liberties enjoyed by citizens and noncitizens within the United States and its territorial
jurisdiction. It is self-evident, I suggest and as The Federalist indicate, that the greater the danger to the safety of people, the
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greater the curtailment of liberty that should be permitted, and
conversely, as the danger subsides, the lost liberties need to be
restored. The Federalist make clear that it would be mischievous
and wrong to disable government from anticipating and preparing for serious threats from abroad in ways, for example, that
may need to be protected by considerations of secrecy in the interests of national security. Thus, in Federalist no. 34, Hamilton
noted that in government ‘‘there ought to a capacity to provide
for future contingencies,’’ and suggested that it would be ‘‘the
extreme of folly . . . to leave the government entrusted with the
care of the national defense, in a state of absolute incapacity to
provide for the protection of the community, against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions.’’
The appropriate line between authority and liberty in most instances can only be defined, it seems to me, from an engagement
of all parts of our system operating through its republican form.
The line is incapable of being drawn appropriately without such
engagement. A serious threat to the foundations of American
society—its fault line, so to speak—is when there is a failure of
such engagement either because one branch of government
dominates another or is silent when it should be active or because the people fail to voice their views to their elected representatives or are unable to do so because of limited access to
information from the press and other sources so essential to the
functioning of a free society.
The approach that I take from my scrutiny of The Federalist is
not unlike that found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. It allows states to derogate temporarily from obligations under the Covenant, but only in circumstances exceptional and temporary in nature, and only by means proportionate
to the exigencies of the situation, with the objective of restoring
as soon as possible the lost liberty. Under the Covenant, of
course, some liberties may not be derogated from in the interests
of security.
Foreign opinion also has a role to play under the Constitution.
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The importance, in the eyes of other nations, of our actions is a
theme that runs throughout The Federalist. Indeed, our relationships with other nations influenced the Framers, for example, to
remove from the states a constitutional role in dealing with foreign nations lest the lack of respect for international undertakings repeat itself as had occurred when some of the thirteen
original states violated the 1783 Treaty of Paris between Great
Britain and the United States. The relevance of foreign opinion
was captured in Federalist no. 63: ‘‘An attention to the judgment
of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: The one is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable on various accounts that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and
honorable policy: The second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion
of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed.’’ And, as Federalist no. 63 observed, errors could have been
avoided by the states in the 1780s if account had been taken of
the ‘‘[J]ustice and propriety of [measures] by the light in which
they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind.’’
I conclude by calling attention to the Preamble of the United
States Constitution, and the objects of the American Union:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, Do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Of justice, Madison said in his famous Federalist Paper no. 51,
that ‘‘it is the end of government [and] the end of civil society.’’
In recommending the adoption of the Constitution, he and his
colleagues stated: ‘‘Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honorable for Human Nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough,
to set so glorious an example to Mankind’’ (no. 37). This example is very much on the line in how the United States balances
security and liberty in its war against terrorism.
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Disregarding the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection
of War Victims
Michel Veuthey1
The laws of war, that restrain the exercise of national
rapine and murder, are founded on two principles of
substantial interest: the knowledge of the permanent
benefits which may be obtained by a moderate use of
conquest, and a just apprehension lest the desolation
we inflict on the enemy’s country may be retaliated on
our own.
Edward Gibbon2
We become the healers, not the killers of our species.
Robert Lifton and Eric Markusen3
Seek to understand the conditions, as far as possible
without national prejudice, which led to past tragedies
and should strive to determine the great fundamentals
which must govern a peaceful progression toward a
constantly higher level of civilization.
General George C. Marshall4
Since Auschwitz we know what man is capable of.
And since Hiroshima we know what is at stake.
Viktor E. Frankl5
The object of war being the destruction of the enemy
State, one has the right to kill its defenders only when

MICHEL VEUTHEY

277

they have weapons in their hands; but immediately as
they put them down and surrender, thus ceasing to be
enemies or agents of the enemy, they at once become
ordinary men and one no longer has any right to their
life.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau6

The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, on the protection
of war victims are an impressive body of positive law in force,
perhaps the most extensive and universal set of rules of international law, still not fully respected and implemented. The Geneva
Conventions certainly have limitations, the most important being
their possible application to weapons of mass destruction. The
Geneva Conventions are not only positive law. They are the result
of history, political experience and wisdom, military honor and
interest, and universal ethical standards. The Geneva Conventions are today the core of international humanitarian law, or
laws of war, which strikes a balance between military necessity
and requirements of humanity.
Laws of war are not always rules of a game between gentlemen
of the same club. Even if play and war are no longer synonymous,7 restraints agreed upon in treaties should be respected.
The modern total war began with the Napoleonic Wars, where
entire nations were pitted against each other. Sherman’s march
to the sea,8 air bombings during World War II,9 terror attacks
against civilian populations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Middle East were the precursors of today’s protagonists of
total war. The twentieth century—‘‘the century of megadeath’’10 —invented both the terms genocide11 and international
humanitarian law. Will the twenty-first century consecrate genocide and discard international humanitarian law? Both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been a fertile ground for
instruments of international law protecting human dignity even
in time of war.12 Will the twenty-first century start with lawlessness
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(a-nomia), lack of restraints in the use of force, ignorance of standards and values for the protection of human dignity?13
After 9/11, some voices implied that the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, on the protection of war victims were obsolete,14 that they should they be disregarded in today’s global war
against terror,15 that torturing prisoners16 and attacking civilians
should be necessary in order to conduct a successful war against
terror.17

The ‘‘Law of Geneva’’ in Force
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Convention of August 12, 1949)18
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea (Second Convention of August 12, 1949)19
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Third Convention of August 12, 1949)20
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Convention of August 12, 1949)21
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (First Protocol)22
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Second Protocol)23

The Geneva Conventions are the core instruments of international humanitarian law. International humanitarian law is usually defined as the set of principles and rules restricting the use
of violence in armed conflicts, to spare the persons not (or no
longer) directly engaged in hostilities (wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilians). It also aims at limiting the use of methods and means of
warfare causing superfluous injury (or excessive suffering, as in
the case of ‘‘dumdum bullets,’’ or gas warfare),24 severe damage
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to the natural environment or betrayal of an adversary’s confidence in agreed-upon obligations (‘‘perfidy’’).
In contemporary written law, the principle of the limitation of
armed violence is reflected in the Saint-Petersburg Declaration
of 1868,25 as well as in Article 22 of The Hague Regulations of
1907,26 which stipulates that: ‘‘The right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.’’ This text is taken
up again, slightly reworded, in paragraph 1 of Article 35 (‘‘Basic
Rules’’) of Protocol 1 of 1977: ‘‘In any armed conflict, the right
of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’’
The terminology used to refer to international treaties may
vary (‘‘Humanitarian Law,’’27 ‘‘International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts,’’28 ‘‘Laws of War,’’29 ‘‘Law of Geneva,’’30 ‘‘Red Cross Conventions,’’31 ‘‘Law of The Hague,’’32
‘‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’’33), but all seek the same
objective—namely, to limit the use of violence in war.
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions is an important issue,
larger than its purely legal dimension, which we shall examine
along the following lines:
Is it legally admissible?
Is it politically advisable?
Is it militarily advantageous?
Is it ethically acceptable?

Is Disregarding the Geneva Conventions Legally
Admissible?
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two 1977 Additional Protocols are the main instruments in force of international humanitarian law. Their provisions embody the major
development and reaffirmation of the legal restraints to violence
in war of the twentieth century. Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would cause a great loss for a body of international law
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that has reached an exceptional level of universal respectability.
The Geneva Conventions are universally ratified.34
Loss of Humanity
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a legal
point of view, the weakening or even the disappearance of a landmark of humanity35 in international humanitarian law, fruit of
the international community’s efforts of the last two centuries36 —if not longer,37 if we consider early efforts to extend the
benefit of international law to all human beings, regardless of
their race, religion, civilization, or nation.
The Geneva Conventions have a long history in all civilizations.38
Francisco de Vitoria (1480–1546), a member of the Dominican
Order, is often mentioned as one of the founders of Western
international law. He believed in jus gentium, a ‘‘law of nations’’—
considered universally valid—established on the basis of natural
law. Living at the time of the conquest of the Americas, Vitoria
developed his teaching partly in the context of the discussions of
his contemporaries on the appropriate treatment of the native
peoples of the Americas.39
Supported by Vitoria, Bartholomew de Las Casas (1474–1566)
devoted himself to the defense of the indigenous peoples of the
Americas against the ruthless exploitation and ferocious cruelty
that they suffered from the Spanish conquerors.40
The four Geneva Conventions expanded from the original ten
articles of the First Geneva Conventions in 1864—protecting
only military personnel wounded in the field in land warfare—to
nearly six hundred provisions protecting members of the armed
forces as well as the entire civilian populations of countries at
war.
Every step of the codification of international humanitarian
law was marked by a pattern involving the following steps:
• Witnessing the needs for additional protection in the field, as
did Henry Dunant on the battlefield of Solferino,41 the Interna-
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tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other organizations of medical doctors amputating limbs of antipersonnel
landmine victims in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and so
many other places
Consulting private military, political, and legal experts on a personal capacity42
Convening experts from the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies43
Convening a conference of government experts44
Proposing draft instruments—based on the previous consultations—to a diplomatic conference convened by the Swiss government, as the state depositary of the Geneva Conventions45
Campaigning for the ratification46 and the adoption of national
legislation for the implementation of the Geneva Conventions47
Negotiating with belligerents on the applicability and implementation of the new instruments48

Contemporary international humanitarian law is the moving
balance between two dynamic forces: the requirements of humanity
and military necessity.49 It is also a sum of tragic real-life experiences that need not be repeated: wounded and shipwrecked
members of the armed forces—and the humanitarian personnel
caring for them—must be rescued and respected; prisoners of
war must be humanely treated and released at the end of active
hostilities; and civilians should not be killed nor harmed.
Each stage of the codification of international humanitarian
law was the result of a post-war shock wave among public opinion
and governments, a collective painful learning process.
These humanitarian codifications occurred as follows:
• The Battle of Solferino (1859),50 between Austrian and French
armies in Lombardy, was the impetus for the First Convention,
in 1864, protecting military wounded on land51
• The Naval Battle of Tsushima (1905),52 between Japanese and
Russian fleets, prompted the adjustment of the Convention on
war at sea, in 1907,53 extending protection to military shipwrecked54
• World War I brought about the two 1929 Conventions,55 including a much broader protection for prisoners of war
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• World War II led to the four 1949 Conventions,56 an extensive
regulation on the treatment of civilians in occupied territories
and internment
• The Vietnam War and struggles for decolonization in Africa
preceded the two 1977 Additional Protocols,57 which brought
written rules for the protection of civilian persons and objects
against hostilities58
• A worldwide campaign promoted by governments, United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,59
and a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),60
that stressed the human suffering and socio-economic costs
caused by antipersonnel mines resulted on the total ban in antipersonnel landmines signed in Ottawa on December 4, 1997

Humanitarian law has evolved from rules protecting only certain categories of privileged individuals (from medieval knights
to today’s prisoners of war), to a set of provisions ensuring fundamental human rights guaranteeing the survival of civilian populations in wartime. This evolution was not only brought by the
codification of new instruments and ad hoc negotiation, but also
by the practice of states as well as by the decisions of International Tribunals.61
Among other significant developments, the International Tribunals on the former Yugoslavia62 and on Rwanda63 broke down
the distinction between international and non-international
armed conflicts regarding the prosecution of war crimes.64
Loss of Humanitarian Standards
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would also entail the disappearance of the universality of humanitarian standards, ratified by practically all countries, that have acquired customary
character, and whose fundamental provisions have even been
recognized as nonderogable (jus cogens).65
The 1907 Hague Regulations, which establish laws for conducting war on land, are considered a part of international customary
law since the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg de-
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clared, on October 1, 1946, that these Regulations were declaratory of the laws and customs of war.66
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are universally ratified.
The two Additional Protocols are widely ratified, but still lack
ratification by the U.S.A. and some other countries. Most of their
provisions have customary character.67
As Dietrich Schindler wrote in 1999:68
The International Criminal Tribunal, in its Tadic decision, came
to the conclusion that many principles originally applicable in international armed conflicts had only in the course of time become
customary rules applicable also in non-international conflicts; it
enumerated a considerable number of such customary rules.69
This finding constitutes one of the most important results of the
post-cold war developments. It shows that non-international
armed conflicts are regulated to a much greater extent by legal
rules than had generally been assumed. The International Court
of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion of 1996 on the legality of the
use of nuclear weapons, also affirmed that a great majority of
treaty rules on international humanitarian law had become customary. It did not, however, specifically refer to rules on internal
armed conflicts.70

Antonio Cassese,71 Christopher Greenwood,72 and Theodor
Meron73 confirm the customary character of most provisions of
the Geneva Conventions.
In particular, the customary nature of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions has been affirmed by the International
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case74 and, more recently, by the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic case.75 In its decision, the Appeals
Chamber also held that many of the provisions of Protocol 2 can
be regarded as customary law.76
As for jus cogens, according to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, ‘‘[a] treaty is void if, at the
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
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norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent of general international law having the same character.’’
In its Article 60, paragraph 5, the same Convention on the Law
of Treaties exempted international humanitarian law from the
rule of reciprocity.77
The International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua case, considered Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as ‘‘elementary
considerations of humanity’’ binding all parties to conflicts:
The Court considers that the rules stated in Article 3, which is
common to the four Geneva Conventions, applying to armed conflicts of a non-international character, should be applied. The
United States is under an obligation to ‘‘respect’’ the Conventions
and even to ‘‘ensure respect’’ for them, and thus not to encourage
persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in
violation of the provisions of Article 3. This obligation derives
from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.78

Loss of Responsibility
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would be ignoring the collective responsibility of all states that consists in ensuring the respect for these instruments. According to Common Article 1 to
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and to Article 1 of Additional
Protocol 1, all states parties to these instruments have the obligation ‘‘to respect and ensure respect’’ for them ‘‘in all circumstances.’’ This wording has been widely understood as implying a
double responsibility for every state party: for its own duties as
well as a collective responsibility for the behavior of other states
parties.79
The International Court of Justice holds that Common Article
1 to the 1949 Conventions had turned into customary law.80
Humanitarian rules and principles are to be respected in all
circumstances. This is especially important today, in the case of
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‘‘collapsed states,’’81 ‘‘postmodern wars,’’82 and anarchic conflicts.83 According to the ICRC’s Commentary to the 1949 Conventions:
The words ‘‘in all circumstances’’ in Common Article 1 of the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions refer to all situations in which the
Convention has to be applied and these are defined in Article 2.
It is clear, therefore, that the application of the Convention does
not depend on whether the conflict is just or unjust. Whether or
not it is a war of aggression, prisoners of war belonging to either
party are entitled to the protection afforded by the Convention.84

This collective responsibility to ensure respect for the Geneva
Conventions in all circumstances could take many forms.85 It
could be a very powerful tool for an effective implementation,
and enforcement, of international humanitarian law. Even if this
provision was only taken over in Protocol 1 in 1977,86 Common
Article 1 of 1949 could imply obligations both for internal87 as
well as international conflicts.88
Loss of Universal Jurisdiction
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean abandoning
the principle of universal jurisdiction for all states parties in
terms of the prosecution of grave breaches of the Conventions
and blurring the standards of the definition of war crimes.89
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions contain provisions defining ‘‘grave breaches’’ (which Additional Protocol 1 expanded
and equated with war crimes) and asking the High Contracting
Parties: ‘‘to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches’’;90 ‘‘to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality, before its own court. It may also, if it prefers,
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
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concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out
a prima facie case.’’91
Loss of Special Agreements
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would also entail losing a
valuable tool for special agreements in non-international conflicts and with non-state actors.
Special agreements were concluded through ICRC delegates
in the Spanish Civil War (for the application by both the Madrid
Government and the Burgos Junta of the two 1929 Geneva Conventions),92 in Palestine in 1948,93 in the Yemen Civil War in
1963,94 as well as in the Civil War in Nigeria95 in 1969. Both sides
accepted to abide by the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union on one side and the Afghan mujahideens on the other side both signed the same agreement with
the ICRC in order to ease the plight of prisoners: the Soviets let
the ICRC visit prisoners in the Puli-Charki jail in Kabul and the
mujahideens handed over their Soviet prisoners to the ICRC for
a two-year internment in Switzerland before being repatriated to
Mother Russia. In the former Yugoslavia, numerous special
agreements were concluded in Geneva and elsewhere under the
auspices of the ICRC.96 The status of the conflicts—whether international or non-international—was left unclear on purpose so
as not to jeopardize ICRC’s activities in the field. In Somalia,
ICRC was allowed to visit a U.S. prisoner of war (POW) in the
hands of General Aidid, thanks to such a special agreement.97
In addition to the general applicability of the Geneva Conventions to a conflict and to the improvement of the treatment of
prisoners on both sides, the establishment of protected areas was
achieved by ICRC thanks to special agreements in Jerusalem in
1948, in Dacca/Dhakka in 1971, in Nicosia in 1974, in Jaffna in
1990, and in Dubrovnik and Osjek in 1991. The rejection by the
UN Security Council of such a procedure for Srebenica—and the
creation of the so-called ‘‘safe areas’’ instead—paved the way for
the massacre of thousands of civilians.98
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Loss of Antiterrorism Rules
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean giving up a
set of rules clearly prohibiting acts of terrorism99 in times of
armed conflict, such as attacks against civilian persons and objects, hostage taking, torture and ill-treatment, as well as collective punishments.
Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Fourth Geneva Convention
reads as follows: ‘‘No protected person may be punished for an
offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are
prohibited.’’
Article 51, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol 1 also specifically prohibits acts of terrorism: ‘‘The civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.’’
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions is certainly not legally
admissible. But:
Could the existing rules and implementation mechanisms be used
more effectively?
Could the limits of the existing rules and mechanisms be identified
more clearly, both in regard to the use of mass destruction weapons and to low-intensity conflicts?

Existing rules and mechanisms could certainly be used more
effectively on the domestic and international level. National implementation regulations as well as the criminal prosecution of
violations by domestic courts could be improved. The role of regional organizations (African Unity, Arab League, Council of Europe, OSCE, Organization of American States) in ensuring
respect for international humanitarian law ‘‘in all circumstances’’ could be enhanced.
The role of the UN, mentioned in Article 89 (‘‘Cooperation’’)
of Additional Protocol 1, could be clarified. This Article reads as
follows: ‘‘In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or
of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act,
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jointly or individually, in cooperation with the United Nations
and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.’’
The use of weapons of mass destruction is not explicitly regulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions or in the 1977 Additional
Protocols.
Less than a month after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ICRC
launched an appeal to all Red Cross and Red Crescent National
Societies on September 5, 1945 (‘‘The end of hostilities and the
future task of the Red Cross’’) expressing its ‘‘anxiety for the
future of the Red Cross work in face of the development of war
techniques.’’100 In an Appeal to the States Parties to the Geneva
Conventions of April 5, 1950 (‘‘Atomic Weapons and Non-Directed Missiles’’), the ICRC stressed the incompatibility between
the recently adopted 1949 Geneva Conventions and the use of
the nuclear bomb. The ICRC then requested governments to
make every possible effort in order to reach an agreement prohibiting this weapon and ‘‘non-directed weapons’’ in general, as
a natural complement to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
1925 Geneva Protocol. The ICRC motivated this appeal by stressing the contradiction between weapons of mass destruction and
the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law,
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and
the prohibition of unnecessary suffering:
The use of this arm is less a development of the methods of warfare than the institution of an entirely new conception of war, first
exemplified by mass bombardments and later by the employment
of rocket bombs. However condemned—and rightly so—by successive treaties, war still presupposed certain restrictive rules,
above all did it presuppose discrimination between combatants
and non-combatants. With atomic bombs and non-directed missiles, discrimination becomes impossible. Such arms will not spare
hospitals, prisoners of war camps, and civilians. Their inevitable
consequence is extermination, pure and simple. Furthermore, the
suffering caused by the atomic bomb is out of proportion to strategic necessity; many of its victims die as a result of burns after weeks
of agony, or are stricken for life with painful infirmities. Finally,
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its effects, immediate and lasting, prevent access to the wounded
and their treatment.

In 1957, the ICRC presented ‘‘Draft Rules for the Limitation
of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of
War.’’ Article 14 (‘‘Weapons with Uncontrollable Effects’’) prohibited the use of weapons ‘‘whose harmful effects—resulting in
particular from the dissemination of incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive, or other agents—could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the
control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian
population.’’ The Draft Rules were not adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross at New Delhi in 1957. Western powers were against any regulation of the use of weapons of
mass destruction within the framework of international humanitarian law, while the Soviet Union wanted a complete prohibition
of nuclear weapons, not only a restriction of their use.
In 1965, the Twentieth International Conference of the Red
Cross, in Vienna, in its Resolution No. 28, solemnly declared that:
All governments and other authorities responsible for action in
armed conflicts should conform at least to the following principles:
—That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited
—That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian
population as such
—That distinction must be made at all times between persons
taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible
—That the general principles of the Law of War apply to nuclear and similar weapons

On May 19, 1967, the ICRC sent a Memorandum (‘‘Protection
of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate
Warfare’’) to the Governments Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 concern-
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ing the laws and customs of war on land reminding them of the
Vienna Resolution and requesting governments to sanction these
principles and ‘‘if need be, to develop them in an adequate instrument of international law.’’ The ICRC also asked governments to reaffirm these principles in a resolution of the United
Nations General Assembly and to include them in the instructions given to the armed forces.101
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444
(XXIII) (‘‘Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’’) reaffirmed the first three principles and left out the fourth principle.102
Before the ICRC could start the process of ‘‘Reaffirmation and
Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed
Conflicts’’ after the adoption of Resolution XX of the Twentyfirst International Conference of the Red Cross, in Istanbul in
1969, it had to agree with the nuclear powers that its endeavor
would only deal with conventional warfare, excluding from its
scope weapons of mass destruction as well as chemical and bacteriological warfare.
As a result, the Additional Protocols of 1977 never make any
specific mention of these arms.
The International Court of Justice dealt with the conformity
of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law in one
Advisory Opinion following two requests.
The first request for an opinion was transmitted to the court
under a World Health Assembly resolution of May 14, 1993, with
the following question: ‘‘In view of the health and environmental
effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or
other armed conflict be a breach of its obligation under international law including the WHO Constitution?’’
The second was requested by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Resolution 49/75 K of December 15, 1994
(‘‘Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’’), pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the
United Nations, on the following question: ‘‘Is the threat or use
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of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?’’
On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to the two inquiries. On one hand, the
court did not find any international rule specifically prohibiting,
in all circumstances, the threat or use of nuclear weapons during
an armed conflict. On the other hand, the court decided unanimously that any use of nuclear weapons would be subject to the
rules and requirements of international humanitarian law.
The issue is certainly not closed. As Judge Géza Herczegh said:
‘‘Given the importance of the Advisory Opinion and of the contrasting views expressed by the members of the court, it would
seem most important that eminent experts in international humanitarian law thoroughly investigate the theoretical questions
that may be raised in this connection.’’103

Is Disregarding the Geneva Conventions
Politically Advisable?
Are the Geneva Conventions to be discarded by the new realists—in a time without mercy—as the remnant of idealists of the
second half of the last century?
Loss of Time
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing at least fifty years of campaigning for
humanitarian standards in armed conflicts.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions, with the UN Charter in 1945
and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, are the
result of the tragic suffering of millions of civilians and prisoners,
victims of total war and genocide in Europe and in Asia. The
survivors pushed for the adoption of international instruments
in order to avoid the repetition of such tragedies. Many governments, international and regional organizations, as well as the
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civil society, especially international humanitarian organizations
and human rights NGOs, strived for decades to guarantee a better respect of these instruments.
Loss of Universality
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing the universality of humanitarian standards, re-establishing different areas and levels of protection of
human dignity in armed conflicts.
The Geneva Conventions, since the First Convention in 1864,
did incorporate in a single body of international law—recently
known as ‘‘international humanitarian law,’’ and also as ‘‘laws of
war,’’ ‘‘laws of armed conflicts,’’ or even ‘‘human rights in armed
conflicts’’—rules and customs originating from all civilizations.
Before this progressive universalization of humanitarian customs,
first limited to ‘‘civilized nations,’’ humanitarian restraints in war
were limited within the same tribe, nation, civilization; wars
against adversaries outside of the group were usually not conducted according to the same restraints. The possible demise of
the universal standards painstakingly attained through the Geneva Conventions could mean the return to various standards
applicable within diverse groups. As the brief Kosovo campaign
demonstrated, strikingly diverging interpretation of humanitarian restraints within a military alliance nearly provoked the
breakdown of a coalition.104
Loss of Dialogue
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing an important common ground for maintaining a minimal dialogue even in the midst of conflicts, as well
as powerful tools for the re-establishment of peace and for the
sustainability of peaceful settlements.
The exchange of names and messages between prisoners and
their families, the passage of relief supplies, more importantly
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the release of prisoners or the repatriation of civilians, keep communication between warring parties open—directly or through
intermediaries such as the ICRC. Such contacts give opportunity
for belligerents to engage in truces, cease-fires, and even peace
negotiations. The fact that prisoners are visited by ICRC delegates, identified, taken care of, their families reassured on their
survival and well-being, and themselves certain of being released
and repatriated contribute to the peaceful settlement and to its
sustainability. On the contrary, attacks against civilians, mistreatment of prisoners, and denial of visits by the ICRC do nothing to
create an atmosphere leading to dialogue. The re-establishment
of normal, trustful relations between Germany and the USSR
after 1945, on one hand, and between the U.S.A. and Vietnam
after 1975, on the other hand, was considerably influenced by
the treatment of POWs during the wars. The first American Ambassador in Hanoi was a former POW, who had to demonstrate
that the noncompliance by the Democratic Republic of Viêt-Nam
of the Third Geneva Convention was past history.
Loss of Restraint
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing restraints in the use of violence that aim
at avoiding degradation between adversaries and among one’s
own population.
Veterans coming back home often experience severe problems
within their families and communities, partly because of lack of
limitations while they were engaged in combat.105
Loss of Movement
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing rules that could effectively prevent the
movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs)106 and of refugees.
Most internally displaced persons and refugees were com-
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pelled to move from their homes by violations of international
humanitarian law. Implementing international humanitarian law
would be the best way to prevent the creation of IDPs and refugees and avoid social and security problems in recipient countries and territories.
Loss of POWs and MIAs
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would entail, from a political point of view, losing procedures allowing the repatriation of
prisoners of war, civilian internees, and internally displaced persons as well as of refugees. Unsolved humanitarian issues become
serious political issues (refugees, missing, disappeared,107
MIAs,108 etc.), necessarily leading to the renegotiation of issues
that could have been solved easily through a faithful implementation of the Geneva Conventions.
The Third Geneva Convention explicitly provides for a clear
and rapid identification of the prisoners, a location of their detention places, a monitoring of their health, and the exchange
of messages between prisoners and their families. According to
Article 118, the release of the prisoners shall happen ‘‘without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.’’ The non-respect of
this rule after the war between Iraq and Iran was unfortunately
facilitated by a UN Security Resolution asking for—in this
order—the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the troops on the border, and only then the release and repatriation of the POWs. As
a result, thousands of POWs on both sides were not repatriated
for many years after the end of hostilities. This leads to severe
consequences on the individual, family, national, and regional
level.
Loss of Private Property
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean losing standards prohibiting the destruction of civilian objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population. The violation of
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those standards generates the need for relief, medical, and food
assistance during the conflict and reconstruction thereafter.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and especially both 1977 Additional Protocols prohibit the destruction of objects indispensable
for the survival of the civilian population.
Loss of Casualty Guidelines
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean losing guidelines that aim at minimizing civilian casualties109 and keeping a
good image for one’s cause, as well as standards of behavior that
avoid alienating the civilian population of occupied territories
and thus lessen the support for resistance movements.110
Loss of International Security
We would also lose a set of standards essential for international
security referred to in many resolutions of the United Nations
(Security Council, General Assembly, Commission on Human
Rights, and other UN organs), of regional organizations, and international human rights NGOs in the last fifty years; and an important aspect of multilateral and international cooperation at a
time when solidarity might be greatly needed on many levels.111
The four Geneva Conventions on the protection of war victims
constitute an important part of international cooperation. They
contribute to international security, facilitate dialogue between
warring parties, aid in the re-establishment of peace and to the
sustainability of peaceful settlements.
The first items to be discussed during negotiations are often
humanitarian issues, such as visits by the ICRC to prisoners of
war, their release,112 or the plight of civilians.
Violations of the Geneva Conventions exacerbate conflicts,
leading to escalations of hostilities and adding obstacles to the
efforts for a peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Violations in one part of the world—if not met by an appropriate reaction by individual states and/or by the international
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community—are too often imitated on the spot in other parts of
the world.
Violations of the Geneva Conventions often are the cause of
movements of internally displaced persons and of refugees, and
can facilitate criminal activities in the area of conflict and well
beyond.
Violations of the Geneva Conventions represent a serious
threat to international security, at the regional level and worldwide, because:
—They are a frequent cause of or pretext for foreign armed intervention. Violations of international humanitarian law thus served
to justify armed intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and East Timor.
—They lead to a geographical extension of conflicts, as shown by the
wars in Algeria and Vietnam and the wars of liberation in Africa,
or even the recent and current conflicts in the African Great Lakes
region.
—They create a system of anarchic instability at national, regional,
and international levels. The situations in Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Guinea are recent examples of this kind of anarchy, fomented
and fueled by the warring parties, who lived by preying on the
civilian population, or even on the humanitarian agencies. Afghanistan and Colombia are other current examples of anarchy
leading to disturbances and giving rise to trafficking and various
kinds of terrorism.
—They cause large-scale movements of displaced persons and refugees, which are sometimes recognized by the United Nations Security Council as threats to security. Even during internal armed
conflicts, population displacements are strictly prohibited. Article
3, common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocol 2 of 1977, contain rules that, if respected, would significantly reduce the number of refugees and internally displaced persons, and victims in general. Respect for international
humanitarian law would also imply the separation of combatants
from civilians, the disarming of camps, the careful placing of refugees, and preventing combatants from using refugees for cover or
aid supplies.113
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—They may contribute to or even cause terrorism. In the words of
Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, quoted in the Christian Science Monitor of November 15, 2002: ‘‘We need to figure out
what are the circumstances that cause unhappy people to strap
bombs to themselves.’’114

Is Disregarding the Geneva Conventions
Militarily Advantageous?
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols were
discussed, adopted, and ratified by decision-makers, including
military experts. Have they been overtaken by the new realities
of war, both high-technology and low-intensity warfare?
Destruction of Humanitarian Values
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean, from a military point of view, destroying humanitarian values largely based
on universal military ethics, traditions, and honor;115 and giving
up decades—even centuries—of humanitarian customs embodied in the Geneva Conventions and incorporated in military manuals and instructions. Abiding by the Geneva Conventions is also
an important part of military discipline116 and legitimacy of an
army117 and of individual units.118 In November 1847, one of the
founders of the ICRC, Swiss General Dufour, issued the following
proclamation to the Confederation troops under his command:
‘‘Confederates, I place in your keeping the children, the women,
the aged and the ministers of religion. He who raises a hand
against an inoffensive person dishonours himself and tarnishes
his flag.’’119
Among the reasons for the military to abide by the Geneva
Conventions, we could mention:
—International humanitarian law was developed in the real world of
military practice, not in an ideal world imagined by academics or
humanitarians, but out of expediency and mutual interest. The
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input of military specialists was constant throughout the codification of the Geneva Conventions. International humanitarian law
is not divorced from the day-to-day military practices and professional military standards.
—Combatants do not get a free ride because they are fighting a liberation war or a war against terrorism. The forms of war change, but
the core of international humanitarian law does not.

As an important military document recently stated:
Military power must be wielded in an unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva
Conventions. This morality should not be a matter of legality, but
of conscience.
Moral behavior is essential for gaining and maintaining the positive worldwide reputation of American fighting men and women
as well as the confidence and support of the American people, a
basic source of American military strength.120

Jeopardizing Protection
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean jeopardizing
clear and universally agreed-upon guarantees for the protection
of combatants in case of injury, sickness, shipwreck, and capture;
and undermining the probability that one’s own soldiers would
be receiving POW status and treatment in case of capture.
Limiting Surrender
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean limiting the
probability of the surrender of enemy combatants, in view of the
uncertainty they could have on their treatment and status; the
surrender of the enemy may be more easily obtained if the
enemy knows that it will be treated humanely.
The principle of humanity,121 the cornerstone of humanitarian
law, has frequently been opposed to military necessities. Nevertheless, these two essential factors are not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, humanity and military effectiveness are
often complementary; the best approach is, indeed, to highlight
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the mutual military, political, and economic benefits of recognizing the enemy—civilian or combatant—as a human being with
the same dignity as one would wish for oneself.
Besides, attacks against the civilian population, far from reducing it into submission, often incites it to resistance. One should
use the dynamic role of humanitarian action to disarm the adversary or, in the words of the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, to
‘‘build a golden bridge to the retreating enemy,’’ meaning:
‘‘Treat the captives well, and care for them. Generally, in war, the
best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To
capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company, or a five-man squad is better than to
destroy them.’’122
One of the fundaments of the four Geneva Conventions on the
protection of war victims is military self-interest: the first three
Conventions protect members of the armed forces when
wounded or sick (First Convention), shipwrecked (Second Convention), captured (Third Convention). The Fourth Convention,
relating to the treatment of civilians, could protect their own
families in occupied territories, or if wounded or interned. Each
of the four Conventions contributes to military discipline. Discipline of one’s own troops must incorporate the respect of humanitarian restraints. History shows that when combatants are
given free rein to kill and destroy indiscriminately, or to commit
acts of savagery against the enemy, they will more likely turn
against their own leaders and act ruthlessly against their own
population. To assure that humanitarian principles are respected
and implemented at this most basic level, credible instruction
and rigorous training are essential. To this end, it is important
that these rules be disseminated simply and clearly in military
manuals or instructions123 and that they be coupled with a system
of disciplinary sanctions guaranteeing their observance.124
Is Disregarding the Geneva Conventions
Ethically Acceptable?
If one cornerstone of the Geneva Conventions is military selfinterest, another is ethics—of religious or humanist origin, aim-
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ing at the preservation of the survival of the group and at the
respect of fellow human beings, even in time of war. The most
universal formulation of this ethical basis for the Geneva Conventions is the Golden Rule, in its positive (‘‘Do unto others . . .’’)
and negative (‘‘Do not do . . .’’) forms.
Loss of Human Dignity
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean, from an ethical point of view, undermining a cornerstone of our civilization
for the protection of human dignity in armed conflicts;125 losing
the common denominator of humanitarian principles and rules
based on all civilizations, building a thin red line between all civilizations;126 and recreating ‘‘islands of humanity’’ within the international community, with different levels of humanitarian
standards.
The Golden Rule can be found in several civilizations, not only
Judeo-Christian ones, and states: ‘‘So, whatever you wish that
men would do to you, do so to them.’’127
This rule was set to ensure the survival of a group, and forbade
behaviors that would have permanently endangered the group.128
Indigenous peoples of all continents have attempted to prevent
excesses that would turn conflicts into collective suicides. The
customs of Melanesians,129 Inuit,130 and Nilotic peoples;131 Buddhism,132 Hinduism,133 Taoism,134 Confucianism,135 and Bushido136 in Asia; Judaism,137 Christianity,138 and Islam139 in the
Middle East; customary humanitarian law in Africa;140 and mutual restrictions imposed by chivalry and military honor141 in Europe contain examples of rules of ‘‘Life-Affirmative Societies,’’ in
which the main emphasis of ideals, customs, and institutions is
the preservation and growth of life in all its forms.142
Loss of Legitimacy
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions would mean ‘‘destroying
one’s cause by the very means used to defend it’’ (Camus):143
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undermining the legitimacy of military actions. Civilian casualties, allegations of ill-treatment, torture, and execution of prisoners that stained various wars did bring these military operations
to an end, due to the reaction of the ‘‘public conscience’’ against
torture,144 killing of civilians,145 and mistreatment of prisoners.146
This has also been true for peacekeeping operations.147
Loss of Civilian Population
Disregarding the Geneva Conventions could also be threatening
the survival of the civilian population locally or on a broader
scale. Over the course of time, we have seen in each civilization
‘‘islands of humanity’’ being formed, inside which certain rules
limited violence in war-time, by imposing responsibilities toward
victims.
The Geneva Conventions sum up these rules on a universal
level. What is at stake today is not so much the survival of the
tribe or the nation or a specific individual civilization, but humankind as a whole. We need to maintain those values of common humanity, cooperation, and equal respect.148
Breaking the Geneva Conventions (and underogable human
rights such as the prohibition of torture) using the defense of
democracy and freedom as a pretext would be fallacious.
Beyond the literal meaning of the Conventions, there is a need
to stress the spirit of the Conventions, and the common interest
in keeping up the standards for our survival.

Conclusion and Proposals
Can the Geneva Conventions survive such merciless wars, conflicts, where everything seems permissible, where every limitation
is equaled to weakness?
As Georges Abi-Saab recently wrote, ‘‘There is no need to reinvent the law.’’149
What is really needed is a better application of existing rules,
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customs, and existing mechanisms, a stronger political will to
abide by the fundamental principles and rules of humanity.
Here are three proposals to contribute to a reinforcement, a
renewal, and a better implementation of the Geneva Conventions in today’s conflicts:
—Reaffirm the fundaments
—Train, teach, educate, and research
—Implement and enforce essential existing rules

Reaffirm the Fundaments
Reaffirm the foundations of the Geneva Conventions through a
declaration of the fundamental humanitarian rules, customs,
and principles applicable in armed conflicts in a simple, easy-tounderstand form.150 The struggle for the respect of fundamental
humanitarian rules in today’s conflicts is not a lost cause; it is
nevertheless an uphill battle to uphold the ‘‘principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.’’151
There is no need to redraft or to renegotiate the formulation
of these fundamental rules. They already exist:
Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
Article 12 (‘‘Protection and Care’’) of the First Convention
Article 12 (‘‘Protection and Care’’) of the Second Convention
Article 13 (‘‘Humane Treatment of Prisoners’’) of the Third Convention
Article 27 (‘‘Treatment. General Observations’’) of the Fourth
Convention
Article 48 (‘‘Civilian Population—General Protection against Effects of Hostilities—Basic Rule’’) of Additional Protocol 1 of
1977
Article 75 (‘‘Fundamental Guarantees’’) of Additional Protocol 1
as well as:
—Article 10 (‘‘Protection and Care’’)
—Article 11 (‘‘Protection of Persons’’)
—Article 15 (‘‘Protection of Civilian Medical and Religious Personnel’’)
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—Article 16 (‘‘General Protection of Medical Duties’’)
—Article 35 (‘‘Methods and Means of Warfare—Basic Rules’’)
—Article 40 (‘‘Quarter’’)
Articles 4 (‘‘Fundamental Guarantees’’) and 5 (‘‘Persons Whose
Liberty has been Restricted’’) of Additional Protocol 2
—The Martens Clause

Train, Teach, Educate, and Research
Train, teach, and educate arm bearers,152 troops, police, militias,
armed groups, and trainers, including foreign trainers and foreign private security groups, in fundamental restraints of violence and essential humanitarian principles.153
This could include mobilizing public role models (such as artists154 or athletes) in close contact with the local traditions155 who
can influence leaders or public opinion at large. Spiritual leaders
should participate in those campaigns, especially when religious
and spiritual values have been used to fuel conflicts.156
Implement and Enforce Essential Existing Rules
Strengthen the implementation of the existing rules through a
better use of existing legal mechanisms and other remedies
against violations.
The international community of States Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions should reaffirm their collective responsibility
according to Article 1, common to all four Conventions and to
Protocol 1.157 The role of the United Nations could also be clarified.158
Other remedies exist and could be used to improve the respect
for the Geneva Conventions, by states and by non-state actors.159
The Geneva Conventions are not only the result of painful experiences of war victims, long negotiations, decisions by courts,
practice of states, and writings of legal experts. The Geneva Conventions are based on the balance between military interest and
universal humanitarian principles. What is needed today is a better application of the existing law and implementation mecha-
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nisms, more creative interpretation and remedies to overcome
the limitations of the letter of the law and to support the spirit of
the Conventions and their Additional Protocols. Multidisciplinary research and training in history, anthropology, ethics, and
spiritualities would highlight the renewed necessity of humanitarian standards in conflicts. Such research would also give evidence
of the contribution of the Geneva Conventions to peace and security on the national, regional, and international level. It could
show as well that violations of the Geneva Conventions are shortsighted, and do not meet the military and political interests of
any warring party. It might, indeed, be too easy for lawyers and
other experts without any battlefield experience to put aside the
Geneva Conventions. It might seem the easy way out for political
leaders to declare the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to a particular conflict, territory, category of prisoners or civilians. The
reality of conflicts could well bring back the mutual interest of
parties, even in asymmetrical conflicts, to abide by fundamental
principles. Even if one side is violating the Geneva Conventions,
there is a unilateral interest in respecting them. To grant humane treatment to an enemy who surrenders is less costly militarily than to corner him and face heroes and fanatics.
Respecting civilians is good for the image, and militarily sound,
because it avoids excessive resistance, even terrorism. The Geneva Conventions could prove very advantageous, both in today’s
and tomorrow’s conflicts, for everyone: for superpowers as well
as for smaller nations; for governments and non-state insurgents;
for regular armies as well as non-state actors. What is needed is
not the undermining of this vital set of rules, but rather the reinforcement of the Geneva Conventions on every possible level:
legal, political, military, ethical, and spiritual.
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Media: Prism or Mirror
Edward Mortimer
More than twenty years ago, when I was just finishing my
book, Islam, Faith and Power, I wrote a sort of spin-off article for
the Middle East Journal called, ‘‘Islam and the Western Journalist.’’ It was, in part, a review of, or a response to, Edward Said’s
book Covering Islam, which, in turn, was a kind of sequel to his
more famous book, Orientalism.
It may seem tedious to recapitulate the arguments of that time
today, but the fact is that they have lost nothing of their topicality. Or maybe they did, in between—but if so, they have regained
it with a vengeance since September 11, 2001. In fact, one of the
strongest sensations of the past year or so for me has been the
feeling of déjà vu. And one of the most frightening things about
it has been the realization that contemporary American society,
at least as represented by its mass media, has an extraordinarily
selective historical memory. One can read any number of articles
comparing George W. Bush to John F. Kennedy, or 9/11 to Pearl
Harbor, or discussing the nineteenth- and twentieth-century
precedents for preemptive self-defense. But in all the discussion
of the American reaction to 9/11, I have seen very few references
to the Iranian revolution, and hardly any to the hostage crisis of
1979–81.
Yet the atmosphere at that time in the United States was quite
similar to what it is now. Many of the same resentments were
expressed, and many of the same questions asked. There was outrage and incomprehension at what seemed an unprovoked and
gratuitous attack on American civilians who were only doing
their jobs. There was exasperation at the inability of overwhelm-
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ing military superiority to deliver a political solution. There was
also a widespread desire to understand better ‘‘why they hate us,’’
and a tremendous awakening of interest in Islam and almost everything to do with it. Indeed, it was largely to cater to that interest and, of course, to profit from it that I wrote my book.
I was a journalist, and my book had no pretensions to be other
than journalistic. Edward Said, then as now, was a professor. His
interest in Western images of Islam long predated the Iranian
revolution, and Orientalism came out shortly before it. It was essentially a book written by a scholar about other scholars. One
can hardly do justice to the argument by summarizing it in one
or two sentences, but it had two main strands. First, Western
scholarly investigation of Islamic societies had not, for the most
part, been disinterested, but had been an instrument of imperial
domination. Secondly, it had given a distorted image of those
societies by exaggerating both what they had in common with
each other and what made them different from the West.
Orientalism has little to say about the mass media because, at
the time it was written, the mass media had little to say about
Islam. In coverage of the Middle East, for example, from the
1950s to the 1970s, Western journalists tended either to ignore
religion as a factor in politics or to assume that it was of diminishing importance. But with the advent of the Iranian revolution in
1978, that changed dramatically. Journalists like me found ourselves required to become instant experts on Islam, and expected
to emphasize religion as a factor when we analyzed political
events in the Muslim world. Inevitably, we turned to the very
scholars whom Said had been criticizing, and we reproduced
their approach with all the simplifications and exaggerations associated with our trade. Said therefore turned his attention to us,
and Covering Islam was the result.
Said himself was not above a bit of simplification and exaggeration—or ‘‘reductionism,’’ to use one of his favorite words. But
his broad point was right. Much of the coverage did tend to emphasize the exotic and alien characteristics of Muslim societies,
and to lump them all together. To a certain extent, this dehu-
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manized ordinary Muslim people, assimilating them with the
most violent and/or anti-Western political agitators among them.
Such a portrayal did not make it easier for Western societies to
envisage rational dialogue and negotiation as a productive way of
dealing with Muslim societies. It encouraged them to think of
the relationship as one inevitably, if regrettably, involving violence and confrontation.
Twenty years later, things do not appear to have changed
much, or anyway not for the better. Islam is now seen almost
entirely through the prism of terrorism, and anyone who questions this approach runs the risk of being vilified as at best naı̈ve
or at worst an appeaser. Lip-service is paid to the need for tolerance and respect for diversity, but in practice an understandable
obsession with security leads to acceptance of racial profiling and
a frantic effort to identify those aspects of Muslim belief or culture that might explain the willingness of young men (and, in
some cases, women) to immolate themselves in the process of
inflicting indiscriminate destruction on innocent civilians. And
the search for such explanations is itself distorted by a bias
toward subjective factors—those to do with Muslim perceptions—as opposed to objective reasons why some Muslims might
feel anger toward the West or the United States. If a journalist
shows too much interest in the latter, he or she can very quickly
incur the accusation of justifying terrorism, which in the present
atmosphere is almost equated with direct incitement.
In another respect, however, this interest in Muslim perceptions is an improvement. It leads to a somewhat more threedimensional picture of Muslim societies, and, indeed, of Muslim
people. If I were to rewrite my article now, I should have to say
something about the Muslim journalist as well as the Western
journalist.
Of course there have been Muslim journalists for the best part
of 200 years. Yet it is really only since 9/11 that they have been
deemed worthy of attention by their colleagues in the Western
media, thanks almost entirely to the role of Al-Jazeerah. This
Qatar-based Arab TV station has gained notoriety in the West as
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the preferred vehicle through which Osama bin Laden conveys
his views to the world. It has also been blamed for its inflammatory coverage of the Palestinian Intifadha, and, more generally,
for the strident anti-Western or anti-American tone of much of
its commentary. The irony is that it is, in many respects, a follower of Western models. It does not have to toe a government
line (except in the negative sense of avoiding direct criticism of,
or embarrassing revelations about, the authorities in Qatar itself ). It features attractive anchorwomen and advertisements
clearly designed to stimulate consumer appetites through associations with sex, glamour, and status. The news coverage is technically slick but often superficial or one-sided. The discussion is
lively but tends to remain within a received spectrum of Arab
opinion; and the prevailing tone is sympathetic to conspiracy theories, particularly about foreign or Western influence within the
Arab world. The core group of journalists that run it are graduates of the BBC Arabic service, but their product is close to being
a mirror image of the stations owned by Rupert Murdoch.
We should not generalize too glibly from these examples. But
a conclusion one might draw is that cultural similarities produced or encouraged by globalization will not necessarily reduce,
and may even accentuate, political differences. And journalists
reporting on one culture or society to another will continue to
face a dilemma. Clearly they will not be doing their job if they
fail to report what makes the two societies different from each
other. Yet they also have a responsibility to see through those
differences to the underlying common humanity, and enable
their audience to achieve a degree of understanding, even empathy, for the words and actions of those they are reporting on.
An important step toward achieving this may be to stop thinking of ‘‘Western’’ and ‘‘Muslim’’ as mutually exclusive categories.
We should remember that by now every ‘‘Western’’ society has a
significant Muslim component, and every ‘‘Muslim’’ society has
absorbed significant influences from the West.
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International Migration:
At the Boiling Point
Kathleen Newland
Although concern about international migration is achieving
a new intensity, migration itself is far from a new phenomenon.
In fact, it considerably predates recorded history. The story of
our species is the story of expansion, conquest, the transformation of vast landscapes by the arrival of man, and—the dark
side—it is also the story of the suppression and disappearance of
peoples—whether the Carib ‘‘Indians,’’ Amazonian tribes, or the
San people of Southern Africa. Is there anything new about migration and refugee flows in the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries? Or are we simply witnessing the latest chapter in
a saga that has continued for millennia? Why is migration now
generating such extraordinary tensions?
One new ingredient is the sheer volume of migration. The absolute numbers of people on the move is greater than ever before—but this is a statement that can be made about almost every
category of human activity. It reflects not only an increase in the
tendency to migrate but also an increase in the number of people doing anything. The population of the world is about 6 billion
people, and has risen very rapidly with the revolution in public
health and basic medical care such as childhood immunization.
The conventional best estimate of the number of migrants in
the world—defined as people residing in foreign countries for
more than one year—is about 175 million. That is a very rough
estimation, but it is a huge number—larger than the population
of all but a handful of the biggest countries. And it has risen
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rapidly. The UN Population Division calculates that only 75 million people fit that definition in 1965; 105 million were migrants
in 1985.
Apart from its absolute size, the other thing that is striking
about that number is what a small proportion of the total human
population it is. In the so-called ‘‘Age of Migration,’’ less than 3
percent of people have left home. The proportions were, at least
for some large parts of the world, greater 100 years ago. The U.S.
Census of 1910 showed that nearly 15 percent of the people living in the United States had been born somewhere else. In the
2000 Census, it was just a little over 10 percent (10.4 percent).
In proportional terms, the period around the turn of the last
century was more strikingly an age of migration. A great wave of
people moved from Europe to the New World—not only to the
United States, Canada, and Australia but also to Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay. There was a very substantial migration from
Japan—then considered desperately overpopulated—to Peru
and Brazil. A large exchange of populations also took place
among the various elements of the British Empire—people
moved from the Indian subcontinent to East Africa and the Caribbean, from Malaysia and India to South Africa. Another great
global flow saw Chinese move to Southeast Asia, North America,
and, in less concentrated streams, to Europe. So very large-scale
migration is nothing new, although the absolute numbers of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are unprecedented.1
Migration today also has developed a momentum that is unusual in historical terms. In the past, the great waves have been
interrupted by catastrophes. Global depression and world war
put a stop to the last great wave. People did not have the means
or the ability to move. Without these catastrophic interruptions,
migration acquires a tremendous momentum, in large part because of the phenomenon often called chain migration, which is
driven by family reunification and community networks. One
member of a family establishes himself—or, increasingly, her-
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Figure 17.1
STOCK OF MIGRANTS BY REGION, 2000
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The number of countries that host a significant number of migrants is increasing.
In 2000, sixty-six countries hosted more than 500,000 migrants, an increase from
twenty-six countries in 1965.

self—in a new country, and in time is able to bring a spouse or
children or parents she left behind. Then the spouse brings his
parents, and they bring their other adult children, who bring
their spouses, siblings, in-laws, and so forth. The communities of
origin often develop a culture and a political economy of migration, so that it becomes an expected part of life’s pattern and
develops a powerful momentum if it is not interrupted by some
external factor.
The late twentieth century has not had a war or depression of
such a scale as to disrupt global migration patterns since recovering from the after-effects of World War II. In fact, the cataclysmic
events of the last twenty years have been such as to promote migra-
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tion—the collapse of the Iron Curtain, removal of internal borders in Europe as part of the process of European integration, the
technological revolution that put long-distance travel and communication within reach of people of modest means. The negative
side can be seen in the protracted civil wars of the late twentieth
century that, rather than disrupting migration patterns, have created new ones as refugees sought safety in other countries. The
worldwide total of refugees peaked in the early 1990s and has remained high, as resolution to these long-standing conflicts proves
elusive. Afghanistan is a case in point. For more than twenty years,
Afghans have had the distinction of being the world’s largest refugee population—7 million at the peak and currently about 4 million. With a fragile peace seeming to hold from late 2002,
however, Afghan refugees are going home in great numbers.
Another new factor in today’s migration context is the stark
contrast between the demographic situation of countries of origin and receiving countries. Most of the receiving countries, particularly the Europeans, have entered demographic free-fall.
Their birth rates have collapsed (in Italy and Spain it is about 1.1
child per woman, half the replacement level) and the average
age of their populations is rising rapidly. As a result of somewhat
higher levels of immigration and relentless fertility declines, immigration accounted for 84 percent of Western Europe’s modest
population growth in 1990–95. Its contribution to Germany’s
population growth was 130 percent—in other words, Germany
would have shrunk substantially in the absence of immigration.
These trends have continued in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Two recent studies, from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Population Division, projected for several countries what levels of immigration
would be required to maintain the size of the population, the
labor force, and the dependency ratio (of workers to non-workers in the population). The projections were very sobering—
huge multiples of present levels of immigration to Europe would
be needed to maintain existing dependency ratios. (See Eliasson,
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in this volume.) The study galvanized a shift in some quarters in
thinking about the need for immigration to prevent a collapse
in productivity and in the financial underpinnings of European
pension and medical insurance systems. Familiarity with the demographic facts of life have not, however, prevented—and may
have encouraged—anti-immigration backlash in a number of
countries where the prospect of greatly increased immigration
gives rise to cultural and social insecurity.
The widespread perception that immigration is out of control
and therefore dangerous exerts a strong influence on the current migration debate. Large-scale migration in the past was not
frequently encouraged or sponsored by governments. Today,
governments have much less control over who comes, and how.
Generally, immigration flows through three major streams: the
family stream, the employment stream, and the humanitarian
stream.
In the advanced industrial countries, family reunification recounts for the great bulk of immigration: about 60 percent in
the European Union and 75–80 percent in the United States.
Governments set the rules for family migration but it is not easy
for them to control the numbers. The right to integrity and unity
of the family is widely recognized as a fundamental human right.
Very few countries place legal restrictions on the right of citizens
to sponsor a spouse or minor children for immigration. Some
add parents under certain conditions. Legal permanent residents
who are not citizens also normally have some rights to family reunification.
The second largest immigration stream to the United States is
employment related. But it is small compared to the family—only
about 107,000 for permanent residence, or 13 percent. (There is
also a sizable temporary labor category, many of whom eventually
gain permanent status.) The employment category is the most
controllable, and most welcome in public policy terms. In Europe, however, it is only in third place among sources of immigrants, at about 7 percent.
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The third stream of immigration—the humanitarian—is in
some ways the most problematical today in the eyes of governments and public opinion in many countries. It is the one part of
the immigration stream over which governments have deliberately relinquished a considerable degree of control. As of the end
of 2002, 145 governments have signed the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which obligates them not to return
a refugee against his/her will to a place where his/her life or
liberty would be in danger. Another clause of that treaty says that
a refugee should not be penalized for entering a country illegally
in order to seek asylum.
The asylum channel is one of the very few ways in which a
person without previous ties in a country can legally remain
there, and has become a major channel of migration—roughly
one-third of all entries to European countries now are asylum
seekers. Many of them are suspected of coming for economic
motives rather than to escape persecution, although the greatest
number come from some of the most violent and oppressive
countries on earth—Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan
all being high on the list of countries of origin of asylum seekers
in the industrialized countries. The United States, with more expansive family and employment programs, receives only 8 percent of its total legal immigration through humanitarian
programs.
The sharp growth in the numbers of asylum seekers in the last
quarter of the twentieth century played an important role in raising the anxiety level about uncontrolled and uncontrollable
entry. In Western Europe, there were only about 13,000 asylum
claims per year filed in the 1970s. The total had risen to 170,000
by 1985 and peaked at about 690,000 in 1992. The lifting of exit
restrictions in the former Eastern Bloc was a major factor in this
sudden rise in the early 1990s; one-third of the 1992 applicants
in Western Europe were from Bulgaria and Romania.
Within this broad picture of international migration in the
early twenty-first century, what accounts for the new and widen-
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ing fault lines? There is a simple answer, and a whole series of
extremely complex ones. The simple answer is, ‘‘more people
want to come in than states are willing to accept.’’ Like most
simple answers, it isn’t completely wrong, but it isn’t very useful,
either. The more complex answers include these factors:
• There are more countries in crisis, resulting in more violent
conflicts and more human rights abuses affecting ever-larger
numbers of people, some of whom are determined to escape by
any available means;
• Growing income disparity between North and South and the
powerful pull of job vacancies in wealthier countries makes migration an economically rational choice for many residents of
developing countries;
• Proportionally fewer opportunities for legal migration invite
people to try to use the asylum channel for labor or family migration, feeding an atmosphere of distrust toward migrants in
many receiving countries;
• Easier and cheaper transportation and communication between
source and destination countries make it easier for people to
travel long distances, and to anticipate conditions at their destinations;
• The growth of a new industry of smugglers and traffickers of
people is hardening both governmental and public attitudes
toward clandestine entry;
• Cross-cutting political pressures on government authorities
urge them to crack down on people who deliberately misuse the
asylum system, but at the same time to respect human rights
and show compassion for the unfortunate;
• There is a pervasive fear on the part of governments that their
sovereignty and ability to control their borders is being eroded
by the forces of globalization—which include migration—and a
corresponding determination to reassert control. Along with
this, of course, goes the fear of being punished at the polls if the
government is perceived to have lost control or to be governing
badly;
• Most importantly, perhaps, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, security concerns have focused in a very broad
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way on immigrant populations and foreign visitors as potential
sources of threat.

Security as a Fault Line
The last of these factors is genuinely new. It is ironic that economic reliance on immigration is growing at the same time that
immigrants are increasingly seen as a security risk—particularly
in the United States, where the security threats from foreigners
that have been detected are not coming from immigrants but
from temporary visitors. The September 11 hijackers, for example, entered as short-term tourists, businessmen, or students. The
words of political leaders after the September 11 terrorist attacks
were reassuring, but subsequent actions have indeed targeted immigrants along with foreign visitors. For example, long-resident
legal immigrants from certain countries (mostly in the Middle
East and Africa) are now required to submit to a special registration procedure with the Immigration Service that has landed
many people in harsh detention conditions simply for minor
technical violations or for lack of complete documentation. Citizenship applications have in some parts of the country been subject to a de facto freeze as the Service is overwhelmed with new
requirements.
Refugee resettlement programs have taken a particularly severe hit, despite the fact that resettling refugees are among the
most scrutinized of all people entering the United States or other
countries. They have been through elaborate selection and processing procedures, and are the only group that arrive in the
United States assigned to domestic agencies that assist in their
integration into new communities. In the United States, a ceiling
for resettlement is set each year in a consultation between the
Congress and the Administration. In fiscal year 2002, the ceiling
was 70,000, yet fewer than 27,000 refugees were admitted for resettlement. Security concerns were the main reason given for the
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dramatic shortfall. It is a sad fact that countries that, through
violence and persecution, generate large numbers of refugees
also generate terrorism or support for terrorists: Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan are among the top source countries for refugees and asylum seekers. The new security
atmosphere has placed refugees from those countries in double
jeopardy.
European countries have somewhat better reasons than the
United States to be concerned about terrorist activities in immigrant communities. More and larger radical Islamist communities are found in European cities, and terrorists (including the
September 11 hijackers) have been found to be living in Europe
as immigrants, asylum seekers, and students. European systems
are less effective in removing persons who may pose a threat; in
particular, very long adjudication periods for asylum seekers in
some countries and poor integration of existing immigrant communities create opportunities for those who intend harm to remain and find cover in communities disaffected from the
mainstream of society. Nonetheless, the links that are being
drawn between immigration in general and security threats are
overdrawn, and often misrepresented.
There are, indeed, ways in which immigrants create security
threats, and it is important to acknowledge them in order to separate reality from fiction. Some of the security threats to home
or host countries that may arise from certain immigrant groups
include the following:
• Immigrants may work against the regimes of their home countries, increasing the threats to those governments. The Tamil
Diaspora, for example, has actively supported the Tamil separatist cause in Sri Lanka.
• Immigrants may directly or indirectly (through hospitality to
visitor) attack the interests of their host country or another
country. This has been evident from some of foiled plots
hatched by al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Rome, Paris, and other
cities in Europe.
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• The host country may use immigrant groups to threaten their
country of origin (or at least tolerate the actions of such
groups), or the home country may use or send immigrants to
act against the host country. Both dynamics have been evident
in U.S.-Cuba relations in the 1980s and 1990s.
• Mass influx of defeated fighters, who mix in among refugees in
border areas, may pose a threat to their home or host countries,
or both, as was the experience of Rwanda and neighboring
Congo after the fighting that followed the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda.
• In some settings, immigrants are perceived to pose a cultural
threat to the host country. Bhutan asserted this fear in the face
of immigration from Nepal, and subsequently dealt harshly not
only with newly arriving would-be immigrants but with longstanding residents of Nepali descent.
• Obviously inefficient and ineffective border controls may create
a crisis of confidence in government, undermining it from
within.

How do these possibilities compare to the actual threats from
immigration that have been the focus of policy attention in the
West post-September 11?
The major security threats associated with migration in North
America and Europe arise from four characteristics. First, particularly evident in Western Europe, is the lack of integration and
the associated alienation of immigrant populations. Some minority groups, such as the Turks in Germany, have been there for
years or even generations, but have very limited access to citizenship and are still regarded very much as ‘‘foreigners’’—even
those who were born in Germany. Being denied full membership
in the host society keeps immigrants from developing feelings of
loyalty and solidarity, and may even lead some among them to a
destructive rage.
Second, the presence of large numbers of undocumented migrants, who do not have legal permission to reside in the country
where they live, creates two levels of security concern. Those without regular status have no legal identity, and have an interest in
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remaining invisible to the authorities. Although their ‘‘invisibility’’ masks no ill intentions in the vast majority of cases, the mere
presence of a large number of undocumented residents makes
looking for the few who do intend harm a needle-in-the-haystack
proposition. Security would be enhanced by getting as many people as possible out of the shadows of irregular migration by regularizing their status.
A third kind of security threat associated with current migration flows is the growing involvement of organized crime in the
movement of people. Tighter controls on entry have made it
more difficult for ordinary migrants to enter without authorization, and so have created a growth industry for smugglers. Annual turnover is estimated to be in the $12–$15 billion range.
With this kind of revenue, smugglers can easily invest in corrupting border guards and immigration officials, creating genuine
new security problems that go far beyond illegal immigration.
Each of these new security problems is a self-inflicted wound
on the part of immigrant-receiving countries rather than a fault
inherent in immigration itself. The immigrant-specific policy responses to September 11 and the kind of terrorist threat it represents have exacerbated rather than solved the problems.
Investigation, registration, and detention based on ethnic and
racial profiling have alienated immigrant populations that were
reasonably well integrated previously. Not only might this bear
bitter fruit in the long run, but also in the short run it makes
disaffected immigrant communities less likely to cooperate with
the authorities in intelligence-gathering and law enforcement. A
closed and fearful community is more rather than less conducive
to terrorism, even if unwittingly.
Movement toward greater opportunities for legal immigration
and regularization of undocumented populations that were proceeding prior to September 11 have lost momentum or even
been reversed. These include the progress toward a migration
agreement between the United States and Mexico, and the
broad, positive migration-harmonization agenda unveiled by the
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European Union at the Tampere Summit in 1999. Moreover, the
high costs of unauthorized entry means that many undocumented migrants who used to come and go between home and
abroad now come and stay, as they can no longer afford frequent
circular trips.
The opportunity for organized crime and criminalized political networks has expanded, both in scope and in profitability.
Illegal immigration has not declined as governments have
thrown more resources at their borders and ports of entry, but it
has become professionalized, and much more dangerous (both
for migrants and for those who try to keep them out) as criminal
gangs come to dominate the traffic.
Immigration measures should have to pass some tests of value
and effectiveness, as well as tests of humanity and consistency
with the values of the society in whose name they are imposed.
Philip B. Heyman, a Professor at Harvard Law School and a former U.S. Deputy Attorney-General, wrote: ‘‘For democratic nations, the primary concerns in dealing with terrorism are to
maintain and protect life, the liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy, and the unity of society, the loss of which can turn a
healthy and diverse society into a seriously divided and violent
one.’’ By his criteria, international migration policy in most
countries is failing the test.
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Figure 17.2
TOP 10 MIGRANT RECEIVING COUNTRIES, 2000
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CORRECTIONS

Part 6
In this final section, two very experienced diplomat-scholars consider what corrective actions are being—or could be—taken to address the fault lines that so threaten the foundations of our cultures
and our political systems. Peter Tarnoff, an international consultant,
has held leading positions in both the private and public sectors of
foreign affairs. His practical considerations of possible corrective
steps that might be taken by sovereign nations is grounded in a
reality nurtured when he was President of the Council on Foreign
Relations and then refined during his term as the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.
Professor Richard Falk contributes a fitting last chapter, one that
notes the impressive upsurge in international humanitarian initiatives in the last decade of the twentieth century. Much of this was
due to the efforts of civil society, human rights organizations, and
even individuals participating in a normative revolution unknown
in history. Falk then warns, however, of the detour in these global
efforts and offers reasons why even the most powerful nation on
earth must rely on our noble traditions, values, and moral position
if we are to survive in a secure, humane world.

18

Government Responses
to Fault Lines
Peter Tarnoff
Most people who serve in government want to be in office indefinitely. They also want to wield as much power as possible.
In some cases, they are motivated principally by high ideals and
commendable motives; in other instances, they are driven primarily by greed and ego. Over the course of time, however, their
conduct and actions can change and evolve for better or for
worse. At the same time, the way governments deal with the
‘‘fault lines’’ issues can be modified by internal and external
forces and incentives.
Moreover, governments can gravitate closer to or away from
belief systems or institutions (‘‘foundations’’). Religions, for example, can provide a framework of values for countries or regions, but governments generally decide opportunistically rather
than spiritually how much influence to accept from an established faith and its clergy.
The ‘‘fault lines’’ are policy categories, not political objectives
or moral ends. While there is general agreement that some of
the ‘‘fault lines’’ are good (such as civil liberties) and some are
bad (for example, torture, terrorism), most governments—even
those widely regarded as ‘‘democratic’’—tend to justify or condemn actions taken on ‘‘fault line’’ issues more on the basis of
the motives of the perpetrator than on the nature of the action
undertaken. Consider the adage: ‘‘one man’s terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter.’’
For the most part, value and theological systems provide gov-
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ernments with an rhetorical structure of belief rather than clear
ethical prescriptions for the way to behave. The weakening of
traditional authorities both secular and spiritual and the proliferation of sources of information have propelled governments into
a state of perpetual motion, constantly in search of marginal advantage or popular favor. It is rare for governments to credibly
align themselves consistently to an accepted value system. For the
most part, political leaders decide what to do first and then wrap
their actions in whatever inspirational or patriotic texts and beliefs they believe will impress the audiences they seek to persuade. Although some American politicians claim that they ask
themselves ‘‘what Jesus would do?’’ when making hard decisions,
it remains to be seen whether the answers they receive come
from within or without.
But before lamenting the passing of the traditional structures
of common values, we should remember that rigid belief systems
sometimes have produced the most intolerant and fanatic of regimes. ‘‘True believers’’ may have once referred to men and
women prepared to sacrifice themselves rather then denounce a
caring and humanistic faith. Now, the term also applies to people
so convinced of the exclusive rightness of their belief that they
will brutalize those who refuse to convert or submit.

Different Paths to Common Goals
It is remarkable how much the preambles of constitutions have
in common. Even when their authors come from different historical, religious, and cultural traditions, these documents extol the
dignity of all citizens and defend the exercise of freedom and
rights while proclaiming the unity of a people in a national politic. Founders of nations and their successors invariably appeal to
universal sentiments common to all humankind. No doubt some
of the constitution writers are sincere in evoking aspirations that
elicit a general will to work for the common good. Other founders may be more cynical or manipulative, knowing full well that
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even a morally correct constitution does not always reflect the
realities of governance.
In order to understand the true intentions of governments, we
may want to distinguish between those that are value oriented
and results oriented. Value-oriented regimes commit themselves
to govern according to traditional—usually religious—texts or
laws. The highest authorities in value-oriented states are clerics
and the most venerated documents of state are scriptures. High
religious authorities are empowered to interpret religious texts
in ways that apply to everyday life including commerce, contracts,
laws, and the definition and punishment of crime. In these societies, severe restrictions usually are imposed on the behavior of
ordinary citizens and close ties with foreign powers are regarded
with suspicion for fear of contamination or subversion.
Results-oriented governments aim to bring about tangible improvements in the well-being of society in areas such as health
care, prosperity, education, public safety, national security, and
infrastructure. When a government is results-oriented, its laws
can be based on a body of traditional doctrine but its constitutional foundation is consistently being interpreted and reinterpreted by secular, often elected, judiciaries.
The United States government is, for the most part, resultsoriented. Its constitution affirms the separation of church and
state. A strong federal system and independent judiciary constrain the power of the central government. The two national
political parties compete for public favor in terms of concrete
deliverables. While public rhetoric, especially during electoral
periods, embraces traditional values and moral principles, elections themselves usually are won or lost on the basis of policy
prescriptions or records of achievement.
Can the same be said of American foreign policy? Is it also
results-oriented or is the propagation of an American value system becoming more central to U.S. objectives around the world?
In the immediate post-World War II period, American foreign
policy was driven principally by the need to establish a network
of coalitions under U.S. leadership that were prepared to de-
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fend—militarily, if necessary—the Western world against encroachments from the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union.
During the forty-five years of the cold war, there were superpower
proxy wars in the developing world but no armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The two alliance adversaries
made little effort to convert the other; both were principally concerned with controlling their own members and preserving their
respective systems of governance and economic organization.
Suddenly, just over a decade ago, the USSR collapsed and the
cold war ended.
An ‘‘end of history’’ was proclaimed by some and it looked to
many Americans as if liberal democratic forms of government
and free market economies had triumphed over the Communist
and totalitarian alternatives and that there would be a universal
recognition that something close to a U.S. model had become
the system of choice for most societies. In the absence of overarching military and ideological threats and a diminished need for
the ‘‘sole remaining superpower’’ to tend to minding its alliances, there was more talk in Washington than before about a
moral foreign policy and greater confidence that American values (often portrayed as ‘‘universal values’’) would be a central
component of Washington’s worldwide reach.

A Doctrinaire Foreign Policy
Doctrines and values are not new to American foreign policy. In
the early nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine alerted Europeans that the U.S. ‘‘should consider any attempt on their part
to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.’’
Shortly after World War II, the Truman Doctrine made clear
that the U.S. would act to oppose any Soviet attempt to extend
its influence into Greece and Turkey. Under President Jimmy
Carter, human rights were placed high on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda and, although Carter was denounced by balance-of-
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power realists for sacrificing American interests on the altar of
idealism, his successor, Ronald Reagan, strengthened democracybuilding efforts primarily to weaken the hold of the Communist
regimes. The first President Bush announced the coming of a
‘‘new world order’’ that was understood to rely heavily on the
American experience and influence.
President Clinton came to stand for what some of his aides
described as a doctrine of ‘‘humanitarian interventionism,’’
where the international community—assisted and sometimes led
by the U.S.—intervenes, with force if necessary, to prevent or
stop human slaughter.
The second Bush Administration has been more ambitious
than its recent predecessors in proclaiming the need for a new
doctrinal structure and the obligation to spread American political, economic, and moral values far and wide. It justifies this redefinition of American interests and strategies on the basis of
what is required to defend the U.S. against new enemies and new
threats in the post-cold war world.
The new Bush Doctrine was published as the ‘‘National Security Strategy of the United States.’’ Since it has been dissected and
debated exhaustively in the press, academic circles, and in foreign ministries worldwide, I will not describe it in detail, but for
this chapter there are features of this doctrine worth noting.
The document makes clear that the United States intends to
preserve and use its position as the dominant military power in
today’s world. Washington will decide what threatens the American way of life and, while there are passing references to international partners, it is clear that the U.S. is prepared (even eager)
to act alone. It is not hard to see in the text the strength of the
Administration’s unilateralist impulse that so concerns most of
America’s friends and allies and that the State Department
gamely tries to minimize.
In the case of Iraq, the doctrinal and moral strains of Bush
Administration thinking meet and fuse. President Bush repeatedly stated that the U.S. would act quickly, decisively, and alone
(if necessary) to remove the threat that Saddam Hussein repre-
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sented. He has been so clear and consistent that it is hard to
imagine the President being satisfied by anything less than a
convincing cleansing of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
and the ouster of Saddam as well. Most world leaders, including
those in the Arab nations, would like nothing better than to rid
Iraq of such weapons, and there was little support around the
world for the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet, why
then was there so much suspicion regarding Washington’s demands when America’s objective (Iraqi disarmament) is so
widely shared?
For two reasons: The first is that many governments believed
that American policy in Iraq was not based on a legitimate fear
of Iraqi intentions or capabilities, but that Washington was using
Iraq as a convenient excuse to assert America’s paramount political power and military superiority and its willingness to use them.
In its first two years in office, the Bush Administration has given
ample evidence of its preference for going it alone and its disdain
for international treaties and commitments. International public
and political opinion had already soured on the U.S. even before
the President put regime change in Iraq at the top of his foreign
policy priorities.
The second reason resonates especially in the Islamic world.
Many Muslim leaders believe that the U.S. will endeavor to transform that country into a Western-style democracy. I do not argue
that the Iraqi people were better off under Saddam Hussein than
under a benevolent U.S. military occupation, but the prospect of
an American democracy offensive starting in Iraq and spreading
throughout the Middle East terrifies even some of America’s best
friends in the region. Lest any reader think that my description
of Bush Administration intentions for a post-Saddam Iraq are
fanciful, I invite them to read the many on-the-record comments
made by high U.S. officials on how democracy will flourish first
in Baghdad and spread rapidly throughout the Middle East.
Some in the administration go so far as to predict that this rapid
democratizing of the region will produce agreement between Is-
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raelis and Palestinians because two democratically elected leaders will find it easier to make peace.
But back again to doctrine and values. Now that there is an
official Bush Doctrine, it becomes awkward for the administration to flexibly and creatively innovate new policies or react to
new emergencies. The recent announcement by North Korea
that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is a case in point.
A threat from North Korea is a clear candidate for preemptive
military attack by the U.S. It is tailor-made for the Bush Doctrine.
However, the Bush Administration is reacting cautiously and cooperatively to the North Korean program—as it should—while
defending itself against charges from the right wing that it is handling the challenge no differently from the way the much-maligned Clinton Administration would have reacted.
The U.S. forcibly installing democracy in Baghdad, and beyond, alarms many in the Middle East who will not soon forget
the crusader spirit of those American officials eager to assert that
the U.S. has the right to remake Muslim societies. Of course,
those international norms of behavior contained in the Geneva
Conventions and other international treaties should be part of
American policy. But imposing Western ways by force of arms
following a military victory on countries determined to preserve
their distinctive cultures and religions would unleash a terrifying
clash of civilizations.

Good Versus Evil: An Age of Absolutes
American presidents have called foreign adversaries ‘‘evil’’ before. Ronald Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an ‘‘evil empire,’’
but he then went on to become a serious negotiating partner
with Mikhail Gorbachev. Now, the second President Bush describes Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as constituting an ‘‘axis of
evil’’ and he warns the rest of the world that countries have a
choice: they can be either for or against the U.S. in the war on
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terror. ‘‘It’s either us or them,’’ the administration asserts and,
in its view, neutrality is tantamount to appeasement.
What role there is now for American diplomacy is an open
question, unless American leadership in the UN Security Council
convinces hard-liners in Washington that multilateral diplomacy
can be made to serve U.S. interests after all. Since World War
II, the U.S. has worked harder at persuading and cultivating its
political, military, and economic partners than at negotiating
with its enemies. Presidents from Truman to Clinton understood
how much American security depended on having close friends
and allies, even when there were differences of views to bridge
and difficult compromises to swallow.
It is also true that diplomatic conditions have changed: America’s new enemies are both more and less threatening than the
USSR at the height of the cold war. They are less threatening
because, whatever their destructive power, they are unable to
obliterate the planet (although some would do so if they could).
But they are more threatening because they do not seek to
reach accommodations with us. They have no interest in summitry or state visits. In the Middle East, some have a political
agenda: the destruction of the State of Israel and the overthrow
of the Gulf monarchies, especially that of Saudi Arabia. They see
the U.S. as the principal obstacle to their aims and have shown
themselves ready to use terror to weaken and hurt us. In the case
of the most fanatic extremists, no negotiation is possible and the
U.S. has no choice but to work with others to destroy them.
Still, does their suicidal fanaticism make all of the terrorists’
demands evil? What happens when countries in the Middle East
that we need for security cooperation and oil express some sympathy for the political agenda of the terrorists? The problem with
labeling governments and groups as either good or evil and demanding (rhetorically, at least) that they be for us or against us
is that it may play well in American politics but it outrages many
important non-Americans whose cooperation is essential to us in
the war on terror and who insist on making a distinction between
the aims and the methods of terrorist states and organizations.
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The overuse of ‘‘evil’’ to describe countries and governments
also places an implicit obligation on the U.S. to dispose of such
regimes. Although the U.S. can fight and win wars in many places
at once, few in America want Washington to be the world’s enforcer. Indeed, less talk of good versus evil and us versus them
might allow the U.S. to recapture the moral high ground in the
war on terror. The more insidious the threat, the more important
it will be for the U.S. to be less absolutist in its approach. During
the cold war, the U.S. could have fought alone against the USSR.
But there is no way that the U.S. can win the war on terror alone,
even if America is statistically more powerful than ever before
when compared to the rest of the world.

Shifting Fault Lines
Living as I do in an earthquake zone in California, I am extremely sensitive to the dangers when fault lines start to shift,
even to a small degree. I also know that it is hard to predict when
and where these movements will occur and what will be the extent of the damage they are likely to cause. It is clear, however,
that even the most democratic and well-intentioned governments
behave uncharacteristically when they feel threatened or destabilized. For example, they can:
—relax their definition of what constitutes torture and permit a degree of corporal punishment and non-physical pressures (e.g.,
sleep deprivation, noise and light harassment, extreme and indefinite isolation, threats to family members, constant interrogation)
—resort to the extra-judicial and covert assassinations of suspected
terrorists
—invoke a political form of ‘‘force majeure’’ as reason for selectively
applying or ignoring the Geneva Conventions
—restrict immigration, especially from countries or cultures perceived to be strange or hostile. Anti-immigrant sentiment also
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leads to the formation of sometimes-powerful neo-fascist political
movements even in developed countries
—pay less attention to issues of discrimination against women and
children in countries that are important partners in confronting a
common new enemy
—amend domestic judicial practices so that terms of indictment and
confinement are radically tightened. Punishments then become
much more severe for crimes stemming from the new threats
—impose restrictions on the media that result in less information
being made available to the general public. Invoking national security considerations is a frequent excuse for withholding information that might prompt citizens to oppose the policies of their
governments.

It is reasonable, even necessary, for societies under threat to
resort to extraordinary measures to defend themselves. But it is
also essential that in open societies there be a continuing public
and political debate about how much security can be gained by
limiting how much freedom. Such a debate can be acrimonious
but it becomes unhealthy only if stifled. As frustrating as it is to
policy makers, the struggle between security and liberty is endless. Should conditions change, practices can be loosened or
tightened. The tectonic plates of policy are always shifting and
the number of independent variables at play in a crisis can be
huge. Nevertheless, as long as governments are committed to the
proposition that it is ultimately desirable for there to be more
freedoms not less and more information not less, citizens can
expect that liberties and openness will someday be restored. But
beware of those—even in democracies—who seek to make emergency restrictions permanent, because the threat is potentially
infinite. Their aim is to transform, not simply defend, society because they live in a world of absolutes, including the illusion of
absolute security.
Because the very nature of post-cold war threats is indefinite
and universal, there are some who believe that it will be necessary
to modify fundamentally the character of free societies in order
to defeat them. We know wars that end with a V-E Day or V-J
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Day, and where we can see the battle lines changing in our daily
newspapers. But there will never be a V-Terrorism Day.
Like foreign policy itself, the campaigns against the new global
threats will be an endless process where success will be measured
incrementally, never conclusively. In the long haul, however, it
will be the free and open societies that are best able to sustain
the efforts and sacrifices necessary to stay the course in the interminable wars against the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

All Alone or All Together
When confronted with complex and ever-shifting fault lines, governments incline either toward the unilateral or the multilateral.
Smaller and more vulnerable countries—especially those firmly
embedded in regional political or economic alliances—are
prone to turn to their neighbors for help in times of crisis. Most
member states of the European Union act that way. Especially in
matters of economic policy, the EU nations tend to stick together
and face the rest of the world in a united fashion after setting
common economic policies. However, EU solidarity is less firm
in political and security matters. Since the U.K. and France are
permanent members of the UN Security Council and most EU
nations are also members of NATO, there are not yet common
European diplomatic or security policies on most issues.
The unilateralist impulse is more prevalent in the case of
major powers and those opaque and dangerous regimes sometimes identified as ‘‘rogue states.’’ Major powers are the most
inclined to act and stand alone. They have the wherewithal to
operate with a high degree of autonomy and their domestic political climate favors policies of ‘‘national interest’’ over ‘‘international comity.’’ China and the U.S. are prime examples of
powerful countries that are readier than most to stand alone on
matters of high policy and principle. In the case of what might
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be called ‘‘outcast regimes,’’ their very isolation and opaqueness
create a shield that makes it hard for outsiders to have a clear
view of their intentions and capabilities. North Korea is such a
case in point.
In principle, the world and the cause of peace would be better
served if international organizations and agreements were effectively respected by all nations. In principle, most countries favor
a rule of international law and order that prevents conflict and
humanitarian chaos.
But problems occur when nations differ over whether a threat
to international peace and stability exists and, if it does, how international players should react. The discussions in the UN Security Council over how to disarm Saddam tended to overshadow
international concerns about the scope and nature of the threat
itself. Since the U.S. and U.K. invaded Iraq, the multilateral approach to solving international problems have suffered a telling
blow (irrespective of all the other ramifications—good and
bad—resulting from this military action).
In principle, the new global threats of the twenty-first century
are mostly multilateral in nature. They include environmental
degradation, international crime, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, ethnic and religious conflicts, disease, extreme
poverty, and violations of human and civil rights. These threats
know no borders and governments are not usually the sole entities with influence and resources. In fact, governments are coming to understand that nongovernmental organs (business, labor,
the media, academia, religious groups, and private voluntary organizations) are active and important components of international affairs.
Today’s multilateral diplomacy extends vertically to non-state
entities and horizontally to like-minded governments and international organizations. Effective international coalitions are no
longer limited to ministers and generals. Non-state players from
business, academia, labor, private voluntary organizations, and
the media are represented at the diplomatic negotiating table
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whether or not they are physically present. International diplomacy is now played like multidimensional chess.

Sanctions and Fence-Mending
When countries clash over what they consider to be important
issues of policy or principle, there is always a risk that they will
resort to military force. However, most governments at least pay
lip service to the proposition that they will use force only as a last
resort and many leaders actually do their best to resolve disputes
peacefully. Moreover, there has emerged in recent decades a
long menu of ways that governments and international organizations can bring non-military pressure to bear on adversaries or
outlaw states:
Economic Sanctions—Three Varieties
Multilateral Usually imposed by the UN Security Council. Generally regarded as the most effective because the most widely observed. Can be lifted once offending country meets certain
conditions but requires a confirming vote by the UN Security
Council to do so.
Unilateral Country-to-country. May have political/moral effect,
but porous economically because most countries are not bound
to restrict trade or investment with targeted regime. If sanctioning country has sufficient power in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), it can block IFI loans and grants as well.
Extraterritorial Sanctioning country applies economic penalties
to third countries trading with targeted country. Hotly contested
politically and legally by countries unwilling to accept jurisdiction of sanctioning country over their sovereign trading practices.
The imposition of economic sanctions can, however, be a
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broad and blunt weapon. Unless they are targeted on the offending country’s leadership, sanctions can cause serious suffering
among the civilian population. If the pain from sanctions on innocents is prolonged and serious, states—especially in the region—will circumvent them. The U.S. has imposed sanctions
more than any other country in recent years, but because most
American sanctions are essentially bilateral, they have had only
marginal economic effects.
Moral/Political Sanctions—Multilateral or Unilateral
This form of sanction is often applied in the area of human
rights. The UN Human Rights Commission meets annually to
pronounce itself on alleged human rights violators around the
world. Charges and countercharges are debated in Geneva before the violations are put to a vote by the Commission. In addition, and uniquely, the U.S. publishes annually a series of human
rights reports describing and condemning what it considers to
be human rights violations around the world.
Shunning
A more discrete form of official displeasure occurs when a country decides to have no or limited diplomatic representation in
another capital. Shunning can be augmented by ordering its diplomats to avoid all contact and dialogue with representatives of
the foreign power.
Sanctions are non-military methods of pressure and punishment, but the diplomatic arsenal also contains devices to promote reconciliation and dispute resolution. They include:
Mediation/Arbitration
Ideally, such interventions occur before international disputes
turn violent. Successful conflict prevention is better than settlement negotiations but resolving a conflict that has already
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erupted is sometimes the only way that peace can be restored.
International organization negotiators (usually, but not always,
with the UN) abound but there are skilled national mediators as
well. For decades, the U.S. has played a unique role in the Middle
East peace process and now, more recently, in the Balkans. Norway has become a powerful mediating force and the EU is reinforcing its dispute resolution capacities. Regional organizations
should play greater roles in settling disputes, although the disputing parties must also be convinced that there are positive and
negative economic consequences for them to settle. This means
that the developed countries and the IFIs have to be prepared to
provide substantial financial rewards for good political behavior.
Constructive Engagement
This is a diplomatic way to describe a ‘‘good cop, bad cop’’ routine for dealing with a recalcitrant state. It involves at least one
outside government maintaining contact with the regime that is
under pressure to change or to cease and desist. Constructive
engagement works best when the ‘‘good cop’’ coordinates its initiatives with the international community pressing for change.
Regional nations, even neighbors, are good in this role although
it helps to have a major power perceived as supportive so that the
country that is the object of all this attention believes that any
eventual political and economic rewards it gains in return for
compliance will have broad international support.
When governments are confronted with cataclysmic threats or
emergencies, traditions, values, and humanitarian actions can be
incinerated by the intense heat of the moment. Especially in democracies where public pressure on governments is greatest, political leaders often feel that they have to act first and ask (moral)
questions afterwards. In the U.S. it is commonly accepted that
the president’s first responsibility is to come to the defense of the
country. Voices calling for measured and appropriate responses
consistent with a nation’s traditions and values rarely penetrate
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into the command centers and cabinet rooms of governments
under attack. There are, however, ways that a sense of morality
and humanism can be inserted into the decision-making process.
The first is to have the public be as well informed as possible
about exceptional measures that a government believes it must
take to prosecute the war (or emergency) effort. Ultimately, it is
the public and its elected representatives that should have the
final say when it comes to deciding how drastic and how durable
these measures must be. But without fairly full disclosure, the
public will be kept in the dark.
The second is to improve the legislative oversight of foreign
policy. For the first two hundred years of our nation, it was generally accepted that foreign policy was the purview of the executive
branch. Only rarely were presidents and secretaries of state subjected to the degree of scrutiny that administrations received on
domestic issues. Then came the Vietnam War and television
news. Trust in government was further eroded by Watergate and
serious oversight of foreign affairs by the Congress began. As a
result, American foreign policy may be less coherent and well
managed than before. But foreign policy is also more transparent
than before and it turned out to be no harder than domestic
policy for the American people to understand.
The third is to broaden the uniquely American practice of having high officials shuttle between private careers and public service. Government careerists find this system arbitrary and
inefficient and they are probably right: it often is. But a government dominated by career politicians and civil servants runs the
risk of isolation and excess. Moreover, having men and women
who were successful in nongovernmental careers appointed to
high public office increases the chances that decisions will better
reflect the attitudes of society at large and that policies will be
made by people who are used to being held accountable for their
actions because they come from professions where rapid meritbased advancement and abrupt dismissals can occur.
Fourth, it is vital for citizens to understand that values are as
essential to their security as military might and economic
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strength. A country true to a legacy of humanism is easier to defend and harder to attack. Its population will rally to the defense
of the homeland. Its government will have standing in calling for
international aid and support. Its enemies will know that world
opinion will turn against them. Such a country is not guaranteed
to be invulnerable in our turbulent world, but it will be much
safer if it makes every effort to adhere to practices and conventions accepted by most of humanity as genuinely beneficial to all.
In modern societies, the pressures for demanding high levels
of accountability, freedom, and openness come from the bottom
up not the top down. Governments under threat will always seek
greater control and autonomy and it is hard to strike a perfect
balance between a government’s ability to manage a crisis and a
free people’s need to know, judge, and change what a government is doing. Still, if the balance of power tilts too strongly and
indefinitely in government’s favor, the new global wars that it is
trying to win will be lost.
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Reviving Global Civil Society
After September 11
Richard Falk
September 11 has challenged the American way of life in a manner that is unprecedented, and evolving in ways the significance
of which we are only beginning to grasp. To uphold the blessings
of democracy, we must start with the understanding that as members of a constitutional republic, we are citizens and not subjects.
Subjects discharge their political responsibilities to society by unconditionally obeying the government. Citizens face a more complex challenge. Their need, especially in periods of crisis, is to
strike a balance between loyalty and patriotism on one side and
conscience and independent judgment on the other. Blind submission by citizens, even in wartime, does not promote the national well-being, nor does it sustain and deepen our confidence
in constitutional government. A passive citizenry forfeits the virtues of democracy as well as betrays a lack of confidence in public
debate on controversial issues. Without the benefits of vigorous
debate and a genuine political opposition, alternatives to war and
militarism tend to be bypassed. The more extreme voices counseling political leaders tend to gain influence, a climate of chauvinistic nationalism is likely to dominate public discussion. This
pattern of behavior represents both a general observation and is
intended as a critical commentary on the drift of American domestic and foreign policy since September 11.1
This assertion of citizen responsibilities might have seemed too
obvious in this country to comment upon only a few years ago. It
has suddenly become a matter of some urgency in the aftermath
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of the mega-terrorist attacks in 2001. Because these attacks
caused such great symbolic and substantive harm, and because
the enemy was a concealed terrorist network operating by stealth
in sixty or more countries in such a manner as to be everywhere
and nowhere, there was a tendency on the part of the citizenry
to close ranks behind our political leaders, relying on their capacity to fashion an effective response that would restore our sense
of security in the face of this new enemy that demonstrated both
its tactical ingenuity and its genocidal plan to kill as many Americans, Jews, ‘‘crusaders’’ as possible. This call for unity by the government was a natural response to such an unprecedented
challenge, but it has had several serious unfortunate side-effects,
including the disruption of some very positive global developments of a humanitarian character that had been moving forward in the decade after the end of the cold war. These
developments owed a great deal to the activism of citizens from
democratic societies around the world, as well as to their organizations, which often took the shape of voluntary transnational
associations.2 These initiatives arising out of civil society were
both supplementing and challenging the policies of governments and international institutions in a number of key areas of
international life.
What makes the present context particularly disturbing is a rediscovery of the fragility of societal reality, and for us here in
America, that despite our power and wealth as a country, we are
both vulnerable to hostile extremism and that our policies
around the world are generating intense and widespread resentment. Despite the achievements of modernity, our political arrangements for governance seem unable to control either the
passions that animate politics or the technologies that are relied
upon to establish security. There may be a tragic predicament
that is embedded in these realizations. Security for the citizenry
is likely to remain elusive despite impressive technological innovations and the greatly intensified efforts of regulatory institutions.3 We confront a serious possibility that the pursuit of
security in our daily lives may prove to be both ineffectual and
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repressive at the same time, thereby imperiling the quality of democracy without providing protection against these new forms of
extremism directed against our nation and people. What is more,
which is the relevant point in this essay, the pressures exerted
by the challenges of mega-terrorism have diverted energies and
resources away from some exceptionally promising developments in the humanitarian sector that were occurring in the
1990s. These developments were exciting in several distinct ways,
raising hopes for significant improvement in the human condition, as well as representing encouraging steps from the perspective of global justice. Such initiatives exhibited both the growth
of transnational social forces emerging out of civil society, often
acting internationally as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and a new spirit of collaboration between governments
and NGOs that was giving rise to a new type of diplomacy that
could be described as ‘‘a new internationalism’’ motivated by ethical concerns, and distinct from the preoccupations with power
and wealth that formed the subject-matter of geopolitics as practiced by leading states. The historic Antipersonnel Landmines
Treaty (1998) was a notable illustration of this new and promising form of global reform.
It seems reasonable to maintain that prior to September 11
there was a multifaceted upsurge of humanitarian initiatives that
had already within the space of a decade established a rather
remarkable record of achievement, with prospects for continuing
progress. I have previously described this set of developments as
the first global normative revolution in human history, that is, a
definite trend of qualitative status suggesting the relevance of
ethical values and issues of justice that was beginning to challenge the dominant realist paradigm that reduced international
relations to calculations of power and self-interest, also called
‘‘national interest.’’4
The First Global Normative Revolution
The centerpiece of the emergent normative revolution was the
genuine rise of human rights from the outer margins of diplo-
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macy and international concern to a position that seemed close
to the center of foreign policy, bearing directly on issues of
whether or not to seek economic gains in relation with countries
whose governments were responsible for repressing their own
populations. Michael Ignatieff, an influential commentator on
global policy trends, argued that human rights had become the
secular religion of our era.5 Such a sweeping generalization undoubtedly reflected wishful thinking, but it was also a historic
comment on some extraordinary reversals of expectations that
had occurred in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet system of
internal and regional domination was certainly hastened by
strong grassroots resistance that claimed to be seeking and demanding the implementation of human rights. The amazing surprise transformation that took place in South Africa without
bloodshed early in the decade was definitely hastened by the antiapartheid movement that was inspired by the global consensus
condemning the institutionalized racism of Pretoria as a crime
against humanity. Such positive outcomes owed a great deal to
pressures exerted by people acting on their own on behalf of
human rights goals, organized at the level of civil society, and
mounting moral outrage that led governments to override material and strategic interests by joining in the struggles to achieve
change.
These encouraging initiatives reflected the interplay of many
different influences, but in this discussion the focus will be on
the distinctive contributions made by the NGO world, and civil
society generally. This contribution is particularly evident in relation to the expanding role of human rights in world politics. The
domain of human rights as a subject for NGO activism goes back
to the period immediately after World War II.6 It is doubtful that
sovereign states in the late 1940s would have assented to an international framework imposing duties to respect human rights if
their leaders had thought such standards were meant in any but
an aspirational spirit. What made the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) a feasible political project was the
assurance that it was understood at the time to be unenforceable.
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This expectation was signaled by shaping the framework in the
form of a ‘‘declaration’’ endorsed by the membership of the UN
General Assembly, but lacking the legal stature of a treaty that
carries with it the implications that the standards set forth are
obligatory. It was also evident after World War II that very few
countries were governed in accordance with the UDHR, and that
their governments would never have lent their approval to an
international instrument that gave the UN or other states some
sort of legal basis to push for implementation.
Human rights NGOs in the decades following 1948 were
formed and immediately realized that a great opportunity existed
to use this aspirational document to promote some desired modifications of behavior by repressive states, and at least to depict
persuasively severe human rights abuses. Amnesty International
took advantage of their realization that governments increasingly
care about their reputation, and that allegations of human rights
abuses are black marks when backed up by genuine information
and given wide distribution by a world media. Such allegations
could not be dismissed as the propaganda of ideological adversaries as was the case in the exchange of cold war charges and
counter-charges being made by officials in Washington and Moscow. NGOs put human rights on the world policy map long before the 1990s, and paved the way for many governments to
adjust their regulatory policies.7 To begin with, the UDHR was
converted in the mid-1960s into a pair of treaties called ‘‘covenants’’ that were widely ratified by states around the world. It
became a matter of political legitimacy for states to commit themselves formally and existentially to the overall goal of conforming
their political practices to human rights standards. This evolution, although welcome, was less attributable to changes of heart
on the part of governments and more to a combination of the
sustained pressure of human rights organizations and some parts
of the media over the years and a closely related trend toward
the democratization of political life. Thus, despite its modest beginnings, human rights NGOs and international institutions increasingly viewed the UDHR as a framework of rights to be
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seriously implemented, which included the push for treaty-making procedures and for the further elaboration of specific rights
that deserved wider recognition (for instance, prohibition of racial discrimination, protection of women and children, prohibition of torture).8
This NGO role was then reinforced by historical circumstances
that led opposition groups in authoritarian societies to rely on
international human rights standards to back up their demands
for political reform. This process of opposition was most dramatic in the settings of Eastern Europe and South Africa where
the wider struggle for fundamental change showed that human
rights could no longer be reduced to a set of pieties but were
now a serious dimension of political conflict. The same dynamic
was to a degree also visible in the Asian pro-democracy movements of the 1980s, which did not achieve success in all instances,
but exhibited the degree to which people everywhere were inspired by the conviction of an entitlement to fundamental
human rights.9
What happened in the 1990s that was so encouraging was that
human rights seemed to become an active ingredient of international public policy, generally exhibiting a sincere concern of the
general public about the suffering endured by vulnerable populations, groups, and individuals victimized by governmental
wrongdoing and subject to media exposure.10 This upgrading of
human rights was also institutionally expressed within the United
Nations, principally by establishing a High Commissioner for
Human Rights, which in turn led to more prominence being accorded to the work of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission. Thanks to the combined pressures of an increasingly
democratized world and a heightened global public opinion
strengthened by media attention, human rights were becoming
an essential facet of international political life in the 1990s.
The second development in the previous decade that formed
part of the normative revolution getting underway, even though
it remained controversial in some settings, was the willingness
of the organized international community, or portions of it, to

350

REVIVING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER 9/11

undertake humanitarian intervention designed to rescue or protect vulnerable populations or minorities from oppressive practices of their government.11 The idea behind humanitarian
intervention is the claim by an external political actor that it refuses to respect the supremacy of territorial sovereignty in those
circumstances of extreme abuse of human rights. The occasion
giving rise to humanitarian intervention in the 1990s was the accusation of ethnic cleansing of a disfavored ethnic or religious
component of the territorial population with the goal of expulsion, an abusive policy that was also often coupled with genocidal
practices involving massive rape and massacres directed against
the targets of abuse. Humanitarian intervention generated the
sort of debate that was also in the background of discussion about
the implementation of human rights generally.12 There were several issues: Should the obligation to uphold human rights be implemented by force? Were the motives underlying humanitarian
intervention truly humanitarian or were these claims masking
geopolitical goals? Must humanitarian intervention in all instances be authorized by the UN Security Council? Did the results of such interventions bring real benefit to the vulnerable
peoples?
To be sure, there were disappointments and ambiguities associated with purported humanitarian interventions in this period.
The Kosovo intervention of 1999 seemed to reward the violence
of the KLA; it relied on tactics that caused extensive death
among Serbian civilians; it proceeded without formal mandate
from the United Nations; and during its aftermath, insufficient
effort was made by occupying forces under NATO authority to
protect the Serbian minority against ‘‘reverse ethnic cleansing.’’
At the same time, the intervention provided the only available
means to ensure that the great majority of the Kosovars would be
rescued from a catastrophic prospect, to have some confidence
in the avoidance of a repetition of the ethnic cleansing that had
in the early 1990s caused so much death and destruction in Bosnia, and to repudiate decisively the criminal policies associated
with the Milosevic government in Belgrade.
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Of potentially even greater significance for the future of world
order, a consensus seemed to be slowly taking shape among leading states insisting that sovereignty was no longer an absolute
grant of authority, and that the moral, political, and legal prerogatives of rulership were conditioned upon adhering to the most
basic human rights standards. If a government henceforth severely abused its people, or a portion thereof, beyond a certain
threshold, then respect for its sovereign rights would be diminished, if not ignored, and such tarnished sovereign rights need
no longer to be respected by the international community. And
in some instances, that loss of sovereignty becomes permanent,
taking the form of affirming the right of the abused minority to
exercise a right of self-determination that could lead to de facto,
and even to de jure, independence. Human rights NGOs cannot
take the major credit for instances of humanitarian intervention,
but it has often been their presence on the ground in the society
experiencing, and their credibility in validating, oppressive circumstance that leads to media emphasis, which in turn tips the
balance toward intervention within governmental circles and at
the United Nations.
Before concluding against humanitarian intervention, it would
be appropriate to consider the massacre of upwards of 800,000
in Rwanda in 1994, where the UN refused to respond to urgent
calls for humanitarian protection, and in Bosnia during the first
half of the 1990s when tepid engagement by the UN led to the
spectacle of a particularly brutal enactment of ethnic cleansing,
culminating in the 1995 massacre of some 7,000 Muslim males at
Srebrenica.13 What I think it is possible to say is that this subjectmatter of humanitarian intervention remained problematic
whether the decision was to take positive action or to refrain
from doing so. There is no doubt that powerful states used the
cover of humanitarian intervention to advance strategic goals,
and refused to allow such responses in comparable situations if
their interests were linked to the status quo. It is reasonable for
smaller states and for ex-colonial states, and the non-Western
world generally, to be deeply suspicious of humanitarian inter-
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vention as it invariably has involved the Euro-American complex
of states imposing its political will with mixed motives on one or
another non-Western state. Such suspicions are deepened if, as
in Kosovo, the UN is bypassed to avoid a veto of a resolution in
the Security Council authorizing force, and if supporters argue
that in the future, not even the imprimatur of a regional grouping such as NATO is necessary, but that it is sufficient to enlist
‘‘coalitions of the willing.’’
Let it be understood that not all of the opposition to instances
of humanitarian intervention comes from leftist skepticism in the
North and anti-interventionism in the South. The political right
is also generally opposed to humanitarian intervention on principled reasons, believing that foreign policy should be guided by
strategic, and possibly ideological, goals, but not by any ethos of
human solidarity. Such conservative views in the United States
opposed the whole idea of humanitarian intervention as a basis
for foreign policy, especially to the extent that it was regarded as
sincere! The shift in American leadership that occurred at the
end of the 1990s represented a move from liberalism to conservatism on this issue, with the new president, George W. Bush, emphasizing throughout his campaign his unwillingness to engage
in ‘‘nation-building,’’ by which he meant the policies guided by
humanitarian motivations pursued by the Clinton Administration in sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in the Balkans. In effect, the left criticized humanitarian intervention because it was
hiding geopolitical motives and was hypocritical while the right
attacked the same policies because they were not convincingly
geopolitical.
The third dimension of this new focus on the ethical side of
international relations that assumed great significance in the
1990s and reflected the growing potency of civil society was the
surge of efforts by individuals and their associations to obtain
redress in various forms for historic grievances.14 This surge of
concern disclosed an increased willingness to treat the crimes
of the past as unresolved: the activism of Holocaust survivors; of
comfort women in the Japanese setting; of a variety of slave labor
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initiatives seeking compensation after the clouds of the cold war;
of claims for reparations associated with the institutions of slavery
and colonialism; of an array of commissions devoted to ‘‘truth
and reconciliation’’; and of grievances advanced by indigenous
peoples who had been dispossessed from their historic lands and
endured humiliation and deprivations.15 This sense of the obligations of present society for past abuses of state power, most of
which were treated as legal and valid at the time of their occurrence, represented an extraordinary recognition that these historic wounds continued to cause suffering to victims and their
descendants, and would never be healed without some active curative response. Many of these grievances had persisted without
serious notice for decades, if not centuries. Why had these past
injustices abruptly generated formal responses and increased activism in the 1990s when they had been ignored for so long?
There is no simple response, no one explanation. Certainly, the
end of the cold war removed some of the obstacles that had
shielded governments from accountability. Also relevant was the
previously mentioned trends toward upholding human rights
and democratization. But perhaps most important was the
spreading awareness of civic empowerment. Holocaust survivors
and their descendants led the way, but also led others with grievances to push for acknowledgement, compensation, apology, and
other types of redress.
In this climate of opinion, the credibility of claimants was
greatly enhanced. To be sure, there was also practical and principled resistance. Those accused tended to be defensive, contending that there was no current responsibility for what had been
done previously in an atmosphere where values and legalities
were different. There was no consistent response from issue to
issue, and from country to country. There were some impressive
symbolic and substantive steps taken toward reconciliation, and
in the direction of reversing past injustice. Swiss banks were induced to return deposits and settle many claims of Holocaust
victims valued in the billions. Corporations using slave labor in
Germany offered fairly large amounts of compensation. Apolo-

354

REVIVING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER 9/11

gies were expressed by leaders such as President Bill Clinton for
the institution of slavery, and by the British queen for the imposition of colonial rule. Several governments, including the Canadian and the Australian, established education and
compensation funds that are trying at least to rescue the traditional remnants of indigenous civilizations from complete extinction, and to provide at least symbolic recompense for past
wrongs.
These evidences that the international community and civil society were coming to some sort of acknowledgment of these historic injustices was again, I think, an important element in this
unexpected normative revolution that was beginning to take
shape in the 1990s. Its essential character was to exhibit the interaction of governments and civil society with respect to a series of
issues bearing on the responsibility of the state. The state, as well
as other international actors, was being humanized by this process by which injustices, even if in the distant past, were being
heeded, and to some extent addressed. Such a process reflected
the capacity of NGOs to help generate an ethical climate of accountability that exerted influence on all global actors, including
the United Nations.
There was a still further fourth major element of this normative revolution that again exhibited the growing strength of civil
society to reshape the role of the state and its institutions with
regard to issues of global justice. This element concerned dramatic efforts to make leaders individually accountable for crimes
of state committed against their own peoples.16 The objective was
to make leaders accountable for severe abuses carried out against
their own people. The Pinochet litigation, arising out of action
taken in Spanish courts leading to an extradition request directed at the British government, came about as a result of tireless efforts by those individuals and their relatives who had been
victimized in Chile during the period of dictatorship not giving
up on the pursuit of justice when living in exile in Spain. The
dramatic fact of Pinochet’s 1998 detention in Britain and the series of legal challenges associated with the detention produced
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some notable achievement. The practice of torture was confirmed by the House of Lords, the highest British judicial tribunal, as an international crime that can be apprehended and
punished anywhere in the world, not just in the country where it
occurred.17 Of even greater importance was the renewal of the
Nuremberg idea that even leaders of sovereign states are not exempt from individual criminal accountability for their official
deeds, that the shield of sovereign immunity is not available.
What happened unexpectedly in the 1990s after a lapse of more
than forty-five years—first in relation to the Balkans and
Rwanda—was this revival of the radical idea applied to defeated
countries after World War II that political and military leaders of
sovereign states are not above the law. Of course, the pursuit of
Pinochet, which in the end failed because he was found medically unfit to stand trial and returned to Chile, suggested the
analogous criminality of a host of other leaders still at large
around the world. Some of those accused were linked to powerful states. The most widely discussed instances were Henry Kissinger, especially for his role in the wrongdoing of the Pinochet
government, and Ariel Sharon for his alleged responsibility for
the massacres that took place in the Palestinian refugee camps of
Sabra and Shatila back in 1982. Questions were raised as to
whether the world is ready for such criminal accountability,
which, given the realities, would lead to very uneven and selective
enforcement of such standards of accountability.
The moves to detain and prosecute Pinochet stimulated civil
society by suggesting that the rule of law might reach those responsible for the worse excesses of governmental and military
authority. The Pinochet controversy, together with the experience of the ad hoc tribunal in The Hague dealing with crimes
attributed to individuals associated with managing the breakup
of former Yugoslavia, led civil society activists to embark upon an
ambitious project to institutionalize the process in some enduring way through the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court entrusted with the prosecution of the most serious
international crimes. What ensued was a notably effective collab-
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oration between a large coalition of NGOs and a series of moderate governments that generated a political process that led in
1998 to the Treaty of Rome and then to the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. Such a major
institutional innovation was brought into being with surprising
speed, securing more than the required sixty ratifications in a
period of a few years.
This experiment in institutionalization is still in its infancy. It
is opposed vigorously at present by the United States, and ignored by several other powerful countries, including China and
Russia. If it could come later to obtain universal participation (as
is the case with the UN), it would likely be viewed as the greatest
institutional innovation since the United Nations itself. Its significance, symbolically and substantively, is that it expresses a determination to extend accountability and the rule of law to those
who represent the state at the highest level. The creation of procedures by which to impose such accountability is a step forward
in the efforts to overcome the impunity, at least on the international level, previously enjoyed by those who control sovereign
states. Also, even compared to Nuremberg, the ICC is ambitious.
The earlier criminal prosecutions of leaders were linked to a war,
and embodied ‘‘victors’ justice,’’ the winners judging the loser.18
Here, any leader at any point is, theoretically at least, subject to
indictment, whether of a powerful or a weak country. The establishment of the ICC in an interdependent globalizing world
could yet become an extraordinary step forward in the struggle
to create global democracy as a complement to national democracy, yet to reach this goal there are major obstacles that must be
overcome. At present, strong resistance to such an expansion of
accountability and the consequent strengthening of the global
rule of law has mainly come from such leading countries as the
United States and China. Both countries are definitely unwilling
at this point to join in the effort to qualify sovereignty as the last
word on legality.
The fifth and final component of the normative revolution
that I am depicting is the rise of global civil society, which has
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become a source of lawmaking and global policy formation. Literally thousands of NGOs are now associated with the representation of transnational social forces in a variety of regional and
global arenas. Their presence was a robust and influential feature
in the first half of the 1990s of such UN conferences as those on
population, environment, human rights, and women’s rights that
advanced a people-oriented agenda on these matters of global
concern. This agenda clashed with the priorities of leading governments and global corporations and banks.19 Increasingly, the
focus of efforts emanating from global civil society was placed
upon the supposed excesses of neo-liberal globalization. The emphasis on globalization led to demonstrations around the world
that gained major attention from the media, particularly in the
aftermath of ‘‘the battle of Seattle’’ in late 1999. The demonstrators and their discussion forums highlighted the antidemocratic
practices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the lending practices of the World Bank.
This antiglobalization movement, although diverse and inchoate, is properly considered as part of the normative revolution
that is being described. Its main thrust was to resist some of the
capital-driven impacts of globalization that seemed to be producing increasing inequality within and among states, as well as leaving some states that lacked investment trade opportunities out
in the cold. These global civil society criticisms were mainly not
opposed to globalization as such, but were insisting on reforms
that would lead to what might be described as ‘‘humane globalization.’’ These criticisms were increasingly engendering a response from some of those most closely associated with the world
economy in its recent globalizing phase. Such figures as George
Soros and Joseph Stiglitz echoed many of the complaints that
were being shouted by the demonstrators about the way the
global economy policy was proceeding.20 As a result, the language
associated with globalization began to exhibit more concern with
such issues as the reduction of world poverty, the promotion of
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greater economic equality, the protection of human rights, particularly labor rights, and matters of environmental protection.
In the background was an acknowledgement by policymakers
and leaders that just as early industrial capitalism had to come
to terms with the labor movement there was a need for global
capitalism to reach a compromise with its critics. Even business
circles were beginning to recognize that continued economic
growth depended on striking a win/win bargain with this deepening grassroots struggle for equity of result and for some kind
of democratic participation in the policy-forming process. What
had been evident earlier in the strident street demonstrations
was also reflected in the changed mood of the business and finance elites that gathered each year in Davos at the World Economic Forum. To continue this dialogue, civil society forces have
organized their own annual event in recent years, pointedly
called the World Social Forum and deliberately held in Porto Allegre in Brazil. The conclusion here is that these transnational
social forces, and their NGOs, were overwhelmingly dedicated to
the promotion of global justice and the range of humanitarian
concerns that constituted the normative revolution of the 1990s.

September 11: Detour or Derailment?
Against this background of positive initiatives, I want to raise the
question as to whether the September 11 attacks have resulted
in a detour from this normative revolution, or merely caused its
temporary derailment. There is little doubt that the energies and
attention given to the initiatives discussed above have been superseded during the last year or so, especially in the United States,
by the renewed foreign policy preoccupation with security and
the dynamics of the war against global terror. In light of this shift
how should we interpret the overall impact of September 11? Its
negative aspects are quite obvious. Instead of seeking to build the
structures of global governance, and strengthen further a global
rule of law as a means of exerting constraints on sovereign states,
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the new emphasis is on claiming the authority to engage in whatever actions contribute to antiterrorist goals. This kind of claim
to carry on violent conflict has two particularly disturbing aspects.
The first concern is that there has resulted the first borderless
war in which the both principal adversaries disavow respect for
the territorial sovereignty of states. The al Qaeda network has
declared jihad against America, its allies, and its people, and is
prepared to launch attacks wherever such targets can be found,
that is, anywhere in the world. The United States, in turn, claims
the right to attack anywhere that it can find an al Qaeda presence
or threat. This pattern of conflict is quite subversive from the
perspective of international law, which evolved to deal with conflicts among territorial sovereigns. Of course, international law
never enjoyed great success in relation to wartime situations, but
it did have some role in moderating the scope of conflict by confining the zone of violent operations to the territorial domains
of the combatants. Now, as President Bush has pointed out, other
countries are denied the option of neutrality and war-avoidance;
either they join with the United States or they will be treated as
siding with the terrorists.
The United States is the most powerful country in human history. Since September 11 its leadership portrays itself as the vehicle of good against this evil of anti-state terrorism. To destroy this
evil, it is determined, as is the case with its al Qaeda adversary, to
suspend limits on the way force is used to achieve goals. Already
prisoners suspected of al Qaeda connections are denied rights
under the Geneva Conventions governing the standards of international humanitarian law. Already the White House has issued
orders permitting assassination of suspects in foreign countries
as a permissible tactic, reversing an earlier ban on assassinations.
There are authoritative indications that American investigative
procedures are directly and indirectly relying on torture.21 When
the leading state treats its national security in such absolute and
unconditional terms, there are grounds for concern as to
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whether the claims being made do not unnecessarily infringe on
individual and sovereign rights.
But there are additional reasons to be troubled. The antiterrorist banner is being waved, but the goals of American foreign
policy were extravagant before September 11, and now seem to
be pretending that the struggle against terrorism validates the
project to exert control over virtually the entire planet. Such contentions can best be understood by reference to such other
American strategic undertakings as the militarization of space,
the realization that U.S. defense spending exceeds that of the
next fifteen countries combined, and there have been Pentagon
leaks disclosing an increased willingness to rely on nuclear weaponry in battlefield situations. Our president has been saying very
clearly that the U.S. possesses and will take whatever steps it
needs to maintain a degree of military dominance that makes it
futile for any country or group of countries to mount a challenge. In effect, President Bush has instructed foreign governments not to waste their resources on trying to compete with the
United States. This stricture applies to both friend and foe. For
neither is it worth trying to challenge the military dominance
that the U.S. now exercises over other states. Foreign governments are explicitly advised, as in the president’s West Point
Commencement Address of 2002, to concentrate on trade and
peaceful pursuits, leaving the business of global security to the
United States.
In effect, American security planners are proposing post-realist
arrangements that follow from the facts of unipolarity. Such
ideas as the balance of power, containment, and deterrence are
essentially outmoded. Whatever stability achieved during the several centuries of modernity, which was organized with reference
to the interaction of a few leading sovereign states, was premised
upon ideas of countervailing power. International law played a
modest role, reinforcing the intended results of countervailing
power by counseling peaceful settlement of international disputes, seeking to be useful by finding the humanitarian niches in
the framework of war that would not undercut actions of warring

RICHARD FALK

361

states based on considerations of military necessity. These niches
related to the protection of prisoners of war, of sick and wounded
soldiers caught on the battlefield, and, to some extent, the prohibition on direct attacks on civilians and non-military targets.
What made these legally imposed limits generally effective was
that they were based on a logic of reciprocity and embodied mutual interests of the conflicting parties.
But this new framework of American power, so far unchallenged by other states, but vulnerable to attack by concealed
transnational terrorist networks, makes us think of the relevance
of one of the basic maxims of political theory. Its formulation is
usually associated with Lord Acton’s statement that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Under these circumstances can we, should we, search for new
limits on the discretion to use force in world politics? This is a
vital question, especially for Americans, that needs to be addressed in this new post-September 11 setting. I want to answer
such a question rather subjectively, by offering some tentative
thoughts about the reconstruction of limits, and how this might
bear upon the wider agenda of humanitarian action. As a starting
point, the only acceptable way to rediscover a framework of limits
is to recognize that our own values and traditions as a free society
based on constitutionalism depend upon nurturing a respect for
law and for the opinions of others, including those situated beyond our borders, and a reluctance to embark upon warfare outside of the Western Hemisphere. This ethical outlook is part of
the federalist idea and the republican vision that has guided our
sense of ourselves as a country, despite notable departures from
time to time, since the national point of origin in the American
Revolution. To protect this heritage at this point, given the pressures of the mega-terrorist challenge and the ambitions of the
geopoliticians in the White House and Pentagon, will require
massive citizen vigilance. Unfortunately, this vigilance will obviously not come from governmental institutions centered in
Washington. If it comes at all it will be from the American people, from interior states such as Kansas and Minnesota, from ac-
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tivism on college campuses, and from a new energy in the
religious community and the labor movement. Even to contemplate such prospects may seem utopian at this point, given the
patriotic mood that still grips the country, as well as the disturbing passivity of the Congress, the opportunistic virtual silence of
the Democratic Party, and the bellicose cheerleading of the
mainstream media.
At stake here also is the matter of fundamental national identity. Aside from this acceptance of the self-limiting character of
the state is the traditional American claim to be a republic and
not an empire. However, if you assess the plans put forth by the
Pentagon or peruse recent issues of Foreign Affairs, it is assumed
that America has become, whether intentionally or not, an empire. The issue that remains more uncertain in these interpretations is whether the United States is likely to be a benevolent
empire or whether it will be its fate to be an irresponsible, and
probably, self-destructive empire.22 The question that has so far
not been raised, at least in these discussions within the American
establishment, is whether being an empire is itself subversive of
the self-proclaimed constitutional identity of this country as a republic. To be a republic is to be sensitive to the fragility of power,
including the acute dangers of its abuse. The main purpose of
the constitutional structure, based on checks and balances, is to
protect the society against the destructive effects and multiple
dangers of unchecked power. This prospect threatens our liberties as citizens, but internationally, the menace of unchecked
power involves ignoring the well-being and viewpoints of others
who lack the means of resisting.
The second problematic aspect of the response to September
11 should have been part of our foreign policy and political consciousness for years, that is, diagnosing and responding to the
legitimate grievances that exist throughout the world, and if ignored, give rise to severe resentment. This resentment is especially directed against those political actors that are perceived to
be responsible for unacceptable conditions and possess the capabilities to fashion just solutions to outstanding conflicts. The
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United States, as the predominant actor throughout the world, is
seen as having contributed to the suffering of peoples due to
its relationship to some of these legitimate grievances. From the
moment of the attacks, the American leadership has failed to
connect anti-American sentiments, including those that give rise
to political and religious extremism, and terrorist tactics with
their real causes. Instead, avoiding the slightest willingness to
allow self-criticism, the explanation of ‘‘why they hate us’’ is reduced to envy directed at our values and achievements. Supposedly, in such self-serving explanations, those who most resent
America’s role in the world do not have our institutions or
wealth, and hate us as a result. Given the actualities surrounding
America’s presence in many parts of the world, especially the
Middle East, such an explanation does not convince beyond our
borders.
These spiraling patterns of resentment pertain to the relations
between the United States and the Islamic world, and especially
the Arab Middle East. Of course, commentary is speculative. But
it certainly seems much more likely that September 11 would not
have happened if the Palestinian problems of self-determination
had been solved years ago in a manner that was fair to both peoples. This conflict should have been dealt with long ago in a balanced way, not only for prudential reasons associated with
regional stability, but as part of a more intrinsic commitment to
a realization of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian
people, who had been denied independence and statehood despite the dynamics of decolonization having swept across the
world in recent decades. The United States possessed the leverage to push toward such a solution, but instead allowed the issue
to be shaped by domestic politics. The contours of a fair solution
have been widely supported at an international level for more
than a decade. To stand aside or to lend support to the Israeli
refusal to allow a solution that would give both peoples their own
states is to flaunt global public opinion and to overlook the reasonable expectations of the Palestinian people. This failure, so
long sustained, inflames Arab and Islamic sensibilities, creating a
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resonance for conspiratorial accounts of Islamic frustrations and
a ready constituency for political militancy.
Not all the legitimate grievances arising from American policies are associated with Islam. And yet September 11 has had a
negative impact on efforts to address substantively unrelated issues, as well. For instance, a promising initiative by the Mexican
government to humanize the circumstances of 20 million Mexican immigrants living in the United States had met with a positive response in the early period of the Bush presidency. But
since September 11 it has been cast aside, apparently indefinitely.
So much so that the Mexican foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda,
who had made immigration reform the centerpiece of his efforts
to improve the character of the U.S.-Mexican relationship, resigned his post in disillusionment.23 If anti-American extremism
were to emerge in Mexico sometime in the future, we could look
back and ask ourselves why we failed to address the arbitrary
hardships endured by so-called undocumented Mexican immigrants that live in this country while remaining vulnerable to exploitation and hardship because of their unresolved immigration
status.

Reviving the Normative Revolution:
Temptations and Commitments
In effect, the construction of a humane framework for global governance, which was proceeding in a generally encouraging way
in the 1990s, has been abandoned in this period after September
11. Can it be revived? Can global civil society renew its pressures
that proved effective in the prior decade? What sorts of issues
should take priority? Despite adverse trends, wherever integrity
and courage are found, there remains the possibility of positive
action with respect to the agenda of the normative revolution.
The security obsessions generated by September 11 are not a
valid excuse for a denial of human rights under most circumstances. Nothing has illustrated this potentiality better than the
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decision by a conservative Republican governor of Illinois,
George Ryan, to commute all 167 death row sentences in his state
just prior to leaving office. Such an act challenges the United
States to question the overall moral viability of capital punishment at the very moment when the federal government has made
the death penalty increasingly easy to apply in any case touching
on the terrorist menace. After all, from a human rights perspective, America lags far behind our traditional European allies on
this issue, and finds itself aligned with some of the worst human
rights offenders in the world, including China, Iraq, and Iran.
One direction of response is to argue that war policies favored
by Washington in relation to ‘‘axis of evil’’ countries are really
‘‘humanitarian interventions’’ under a different name. In the
background is the claim that the Afghanistan War emancipated
the people of Afghanistan from the oppressive cruelties of the
Taliban regime. Although the evidence is conflicting in several
respects, the Taliban collapse seems to be providing the Afghan
people with enhanced possibilities for the achievement of minimal human rights, especially with respect to the treatment of
women. The same position may result from the change of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. True, the Bush Administration
does not rely on a humanitarian rationale to validate its thrust
toward war, but rather the threat associated with Iraq’s undisclosed weapons of mass destruction and the possible linkage to
the al Qaeda network. Outside of America, this justification for
war had few adherents. But why not support the war as an instance of humanitarian intervention, taking comfort from the effects of the Kosovo intervention and the outcome of the
Afghanistan War?
It is true that the removal of the Saddam Hussein Baathist regime will have an emancipatory impact on Iraq, possibly even
allowing its return to normalcy in relation to the outside world
and enabling economic recovery to occur, as well as installing in
power a more moderate leadership. Such prospects are clouded
by serious uncertainties about the ease and repercussions of an
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American-led intervention. The complexities of the situation are
such that such an intervention, followed by an augmented American military presence in the region, will fan the flames of antiAmericanism, likely worsening the problems arising from terrorism. Beyond this, some informed observers believe that the control of a post-Saddam Iraq will be exceedingly difficult, with the
dangers of the fragmentation of the Iraqi state and/or a civil war
lurking close to the surface. If these negative scenarios occur,
then it is quite possible that anti-American moves in countries
such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even Pakistan could
occur, widening the arena of violent conflict.
There are other problems with the suggestion that those who
favor humanitarianism and human rights at the global level
should advocate support for the Iraq war. American hypocrisy on
the issue is awkward. The worst crimes of Baghdad were committed in the 1980s, quite long ago, when Iraq was a virtual regional
ally of the United States, and criticism deliberately muted. This
includes criminal Iraqi uses of chemical weaponry against Iranian soldiers in the Iraq-Iran War and against Kurdish villages,
especially Halabja. It also overlooks the degree to which the
American insistence on sustaining a harsh sanctions policy following the Gulf War has contributed to the deaths of more than
a half million Iraqi civilians, according to impartial UN and NGO
documentation. And finally, in relation to the al Qaeda threat,
there exists a strong argument that Saddam’s Iraq had nothing
to do with this terrorist network, and that the U.S. government
needs to concentrate its political and military efforts on this danger. There are great dangers in a costly and risky campaign for
regime change in Iraq, despite the well-documented case depicting the brutalities and oppressiveness of the Saddam regime. It is
not, accordingly, a good enough case for humanitarian intervention to overcome the objections, and thus opposition to the Iraq
war policies was justified.
In conclusion, returning to the spirit of the normative revolution in the 1990s is not immediately feasible. There is a sufficient
active and continuing security threat to validate the current di-
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version of energies and resources. But if this direct security threat
can be minimized by the American response, then the deeper
security argument strongly supports the revival of the normative
revolution, starting with fashioning equitable responses to legitimate grievances around the world. Without resuming the struggle to achieve humane global governance, the likelihood is that
forces of resistance will occur in forms that will jeopardize security in additional ways. We need the moral and political imagination to realize that the security of the rich and powerful in a
globalizing world depends over time on improving the circumstances and raising the hopes of the poor and weak. If September
11 has taught us anything, it should be that the weapons and
tactics of the weak are capable of inflicting severe harm with significant adverse material and psychological consequences. To
learn from such a traumatic experience means nurturing our
ethical impulses as well as sharpening our swords!

APPENDIX

Essential Provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and 1977 Additional Protocols
—Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
—Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed ‘‘hors de combat’’ by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect
to the above-mentioned persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guar-
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antees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to
the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part
of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
—Article 12 (‘‘Protection and Care’’) of the First Convention:
Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in
the following Article, who are wounded or sick, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.
They shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party to
the conflict in whose power they may be, without any adverse
distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political
opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts upon their
lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in
particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall
conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the
order of treatment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
The Party to the conflict which is compelled to abandon
wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military considerations permit, leave with them a part of its medical personnel and
material to assist in their care.
—Article 12 (‘‘Protection and Care’’) of the Second Convention:
Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in
the following Article, who are at sea and who are wounded, sick,
or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood that the term ‘‘shipwreck’’ means
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shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by
or from aircraft.
Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for by the
Parties to the conflict in whose power they may be, without any
adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion,
political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts
upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they
shall not willfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor
shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the
order of treatment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
—Article 13 (‘‘Humane Treatment of Prisoners’’) of the Third
Convention:
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any
unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death
or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its
custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of
the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be
subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental,
or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out
in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
—Article 27 (‘‘Treatment. General Observations’’) of the Fourth
Convention:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect
for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious
convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They
shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
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especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and
against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on
their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or
any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of
health, age, and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with
the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose
power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion, or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of
control and security in regard to protected persons as may be
necessary as a result of the war.
—Article 48 (‘‘Civilian Population—General Protection against
Effects of Hostilities—Basic Rule’’) of Additional Protocol 1 of
1977:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.
—Article 75 (‘‘Fundamental Guarantees’’) of Additional Protocol 1 as well as:
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in
Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a
Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and
shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this
Article without any adverse distinction based upon race,
color, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honor, convictions and religious practices
of all such persons.
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2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by
civilian or by military agents:
a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular:
(1) murder;
(2) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(3) corporal punishment; and
(4) mutilation;
b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution, and any
form of indecent assault;
c) the taking of hostages;
d) collective punishments; and
e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained, or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a
language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention
for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the
minimum delay possible and, in any event, as soon as the
circumstances justifying the arrest, detention, or internment have ceased to exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed
on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to the
armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced
by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting
the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and
during his trial all necessary rights and means of defense;
b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the
basis of individual penal responsibility;
c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal of-
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fence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it
was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed
than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of
the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition
of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law;
e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be
tried in his presence;
f ) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt;
g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party
for an offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been previously
pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure;
i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to
have the judgement pronounced publicly; and
j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his
judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within
which they may be exercised.
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related
to the armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated
from men’s quarters. They shall be under the immediate
supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families
are detained or interned, they shall, whenever possible, be
held in the same place and accommodated as family units.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons
related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection pro-
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vided by this Article until their final release, repatriation or
re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and
trial of persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply:
a) persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law; and
b) any such persons who do not benefit from more favorable
treatment under the Conventions or this Protocol shall
be accorded the treatment provided by this Article,
whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol.
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting
or infringing any other more favorable provision granting
greater protection, under any applicable rules of international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1.
—Article 10 (‘‘Protection and Care’’):
1. All the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, to whichever Party
they belong, shall be respected and protected.
2. In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and
shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the
least possible delay, the medical care and attention required
by their condition. There shall be no distinction among
them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.
—Article 11 (‘‘Protection of Persons’’):
1. The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who
are in the power of the adverse Party or who are interned,
detained, or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of a
situation referred to in Article 1 shall not be endangered by
any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited
to subject the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of health
of the person concerned and which is not consistent with
generally accepted medical standards which would be ap-
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plied under similar medical circumstances to persons who
are nationals of the Party conducting the procedure and
who are in no way deprived of liberty.
It is, in particular, prohibited to carry out on such persons,
even with their consent:
a) physical mutilations;
b) medical or scientific experiments;
c) removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, except
where these acts are justified in conformity with the conditions provided for in paragraph 1.
Exceptions to the prohibition in paragraph 2(c) may be
made only in the case of donations of blood for transfusion
or of skin for grafting, provided that they are given voluntarily and without any coercion or inducement, and then only
for therapeutic purposes, under conditions consistent with
generally accepted medical standards and controls designed
for the benefit of both the donor and the recipient.
Any willful act or omission which seriously endangers the
physical or mental health or integrity of any person who is
in the power of a Party other than the one on which he
depends and which either violates any of the prohibitions in
paragraphs 1 and 2 or fails to comply with the requirements
of paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach of this Protocol.
The persons described in paragraph 1 have the right to refuse any surgical operation. In case of refusal, medical personnel shall endeavor to obtain a written statement to that
effect, signed or acknowledged by the patient.
Each Party to the conflict shall keep a medical record for
every donation of blood for transfusion or skin for grafting
by persons referred to in paragraph 1, if that donation is
made under the responsibility of that Party. In addition,
each Party to the conflict shall endeavor to keep a record of
all medical procedures undertaken with respect to any person who is interned, detained, or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of a situation referred to in Article 1. These
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records shall be available at all times for inspection by the
Protecting Power.
—Article 15 (‘‘Protection of Civilian Medical and Religious Personnel’’):
1. Civilian medical personnel shall be respected and protected.
2. If needed, all available help shall be afforded to civilian
medical personnel in an area where civilian medical services
are disrupted by reason of combat activity.
3. The Occupying Power shall afford civilian medical personnel in occupied territories every assistance to enable them
to perform, to the best of their ability, their humanitarian
functions. The Occupying Power may not require that, in
the performance of those functions, such personnel shall
give priority to the treatment of any person except on medical grounds. They shall not be compelled to carry out tasks
which are not compatible with their humanitarian mission.
4. Civilian medical personnel shall have access to any place
where their services are essential, subject to such supervisory
and safety measures as the relevant Party to the conflict may
deem necessary.
5. Civilian religious personnel shall be respected and protected. The provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol concerning the protection and identification of medical
personnel shall apply equally to such persons.
—Article 16 (‘‘General Protection of Medical Duties’’):
1. Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for
carrying out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.
2. Persons engaged in medical activities shall not be compelled
to perform acts or to carry out work contrary to the rules of
medical ethics or to other medical rules designed for the
benefit of the wounded and sick or to the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol, or to refrain from performing acts or from carrying out work required by those rules
and provisions.
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3. No person engaged in medical activities shall be compelled
to give to anyone belonging either to an adverse Party, or to
his own Party except as required by the law of the latter
Party, any information concerning the wounded and sick
who are, or who have been, under his care, if such information would, in his opinion, prove harmful to the patients
concerned or to their families. Regulations for the compulsory notification of communicable diseases shall, however,
be respected.
—Article 35 (‘‘Methods and Means of Warfare—Basic Rules’’):
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, and material
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
—Article 40 (‘‘Quarter’’):
It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to
threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this
basis.
—Article 4 (‘‘Fundamental Guarantees’’) of Additional Protocol
2:
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased
to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person,
honor, and convictions and religious practices. They shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no
survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph
1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever:
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a) violence to the life, health, and physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel
treatment such as torture, mutilation, or any form of corporal punishment;
b) collective punishments;
c) taking of hostages;
d) acts of terrorism;
e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution
and any form of indecent assault;
f ) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
g) pillage;
h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:
a) they shall receive an education, including religious and
moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible
for their care;
b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated;
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years
shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups
nor allowed to take part in hostilities;
d) the special protection provided by this Article to children
who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are
captured;
e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by
law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to
remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country
and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.
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—Article 5 (‘‘Persons Whose Liberty Has Been Restricted’’) of
Additional Protocol 2:
1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained:
a) the wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance
with Article 7;
b) the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the
same extent as the local civilian population, be provided
with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards
as regards health and hygiene and protection against the
rigors of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;
c) they shall be allowed to receive individual or collective
relief;
d) they shall be allowed to practice their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive spiritual assistance
from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious
functions;
e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working
conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the
local civilian population.
2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention
of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, within
the limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons:
a) except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the
immediate supervision of women;
b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and
cards, the number of which may be limited by competent
authority if it deems necessary;
c) places of internment and detention shall not be located
close to the combat zone. The persons referred to in
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paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places where
they are interned or detained become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their
evacuation can be carried out under adequate conditions
of safety;
d) they shall have the benefit of medical examinations;
e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be
endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons described in
this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned, and
which is not consistent with the generally accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances.
3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose liberty has been restricted in any way whatsoever for reasons
related to the armed conflict shall be treated humanely in
accordance with Article 4 and with paragraphs 1(a), (c), and
(d), and 2(b) of this Article.
4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty,
necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by
those so deciding.
—Martens Clause (Article 1, para. 2 of Protocol 1):
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity, and
from the dictates of public conscience.
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Notes to Chapter One
Christianity and Humanitarian Action
Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J.
1. Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1996), 161.
2. Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes, 24.
3. Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II), Love and Responsibility (New York:
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4. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, 24.
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8. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, ‘‘Catholic Identity: Resolving Conflicting Expectations,’’ in The Future of Catholic Institutional Ministries,
eds. Charles J. Fahey et al. (New York: Fordham University Third Age
Center, 1992), 75–84, at 77.
9. Quoted from Fred Kammer, ‘‘Ten Ways Catholic Charities are
Catholic,’’ Catholic Charities Web site: catholiccharitiesusa.org/beliefs/
10ways.
10. ‘‘The Pope’s Address to Catholic Charities,’’ Origins 17 (October 8, 1987): 286–88, at 288.
11. Gaudium et spes, 42, 45.
12. Vatican II, Decree Unitatis redintegratio, 12.
13. Text in Origins 32 (June 20, 2002): 81–84.
14. Francis Arinze, Meeting Other Believers (Huntington, Ind.: Our
Sunday Visitor Publishing Co., 1997), 29.
15. ‘‘John Paul II Angelus Address of September 23, 2001,’’ Origins
31 (October 4, 2001): 287, 289, at 289.
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Notes to Chapter Two
For the Sake of My Kin and Friends:
Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action in Judaism
Rabbi Harlan J. Wechsler
1. Compare this, as well, to Plato’s idea in the Timaeus that creation is so lowly a task that it needs to be done by the demiurgos and not
by God Himself.
2. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper and
Row, 1962), 234–59.
3. Cf. Yohanan Muffs, Love & Joy: Law, Language and Religion in
Ancient Israel (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America,
1992), 9–48.
4. Harlan J. Wechsler, ‘‘The Artisan’s Touch: Jewish Ethics and the
Doctrine of Creation,’’ Conservative Judaism (Summer 1974): 54–60.
5. Gen. 1:27.
6. Maimonides The Guide for the Perplexed 1.1.
7. Commentary to Gen. 1:27.
8. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom (New York:
Schocken, 1972), 153.
9. Babylonian Talmud (BT) Sanhedrin 38a.
10. Gen. 2:7.
11. Nahmanides to Gen. 1:26.
12. Gen. 2:18.
13. Gen. 2:23. See Joseph B. Soloveitchik, ‘‘The Lonely Man of
Faith,’’ Tradition (Summer 1965): 5–67.
14. BT Taanit 23a.
15. Cf. the writings of the modern Jewish philosopher Emanuel
Levinas. See, for example, Ira F. Stone, Reading Levinas/Reading Talmud
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1998), 3–22.
16. BT Sanhedrin 38a.
17. Ibid., 37b.
18. Ibid., 38a.
19. Ibid., 37b.
20. Gen. 2:16–17.
21. Gen. 6:6.
22. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 53–85.
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23. Deut. 6:5. This is part of the first paragraph of the Shema, the
Scriptural recitation that is the center of both morning and evening
prayers.
24. Ibid., 11:13–21. This is the second paragraph of the Shema. See
BT Berakhot 13a.
25. As the paragraph recited before the Shema in the daily prayers
puts it: ‘‘A great love you have loved us.’’ It then goes on to speak of
the Law, its teachings, and commandments.
26. BT Sanhedrin 56a; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), Laws of Kings, chaps. 9 and 10.
27. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance, 3:5. Also
Laws of Kings, 8:11. This is based on the Talmud, BT Sanhedrin 105a.
In that chapter, Balaam is noted as a king (obviously a gentile king)
who will not be rewarded with life in the world to come. His lack of
righteousness is emphasized. It follows, therefore, that those who are
righteous will have a place in that eternal abode.
28. Coming from a different place, I echo the view expressed by
Pope John Paul II in the 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus.
29. See M. A. Casey, ‘‘How to Think About Globalization,’’ First
Things (October 2002): 47–56.
30. Exod. 20:12. This is complemented by Lev. 19:3 (‘‘You shall
each revere his mother and his father . . .’’) in the development of the
law.
31. The laws of honoring and revering parents are discussed in BT
Kiddushin 30b–32b. The laws of standing up and revering the old are
discussed in the same tractate, 32b–33a.
32. BT Kiddushin 33a.
33. These discussions are in BT Shabbat 151b–152a, Midrash Vayikra Rabbah, Parashah 18:1, and Midrash Koheleth Rabbah, chap. 12.
34. See Harlan J. Wechsler, ‘‘The View of Rabbinic Literature,’’ in
Justice Across Generations: What Does It Mean? (Washington: AARP, 1993),
19–34.
35. The classic work on the subject is Hafetz Hayyim by Rabbi Israel
Meir HaCohen.
36. Rabbi Joseph Caro, Shulhan Arukh (Code of Jewish Law), Orah
Hayyim 329:1.
37. BT Sanhedrin 74a.
38. For a review of the laws of warfare, see Elliot Dorf, To Do the
Right and the Good (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2002).
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39. Lev. 19:3–18.
40. Gen. 3:21.
41. Deut. 34:6.
42. BT Sotah 14a.
43. Deut. 13:5.
44. Ibid., 4:24.
45. Gen. 3:21.
46. Ibid., 18:1. The previous verses speak of Abraham’s circumcision. The visit of God thus follows immediately after.
47. Ibid., 25:11.
48. Deut. 34:6.
49. BT Sotah 14a.
50. Jer. 9:22–23.
51. The words of the ‘‘Aleynu’’ prayer recited three times daily.
In modern Jewish thought, social action is often termed, tikkun olam,
perfection of the world. This use of this terminology is derived from
these words.
52. Midrash Tanhuma (Buber), Tazria 7.
53. Quoted in Norman Lamm, The Good Society: Jewish Ethics in Action
(New York: Viking, 1974), 219.
54. Mishnah Avot 2:16.
55. Lev. 19:34; also Deut. 10:19.
56. Deut. 5:15.
57. Ibid., 15:14–15.
58. Ibid., 24:17–18.
59. Ibid., verse 22.
60. Zech. 14:9, 16–17.
61. Num. 6:26.
62. Ps. 37:11.
63. See Midrash Leviticus Rabbah 9:9, and Midrash Numbers Rabbah 11:7.
64. Jer. 31:15–16.

Notes to Chapter Three
Strategies for Disagreement
His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal
1. This paper was delivered at the ‘‘Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action’’ symposium by Professor Mustapha Tlili, Founder

CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES

387

and Director of Dialogues-Islamic World-U.S.-the West and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute.
2. H. Küng and H. Schmidt, eds., A Global Ethic and Global Responsibilities: Two Declarations (London: SCM Press, 1998), 8–42 (texts in parallel).
3. A. Toynbee, An Historian’s Approach to Religion, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), 313–14.
4. In this regard, it is my hope that the Parliament of Cultures in
Istanbul, devoted to cross-cultural dialogue on values with a focus on
media and education, and the project ‘‘Partners in Humanity,’’ which
I have undertaken with John Marks of the Search for Common Ground,
devoted to the promotion of responsible and representative media, will
have some positive effect.
5. M. Khatami, ‘‘Dialogue among Civilizations and the World of
Islam,’’ in his Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society (Karachi: Foundation for
the Revival of Islamic Heritage, 2000), 1–5, at 3.
6. See especially pages 1–2 in El Hassan bin Talal, ‘‘A Personal
Vision,’’ in Continuity, Innovation and Change: Selected Essays (Amman,
2001), 1–6; and see pages 1–13 in ‘‘The Ethics of Human Solidarity,’’
in Winning The Human Race? The Report of the Independent Commission on
International Humanitarian Issues, foreword by Sadruddin Aga Khan and
Hassan bin Talal (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1988).
7. Issues touched upon in the context of humanitarian benefit in
the professional sphere by Reinhard Mohn in Humanity Wins: A Strategy
for Progress and Leadership in Times of Change (New York: Crown Business,
2000), 74–75.
8. Tarif Khalidi, ed. and trans., The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories
in Islamic Literature (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 57:84. Another tradition reports that a man asked Jesus to
teach him how a servant could be truly pious before God. Jesus replied
that [to be pious] would be to truly love God, work in His service, and
be merciful to all the people of the questioner’s race. Further questioned as to who constituted this race, Jesus replied, ‘‘All the children
of Adam. And that which you do not wish done to you, do not do to
others.’’ (Ibid., 48:79.) Cf. Matt. 22:34–40.
9. B. A. Dar, ‘‘Ethical Teachings of the Qur’an,’’ in A History of
Muslim Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. M. M. Sharif (Delhi: Pakistan Philosophical
Congress, 1961; reprint 1995), 155–78, at 158.
10. Ibid., 168.
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11. For example, readings of Article 26, items 2 and 3, on freedom
of education and the parents’ right to determine education for their
child in the context of the current debates in the U.K. and Europe on
whether or not government should lend financial support to singlefaith schools; Article 16, item 3, on the protection of the family unit
and its relation to recent objections by Christian groups to U.S. contributions to UN family-planning programs; Article 14, item 1, on the
right to asylum, and the difficulties of negotiating the huge influx of
Palestinian refugees into Jordan over the past fifty years.
12. See, for example, the outline of the Saudi representative’s misgivings concerning the UNDHR document and the Pakistani representatives differing comments, described in D. Little, J. Kelsay, and A.
Sachedina, Human Rights and the Conflicts of Culture: Western and Islamic
Perspectives on Religious Liberty (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1988), 35–37.
13. Cf. J. L. Esposito on Islamic modernizers: ‘‘On the one hand,
they identified with premodern revivalist movements and called for the
purification of internal deficiencies and deviations. On the other, they
borrowed and assimilated new ideas and values from the West. For
some, like Sayyid Ahmad Khan, this was accomplished by maintaining
that Islam was the religion of reason and nature par excellence. For
others, like Afghani and Iqbal, the rubric was the reclaiming of progressive, creative past whose political and cultural florescence demonstrated that the very qualities associated with the power of the West
were already present in Islam and accounted for its past triumphs and
accomplishments,’’ Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 140–41.
14. Qur’an 24:35.

Notes to Chapter Four
The World of the Dinka: A Portrait of a Threatened
Culture
Ambassador Francis Mading Deng
1. The author’s writings on the Dinka include: Tradition and Modernization (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971); The
Dinka of the Sudan (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); The
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Dinka and Their Songs (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973); Dinka Folktales (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1974); Dynamics of Identification: A Basis of National Integration in the Sudan
(Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1974); Africans of Two Worlds
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978); Dinka Cosmology
(London: Ithaca Press, 1980); Recollections of Babo Nimir (London: Ithaca Press, 1982); and The Man Called Deng Majok: A Biography of Power,
Polygyny, and Change (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1986).
2. Major Court Treatt, who traveled throughout Africa during the
first quarter of the twentieth century, reaching the land of the Ngok
Dinka of Abyei in 1928, wrote: ‘‘As we drew nearer and obtained a
clearer view of the village standing on rising ground, it seemed that we
had stumbled on the master-builders of the tribes; instead of the usual
undersized, vermin-infested native huts we beheld large, clean-looking
dwellings about twenty-five feet in diameter, decorated with twisted
grass-work and magnificently thatched.’’ Out of the Beaten Track (New
York: E. P. Hutton & Co., 1931), 60. In another context, Major Treatt
described the inside of a Dinka dwelling:
My first impression of roominess and excellent workmanship was pleasantly buttressed by the realization that the floor was dry and the hut
itself warm, and I subsequently found that this temporary home of mine
measured twenty-five feet in diameter beneath a domed roof twenty feet
high. Excluding the center pole, at a height of seven feet was a wooden
platform covered with clean grassmats, and beneath this platform was a
small open fire, the smoke from whose hearth of lumps of based ant-hill
earth protected the sleepers from mosquitoes (79).

Major Treatt concludes his account of Dinka dwellings: ‘‘Their
huts, whose thatching is beyond all praise, are the most efficiently built
native dwellings I have ever seen. And even the remnants of former
huts . . . bear testimony to the excellence of their architecture’’ (124).
In a private letter dated February 24, 1932, one of the letters to
relatives and friends which he kindly passed on to me, K. D. D. Henderson sketches pictures of a dwelling hut and a cattle-byre and observes
that the latter holds about fifty head of cattle a night. Since every animal is tied to a peg with sufficient space left between the animals to
avoid entanglement, this evidently means that the byre is very spacious.
3. Among the varieties that Henderson mentioned in a letter
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dated March 3, 1932, were: ‘‘Teal, whistlers, pintail duck, comb duck,
Egyptian geese, sacred ibis, wood ibis, maribou storks, saddle storks,
greater and lesser egrets, golden crested crane, cormorants, herons,
pelicans, fish eagles,’’ all of which he describes as ‘‘almost as common
hereabouts as sparrows.’’ Major Treatt also observed ‘‘small water-holes
speckled with myriads of water birds. . . . Duck and geese grubbed in
the lush water grass of these pools while numerous species of storks
would swoop down in shining curves, and once or twice we saw the
rare pygmy goose sliding with its deceptive apparent slowness above the
surface of the pools’’ (59–60).
4. Yet, as Godfrey Lienhardt noted, ‘‘The agnatic genealogical
structure of his whole clan . . . is not known to a Dinka; he knows that
there are likely to be many sub-clans of his clan, all descended from
wives or sons of the clan founder, whose name and existence have been
forgotten long ago by members of his own sub-clan.’’ ‘‘The Western
Dinka,’’ in Tribes Without Rulers, eds. Middleton and Tait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 105–6; see also Paul Howell, ‘‘Notes on
the Ngok Dinka,’’ Sudan Notes and Records 32 (1951): 256.
5. According to Paul Howell, ‘‘The initiative does not have to
come from the junior age-set but usually does, and in the form of rude
songs which cast reflection on the waning popularity among the girls
of the age-set senior to them’’ (‘‘Notes on the Ngok Dinka,’’ 252). To
my knowledge, the initiative is always taken by the older age-set in the
form of scandalous songs in which they imply a challenge to the qualification of the younger generation to rise to the level of warriors and
eligible partners of the corresponding female age-set. The theme of
their songs is to identify the members of the younger age-set with their
mothers as children still and to insult their mothers by association, even
if they had sibling brothers in the senior age-set. For the younger ageset to insult their seniors, even in retaliation, would be totally inappropriate and unacceptable.
6. Godfrey Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the
Dinka (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), 26.
7. Charles Seligman and Brenda Seligman, The Pagan Tribes of the
Nilotic Sudan (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1932), 173. David Cole
and Richard Huntington observed, in their African Rural Development,
‘‘If it is possible to rank peoples according to their religiosity, then the
Dinka must be counted among some of the most religious peoples of
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the world. They are intensely respectful of Divinity in all of its many
manifestations.’’
8. Major Titherington, ‘‘The Raik of Bahr el Ghazar Province,’’
Sudan Notes and Records 10 (1927): 159, 169.
9. Divinity and Experience, 46–47. Dinka religion can be described
as monotheistic in that they believe there is only one God, Nhialic, a
word with the connotation of ‘‘above’’ or ‘‘in the Sky.’’ As Lienhardt
observed, the Dinka ‘‘assert with a uniformity that makes the assertion
almost a dogma that ‘Divinity (God) is one.’ They cannot conceive of
Divinity as a plurality and, did they know what it meant, would deeply
resent being described as polytheistic’’ (156). But they also believe in a
complex set of spirits, some of whom have godly attributes and are
sometimes described as gods.
10. The manner in which the clans divide into segments, resulting
in a parochialism of loyalties at the expense of the wider unity of the
clan, is sometimes attributed to the effect of women and maternal kin.
For the story of how women allegedly caused the original break into
clans, see Father Nebel, Dinka Grammar (1948), 129. For another story
that demonstrates the tensions and conflicts between paternal and maternal loyalties, see Dinka Grammar, 134.
11. Francis Mading Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs (Oxford University Press, 1974), 241.
12. Lienhardt, ‘‘Western Dinka,’’ 106–7.
13. Father Nebel, Dinka Dictionary (1954), 315.
14. Francis Mading Deng, Dinka Cosmology (London: Ithaca Press,
1980), 58. Quoted in Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities
in the Sudan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 196.
15. Deng, Dinka Cosmology, 42; and Deng, War of Visions, 197.
16. Major Court Treatt, Out of the Beaten Track (1931), 115–16.
17. Major Titherington, ‘‘The Raik Dinka,’’ Sudan Notes and Records
10 (1927): 159.
18. Quoted in Deng, War of Visions, 282.
19. Godfrey Lienhardt, ‘‘Man in Society,’’ in The Listener (London:
BBC, 1963), 828. See also Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience, 248.
20. Howell, ‘‘The Ngok Dinka,’’ 262–63. See also Deng, Tradition
and Modernization, 149–50.
21. Titherington, ‘‘The Raik Dinka,’’ 168.
22. Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs, 142. These and other extracts
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from songs are reproduced from original translations, occasionally with
minor revisions for greater clarity.
23. Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs, 236.
24. Francis Mading Deng, Tradition and Modernization (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 219–24.
25. For examples of divorce and breach of engagement, see Deng,
The Dinka and Their Songs, 219–224.
26. Deng, Dinka Cosmology, 46.
27. Ibid., 99.
28. Francis Mading Deng, The Man Called Deng Majok (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 227.
29. John S. Trimingham, The Christian Church in Post-War Sudan
(London and New York: World Domination Press, 1949), 34.
30. Audrey Butt, The Nilotics of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda
(London: International African Institute, 1952), 41.
31. Francis Mading Deng, The Dinka of the Sudan (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 172.
32. Deng, The Dinka of the Sudan, 162.
33. Deng, The Dinka of the Sudan, 139; and Deng, The Dinka and
Their Songs, 157–58.
34. Deng, The Dinka of the Sudan, 228.
35. Ibid., 229.
36. Deng, The War of Visions, 214.
37. See Deng, Dinka Cosmology, 269.
38. Godfrey Lienhardt, ‘‘The Dinka and Catholicism,’’ in Religious
Organization and Religious Experience, ed. J. Davis (London and New York:
Academic Press, 1982), 89–90.
39. The accounts quoted here are reproduced, sometimes with
minor revisions in the original translation.
40. Francis Mading Deng, Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in AfroArab Sudan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 50.
41. Ibid., 64.
42. Deng, Dinka Cosmology, 61.
43. Ibid., 196.
44. Ibid., 197.
45. Ibid., 201.
46. Ibid., 203.
47. For arguments in favor of a culturally oriented approach to development, see Francis M. Deng, ‘‘Crisis in African Development: A
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Social and Cultural Perspective,’’ Annual Report (New York: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1984); Francis M. Deng, ‘‘Cultural Dimensions
of Conflict Management and Developments: Some Lessons from the
Sudan,’’ in Culture and Development in Africa, eds. Ismail Serageldin and
June Tabaroff (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994), Technical
Paper 225, 466; Afterword in David Cole and Richard Huntington, Between a Swamp and a Hard Place (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1997); and Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons, eds., African Reckoning
(The Brookings Institution, forthcoming).

Notes to Chapter Five
Military Values and Traditions
Major General Timothy Cross, CBE, FCIT, FILT
1. The booklets, issued to every officer and soldier in the British
Army, include statements on the ethos and values of the British Army.
It defines the ethos as: ‘‘That spirit which inspires soldiers to fight. It
derives from, and depends upon, the high degrees of commitment,
self-sacrifice, and mutual trust which together are so essential to the
maintenance of morale.’’ It lists the values of the British Army as:
• Selfless Commitment—to put others before yourself
• Courage—to face up to danger and what is right
• Discipline—to maintain the highest standards, so that others can rely
on you
• Integrity—to earn the respect and trust of your comrades
• Loyalty—to be faithful to your comrades and your duty
• Respect for others—to treat others with decency at all times

2. All members of the British military are subject to all aspects of
civil as well as military law.
3. Leadership and discipline are, in my view, the primary ‘‘traditions.’’ There are others. For example, during research on ‘‘The Right
to Be Different’’ paper conducted for the British Armies Adjutant General Department in 1995–96, numerous senior officers were interviewed and a series of discussion groups held to discover what the ethos
of the British Army was thought to be and what made it unique, compared to public institutions and private organizations. By re-analyzing
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the list of values made at the time, a list of military virtues was drawn
up as follows:
Personal integrity. To be willing to accept hazard, danger, and selfsacrifice; courageous—morally, physically, and intellectually; honorable and self-controlled; humane, conscienced, and restrained in operations and war.
Trustworthy, with regard to: intelligent conformity and obedience;
loyalty and powers of self-discipline; confidence, based appropriately
on openness and confidentiality; the sublimation of self-interest in the
legitimating interests of the group and no curtailment or suspension of
labor.
Competence. To have acquired necessary functional competence
based on best practice in military doctrine, planning, training, and use
of resources; tolerance to sustained hardship and stress in adverse conditions; judgement in military matters (and the ability to lead others);
personal standards to withstand any detrimental pressures from outside
the military profession or from within.
4. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (500–300 B.C.).
5. General Franks, Commander, 7 U.S. Corps (A.D. 1997).
6. A slightly more modern example: ‘‘It is singular how a man
loses or gains caste with his comrades from his behaviour, and how
closely he is observed in the field. The officers, too, are commented
upon and closely observed. The men are very proud of those who are
brave in the field, and kind and considerate to the soldiers under them.
An act of kindness done by an officer has often during the battle been
the cause of his life being saved. . . . I know from experience that in
our army the men like best to be officered by gentlemen, men whose
education has rendered them more kind in manners than your course
officer, sprung from obscure origin, and whose style is brutal and overbearing.’’ Recollections of Rifleman Harris, Peninsula, 1808.
7. ‘‘A good example of this is the story of the wreck of the Warren
Hastings, which was carrying four companies of the King’s Royal Rifle
Corps and as many of the York and Lancaster Regiment, on the island
of Reunion in 1897. When the ship struck, sentries of the Rifles were at
once posted at various points on the lower deck, to guard the access to
the spirit room and such like; and there they remained while boats were
lowered to take the battalion ashore. The water rose steadily upon them
inch by inch, and had reached their chests, when at last an officer came
to summon them also, last of all, to take their place in the boats. He
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collected them all, as he thought, but in the noise and darkness he
missed one man and left him behind. The man saw his comrades disappear up the ladder, and the officer about to follow them, and not till
then did he ask, without quitting his post, ‘Beg pardon, sir, may I come,
too?’ If ever you hear any man speak lightly of military discipline, tell
him that story, for that Rifleman is worthy to be placed alongside the
Roman sentry at Pompeii.’’ Sir John Fortescue, Military History Lectures
delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge.
8. Field Marshall The Viscount Slim, coverage and other broadcasts.
9. Sir Arthur Bryant, Years of Victory.
10. From Colonel Henderson, The Science of War.
11. Josh. 1:5–7.
12. A good example is this extract from an N.C.O.’s Report from
the Ruthven Redoubt, August 30, 1745:
HON. GENERAL—This goes to acquaint you that yesterday there appeared in the little town of Ruthven about three hundred of the enemy,
and sent proposals to me to surrender the Redoubt upon condition that
I should have liberty to carry off bags and baggage. My answer was, ‘‘I am
too old a soldier to surrender a garrison of such strength without bloody
noses!’’ They threatened to hang me and my men for refusal. I told them
I would take my chance. This morning they attacked me about twelve
o’clock with about one hundred and fifty men; they attacked the foregate and sally-port. They drew off about half an hour after three. I expect
another visit this night, but I shall give them the warmest reception my
weak party can afford. I shall hold out as long as possible.
I conclude, Honourable General, with great respects,
Your most humble servant,
J. Molley, Sergt. 6th[Foot] (Quoted in Britain at Arms)

13. When deployed on operations, soldiers are subject to the Laws
of Armed Conflict and to the local law wherever they are serving—
together they form the baseline for the standards of personal conduct
of the soldier as a citizen. The constraints of Just War (jus ad bellum)
impose severe limitations on soldiers—as well as politicians. Imperatives
of military effectiveness increasingly conflict with other needs, particularly on complex emergencies/operations short of declared war. This
poses great difficulties in defining the appropriate rules of engagement. Overall every serviceman and woman faces real practical difficulties with regard to the Laws of War (jus in bello).
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14. Captain Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword.
15. ‘‘I do not believe that today a commander can inspire great
armies, or single units, or even individual men, unless he has a proper
sense of religious truth. All Leadership is based on the spiritual quality,
the power to inspire others to follow.’’ Field Marshall Montgomery.
16. Bill Slim tells a story of one of his experiences early on after
taking command in Burma:
In the camps on the line of communications, all reinforcements to the
various fronts were held often for weeks until required. . . . Almost without exception I found these places depressing beyond words. Decaying
tents, or dilapidated bashas, with earth floors, mosquito ridden, and lacking all amenities, were the usual accommodation; training and recreation
were alike unorganised; men were crowded together from all units. No
wonder spirits sank, discipline sagged, and defeatist rumours spread.
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trade-related, or certain types of development assistance) with respect
to countries on Tier 3 of the 2003 and later TIP Reports.
4. The act defines ‘‘minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking,’’ which are summarized as follows:
1. The government should prohibit trafficking and punish acts of trafficking.
2. The government should prescribe punishment commensurate with
that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault, for the knowing
commission of trafficking in some of its most reprehensible forms
(trafficking for sexual purposes, trafficking involving rape or kidnapping, or trafficking that causes a death).
3. For knowing commission of any act of trafficking, the government
should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter,
and that adequately reflects the offense’s heinous nature.
4. The government should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking.

The act also sets out seven criteria that ‘‘should be considered’’ as
indicia of the fourth point above, ‘‘serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking.’’ Summarized, they are:
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1. Whether the government vigorously investigates and prosecutes acts
of trafficking within its territory.
2. Whether the government protects victims of trafficking, encourages
victims’ assistance in investigation and prosecution, provides victims
with legal alternatives to their removal to countries where they would
face retribution or hardship, and ensures that victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being
trafficked.
3. Whether the government has adopted measures, such as public education, to prevent trafficking.
4. Whether the government cooperates with other governments in investigating and prosecuting trafficking.
5. Whether the government extradites persons charged with trafficking
as it does with other serious crimes.
6. Whether the government monitors immigration and emigration patterns for evidence of trafficking, and whether law enforcement agencies respond appropriately to such evidence.
7. Whether the government vigorously investigates and prosecutes public officials who participate in or facilitate trafficking, and takes all
appropriate measures against officials who condone trafficking.

The act also states three factors that the department is to consider in
determining whether a country is making significant efforts to bring itself
into compliance with these minimum standards. Summarized, these considerations are: (1) the extent of trafficking in the country; (2) the extent
of governmental noncompliance with the minimum standards, particularly
the extent to which government officials have participated in, facilitated,
condoned, or are otherwise complicit in trafficking; and (3) what measures
are reasonable to bring the government into compliance with the minimum standards in light of the government’s resources and capabilities.
5. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution outlaws slavery, including involuntary servitude (holding another in service through
force or threats of force), and provides a basis for criminal statutes penalizing those activities.
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148. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992), xv: ‘‘This is the critical historical challenge that America
now faces in the postutopian age. The point of departure for an effective
response is the recognition that only by creating a society that is guided by
some shared criteria of self restraint can it help to shape a world more truly
in control of its destiny. Only with such recognition can we ensure that we

CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES

431

will be the masters, and not the victims, of history as we enter the twentyfirst century.’’
149. Georges Abi-Saab, ‘‘There is No Need to Reinvent the Law,’’ Crimes
of War: A Defining Moment—International Law Since September 11. Available at:
www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-abi-printer.html
150. There have been many proposals to draft simple humanitarian
rules, applicable in all situations of conflict:
—in the early 1970s, Prof. J. Patrnogic, President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo, Italy): www.iihl.org
—in 1976, Michel Veuthey, ‘‘Propositions,’’ the conclusion of Guérilla et droit
humanitaire (Geneva: ICRC), 373–78, as well as in the second (1983) edition.
—in 1983, Theodor Meron, ‘‘On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian
and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument,’’ AJIL 77:
589; Theodor Meron and Allan Rosas, ‘‘A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards,’’ AJIL 85 (1991): 375; Asbjoern Eide, Allan Rosas
and Theodor Meron, ‘‘Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts
Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards,’’ AJIL 89 (1995): 215.
—David Petrasek, ‘‘Moving Forward on the Development of Minimum Humanitarian Standards,’’ AJIL 92: 557–63.
—Jean-Daniel Vigny and Cecilia Thompson, ‘‘Fundamental Standards of
Humanity: What Future?’’ Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 20, no. 2
(2002): 185–99.

151. On the Martens Clause, see:
—A. Cassese, ‘‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’’
EJIL 11, no. 1.
—A. Cassese, International Law, 121–23.
—Robert Kolb, ‘‘The Relationship Between International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions,’’ International
Review of the Red Cross, no. 324: 409–19.
—Theodor Meron, ‘‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience,’’ AJIL 94, no. 1 (January 2000): 78–89.
—UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Secretary-General on
Minimum Humanitarian Standards (E/CN.4/1998/87 and Add. 1).

152. See ICRC Annual Report 1999, pages 135, 162, 171, 275, 385.
153. See the excellent ‘‘Respect for International Humanitarian Law,’’
Handbook for Parliamentarians (Geneva: ICRC and the IPU, 1999), 56–57,
with many practical recommendations (‘‘What can you do?’’). Available
online: http://www.ipu.org/english/handbks.htm and in PDF at: www.icrc.org

432

CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES

154. See the ‘‘Woza Africa’’ Project by the ICRC in 1997. See the following document online: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList75/
644CDEA605D33696C1256B66005AD038
155. See also this recommendation by the Brahimi Report (A/55/
305-S/2000/809):
272. United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others,
are obliged to respect local norms, culture, and practices. They must go out
of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their
host environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are
guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that home might be,
particularly when the United Nations takes on a transitional administration
role. And they must also treat one another with respect and dignity, with
particular sensitivity towards gender and cultural differences. http://www
.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/part6.htm

156. On the role of spiritual leaders for the promotion of common
human values, see:
—Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, ed., Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Nonviolence in Religious Traditions (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2000).
—The message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the World Day of Peace
2003 (‘‘Pacem in Terris—A Permanent Commitment’’) with the following
headings: ‘‘A new awareness of human dignity and inalienable human
rights,’’ ‘‘The universal common good,’’ ‘‘A new international moral
order,’’ ‘‘A culture of peace’’: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20021217_xxxvi-worldday-for-peace_en.html

157. Including on the monitoring of violations and prosecution of war
criminals. See, for example, the resolution adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on November 15, 1999, concerning the armed intervention in Kosovo (‘‘Respecting and Ensuring Respect for International
Humanitarian Law’’) reproduced in the International Review of the Red Cross,
no. 837 (Geneva) (March 31, 2000): 263–64.
158. On the United Nations and the implementation and enforcement
of humanitarian law, see:
—The Presidential Statement of the President of the UN Security Council
with the Aide Mémoire
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Notes to Chapter Nineteen
Reviving Global Civil Society After September 11
Richard Falk
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Küng, Hans, 42
Kurds, 366
Kuwait, 96

INDEX

Kuwait Staff College, 94
Kyoto, 19
La Patria (newspaper), 130
Labor, 74–75, 180–81
immigrants and, 159–60, 169–
70, 173–74
Laeken summit, 182
Lamm, Rabbi Norman, 38
Lancet, 207
Land, xix, 54
Languages, 191–92
Laqueur, Walter, 216
Las Casas, Bartholomew de, 280
Latin America, 148, 178–79, 214,
216, 277
Law, Cardinal Bernardin, 16
Law of Geneva, 278–79, 415n30,
415n32
Laws, 31–34, 49, 177
habeus corpus, 265, 267–68,
273
humanitarian, 189, 277
international, 145, 194–95, 200–
202, 277, 280–82, 288, 299,
412n12, 420n65
military, 90, 393n2
universal, 29–30, 385n28
Laws of Armed Conflict, 108,
395n13
Laws of The Hague, 279, 415n30,
415n32
Laws of War, 279, 395n13, 415n29
Lebanon, 42
Levinas, Emanuel, 384n15
Lexgins, 42
Liberia, 296
Liberty, 272–74, 410n15
Libya, 217, 234
Lienhardt, Godfrey, 58–59, 64, 69,
78, 390n4, 391n9
Life, xix, 5–12, 28, 32–34

455

Life and Work Movement, 18
‘‘Life-Affirmative Societies,’’ 300
Lifton, Robert J., 206, 276, 411n3
Lincoln, Abraham, 263, 267
Lineages, 56
Lisbon, 204
Literature, 140–41
Lithuania, 107
Lombardy, 281
London, University College, 140,
150
Longman, Albert, 227
Lopes, Tim, 129
Love, 8–12, 20, 28–29, 35–36
Lovingkindness, 35–36
Luxembourg, 156
Lykketoft, Mogens, 161
Macedonians, 41–42
Madison, James, 263, 265, 269–71,
275, 410n14
Magna Carta of 1215, 265–66
Maillard, Father, 230
Maimonides, 23, 29, 36, 39–40,
385n27
Malaya, 204
Malaysia, 149, 310
Man, 6–8, 23–30, 37–38, 42
Manizales, Columbia, 130
Mao Tse Tung, 218
Maoist guerrilla groups, 129, 131
Markets, 116–17, 125
Marks, John, 387n4
Markusen, Eric, 276, 411n3
Marlborough, John Churchill, first
Duke of, 102
Marshall, George C., 276
Martens Clause, 431n151
Mass communication, 44
Matthew, 11
Maunsell, Brigadier, 94
Maxwell, Rachel, 150

456

INDEX

Media, xvi, 164–65, 305–8
globalization of, 114–17, 125
mass, 124–27
responsible, 43–44, 123–27,
207–8, 387n4
Western, xvii, 123–24
‘‘Medical Humanities Resource
Database,’’ 140
Medicine, xvi, 85, 136–52
‘‘Medicine and Human Rights,’’
150
Medicine Betrayed: the Participation
of Doctors in Human Rights
Abuses, 206
Meir, Rabbi, 25
Melanesians, 300
Melbourne University, 227
Mendel, R. Menahem
Meron, Theodor, 283
Messiah, 39–40
Metaphors, 22–23
Metaphysics, 41
Mexico, 173, 178, 319, 364
MIAs. See Missing in action
(MIAs)
Middle Ages, 192–93, 201
Middle East, 3, 115, 119, 125, 176,
277, 300, 332–34, 435n10
Middle East Journal, 305
Migration, xvi–xviii, 153, 155,
158–59, 173
chain, 310–11
demographics of, 309–13, 320t,
321t, 433n1
fault lines of, 314–19
international, 309–19, 320t, 321t
security and, 317–19
Military, xvi, 84, 206, 297–99,
427n116, 428n123
community, 87–88
courage of, 104–7
discipline, 98–103, 394n7

good, 103–4, 109–12
integrity, 107–9, 395nn12–13
leadership, 94–98, 394n6,
396n15
v. non-military, 88–91,
393nn2–3
operations, 93–94
traditions/spirit/comradeship,
91–93
Minden, Battle of, 92
Minorities, 14, 165, 177, 193
Missing in action (MIAs), 294
Missionary Sisters of Charity, 14
Mississippi, 15
Moldovans, 41–42
Moltke, Helmuth, 102
Monasteries, 13–14
Monroe Doctrine, 330
Montgomery, Bernard Law,
396n15
‘‘Morale, Leadership, Discipline,’’
94
Moran, Lord, 104–5, 107
Morocco, 223
Mortimer, Edward, 259
Mosaic Law, 9
Moses, 28, 46, 106
MSNBC, 125
Mt. Sinai, 28
Muhammad, 3, 46–47
Multiculturalism, 117–22
Murder, 33–34
Murdoch, Rupert, 308
Musharraf, General, 221
Muslim Diaspora, 222
Muslims, 19, 42–44, 46–52, 107,
351, 388n13
in Africa, 75–78, 125
beliefs/views of, 165, 306–8,
332
in Europe, 175–78
fundamentalists, 175–76, 214

INDEX

Mu’tazilites, 51
Sufi, 48
Nagasaki, 288
Nahmanides, 24
Namaan the Syrian, 9
Nanking, China, 192, 202, 204,
352
Napoleonic Wars, 277
Nashe Vremya (newspaper), 133
National Conference of Catholic
Charities, 14
National Liberation Front (FLN),
219
National Organization of Cypriot
Fighters (EOKA), 219
‘‘National Security Strategy of the
United States,’’ 331
Nation-states, 30, 89, 115, 225
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)
Nature, 24
Nazareth, 9
Nazis, 33, 39, 161, 201, 206–7
NBC, 125
N.C.O.’s Report, Ruthven Redoubt, 395n12
Nebel, Father, 64
Nelson, Viscount Horatio, 101–2
Nepal, 148–49, 317
Netherlands, 149, 155, 172, 183
New Dictionary of Medical Ethics,
143
New Guinea, 148, 296
New Testament, 120
New York, 51
New York Police Department, 189
New York Times, 15
New York University, 140
New Zealand, 148
Newland, Kathleen, 259
Newman, Cardinal John, 3

457

NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
Nicaragua, 234, 283–84
Nicosia, 286
Nigerian Civil War, 286
Nilotics, xiii, 54–55, 73–74, 300
Ninevites, 9
Noah, 26
Nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), xviii–xix, 86, 197,
200, 256, 282, 292, 295, 346,
419n60
activism, 347–51, 354, 356–58,
366
Noriega, Efraı́n Varela, 130
North America, 193, 217, 310, 317
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 85–86, 96, 330,
337, 350, 424n104
Parliamentary Assembly,
432n157
North Korea, 217, 234, 333, 338
Northeastern Ohio Universities
College of Medicine, 139
Northern Ireland, 18, 85, 96, 195,
203–4, 224
Northern Macedonia, 86, 96
Norway, 156, 163, 224
Nuer tribes, xiii, 73
Nuremberg, 282–83, 355–56
O’Brien, Eoin, 83
Observer, The, 233
Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR), 250–51
Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR),
146
Ogata, Sadako, 236
O’Hare, Joseph A., 83
OHCHR. See Office of the United

458

INDEX

Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Old Testament, 9, 91, 106
‘‘On War,’’ 106–7
Operational Concept for Terrorism
Counteraction (U.S. Army), 227
Order, 18
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), 312
Organizations, Catholic, 14–19
Orientalism (Said), 305–6
ORR. See Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)
Osjek, 286
O’Slater, Robert, 233
Ossetians, 42
O’Sullivan, Gerry, 234
Ottawa Convention, 419n59
Out of the Beaten Track (Treatt),
389n2
Ozanam, Frederic, 14
Pacem in Terris (Pope John XXIII),
7
Pagadian City, Philippines, 132
Paine, Thomas, 135
Pakistan, 128, 131, 148, 221, 223–
24, 388n12
Palestine, 226, 230, 235–40, 286,
355, 363, 414n17
Palestinian Authority Territories,
131–32
Palestinian Intifadha, 308
Palestinian Mandate, 218
Papua, 148
Parables, 9–10
Paraguay Reductions, 117
Parents, xviii, 31, 34, 385nn30–31,
388n11
Paris, 317
Parliament of Cultures (Istanbul),
387n4

Parliament of the World Religions, 42, 51
‘‘Partners in Humanity,’’ 387n4
Pathologists, 205
Patriotic Fund, 101
Paul VI, Pope, 8
Peace, xx, 3, 19, 33, 37, 40, 136,
225
Pearl, Daniel, 127, 131
Perceptional revisionism, 43–44
Persson, Göran, 173
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